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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the representation of mental illness in the UK press. Specifically, 
it addresses the following central research questions: ‘What do the terms ‘mental 
health’ and ‘mental illness’ refer to, ‘How are people with mental illness named and 
referred to in reports on mental illness’, ‘What are the salient transitivity processes in 
news reports on mental illness’ and ‘Do press reports on mental illness accurately 
portray the symptoms of specific mental illnesses?’ In order to investigate these 
questions, I designed and constructed the MI 1984-2014 corpus, which comprises 
50,972,932 words of UK local and national news articles from 1984-2014. The stretch 
of time covered by the corpus is an important period for legislation related to mental 
health, including the 1983 Mental Health Act and the amendments to this act in 2007. 
I use frameworks drawn from corpus linguistics (e.g. keyness and collocation 
analysis) and Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. naming and transitivity analysis) to 
analyse the MI 1984-2014 corpus. 
 The main findings from my study are as follows: (i) lexical items in the semantic 
domain of mental health and illness are undergoing semantic change (e.g. the term 
‘mental health’ is being used more frequently to refer to states of mental illness via a 
process of socially motivated and euphemistic language change); (ii) with regard to 
naming practices and, in particular, naming practices that anti-stigma initiatives have 
identified as problematic and stigmatising, the press use identity-first forms 
(identified as stigmatising by mental health advocates) to refer to people with mental 
illness (e.g. ‘a schizophrenic’) more often than person-first forms (such as ‘a person 
with schizophrenia’); despite this, early evidence suggests the press are increasingly 
adopting person-first language, which is the linguistic structure promoted by mental 
health advocates; (iii) with reference to transitivity, whilst the press overall represent 
the process of having mental illness as ‘suffering’, first-person accounts from people 
with mental illness are proportionally 4-times more likely to refer to having mental 
illness as ‘experiencing’ it (e.g. “I was experiencing psychosis”). I found that, overall, 
reports that include symptoms of mental illness are inaccurate, or are reported in 
contexts that are too specific to serve the purpose of properly informing the public 
about mental illness. 
On the basis of these findings, I argue that it would be beneficial for journalists 
and mental health charities to make a number of changes to the way they write about 
mental health. One basic but important change for mental health charities would be 
to take account of linguistic evidence prior to creating guidelines stipulating 
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prescribed linguistic forms for discussing mental illness in the press. A further 
important change for journalists would be to more accurately depict the symptoms of 
mental illness in news articles and ensure that symptoms are contextualised 
appropriately (e.g. not used in reference to violent attacks). 
This thesis is offered as a contribution to the developing field of medical 
humanities. It provides findings and methods for examining further the issue of the 
press representation of mental illness and the related impact on society (and on 
individuals in society) that this can have. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2003, the British newspaper The Sun ran the front-page headline “Bonkers Bruno 
Locked Up”. The story reported on the former professional boxer, Frank Bruno, being 
taken to a psychiatric hospital after being sectioned under the 1983 Mental Health Act. 
Bruno had been experiencing depression and was later diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder. 
 The headline generated a media furore because of the language it used to 
describe Bruno’s hospitalisation, and because the article referred to Bruno as a ‘nut’. 
In response to the backlash and in an attempt to right the offence caused by the 
headline, The Sun re-released the article with the new headline ‘Sad Bruno in Mental 
Home’. Speaking to The Guardian newspaper about the Sun headline, Majorie Wallace, 
the then chief executive of the mental health charity Sane, said, “It is both an insult to 
Mr Bruno and damaging to the many thousands of people who endure mental illness 
to label him as ‘bonkers’ or 'a nutter' and having to be 'put in a mental home' (Gibson, 
2003). After the release of the new headline, mental health professionals were still 
dissatisfied with the language used by The Sun, commenting that the use of “mental 
home” in reference to the psychiatric hospital Bruno was admitted to did not properly 
convey the purpose of such institutions (as places to recover from being ill) and said 
that the headline did not reflect the positive step that being sectioned can be; i.e. it is 
at that point that a person may finally get help (Persaud, 2003). The Guardian article 
equated the reporting of Bruno’s hospitalisation by The Sun with a previous article the 
newspaper had published in 1989 reporting on the Hillsborough disaster in which 96 
people died1. The article reported that Liverpool football fans attacked police while 
they tried to rescue injured fans, leading to a mass boycott of the newspaper that is 	
1 The Hillsborough disaster (named after the Hillsborough stadium in Sheffield, UK) was a fatal 
human crush in which 96 people were killed and 766 people were injured as a result of overcrowding 
in the tunnels leading into the Hillsborough football ground. The event has been widely discussed 
ever since, with reports focusing on getting justice for the 96 people who died, after the press and the 
police falsely blamed the fans for the incident. As a result of the press reports, the Hillsborough 
disaster has become a highly contentious and even taboo subject. 
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still ongoing today. Discussing both the Hillsborough disaster and the representation 
of Bruno’s hospitalisation, the journalist Owen Gibson described the negative reaction 
to the articles as being a result of the newspaper misjudging “the public mood” 
(Gibson, 2003). Gibson’s comment here is an interesting one, as it suggests that there 
had been a shift in the public understanding or awareness of mental illness that had 
not been understood by the press at that time. Gibson’s decision to equate the public 
reaction to the ‘Bonkers Bruno’ headline and the Hillsborough disaster demonstrates 
how strong Gibson felt the public reaction was to the language used in the article at 
that time. 
 Since the ‘Bonkers Bruno’ headline, a range of media guidelines about how to 
responsibly report on mental illness have been created. For example, Time to Change, 
an anti-stigma initiative launched in 2007 by the UK mental health charities Mind and 
Rethink Mental Illness, has a section of their website dedicated to offering advice about 
how to accurately portray mental illness in the media and in fictional depictions. They 
write: 
 
Avoid using: 
• ‘a psycho’ or ‘a schizo’ 
• ‘a schizophrenic’ or ‘a depressive’ 
• ‘lunatic’ ‘nutter’ 'unhinged' 'maniac' 'mad' 
• ‘the mentally ill’, ‘a person suffering from’ ‘a sufferer’, a ‘victim’ or ‘the 
afflicted’ 
• 'prisoners’ or ‘inmates’ (in a psychiatric hospital) 
• ‘released’ (from a hospital) 
• 'happy pills' 
Instead try:  
• ‘a person who has experienced psychosis’ or 'a person who has 
schizophrenia' 
• someone who ‘has a diagnosis of’ is ‘currently experiencing' or ‘is being 
treated for… 
• ‘a person with a mental health problem’ 
• ‘mental health patients’ or ‘people with mental health problems’ 
• ‘patients’, ‘service users’ or clients 
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• ‘discharged’ 
• ‘antidepressants', 'medication' or 'prescription drugs' 
(‘Mind Your Language’, Time to Change 2019) 
 
 
Taken together, the response to the ‘Bonkers Bruno’ headline and the guidelines 
released by Time to Change demonstrate that the language used to refer to and discuss 
mental illness is extremely important. They also show that the public are increasingly 
aware of the role that language plays in public perceptions of mental illness. The 
introduction of media guidelines for how to write about mental illness is a positive 
step because it indicates that there is greater awareness of the ideological effect 
language can have on how the mental illness in question is perceived. However, the 
language that anti-stigma initiatives such as Time to Change prescribe is not based on 
any linguistic research. The lack of linguistic research into the area of prescribed forms 
for discussing mental illness, then, constitutes a gap in the existing research which this 
thesis aims to fill. 
Recent reports into stigma around mental illness suggest that attitudes towards 
mental illness are changing for the better. For example, Corker et al. (2016) report that 
discrimination “has fallen significantly” (2016: 6) in recent years, which they suggest 
may be related to (but cannot be directly attributed to) the Time to Change anti-stigma 
campaign. The research conducted by Corker et al. (2016), like the majority of previous 
research into the stigma surrounding mental illness, is based on analyses that make 
use of methodological tools such as bespoke scales (Corker et al. 2016 use the 
Discrimination and Stigma Scale). Such gradations are often based on Likert-type 
scales; e.g. a statement alongside a four-point scale that the participant can agree or 
disagree with, using the scale to denote the degree of their agreement/disagreement). 
Nonetheless, such studies are typically interested in attitudes towards mental illness, 
and not in how language affects these attitudes. 
In addition to the research that uses scales to assess attitudes to mental illness, 
much previous research has also used bespoke coding schemes for analysing 
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stigmatising themes in newspaper discourse. For example, Rhydderch et al. (2016) 
explored the effect that the Time to Change campaign had between 2008-2014 using a 
coding scheme to inform a content analysis (i.e. a process by which a text is analysed 
for its constituent themes). After analysing the results using univariate logistic 
regression models, Rhydderch et al. (2016) concluded that there was a decrease in 
stigmatising articles, with “an increase in the proportion of antistigmatising articles 
which approached significance at p < 0.05” (Rhydderch et al., 2016:5). The analysis 
conducted by Rhydderch et al. (2016) (i.e. a content analysis with the aim of finding 
stigmatising articles which is then quantified for statistical analysis) is typical of the 
existing research into press representations of mental illness, in that (i) the focus is on 
locating stigmatising articles, (ii) the method is thematic in the first instance and then 
quantitative in the second, and (iii) there is no or very little exploration of language 
(Rhydderch et al. 2016 do hypothesise that there will be a decrease in ‘pejorative 
language’ but they do not explain what they mean by this term). 
The widespread use of scales and coding models (which I discuss in more detail 
in Chapter 2) means that the analysis of representations of mental illness in the press 
is typically quantitative and does not privilege language as an object of study. This 
has led to an extraordinary situation in which there exist prescribed linguistic forms 
for discussing mental illness (i.e. those listed above by Time to Change) and very many 
studies on the stigma surrounding mental illness in the press, yet no research into how 
these things are related; i.e. how prescribed linguistic forms may affect stigmatising 
attitudes. A lack of research also means that it is unclear whether there really is a 
linguistic basis for these prescriptions. There is an implicit assumption in the existing 
research that language does indeed affect how people view mental illness (otherwise 
why prescribe language for talking about mental illness and why generate hypotheses 
based on language use?) and yet there exists no comprehensive account of how, 
linguistically, mental illness is represented the press. This is the context which has led 
to this thesis. 
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Despite the fact that previous research demonstrates an improvement in attitudes 
towards mental illness, it is now 16 years since The Sun’s headline about Bruno and it 
is still the case that media depictions are often inaccurate, over-simplistic and 
stigmatising. A recent example of a damaging media representation from February 
2019 concerns the death of the musician Keith Flint. Against extant advice developed 
by The Samaritans on how to responsibly report celebrity suicide in the media, The 
Daily Mail reported Flint’s death by giving specific details of the method of suicide 
and The Sun reported the story via a front-page headline. Both newspapers stated that 
the cause of Flint’s suicide was depression caused by the breakdown of his marriage. 
The Samaritans advise that celebrity suicides should not be sensationalised, reported 
as a front-page item or be attributed to simplistic causes. Moreover, research 
conducted by The Samaritans has shown there to be a link between media coverage 
and suicide rates with suicide rates increasing significantly if “suicide methods are 
reported, if the story is placed prominently and if the coverage is extensive or 
sensationalised” (The Samaritans, 2019). The language used to describe mental illness, 
then, has real-world and potentially fatal consequences. Moreover, mental illness is 
increasingly prevalent in the UK. Statistics show that ¼ of people in the UK will 
experience a mental health problem each year, with 1 in 6 people in the UK reporting 
a mental health problem each week2 (Mind, 2019a). In addition to this, because of the 
existing stigma of mental illness (and the resultant self-stigma) caused by the language 
surrounding mental illness, the rate at which people experiencing mental health 
problems access and continue to access healthcare is hindered (Schomerus et al., 2012; 
Flynn et al., 2016). It is also the case that, despite a tendency to link mental illness with 
crime and violence in the press, 45% of people with a mental illness will be a victim of 
crime themselves, with people with schizophrenia being more likely to be victims of 	
2 The statistics taken from Mind (https://www.mind.org.uk/information-support/types-of-mental-
health-problems/statistics-and-facts-about-mental-health/how-common-are-mental-health-
problems/#two) are based on people living in private housing in England. As a result, they may not 
be indicative of the mental health problems faced by “people in hospital, prison, sheltered housing, or 
people the homeless” (Mind, 2019a). 
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a crime than perpetrators of it. For the reasons outlined in this section, there is much 
scope for research into the language of mental illness in the press and the potential 
ideological effects that language choices can have. This is the topic of this thesis. In the 
next section I briefly summarise the value and importance of studying media 
discourse from a linguistic perspective to gain a perspective on the language of mental 
illness. Following this, I outline the research questions (RQs) that my thesis answers. 
 
1.1 The language of mental illness 
 
Fairclough (1995) states that “media texts constitute a sensitive barometer of 
sociocultural change, and they should be seen as valuable material for researching 
change” (1995: 52). Newspaper discourse, then, provides insight into the language of 
mental illness for reasons wider than those detailed in the previous section. Studying 
media discourse enables us to look not just at the reporting of individual events (such 
as the case of Keith Flint) but also at the linguistic patterns that are indicative of public 
perceptions of mental illness, such as the labels used to describe specific mental 
illnesses and the people that ‘have’ mental illness. For example, there is a significant 
difference between describing someone as ‘a person with schizophrenia’ and ‘a 
schizophrenic’; similarly, there is a difference between calling someone ‘a patient’ and 
a ‘sufferer’ of mental illness (I explore these two issues in more detail in Chapters 7 
and 8 respectively). Moreover, studying media discourse diachronically allows us to 
chart how these usages and their effects have changed over time. Through linguistic 
analysis, it is possible to study empirically the ‘public mood’ that Gibson (2003) 
invoked to explain the outrage at the ‘Bonkers Bruno’ headline. 
In recent years a wealth of research has been conducted into the language of 
mental health in the press. The vast majority of this research, however, has been 
carried out by researchers working in the fields of psychiatry or media studies and, 
consequently, has not deployed the systematic tools for language analysis developed 
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in linguistics. Moreover, the few analyses that have been conducted by linguists have 
tended to be qualitative or specific to one theme in mental health research, resulting 
in small-scale studies that are open to criticism, particularly the over-reliance on the 
subjective interpretation of findings. Generally, previous studies of how mental illness 
is discussed in the press tend to focus on a particular theme (e.g. analysing stigma) or 
on a particular mental illness (e.g. schizophrenia). These studies tend either to find 
evidence that stigma exists (although this is perhaps unsurprising given that studies 
analysing stigma already presuppose its existence) or only offer valuable information 
about a specific mental illness. In contrast, in this thesis a range of mental illnesses (as 
defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition, 
hereafter DSM-V) are analysed with no a priori expectations of their representation. 
For example, while my research questions are not concerned specifically with stigma, 
they do not neglect the possibility (and in fact high probability) that stigmatising 
language may be found. It is my opinion that corpus-assisted discourse analysis that 
asks specific questions of the data in question (e.g. ‘how is stigma manifest in 
language?’) only succeeds in corroborating the existence of top down social constructs 
since it does not explore the data from the bottom-up, which is what is needed in order 
to explore how meaning is constructed in the data. Furthermore, the analyst already 
knows that such constructs are present in the data because the varied nature of a 
specialised corpus requires that the analyst collect data using specific search terms. As 
a result, the analyst already knows that certain terms related to a particular construct, 
e.g. stigma, will be present in the data. To remedy criticisms of such interpretative 
positivism in corpus analysis, it is necessary to broaden research questions (and data 
collection) significantly more widely than previous studies have. Doing this offers a 
means of remedying the claims of positivism inherent in corpus linguistic analysis (i.e. 
the notion that a corpus can only tell you what is in it and not what is absent), as well 
as advancing our understanding of mental health and illness reportage. The reason 
for this is that the topics discussed in articles concerning mental illness are 
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significantly more diverse than stigmatising language; for example, newspaper 
reports of mental illness and arts initiatives (Atanasova et al. 2019)3.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
Having outlined the context for this study, and the importance of studying the 
linguistic representation of mental illness in news reports, I now present the research 
questions that I answer in this thesis. These are as follows: 
 
1. How are the terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ used in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus? 
2. What linguistic strategies are used to name, label and describe people with 
mental illness in the MI 1984-2014 corpus? 
2.1. To what extent is person-first language present in the MI 1984-2014 corpus? 
2.2. What themes are present in the corpus for referring to people with mental 
illness?  
3. What processes are associated with mental illness in the MI 1984-2014 corpus? 
3.1. What terms do the press use to refer to having mental illness? 
4. Is the depiction of mental illness realistic?  
4.1. Are the symptoms of each disorder type (e.g. depressive illnesses) 
accurately portrayed in the press? 
 
Answering these questions requires both qualitative and quantitative analysis, as well 
as top-down and bottom-up approaches. The analysis of the basic linguistic units of 
the noun phrase and the verb phrase in RQs 2 and 3 constitutes a bottom-up analysis 
because I am not starting my analysis by looking any a priori feature above what 
	
3 Despite this, research to date has focused on negative press representations. 
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naming strategies or processes are frequent in the corpus. By contrast, RQs 1 and 4 are 
more top-down because I start my analysis with the intention of exploring a 
predetermined feature of the texts, i.e. how ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ are 
used in the corpus (RQ1), and whether the symptoms of illness are present in the 
corpus (RQ4). 
Answering these research questions also requires the use of a representative 
corpus. In the next section I introduce the MI 1984-2014 corpus and show how I 
designed the corpus to allow me to answer the questions listed in this section. 
 
1.3 The Mental Illness Corpus 1984-2014 
 
I discuss the corpus creation procedure in detail in Chapter 4; however, I will briefly 
introduce the data here. The corpus comprises 50,729,32 words of newspaper articles 
reporting on mental illnesses between 1984 and early 2014. The timeframe of the 
corpus saw a relatively high level of mental health reform. For example, The Mental 
Health Act 1983, The Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act (1995), The 
Mental Capacity Act (2005), the amendments to the 1983 Mental Health Act in 2007 
and the 2013 Mental Health (Discrimination) Act all occurred within the time period 
covered by the corpus. The dates covered by the MI 1984-2014 corpus, then, are broad 
enough to provide insight into any diachronic change in the lexis and structural forms 
associated with mental illness, as well as being fitted to a relevant period in UK mental 
health history. The MI corpus is, then, continuous and longitudinal. 
The articles were collected using the LexisNexis database. The search terms 
were collated using information from the Mind ‘A-Z of mental illnesses’ (Mind, 2018) 
and informed by the 5th Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (2013) (DSM-V). To allow for maximum coverage of mental illnesses and 
their associated lexical forms, i.e. nominal forms such as psychosis and adjectival forms 
such as psychotic, wildcards (such as !) were used; e.g. psycho!. After construction of 
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the search terms, the following sampling frame was used to search the LexisNexis UK 
Newspapers database from January 1983 to January 20144 (articles were grouped for 
high similarity): 
 
(mental illness!) OR (mental health!) OR (mental ill health) OR (mentally ill) OR 
(mentally un!) OR (agoraphobi!) OR (anorexi!) OR (anxiety) OR (autism) OR 
(autistic) OR (binge eating disorder) OR (bipolar!) OR (body dismorph!) or 
(borderline personalit!) OR (BPD) OR (bulimi!) OR (depress!) OR (dissociative 
disorder) OR (dissociative identity disorder) OR (eating disorder) OR (multiple 
personality disorder) OR (mpd) OR (obsessive compulsive disorder!) OR 
(obsessive compulsive) OR (ocd) OR (paranoia) OR (personality disorder) OR 
(postnatal depression) OR (posttraumatic stress) OR (post traumatic stress) OR 
(post-traumatic stress) OR (ptsd) OR (psychosis) OR (psychotic) OR 
(schizophreni!) OR (seasonal affective disorder!) OR (social phobia) OR 
(bulimia) OR (hypomania) OR (hypermania) OR (mania) OR (mania!) OR 
(manic) OR (manic!) OR (schizo)  
 
 
The corpus creation procedure facilitated the creation of illness subcorpora in addition 
to year subcorpora, guided by the original search terms; for example, the terms 
collected as part of the eating disorder and OCD subcorpora are shown below.  
 
Eating Disorder 
subcorpus 
eating disorder, eating disorders*, 
bulimi*, binge eating disorder, 
anorexi* 
OCD subcorpus obsessive compulsive disorder*, 
obsessive compulsive, ocd 
 
The design of the corpus and the illness subcorpora allowed for the analysis of 
diachronic (across time) as well as synchronic (e.g. across illness) variation. 
 The Mental Illness Corpus 1984-2014 that I created to answer my research 
questions constitutes a significant resource for the investigation of constructions of 
mental illness in the UK press. In the next section, I explain how it is used in each of 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
	
4 No data was collected for 1983 as the database returned no hits for this time period.  
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1.4 Structure of this thesis 
 
In the next Chapter (Chapter 2) I provide a review of the existing literature on the 
representation of, and attitudes towards, mental illness in a variety of text types, e.g. 
online data, newspaper data and spoken data. In addition to research on the 
representation of mental illness in these different data types, I also discuss the 
theoretical position of Social Constructionism (particularly in reference to CDA). My 
review of the literature in Chapter 2 includes coverage of research from psychiatry, 
linguistics and counselling. As a result of including the research conducted into a wide 
variety of different text types, in addition to a wide variety of analytical fields (e.g. 
psychiatry, linguistics), the literature review in Chapter 2 is very broad. The reason I 
have included such a broad variety of literature is that no study to date has surveyed 
this range of work for what it says about the linguistic representation of mental illness. 
Moreover, due to the fact that the data contained in the MI 1984-2014 corpus is so 
broad (in that it covers a significant period of time as well as a significant number of 
illnesses), I felt it important to thoroughly review the existing literature into a range 
of illness types as well as analytical methods. 
 In Chapter 3, ‘Analytical Methods 1: Corpus Linguistics’, I provide a brief 
overview of corpus linguistics with particular reference to the approach I adopt in this 
thesis: namely, corpus linguistics as a method (as opposed to corpus linguistics as a 
theory) (McEnery & Hardy, 2012; Tognini-Bonelli, 2001). I also detail the specific 
corpus linguistic analytical methods that I use in this thesis, such as collocation and 
keyness analysis and the statistical tests and cut-offs associated with each analysis. 
Due to the fact that I exemplify each analytical method using data from the MI 1984-
2014 corpus (specifically the data collected during a pilot study and an illness-specific 
sample of the data), I also illustrate the utility of each analysis type for analysing 
ideology in texts. Chapter 3, then, offers an overview of the corpus tools I use in this 
thesis but also provides information about the theory underpinning each analysis. For 
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example, a node word’s collocates (found by conducting a collocation analysis) 
provides evidence about the meaning of that node word, as in Firth’s statement that 
“you shall know a word by the company it keeps” (Firth, 1957: 11). 
 Following a similar structure to Chapter 3, in Chapter 4, ‘Analytical Methods 
2: Critical Discourse Analysis’, I provide an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
covering the early manifestations of linguistic inquiry into ideology in texts such as 
that of the East Anglia School (Fowler et al., 1979) to contemporary research into 
corpus-assisted discourse analysis that combines these early principles of CDA with 
computational methods. I also discuss and contest the notion that the automation of 
textual analysis offered by corpus linguistics provides a magic bullet for objectivity in 
CDA. As was the case in Chapter 3, I also outline the different CDA methods that I 
use in this thesis in Chapter 4. Specifically, I discuss, and exemplify using relevant 
data, Halliday’s transitivity model, taken from his model of Systemic Functional 
Linguistics (1973), and naming analysis. 
 In Chapter 5, ‘Corpus Construction’, I describe the process of constructing the 
MI 1984-2014 corpus, from compiling the sampling frame (e.g. search terms, dates 
covered) to the compilation procedure for the illness and year subcorpora. In 
particular, I provide a detailed discussion of the interpretative status of search terms 
and show how the dates the corpus covers are fitted and relevant to the topic matter 
in terms of legislation passed in this period. In my report of the corpus construction 
procedure, I cover practical issues related to compiling corpora such as cleaning the 
data. Furthermore, I include a discussion of the problems that the interdisciplinary 
nature of corpus construction poses for the researcher (i.e. that the researcher has to 
know about programming, statistical methods, etc. in addition to methods of 
linguistic analysis). I conclude Chapter 5 by showing how the corpus construction 
procedure resulted in a representative and evenly distributed corpus. 
Chapter 6 is the first analysis chapter. In Chapter 6, I answer RQ1, “Has the 
meaning of mental illness changed over time in the press?”. I start my analysis in 
Chapter 6 by arguing that the terms ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ have been 
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used interchangeably in the previous literature on the representation of mental illness 
in the press. Specifically, I argue that using these two terms interchangeably 
(especially during data collection) may result in incomparable datasets. In the rest of 
Chapter 6, I argue that the terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ are distinct terms, 
and that the meaning of the two terms has shifted over the time period covered by the 
MI 1984-2014 corpus. I argue that the lexical change I observed is consistent with 
pragmatic accounts of language change in which the language development is in part 
a result of euphemism (e.g. Traugott & Dasher, 2002). 
In Chapter 7, I explore the labels associated with mental illness in more detail, 
specifically through naming analysis. In doing this, I address RQs 2-2.2 which are 
concerned with how people with mental illness are named and what themes are 
present related to naming practices in the MI 1984-2014 corpus. In Chapter 7, I discuss 
prescribed forms for referring to people with mental illness (such as person-first 
language) and explore the frequency of such prescribed forms in the corpus. In 
addition. I explore salient naming strategies in the corpus, particularly the labels 
‘patient’, ‘sufferer’ and ‘victim’. Using corpus evidence, I show that these labels are 
patterned to specific illness types. Furthermore, I examine themes in naming practices 
in the MI 1984-2014 with particular reference to referring to people with mental illness 
as numbers. I argue that the tendency in the corpus to refer to people as quantities and 
statistics depersonalises people with mental illness. Moreover, I argue that the 
‘rhetoric of quantification’ (Fowler, 1991: 166) provides a way for the press to 
sensationalise news events related to mental illness which in turn constitutes the 
representation of mental illness as a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1973). 
 In Chapter 8, I address RQs 3-3.1 to explore the ways in which the press talk 
about people having mental illness. In order to do this, I conduct a mixed-methods 
analysis of the data. In the chapter, I analyse the salient processes described in a 
sample of the data and then explore the frequency and the semantic and pragmatic 
content of the verbs ‘suffer’ and ‘ experience’ in the context of prescribed forms for 
talking about having mental illness (e.g. the Time to Change advice to avoid the verb 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 
 27 
‘suffer’). In Chapter 8, I show that ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ occur in different semantic 
contexts in the MI 1984-2014 corpus as well as general language corpora, which may 
contribute to ‘suffer’ being a more problematic term for describing mental health than 
‘experience’. Moreover, I show that ‘suffer’ is proportionally less likely to be used in 
first-person narratives because ‘suffering’ is attributed to people with mental illness 
by others, e.g. medical professionals, in reported speech. I bring together my findings 
in a set of lexicogrammatical heuristics based on the semantic content of ‘suffer’ and 
‘experience’ in context (e.g. whether the word encodes animacy or is temporally 
bounded). I argue that my analysis provides a more nuanced understanding of what 
‘suffer’ in its transitive and intransitive form means, both in terms of who and what it 
can be used in reference to.  
 In a departure from the bottom-up analyses conducted in Chapters 6-8 (i.e. 
analyses that are motivated by a particular linguistic feature, such as the noun phrase 
or the verb phrase), in Chapter 9 I investigate if and how the symptoms of mental 
illness are present in the MI 1984-2014 corpus. In doing this I address RQ4 and RQ4.1: 
“Is the depiction of mental illness realistic?” and “Are the symptoms of each disorder 
type (e.g. depressive illnesses) accurately portrayed in the press?”. In order to answer 
these research questions, I explore the symptoms of each disorder type covered by the 
corpus. Specifically, I use keyword and key semantic domain analysis to explore 
whether the symptoms of mental illnesses are accurately represented in news articles 
on mental illness. In addition to corpus tools, I also qualitatively analyse the most 
prototypical text for each illness subcorpus (i.e. the text that contains the most frequent 
features of the illness subcorpus overall) to explore whether the keyness findings are 
also a feature of whole texts. In Chapter 9 I also explore whether the language used in 
the illness subcorpora relating to illness with the same or related symptoms features 
lexis that overlaps. 
 In Chapter 10, ‘Conclusion’, I provide a discussion of the findings reported in 
this thesis and revisit my research questions. I detail the caveats of my research as well 
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as provide ideas for future research in the area of the language of mental illness. I also 
discuss the practical implications of my work. 
 
1.5 Conventions 
 
Throughout this thesis I make use of the following typographical conventions: 
 
• ‘single quotes’ to refer to lexical forms (e.g. ‘mental illness’) 
• “double quotes” to refer to extracts from the data, extracts from 
newspaper articles, or verbatim extracts from this thesis or the existing 
literature 
• Italics to refer to concepts, publication names (e.g. The Sun), the names 
of organisations (e.g. Mind) and for emphasis, e.g. no lexical item is 
inherently stigmatising” 
• SMALL CAPS to refer to semantic domains (e.g. ‘flute’ and ‘piano’ are 
lexical items associated with the semantic domain of MUSIC) 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
In this introduction I have shown that mental health and illness is an increasingly 
important topic in UK society, both in terms of the number of newspaper articles 
covering mental illness-related issues, and the increased prevalence of mental illness 
generally. I have also shown how the public are increasingly aware of the language 
used to discuss mental illness in the press (see, for example, the “Bonkers Bruno” and 
Keith Flint examples in Section 1.1). Moreover, I have explained how the language 
used to discuss mental illness is being increasingly prescribed by anti-stigma 
initiatives. Despite all of these activities and initiatives, very little research exists that 
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explores the language used to discuss mental illness in the press using a purely 
linguistic approach. For this reason, I have set out the research gap in the existing 
literature that this thesis goes some way to addressing. In this chapter I have also 
introduced the MI 1984-2014 corpus and provided an outline of what I will discuss in 
the rest of this thesis. 
 In the next chapter I review the existing literature relevant to this thesis as 
means of providing a detailed context for the analysis that follows in subsequent 
chapters. 
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2. The language of mental illness 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, increasing numbers of researchers in linguistics, psychiatry and 
mental health studies more broadly have turned their attention to the analysis of the 
ideological effect language has on how the public view mental illness. Prior to this, 
research into language and mental illness broadly fell under the umbrella of 
interactionalist research that makes use of spoken data (e.g. Antaki, 2007; McCabe et 
al., 2002). Mental illnesses are defined by the American Psychiatric Association 
(hereafter APA), as “health conditions involving changes in emotion, thinking or 
behaviour (or a combination of these). Mental illnesses are associated with distress 
and/or problems functioning in social, work or family activities.”(APA, 2019). In this 
chapter, I offer an overview of research into the language of and about mental illness 
and position my own work in relation to it. 
The following sections provide an overview of the main themes in existing 
literature, starting with social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), the 
theoretical underpinning that most applied studies make use of (albeit without stating 
this fact). Given that mental illness research necessarily has to span a wide range of 
disciplines, studies will be reported from a range of areas, although most research is 
published in journals that list psychiatry as a key area. The reason for including a wide 
range of sub-disciplines and study types in my review of the relevant literature is to 
give a well-rounded perspective of what research has been conducted in the area of 
language and mental illness. Another practical reason for doing this is that many of 
the studies combine methods from various disciplines; e.g. linguistic studies use 
methods from sociology, and psychiatric studies adopt methods from sociology and 
linguistics. 
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In Section 2.2, I briefly outline social constructionism and how it has been used 
in studies relating to the analysis of language. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I provide an 
overview of the existing research into language and mental illness. 
Overall, in this chapter I show that there has been much research in the area of mental 
illness, particularly in reference to stigma and discrimination. However, I argue that 
existing research into the representation of mental illness in the press neglects to 
identify language as an object worthy of study in itself, or as a factor in how stigma 
and discrimination are manifested. This chapter then, advances my thesis by 
identifying the gaps in current research that I argue linguistic analysis of the kind 
conducted in this thesis can go some way to filling. Moreover, this chapter provides a 
broad overview of previous research findings including findings that may not appear 
to be directly related to news reports on mental illness, but which I argue help to 
contextualise public attitudes towards mental illness. This chapter, then, also 
constitutes a reference point for existing research findings that I refer back to at 
various points in the thesis. 
 
2.2 Social constructionism 
 
In linguistics, much research relies on the ideas underpinning social constructionism 
(it is social constructionism that forms the foundation of the whole notion of 
‘discourse’ that underpins CDA) and yet very few researchers make this link clear. 
Burr (1995) makes this point, stating that there has been 
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a gradual emergence of a number of alternative approaches to the study of 
human beings as social animals. These approaches have appeared under a 
variety of rubrics, such as ‘critical psychology’, ‘discursive psychology’, 
‘discourse analysis’, ‘deconstruction’ and ‘poststructuralism’. What any of 
these approaches have in common, however, is what is now often referred to 
as social constructionism. 
 
(Burr, 1995: 1) 
 
The tendency for researchers not to report that they subscribe to social 
constructionism is perhaps due to the fact that the link between language and the 
nature of meaning is so entrenched that to make the link explicit is unnecessary. 
However, it is important to detail what social constructionism is and why it is the 
primary theory used in studies analysing mental illness and language because 
subscribing to social constructionism implies a wide range of theoretical assumptions 
that are otherwise left unsaid. For example, the very definition of what constitutes a 
social construct (e.g. a text), or the belief that through the study of a social construct 
we have access to a society’s understanding of social constructs, is often left unsaid in 
previous research.5  
In its most basic form, social constructionism is concerned with the nature of 
knowledge, and posits that reality is constructed through our interaction with social 
objects and social actors. Burr (1995) states that in order to be a social constructionist 
one would have to believe that (i) a critical stance is needed in order to better 
understand “taken-for-granted ways of understanding the world” (Burr, 1995:2), (ii) 
ways of seeing the world are “historically and culturally relative” (1995: 2) with 
products being “specific to particular cultures and periods of history” (1995: 2). (iii) 
	
5 The idea that social constructs reflect society is one that is taken for granted in corpus linguistics, 
where media texts are often presented as social constructs and as being indicative of a societal view 
on a topic, usually without any theoretical underpinnings to these assumptions being offered. I am 
not raising this point to cast doubt on whether this is a sound basis for analysis but one should 
consider these assumptions, particularly in corpus linguistic studies, where in most cases the focus is 
almost entirely on the production of texts rather than the reception of them.  
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knowledge is co-constructed, i.e. meaning making is inherently social and interaction 
based, and (iii) “knowledge and social action are interlinked” (1995: 5) 6  with 
constructions being bound by what is permissible within a particular social setting, 
e.g. one may have a different understanding of a particular social construction but the 
possible social actions associated with that construct are limited by what is 
permissible within a given social setting. To exemplify this last point, Burr (1995) uses 
the example of societal views on drunkenness changing from seeing it as a crime to 
considering it an illness. In the former case, imprisonment was the acceptable social 
action; in the latter, the acceptable social action is medical or psychological 
intervention (Burr, 1995: 5). 
The basis of the social constructionist view (and many other philosophical 
underpinnings of linguistics more generally) was greatly influenced by the work of 
the American Pragmatists such as Mead (1934) and Peirce (1906). Their work on the 
area of symbolic interactionism sees meanings as “social products, as creations that 
are formed in and through the defining activities of people as they interact” (Blumer, 
1969: 5), as opposed to structuralist theories of meaning, which assume that something 
has an inherent meaning. Due to the fact that social constructionism states that reality 
is socially constructed, it is a useful paradigm for challenging normative or common 
sense understandings of society. Social constructionism, then, is concerned most 
primarily with the ways in which “the world can be socially constructed by the social 
practices of people but at the same time experienced by them as if the nature of their 
world is pre-given and fixed” (Burr, 1995: 13)7. 
Social constructionism has been adopted in a wide range of linguistic sub-
disciplines such as sociolinguistics (Britain, 2018; Coulmas, 2016; Wolfram, 2015), 
linguistic ethnography (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005; Ochs & Shohet, 2006; Rampton & 	
6 It is easy to see here the clear links with social based theories of language and pragmatics more 
generally. 
7 As Burr points out, social constructionism itself is now a social construct, and by writing a book on it 
he is “contributing to what might be called ‘the social constructionism of social constructionism’” 
(Burr, 1995: 13). 
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Charalambous, 2016) and pragmatics (File, 2018; Marra, 2012) in varying degrees of 
philosophical depth. However, in this chapter, I will only offer an overview of 
research using social constructionism in relation to studies in CDA, and more 
specifically in mental illness research. My reason for having detailed above where 
social constructionist theory is used in linguistics more broadly is to show that the 
theory is well-used as a basis for language analysis, and that it does not belong to a 
particular branch of linguistics or to research that has particular aims (e.g. to be 
critical), as some critics have suggested (Hacking, 1999). 
 
2.3 Social constructionism and CDA 
 
Despite being the theory underpinning much work in CDA, very few CDA 
researchers explicitly state that their research is underpinned by a theory of social 
constructionism. For example Fairclough (1992) accepts that his viewpoint is one of 
social constructionism (or constructivism as he terms it), but attributes much of the 
theory underpinning his work to the constructionist thinking of Foucault (1972) 
(Fairclough, 1992: 37-61). Indeed, it is to Foucault that the term discourse is generally 
attributed, which is the term for language-in-use that is used frequently in linguistic 
social constructionist research. In contrast to the social constructionism used in 
discourse analysis generally, which follows Burr (1995) and Berger & Luckmann’s 
(1966) notion of social constructionism (i.e. the analysis of how social constructs are 
created and negotiated through interaction and therefore how we understand ‘reality’ 
through social constructs), Foucault’s conception of social constructionism is focussed 
almost entirely on how discourses frame “distinctive disciplinary formations through 
which power/knowledge (power as knowledge/knowledge as power) operates” 
(Clarke, 2005:149). For Foucault, the function of discourses is to produce, legitimate 
and maintain power asymmetries. Foucault’s concern is not with the analysis of 
individual instances of how discourses are created per se. As a result, we can think of 
Foucault’s conception of discourse as being at the macro end of the CDA spectrum, 
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the end that deals with sociological phenomena. In contrast, the linguistic analysis of 
discourses can be conceptualised as being at the micro end. The extent to which one 
attributes social construct status on this scale can be thought of as being relative to the 
analyst’s frame of reference. What I mean by this is that, for Foucault, a discourse (i.e. 
a collection of ideas and social actions about a topic) may constitute a social construct. 
By comparison, for the linguist a social construct may be much less widespread and, 
perhaps as a result of this, more measurable, e.g. the use of particular linguistic 
variables to index a particular group identity. In fact, Burr (1995) makes a similar 
distinction between macro social constructionism or Foucauldian discourse analysis 
and micro social constructionism or discursive psychology (1995: 21). By drawing a 
distinction between micro and macro discourse analysis, I do not wish to attribute a 
higher status to either form. I see both as types of discourse analysis, and I do not 
think they are mutually exclusive. It is the case however, that I as a linguist am more 
interested in the micro end of the scale. 
Moreover, as a result of how broad it is, Foucault’s theory of discourse alone is 
not sufficient to provide the parameters for linguistic analysis; rather it presumes the 
existence of a discourse. As a result of this, Fairclough suggests that his own view of 
CDA involves operationalizing Foucault’s theory of ‘discourse’ in a loose sense8. In 
later work, Fairclough claims to subscribe to a social realist paradigm because 
although social products are constructed, once constructed they become reality 
(Fairclough, 2003: 8; Sayer, 2000). Criticisms of social constructionism as anti-realist 
are common (i.e. that social constructionism does not account for the fact that a real 
social world “exists independently of our knowledge about it” (Fairclough, 2010: 
355)); however, my own view on this is that a weaker version of social constructionism 
that takes account of brute facts (those facts that exist outside of human interaction) 
	
8 Foucault’s conception of discourse is a sociological theory, and as such is abstract and not linked to 
particular social constructs, e.g. linguistic artifacts. This is a source of criticism for Fairclough. 
Furthermore, for Foucault, discourse is mainly concerned with power imbalance and the description 
of sociohistorical ‘discourse formations’ (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1972). 
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and institutional facts (those facts that exist as a result of human interaction) can 
account for such criticisms. An oft-cited example to explain brute and institutional 
facts is the concept of cash money. Take for example a £10 note. The brute facts about 
the £10 note are that it is made of paper and contains ink. The institutional facts about 
the note are that it is institutionally valuable to a particular sum and we can buy things 
with it based on this fact. In order for the note to be more than paper and ink, we have 
to observe the institutional facts about the note which include (among others) financial 
institutions and local and global rules of commerce. In line with Searle (1995), I 
suggest that once a social construct is established it can take on epistemologically 
objective status whilst also being ontologically subjective (i.e. a social construct takes 
on the guise of reality through entrenchment but it is only afforded that guise by the 
very nature of knowledge being socially constructed). 
Studies that take a social constructionist perspective are prevalent in research 
into mental illness. The reason for this is that such a theory provides a link between 
texts (i.e. newspaper articles), social actions (i.e. policy change) and the nature of 
knowledge (public understanding of mental illness), but also shows how mental 
illness as a social construct itself is diagnosed. For example, Georgaca (2013) provides 
an overview of how social constructionist research has provided critiques of 
psychiatric diagnosis. She writes that the social constructionist paradigm “attempts to 
denaturalize phenomena that have come to acquire a taken-for-granted character by 
highlighting the processes through which these are socially constituted.” (2013: 56). 
Consequently, research into mental illness that takes a social constructionist 
perspective  
focuses on highlighting the contingent, socially produced character of 
categories of mental distress and of associated professional practices. Within 
this paradigm, thus, classification, the dominant system of knowledge 
regarding mental distress, and diagnosis, the practice of assigning a 
psychopathological category to a person, are not taken as given or as resources, 
but rather are treated as topics of investigation in their own right. The aim is to 
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examine how these systems of knowledge and practice have come to take their 
current form, how they are accomplished in practice and finally the 
consequences for mental health institutions and for individuals in distress.  
(Georgaca, 2013: 56). 
Georgaca argues that by challenging underlying common-sense understandings of 
mental illness diagnoses, stakeholders in mental illness activism can provide 
alternative, more empowering understandings of mental illness. Further to this, 
Conrad & Barker (2010) state that social constructionist research in the field of medical 
sociology has made “significant contributions to our understanding of the social 
dimensions of illness” (Conrad & Barker, 2010: 567). However, the use of social 
constructionist theory in medical settings is not without its problems; as Bury (1986) 
states, if we were to take a purely social constructionist approach to medicine “the 
stable realities of the human body and disease are in fact 'fabrications', or 'inventions' 
rather than discoveries” (Bury, 1986:165). Bury (1986) raises an interesting point here 
about the intersection between the objective nature of medicine and the constructed 
nature of knowledge; however, I argue that taking a social constructionist perspective, 
particularly in the analysis of language about mental illness is useful because, for 
instance, it allows for the comparison of the effects of changing labels for mental 
illness, e.g. prescribed language for referring to people with mental illness, and it 
allows for the culturally-specific aspects of mental illness to be uncovered. 
For Bury (1986), the issue with constructionist approaches to medical sociology 
is that they negate the fact that there are some “stable realities” in medicine. Whilst I 
agree that there are certainly “stable realities” in medicine, perception plays a huge 
role in how we view illness. There is a wealth of research that demonstrates cultural 
differences in how people view illnesses. For example, Furnham & Baguma (1999: 121) 
showed that Ugandan students believed supernatural powers influenced their health 
to a certain extent whereas students from Great Britain did not. Sayakhot et al. (2012) 
found that Australian women associated the menopause with aging whereas Laotian 
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women did not. Gray et al. (2009) found that compared with Chinese carers of people 
with Alzheimer’s Disease, Latino carers attributed the disease to the person having 
had a hard life (Gray et al., 2009: 2) and Cohen (1995) found that in India dementia 
was called “hot brain” (Cohen, 1995: 314) and was associated with anger, rather than 
memory loss. Moreover, research has shown that not only do associations with 
illnesses vary across cultures, but so too does the notion of what health is, which 
means that what a person sees as a symptom of an illness may vary cross-culturally 
(Wallin & Ahlström, 2010). This is hugely important because without a set of 
symptoms then there is no ‘objective’ disease, if we are to accept Bury’s (1986) point 
that medicine should be based on “stable realities”. 
Moreover, as Conrad & Barker, 2010: S70) point out, some diseases, such as 
fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome, are contested as they are ‘medically 
invisible’ and therefore much of our understanding of them comes from the person 
experiencing symptoms and not medical professionals. Social constructionist 
approaches take account of the cultural understandings of illnesses because they take 
into account the social meaning of the illness as distinct from the biological condition 
or disease. (Conrad & Barker, 2010; Eisenberg, 1977). This is not to say that the disease 
side of the illness/disease distinction cannot be accounted for in a social 
constructionist paradigm. Conrad & Barker (2010: 68) argue that “the disease side of 
the disease/illness conceptual distinction is also ripe for social constructionist analysis, 
insofar as what gets labeled a disease or qualifies as biological is often socially 
negotiated.” 
Furthermore, social constructionism can account for stigma around illnesses and 
the concept of disability where it is often the case that people do not identify as 
disabled but rather see society as disabling them (Scope, 2019). The politicisation of 
disability is just one place that we see the social construction of disability. For example, 
recent changes to Income and Support Allowance in the UK requires people to have 
their level of disability assessed. Social constructionism, then, is a widely used and 
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useful theory to analyse the language of illness, and in the case of this thesis, the 
language of mental illness specifically. 
 In the next section, I report the existing research into mental illness and 
language. 
2.4 Themes in research on mental health and language 
 
In section 2.2, I described social constructionism as the theoretical basis for many of 
the studies into the language of mental illness. In the following sections I outline the 
existing research into mental illness and language. I do so in broad themes, e.g. 
research into stigma, research using press data. Due to the fact that I present the 
existing literature by theme, the different issue each subsection covers may not be on 
the same conceptual level; e.g. stigma is on a different conceptual level to press data. 
The reason I include research on stigma as a separate section is because much research 
in this area does not use press data (and therefore having a section within the press 
data section would not be appropriate), but also because much of my analysis in this 
thesis discusses directly and indirectly (e.g. through discussing prescribed linguistic 
forms) the role that language has in stigma creation and perpetuation. 
 In the next sections (2.3.1-2.3.2), I report on research on the theme of stigma and 
stigma reduction efforts. In Section 2.4-2.4.4 I report on research that uses press data. 
In Section 2.5 I provide an overview of the literature on stigma and the representation 
of mental illness in the news before I position my research in relation to the existing 
literature in Section 2.6. In Section 2.7, I conclude. 
 
2.4.1 Stigma and self stigma 
 
Perhaps the most widely researched area of the social construction of mental illness is 
the study of stigma. Stigma, Björkman et al. (2007) write, “has been identified as one 
of the most important obstacles for a successful integration of people with mental 
illness into the society” (2007: 332). The term was first discussed in detail by Goffman 
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(1963) in Stigma: Notes on a Spoiled Identity, and, as a result of Goffman’s work into 
stigma, social scientists paid increased attention to the social and political 
consequences of it. As a result, it has been the focus of a significant body of research 
spanning psychiatry, sociology, psychology and linguistics. For example, Corrigan 
(1998: 202) writes that “the negative impact of severe mental illness is not entirely due 
to the ramifications of a biological disorder. Society's reaction to the disease seems to 
have an equally harmful impact on the person's abilities to successfully achieve life 
goals”. The discrimination and prejudice that constitutes stigma surrounding mental 
illness has been termed a ”psychosocial” (Wahl, 2012: 9) aspect of illness that is a 
significant obstacle in the process towards recovery. In a two-decade long review of 
mental illness stigma in the mass media, Klin & Lemish (2008) found that mass media 
representations of mental illness were “exaggerated, distorted, or inaccurate” (2008): 
443) and that people with mental illness were presented as violent and dangerous. In 
addition to this, Corrigan & Watson (2002) found that stigma is not something that 
exists solely outside the individual with a mental illness, but also affects and plays a 
key role in the “personal power” (Corrigan, 2002) and self-esteem (Corrigan & 
Watson, 2002: 35) of individuals with a mental illness. As a result, “individuals with 
mental illness who then perceive negative actions by others to be legitimate will 
manifest lower self-esteem and diminished self-efficacy.” (Corrigan & Watson, 2002: 
47). Moreover, studies have discovered that even trained professionals have been 
found to “diminish the personhood of those labelled as mentally ill” (Lyons & Ziviani, 
1995:1007). This means that due to the stigma surrounding mental illness it may be 
the case that people with a mental illness are not accessing services to help them due 
to a fear of being stigmatised, and professionals are not providing the services they 
ought to because they hold stigmatising views. More worrying still, research has 
shown that inaccurate media depictions of mental illness “could sometimes 
overwhelm direct experience in this area” (Philo, 1997: 171). Goodwin et al. (2016) 
echo this sentiment, and write that “Fictional depictions of mental health diagnoses 
may make for dramatic and entertaining viewing, but such inaccuracies present 
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audiences with misinformation and contribute to stigma.” (2016: 385). However, 
stigma is not something that affects all mental illnesses in the same way. Research has 
shown that different mental illnesses are more or less stigmatised that others. For 
example, Mann & Himlein (2004) found that the “stigmatization of schizophrenia was 
significantly higher than stigmatization of depression”. Moreover, in their participant 
sample of undergraduate students in America, they found there to be “significantly 
less stigmatization of mental illness […] among females than among males.” (Mann & 
Himlein, 2004: 185). Dietrich et al, (2006) also found that there is a link between 
stigmatising media representations of people with a mental illness and negative 
attitudes towards people with mental illness (Dietrich et al., 2006). 
In addition to stigma from others, there is a wealth of research into the negative 
effects of self-stigma on people with mental illnesses, specifically their willingness to 
perceive their symptoms as being to do with mental illness and also their willingness 
to engage with mental health professionals. Schomerus et al. (2012) found that people 
with a depressive syndrome were less likely to perceive their symptoms as being to 
do with mental health (what they term as ‘lower problem appraisal’) and as a result 
are less likely to seek the help of professionals if they held self-stigmatising attitudes. 
They concluded that personal stigmatising attitudes posed a barrier to seeking 
professional health care. Moreover, such lack of engagement with primary care and 
specialist mental health services has implications for the worsening of mental illness 
conditions. 
Research into the stigma surrounding mental illness has been plentiful; however, 
all of the studies reported so far in this section presuppose the existence of stigma, i.e. 
they are all top-down analyses. This is not to say that stigma does not exist. I believe 
it does, but the effect of embarking on the analysis of stigma as an a priori construct 
means that the existing research into mental illness stigma focusses almost entirely on 
the effect of stigma, rather than how stigma is created and – specifically for the linguist 
interested in stigma – how stigma is created through language. For example, Corrigan 
& Watson (2002: 38) draw attention to the fact that stigma is the result of stereotypes, 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 
 42 
prejudice and discrimination against people with mental illness but they do not 
unpack what these stereotypes are or how the vague concepts of prejudice and 
discrimination are actively enacted in different social settings. In another example of 
in the psychiatry literature concerned with stigma where the term is not fully 
explored, Thornicroft et al. (2007) state that “the term stigma refers to problems of 
knowledge (ignorance), attitudes (prejudice) and behaviour (discrimination)” 
(Thornicroft et al., 2007: 192). Again, this definition only provides vague descriptions 
of how stigma is manifest and provides no examples of how these concepts may be 
realised through language. Similarly, Kvaale et al. (2013) describe stigma as being 
related to the concepts of blame, dangerousness and social distance, but they too do 
not define what they mean by these terms or how the reification of these concepts may 
influence stigmatising attitudes. Furthermore, the methods employed to assess levels 
of stigma are limited in their scope. For example, Schomerus et al. (2012) based their 
findings on self-stigma entirely on the statistical analysis of Likert scale results where 
students with depression were asked to state the degree to which they agreed or 
disagreed with a set of statements. The statements the researchers used to elicit data 
were all negatively framed, e.g. “I believe people with mental illness are dangerous”. 
As a result, their findings could be said to be biased towards negative results due to 
this negative framing. Moreover, findings that rely on methods such as Likert scales 
are limited in their scope because such methods are restricted with regard to how 
much information it is possible to amass from participants, given that the aim of Likert 
scales is to quantify opinions on something (and therefore the data collected is 
discrete). Moreover, research into the experimental design of Likert scales has shown 
that participants completing Likert scales can exhibit “end-aversion bias” (Hassan & 
Arnetz, 2005: 4), where participants avoid the extreme ends of the scale, which can 
result in skewed results. Additionally, researchers have argued that whilst measures 
such as Likert scales provide initial information about opinions on a topic, they are 
“not appropriate on a stand-alone basis” (Torrance et al., 2001: 329). Taken together, 
the existing research into stigma and self-stigma, then, presupposes the existence of 
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stigma whilst offering no or very little explanation of what constitutes stigma. Due to 
the assumption of stigma as an a priori construct, previous research also focuses on the 
effect of stigma rather than how it is created or reinforced. Furthermore, previous 
research into stigma is over-reliant on discrete models to elicit data such as Likert 
scales and questionnaires. As a result of elicited data using predetermined questions, 
the measures of assessing stigma are limited in scope.  
In the next section, I review the existing literature into anti-stigma initiatives. 
 
2.4.2 Stigma reduction efforts 
 
In this section, I describe the existing research into stigma reduction, such as anti-
stigma initiatives. Due to the fact that anti-stigma initiatives in the UK are few and 
still ongoing (and therefore the efficacy of them is still being assessed), I will also 
report research into the anti-stigma initiatives in other cultures. 
As I discussed in the previous section, research into the stigma surrounding 
mental illness has reported that it has real-world consequences, such as making 
people with mental illness feel unable to access primary health care as well as stay 
engaged with that care. Furthermore, research has shown that there is a link between 
the stigma around mental illness and people’s attitude towards those with a mental 
illness, including, in some cases, medical professionals and those with direct (and 
contrasting) experiences of people with mental illness. Furthermore, increased 
awareness of and education about mental illness results in decreased stigma 
(Simmons et al., 2017). Based on this body of research we can be fairly confident that 
stigma exists (even if the ways in which it is manifest are not discussed in the previous 
research) and that it has an effect on how people perceive mental illness and people 
with mental illnesses. In research since Goffman’s work on the nature of stigma, 
researchers have explored ways in which stigma can be reduced by creating anti-
stigma programmes and assessing the efficacy of national anti-stigma media 
campaigns. More recent research has discussed in detail the cultural differences 
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surrounding mental health stigma. For example, Fung et al. (2011) developed a self-
stigma reduction program for 66 adults with schizophrenia in Hong Kong. They argue 
that stigmatisation of people with schizophrenia in China is greater than in Western 
societies due to the collectivist nature of Chinese culture, or the tendency to “place the 
need, interest, and objective of in-groups at a higher priority than that of the 
individual” (Wang & Chen, 2010). Following Lam, et al. (2010), Fung et al. (2011) argue 
that “under the collectivistic ideation, deviant behaviors of schizophrenia are 
regarded as character flaws or low moral standards, an interpretation that in turn 
results in higher levels of discrimination (2011: 208). Fung et al. (2001) found that 
whilst the program had short-term positive effects on the individuals, the effects were 
not long-lasting. In addition to Fung et al.’s (2011) findings from their stigma 
reduction campaign, a range of studies have demonstrated that TV and social media 
campaigns (hereafter SMCs) can change public attitudes about mental illness and the 
stigma associated with it (Søgaard et al., 1995). For example, Stuart (2003) explored 
the differences made by one Canadian newspaper before and after the pilot project of 
the global anti-stigma program ‘Open the Doors’ (Stuart, 2003: 652). Stuart found that 
as a result of educating reporters about mental illness, the number of positive stories 
increased by a third and the overall length of the stories increased by a quarter (Stuart, 
2003: 651). Moreover, in more recent and more broad research, Sampogna et al. (2017) 
assessed the effect of anti-stigma marketing campaigns in the UK between 2009-2014, 
during which time the anti-stigma SMC Time to Change had been in effect. Using 
questionnaires to assess attitudes towards mental illness in the community (n=10,526), 
they found that there was a positive correlation between awareness of the Time to 
Change SMC and higher scores on the questions concerned with tolerance and support 
(Sapogna et al., 2017: 116). As a result, they concluded that SMCs can have a positive 
effect on stigma reduction. This result built on previous research into the effectiveness 
of Time to Change conducted by Thornicroft et al. (2013), who found that there was an 
increase in positive articles after the Time to Change SMC with the number of 
stigmatising articles staying the same. 
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As was the case with the research I discussed in the previous section, the research 
into the efficacy of the various anti-stigma campaigns have been conducted by 
researchers working in the field of psychiatry. As a result of the fact that much of the 
previous research was conducted in one field, the methods used to research the 
efficacy of anti-stigma initiatives have many of the same methodological issues that I 
reported in the previous section. Namely, previous research into anti-stigma 
initiatives does not explore what the concept of stigma is in any great detail, but 
presumes its existence. Moreover in such studies, language (which presumably is a 
fundamental part of how stigma is manifest) is not an object of study. To give an 
example of how previous research neglects language analysis, I will revisit the 
research conducted by Sampogna et al. (2017), who explored the Time to Change SMC, 
because their methods are similar to many other studies. Sampogna et al. (2017) used 
three very commonly used questionnaires (sometimes referred to as scales) that are 
designed to assess participants attitudes, knowledge about and behaviour towards 
people with mental illness. Just like those reported in the previous section, the 
questionnaires are Likert scales. The questionnaires are titled the Community Attitudes 
toward Mental Illness (CAMI) questionnaire (Taylor & Dear, 1981), the Mental Health 
Knowledge Schedule (MAKS) questionnaire (Evans-Lacko et al., 2010) and the Reported 
and Intended Behaviour Scale (RIBS) questionnaire (Evans-Lacko et al., 2011) (see also 
Granello & Gibbs, 2016; Henderson et al, 2016; Wahl & Leftkowitz, 1989; Wolff et al., 
1996; for other examples of research that uses some or all of these questionnaire to 
elicit data). Previous research like that of Sampogna et al. (2016) has used one or a 
combination of the three questionnaires to elicit data (data here constitutes the 
participants’ responses to statements on the questionnaires). Combining multiple 
questionnaires in one study allows the researchers to cross-reference findings, e.g. 
explore correlations between certain views (e.g. the view that people with mental 
illness are a threat to society) and the level of knowledge about mental illness (e.g. a 
high awareness of issues concerning mental illness may correlate with increased 
tolerance of people with mental illness). In using these questionnaires to elicit data 
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about stigmatising views then, Sampogna et al. (2016) assume that certain attitudes 
and behaviours constitute stigma (this is in line with Thornicroft et al.’s (2007) 
definition of stigma discussed in the previous section) rather than assess whether (and 
if so, how) stigma is manifest in data. The first problem with research such as that 
conducted by Sampogna et al. (2016) is that, just like the previous research reported 
above, it assumes that stigma exists and that stigmatising attitudes and beliefs are 
accessible through questionnaires. This is not to say that the questionnaires are not 
useful or that stigma does not exist, however. The three questionnaires are useful in 
that they allow for the quantification of attitudes, behaviours and knowledge. This is 
turn means that correlations between attitudes and behaviours and knowledge can be 
explored. However, I argue that these questionnaires are limited when used as the 
sole method of data elicitation. This is because they can only reveal what a participant 
thinks they believe and thinks about how they would act rather than how they actually 
do. Moreover, due to the Likert scale design of the questionnaires, a participant’s 
answers are not just based on their own potentially unreliable account of their 
thoughts and behaviours, but are also limited by the set number of responses they can 
give (e.g. dis/agreement words on a 5-point scale). In addition to these problems, the 
participants in many studies are students or professionals working in psychiatry or 
psychology, which may mean that they have a vested interest in answering the 
questionnaire in a certain way. To illustrate my point by way of an analogy from 
linguistics (where I use the pronunciation of a word as akin to an statement on a Likert 
scale), a sociolinguist would not ask a person how they pronounce a certain word 
because to do so would necessitate people being able to accurately reflect on their own 
pronunciation, which may be tied up in all sorts of ideology surrounding the prestige 
of certain accents (just like attitudes towards people with a mental illness are 
ideologically loaded), resulting in the person not pronouncing the word in the way 
they would unprompted. Furthermore, a sociolinguist would not ask a person how 
they pronounce a certain word because to do so could potentially bias the person’s 
view of how they do in fact pronounce it, resulting in the participant accommodating 
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to the sociolinguist (just like a student answering a survey may exhibit participant 
bias). Moreover, how a participant in a sociolinguistic experiment pronounces a word 
may vary depending on the context, just as attitudes may change depending on the 
context. To explore variation in pronunciation, then, sociolinguists use various 
methods, such as asking participants to read passages aloud that feature a certain 
phoneme in different positions of a word. Likert scales cannot assess participants’ 
attitudes outside of the hypothetical conditions described on the Likert scale 
questionnaire. 
Notwithstanding these problems with Likert scale design (and the problems I 
discussed in the previous section related to end-aversion bias), the questionnaires are 
limited in what they reveal because, as I alluded to in my analogy, they are open to 
participant bias (e.g. where a participant answers in a certain way in order to fulfil 
what they perceive the purpose of the experiment to be – as in the sociolinguistics 
example). Also, there is arguably a greater risk of participant bias from the use of 
methods designed to test people’s attitudes towards people with mental illness, 
simply because people may not wish to appear to hold stigmatising attitudes about 
such people. This is particularly the case in previous research that has used the 
Community Attitudes to Mental Illness (CAMI) scale on participant groups with a vested 
interest in people with mental illness such as counselling professionals (e.g. Granello 
& Gibbs, 2016). 
Knowing this, I argue that perhaps a more revealing way to explore stigmatising 
attitudes and behaviours towards people with mental illness is to look at written data, 
e.g. newspaper articles. The reason for this is that language is one way that authors 
can encode ideology (i.e. stigmatising attitudes about mental illness) in a way that is 
unobvious, and in some cases, unintentional (and therefore revealing of unfelt 
ideology surrounding mental illness). Some research in psychiatry has explored the 
efficacy of anti-stigma initiatives using press data. For example, Rhydderch et al. 
(2016) explored the effect that the Time to Change anti-stigma initiative had on 
newspaper coverage from 2008-2014. They found that newspaper coverage of mental 
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illness has increased over time (Rhydderch et al., 2016: 45). In their analysis, the 
research team identified the central theme of each newspaper article for any ‘element’ 
(roughly akin to topic, e.g. ‘recovery and treatment’, ‘danger to others’) which was 
“stigmatising, antistigmatising or neutral.” (Rhydderch et al., 2016: 47). Rhydderch et 
al. (2016) do not state what constituted a central theme, or what criteria they used to 
assess whether a given ‘element’ of the text was stigmatising, antistigmatising or 
neutral. They do however, list “pejorative language” as an element of interest 
(Rhydderch et al., 2016: 47). They do, then, view language as contributing to stigma, 
but they do not offer any explanation of what they see pejorative language to be. For 
this reason, whilst Rhydderch et al.’s (2016) research does recognise the role language 
plays in stigma creation, it is not replicable because the parameters of what 
stigmatising elements are, or what constitutes pejorative language are not specified.  
With these problems in mind, a systematic analysis of large quantities of 
language data on the topic of mental illness that uses well-documented and replicable 
analytical methods, such as those of corpus linguistics, provides a better means of 
analysing stigma in newspaper discourse. Moreover, computational analysis of such 
data (like that conducted in corpus linguistic analyses) means that common linguistic 
patterns, which may relate to stigma, are more easily identified than in predesigned 
questionnaires on stigmatising attitudes. Furthermore, due to the fact that linguistic 
analysis of newspaper discourse is conducted after the texts are written, the 
participant bias I discussed previously is not an issue. 
In the next section, I review the existing research into the representation of 
mental illness that uses press data. 
 
2.5 Press data 
 
A wealth of research has been conducted on representations of mental illness in the 
press. The reason for press data being so widely used in studies is that it is still a major 
source of information for the public about mental illness (Philo et al., 1994). For 
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example, Nawková et al. (2012: 22) write that “even in the era of the internet, printed 
media are still among the most frequently identified sources of mental health 
information”. The studies conducted of mental illness using press data have many 
different focuses; for example, diachronic studies to assess attitudes to mental illness 
over time, gender differences in the reportage of mental illness, depictions of mental 
illness and criminality and representations of specific illnesses. In section 3.3.1 I will 
provide an overview of the key themes in existing research. In the sections following 
3.3.1, salient themes in the research will be discussed in more detail. 
 
2.5.1 Mental illness in the news 
 
As was demonstrated in Section 2.3, a vast proportion of research into mental illness 
has focussed on the stigma of mental illness and negative portrayals of mental ill 
health in the press. Stuart (2003) writes that “negative media stereotypes are among 
the most hurtful and socially limiting stigma experiences reported by mental health 
service consumers and family members.” (2003: 651). Despite research reporting that 
press coverage of mental illness is getting better (Francis et al, 2004; Whitley & Wang, 
2016), other research shows that there is still a focus on mental illness over the positive 
aspects of mental health such as wellbeing (Kenez et al. 2015). Consistent findings in 
much of the existing research is that mental illness is reported often, is highly topical 
(Ohlsson, 2017), and is reported as an epidemic (Ohlsson, 2017: 309; Bilić & Georgaca, 
2007). Furthermore, research has consistently shown that news articles on mental 
illness rarely feature any report or quote from a person with a mental illness. For 
example, Nairn & Coverdale (2005) found that only 0.8% of 600 newspaper articles 
taken from New Zealand newspapers featured any self-depiction or report from a 
person with a mental illness. This supports earlier research which noted an absence of 
voices from people who have first-hand experience with mental illness in media 
reporting (Wahl et al., 2002). More recent research conducted in Bermuda found that 
over a 20-year period the number of mental health professionals quoted had increased 
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while articles featuring servicer users stayed the same. Moreover, where a service user 
was quoted, the quote was usually taken from court reports pertaining to violent 
crime (Roberts et al., 2013: 388). 
Reporting mental illness in articles that focus on violence, serious crime and 
dangerousness is also a major cross-linguistic theme in media reports on mental 
illness. (This is despite evidence that suggests that age, gender and ethnicity are more 
accurate predictors of violent crime than severe mental illness (Fazel & Grann, 2006)). 
For example, in a survey of three European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Croatia), Nawková et al. (2012) found that news stories relating to mental illness 
varied across the countries but were consistently negative across the three countries. 
They also found that positive articles were more likely to be around 50% longer than 
negative ones, leading the researchers to say that “longer articles are more positive 
because the journalist has more room to give accurate details” (Nawková et al., 2012: 
7). Moreover, they found that despite statistics showing that people with mental 
illnesses are more likely to be victims of aggression, very little attention was given to 
this topic (2012: 8). They also found that articles did not cover issues to do with 
recovery and therapy that showed the positive aspects of living with mental illness 
(2012: 8). The tendency to report mental illness sensationally and in reference to 
violence and aggression in the media has led to concerns that such coverage may 
create a “moral panic” (where a “group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests” (Cohen, 1973: 2)) around mental illness (I 
discuss the notion of moral panic in Chapter 7). Such research into moral panics 
includes that by Paterson (2006) who explored the association between violence and 
mental illness. Furthermore Hallam (2002) explored the link between violence and 
mental illness in reference to community care policy (Hallam, 2002). 
Rose (1998) also explored the link between the perceived failures of community 
care (as compared with institutional care) through an exploration of coverage of 
violent crimes in the media, notably the case of Christopher Clunis who stabbed and 
killed Jonathan Zito in London in 1992. Clunis had schizophrenia and had been 
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discharged from hospital prior to the attack. Reports after Zito’s murder focused on 
how community care had failed in treating and Clunis and preventing such an attack. 
Rose’s study echoed the findings of Thornton & Wahl (1996) who found that after 
reading a news article reporting on a murder committed by a person with mental 
illness while on day release from a psychiatric hospital, participants were more likely 
to view people with mental illness as in need of “monitoring and restriction”. (Wahl, 
2003: 1596). This, Wahl writes, “fuels resistance to community care” (2003: 1596). 
Thornton & Wahl’s findings are based on an experiment in which students in an 
introductory psychology class were randomly given one of three experiment packs 
each containing a newspaper article that Thornton & Wahl deemed stigmatising and 
one other article which was either a “fact-orientated” article, an article that “addressed 
misconceptions about mental illness and gave correct information on mental illness”, 
and an article that “discussed media distortion of mental illness” (Thornton & Wahl, 
1996: 18-19). The experiment also included the use of a fourth pack that did not include 
any article deemed to be stigmatising. This was the control condition. The students 
were then asked to fill in series of questionnaires, one of which was the CAMI scale I 
described in the previous section. Whilst the findings that Thornton & Wahl (1998) 
report are compelling (i.e. that there is a link between media depictions and the view 
that people with mental illness should be monitored and restricted), the findings are 
predicated on methods that are limited for the reasons I have previously outlined. 
These reasons are that (i) the authors do not specify the characteristic features of the 
text that they say is stigmatising (above the fact that the text features a violent event), 
(ii) they use questionnaires to elicit the participants’ opinions only, and (iii) because 
their participants are psychology students, they are not representative of the general 
public. Furthermore, the experiment does not accurately reflect the means by which 
people consume newspaper articles; e.g. it is highly unlikely that a member of the 
public would read two articles on mental illness in such close proximity that one 
would affect the interpretation of the other in such obvious ways. The creation and 
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reproduction of stigma in the news is much more pernicious than Thornton & Wahl’s 
experiment suggests. 
Thornton & Wahl’s experiment is limited too in that the number of articles 
presented to participants was very small (just two). In a larger scale study, Wahl et al. 
(2002) analysed the news coverage of mental illness in 300 newspapers. However, this 
research was still based on the subjective analysis of themes in newspaper reports. For 
example, Wahl et al. (2002) describe their method as including the identification of 
“the main themes of each article” and “the overall tone of the article” (Wahl et al., 
2002: 9). As a result, the study is limited in its replicability because thematic analysis 
of this kind relies on the interpretation of the individual analyst. Wahl et al. (2002) do, 
however, make reference to language in their research. They analyse the frequency of 
person-first language (e.g. ‘people with mental illness’ rather than ‘the mentally ill’). 
This recognition of the role language plays in creating stigma is positive; however, the 
research team refer to person-first language without fully exploring whether there is 
a linguistic basis for person-first forms. 
In their research, Wahl et al. (2002) found that very little attention was paid to 
community intervention in the newspaper coverage. Reporting on this earlier work, 
Wahl (2003) writes: 
 
Seldom were psychosocial or community interventions described, despite their 
increasing importance in the recovery movement. Thus, current newspaper 
coverage contributes to the medicalization of mental illness and the public is 
led to accept—and provide financial support for—medication and 
hospitalization as the primary solutions for mental health problems. Similar 
acceptance and support for psychosocial intervention, rehabilitation, and 
community treatment will likely be harder to obtain given their absence from 
journalistic considerations of mental health treatment options. 
 
(Wahl, 2003: 1598) 
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Media reportage, then, can affect attitudes towards people with mental illness in a 
local sense (i.e. stigmatising an individual), but also in a national sense as moral panics 
caused by media reports may influence social policy, such as a movement away from 
community care and coercive mental health policy. 
There are other trends in the research into mental illness in the news. For 
example, the coverage of causes and responsibility for mental illness. Zhang et al. 
(2016) found that historically the responsibility for and the causes of depression were 
more likely to be attributed to the individual than to society in US newspapers, writing 
that “the number-one causal factor presented by the media was genetics, personality, 
and individual health outcomes” (2016: 128). Moreover, Corrigan et al. (2005) found 
that attributing the cause of mental illness to environmental factors was more common 
than attributing the cause to individuals, and Ohlsson (2017) found that an increase in 
mental health problems in the Swedish print media was being attributed to life in 
modern society (2017: 302). As a result of this, Ohlsson states that often the concept of 
mental health is taken for granted in the news reports and, because of this, “there is a 
conceptual confusion when it comes to what should be regarded as medical problems 
and what should rather be seen as other kinds of painful experiences.” (2017: 304). 
Ohlsson (2017) argues that mental illness is used in a vague way to describe specific 
mental illnesses (e.g. schizophrenia) to emotional (i.e. non-pathologised) pain). 
Confusion over what constitutes mental illness was also a theme found by Pescosolido 
(1999) who found that members of the American public were less likely to view 
depression as severe or, in some cases, as a mental illness at all. (1999: 1343). More 
recently Rowe et al. (2003) found that the reporting of depression in Australian 
newspapers often neglected to provide any definitions or explanations of depression 
and that depression was a taken-for-granted concept. They also found that depression 
was often compared with “other, genuinely biological, illnesses […] where medico-
scientific language is used to account for lived experience” (Rowe et al., 2003: 692); i.e. 
experts were promoted rather than members of the public. 
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There also exist trends in the coverage of particular participant groups in 
newspaper reports on mental illness. For example, Slopen et al. (2007) analysed news 
articles to assess mental illness reportage and responsible journalism. The research 
team use the term ‘responsible journalism’ to refer to those newspaper articles that 
adhered official media guidelines set out by mental health professionals in Australia 
(e.g. the guidelines included avoiding “slang terminology”). They found that articles 
related to children were more likely to refer to behavioural issues and alcohol or drug 
abuse while stories on adults were more likely to refer to crime and dangerousness. 
They also found a greater degree of responsible journalism in the child stories, 
whereas stigmatising language was more likely to be found in adult stories (Slopen et 
al., 2007: 3). Slopen et al.’s (2007) findings are interesting because they are revealing of 
the different journalistic practices in reports on mental illness; however, the 
methodology used does not query the role that language plays in any detail. They 
never unpack what the term ‘slang’ refers to; they simply list some lexical items that 
they coded as slang. This list includes words such as “psycho” and “nuts”, which may 
be conventionally associated with slang use, but they also list the words “lunatic” and 
“madness”, despite the fact that there is no basis for defining these as slang terms 
(especially in the UK where these terms would have been used in official mental 
illness legislation historically, e.g. The Lunacy Act of 1845). Moreover, Slopen et al. 
(2007) study slang usages with the assumption that such usages are inherently 
stigmatising. Doing this is clearly problematic from a linguistic perspective where the 
context of any utterance (written or otherwise) has to be taken into account in order 
for something to be deemed as offensive, and so no work is inherently stigmatising. 
Further to Slopen at al.’s (2007) finding that there are different journalistic practices 
depending on who the person with mental illness is (i.e. adult or child), Coverdale et 
al. (2002) found that in newspaper articles in New Zealand, more articles concerned 
male mental illness than female mental illness with no articles on child or adolescent 
mental illness. 
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A further theme that is covered in much of the existing literature is whether or 
not articles refer to recovery or treatment. Corrigan et al. (2005) found that there was 
equal representation of biological and psychosocial treatments in a sample of US 
newspaper reports on mental illness (n=3353) with just 4% of those addressing 
recovery (Corrigan et al., 2005: 551). More recent articles have shown that recovery is 
a theme in news articles reporting on mental illness. In one of very few studies into 
press representations of mental illness that is informed by linguistics, Atanasova et al. 
(2019) found that recovery was the most prominent theme in a corpus assisted analysis 
of 1,412 British newspaper articles. Moreover, in contrast to the prevailing trend in 
psychiatry research that assumes that reports on mental illness are stigmatising, 
Atanasova et al. (2019) found that the discussion of stigma (e.g. raising awareness 
about it) was a key theme in newspaper reports.  
In the following sections, specific themes in media depictions of mental illness 
research will be covered in more detail. 
 
2.5.2 Depictions of criminality and violence 
 
So far in Section 2.4, I have reported on the existing literature that has found an 
association between mental illness and violence and criminality. In this section, I 
explore research in more detail. The reason for doing this is that research into 
depictions of criminality and violence in reference to mental illness have been 
numerous. Consequently, this topic warrants its own section. 
As I have shown in my report on the existing literature so far, mental illness is 
consistently presented negatively in the media, which results in stigma around mental 
illness. One of the ways in which this stigma is created is through the reporting of 
mental illness alongside reports of criminality or violence. For example, Bowen (2016) 
found that 42% of UK newspapers that reported on personality disorder between 
2001-2012 linked personality disorder and homicide (2016: 601) with articles that 
linked personality disorder and homicide decreasing in the later time period (2007-
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2012). Bowen’s findings echo those of Whitley & Berry (2013) who found that 40% of 
Canadian newspaper articles on mental illness between 2005-2010 (n=11,263) were 
related to violence & criminality. Additionally, what is and is not included in reports 
on mental illness can result in incorrect assumptions about the symptoms of illnesses. 
For example, Vilhauer (2015) explored depictions of auditory verbal hallucinations 
(hereafter AVH) in US newspaper data (n=181) and found that the media reported 
AVH as a pathology rather than something that can occur in psychologically healthy 
people. Vilhauer (2015) argues that the representation of AVH as a pathology could 
increase stigma around AVH. Moreover, Vilhauer (2015) found that people who 
experience AVH were portrayed negatively, with AVH being associated with violence 
and criminal behaviour (2015: 61) (see Deamer & Hayward, 2018 and Demjen et al., 
2019 for linguistic accounts of voice hearing using non-press data). 
Looking specifically at the link between violent crime and mental illness, Flynn 
et al. (2015) explored the reporting of 60 homicide-suicide cases in newspapers in 
England and Wales over a three-year period. They found that pejorative and 
derogatory language (terms that they do not unpack but rather assume are obvious) 
was used in reference to mental illness with the depiction of mental illness being 
inaccurate. They found several themes (guided by an existing and generic qualitative 
analysis framework devised by Hodder 2010 [2003]) in the articles analysed (n=1163) 
including blaming, violence and personal tragedy, mental illness and speculation that 
the incident was due to mental illness (Flynn et al., 2015: 270). In line with these 
findings, McGinty et al. (2016) found that in a sample of US newspapers published 
between 1995-2014 (n=400), there was an increase over the time period in articles that 
mentioned mass shootings committed by people with mental illnesses (2016: 1121). 
Furthermore, Whitley et al. (2017) explored Canadian newspaper articles that 
reported on cases where a person has been found not criminally responsible on 
account of mental disorder (NCRMD) compared with general articles on mental 
illness. They found that articles containing references to NCRMD were more negative 
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overall and “almost never focused on recovery or rehabilitation, in stark comparison 
to generic articles about mental illness” (Whitley et al. 2017: 697). 
Previous research has also shown that reports on certain illnesses are more likely 
to feature depictions of people with mental illness as criminal or aggressive. For 
example, Nawka et al. (2012) analysed 375 Czech Republic and Slovakian newspaper 
articles from 2007. They found that 31.2% of the data reported aggressive behaviour, 
with homicide being most frequently mentioned in reference to psychotic disorders 
and schizophrenia whereas suicides and homicides were more frequently reported in 
reference to affective disorders. Additionally, they found that eating disorders and 
anxiety disorders were not linked to any aggressive behaviour (Nawka et al., 2012: 1). 
Additionally, Coverdale et al. (2002) found that in a sample of newspaper articles in 
New Zealand, a key theme was criminality, but also vulnerability (the notion that 
people with mental illness are “incompetent and unable to control their own life” 
(2002: 699). They also found that in positive articles, common themes were human 
rights, leadership, sporting prowess or educational accomplishments (2002: 699). 
More recent diachronic studies have demonstrated a change in media representations 
of mental illness towards more positive reporting. For example, Goulden et al. (2011) 
used content analysis to analyse UK newspaper articles in three different years (1992, 
2000, 2008) (n=1361). They found there were fewer negative articles over the time 
period with an increase in articles on psychiatric disorders featuring explanations of 
this category of mental illness. However, the coverage of illness types was variable. 
They write: 
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The overall positive trend masks considerable variation by diagnosis. The 
reporting of depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and eating disorders, either 
improved over time or was always largely favourable. In contrast, 
schizophrenia, personality disorders, and general references to mental illness, 
appeared mainly in the context of 'bad news', and saw little or no change in 
their coverage over time. 
 
(Goulden et al. 2011: 5) 
 
These findings are echoed by Whitley & Wang (2016) who analysed articles that 
discussed mental illness from Canadian newspapers between 2005-2015 (n=24, 570). 
They found that articles with a positive tone had doubled over the time period and 
stigmatising content had reduced by a third (2016: 278). They argue that these figures 
suggest that national anti-stigma campaigns have been successful. 
The research I have reported in this section exhibits a fairly standard 
methodological approach to the analysis of press data in the existing literature. This 
consists of collecting newspaper articles based on arbitrary search terms, conducting 
some form of thematic or content analysis (e.g. Coverdale et al., 2002; Goulden et al., 
2011) with the aim of identifying whether the articles are positive or negative (e.g. 
Goulden et al., 2011; Whitley & Wang, 2016) or identifying key themes (Coverdale et 
al., 2002). The problem this methodological approach is that whether an article is 
viewed as positive or negative, or what constitutes a key theme, relies heavily on the 
analyst’s own interpretation of the data, which makes the research hard to replicate 
(recall that I argued this same point about Rhydderch et al.’s (2016) research into anti-
stigma initiatives). 
 
2.5.3 Gender and mental illness 
 
There are a number of studies exploring gender differences in reports on mental 
illness. The reason that gender is an interesting variable to study in mental illness 
reportage is that some mental illnesses are more prevalent in certain genders. For 
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example, unipolar depression is twice as common in women, and men are “more than 
three times more likely to be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder than 
women” (WHO, 2019). Moreover, how a society socially constructs an illness can 
create stereotypes about who can be affected by specific mental illnesses. For example, 
there is a stereotype that only women get eating disorders and that depression is at 
odds with a masculine identity (Galasiński, 2017). Previous research has also shown 
that the mass media present gender biases in relation to mental illness; for example, 
Klin & Lemish discuss how women’s magazines frame stress and agoraphobia as 
“female mental disabilities” (2008: 438) whereas magazines over-represented men in 
discussions about “psychoses, personality disorders and childhood problems” (Klin 
& Lemish, 2008: 438). 
Research has shown that men do not access help for mental illness (Johnson et 
al., 2012) because seeking help for depression is seen as “culturally feminized” 
(Kilmartin, 2005; Scholz et al., 2014). Machlin et al. (2014) explored the link between 
positive portrayals of men with depression in the news and men seeking help for 
depression and anxiety via helpline services in Australia. They found that there was 
an increase in the uptake of helpline support in the weeks after the positive news 
stories. Furthermore, Whitley et al. (2015) explored gender in mental illness reports. 
Using content analysis to analyse 1168 newspaper articles collected over a six-month 
period, Whitley et al. (2015) found that newspaper articles about men were more 
negative than those about women. Whitley et al.’s (2015) study is another example 
where the method used is heavily reliant on interpretation, e.g. content analysis. In a 
description of their method, Whitley et al. (2015) write that they “read and coded 
articles for the presence or absence of themes and content” (Whitley et al., 2015: 325) 
but offer no description of what constitutes a theme. As a result of the overreliance on 
interpretation and unclear parameters of what constitutes a theme, Whitley et al.’s 
(2015) research is not replicable. 
Finally, in research into suicide, Marzano et al. (2018) found that in a collection 
of 8,101 articles published in the UK and the Republic of Ireland over a 12-month 
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period; reports featuring young females (particularly those whose suicide was 
considered unusual) were more common. 
Existing research, then, has shown clear gender differences in the reportage of 
mental illness. 
 
2.5.4 Depictions of schizophrenia 
 
The reason for having a separate section on studies into newspaper representations of 
schizophrenia specifically is that research into schizophrenia in the press is hugely 
overrepresented in the literature to date. This is intriguing when one considers that 
newspaper articles on schizophrenia are less common than those discussing other 
illnesses (Wahl, 1996). A considerable amount of research into the representation of 
schizophrenia in print media has been concerned with the label itself, which is 
medically contested, even leading some mental health professionals to state that 
schizophrenia does not exist (van Os, 2016). 
An example of research in this area is Lasalvia et al. (2015), who conducted a 
review of research into the label ’schizophrenia’ in light of mental health professionals 
and researchers calling for the term to be abandoned, arguing that it was stigmatising 
(Howe et al., 2014; Read et al., 2006). Lasalvia et al. (2015) analysed 47 articles 
published worldwide on the topic of renaming schizophrenia and new candidate 
labels. The team found that, overall, the research suggested that relabelling the 
condition would be a positive step, as non-medical usages of 
schizophrenia/schizophrenic “make it difficult to convey its proper meaning and 
contribute to maintaining the misconceptions and misinformation about the 
condition” (Lasalvia et al., 2015: 282). The use of schizophrenia or schizophrenic to refer 
to things outside of a medical context has been a source of much research. Studies 
have also shown that in contrast to other mental illnesses, schizophrenia reportage is 
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more negative overall9 (Aoki et al., 2016, Thornicroft et al., 2013; inter alia). One area 
of research into media depictions of schizophrenia that has attracted much attention 
is the use of schizophrenia as a metaphor (Duckworth et al., 2003; Guarniero et al., 
2017; Lampropoulos et al., 2017, inter alia)10, although these studies have tended to be 
carried out by researchers working outside of linguistics and therefore the 
categorisation and systematic analysis of source/target pairings are neglected, with 
statistical information about metaphorical usage being reported instead. Moreover, 
whether or not these studies refer to metaphor as it is known in linguistics and the 
cognitive sciences, or whether metaphor in the studies refers to any non-medical 
usage is unclear, as the reported method for analysis is often focused on the 
quantitative coding process rather than the linguistic instantiations of metaphorical 
language. Nevertheless, these studies do offer interesting insight into how often 
schizophrenia is used to refer to things outside of a medical context. Some researchers 
have categorised metaphorical usages. Frequent usages of schizophrenia as a metaphor 
in these studies include schizophrenia to refer to “split personality” or unpredictability. 
For example Magliano et al. (2011) found that metaphorical usages of schizophrenia 
were more common than references to it as a medical illness, with the metaphorical 
usages being used to refer to incoherence (related to the split personality metaphor), 
dangerousness/aggressiveness and eccentricity/oddness. (Magliano et al., 2011). 
These categories were also found in Greek newspapers (Athanasopoulou & Valimaki, 
2014). Further to this, Duckworth et al. (2003) found that 28% of a sample of US 
newspapers (n=876) featured schizophrenia as a metaphor, which they state creates 
imagery that “encourages further stigmatization and a popular orientation that 
discourages individuals from seeking treatment for their illness” (Duckworth et al. 
2003: 1402). In addition to this, Chopra & Doody (2007: 423) found that schizophrenia 
	
9 Aoki et al. (2016) focus on Japanese newspaper coverage and use the representation of bipolar 
disorder as a control condition. 
10 These studies often report Sontag’s (1996) work on illness as metaphor and seem to be based on this 
view of metaphor. 
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was more likely to be used in a metaphorical sense than cancer was, but the reverse 
was true in US newspapers. Moreover, they report that 11% of their sample 
newspapers used schizophrenia as a metaphor. 
Wahl (1996) looked at the representation of schizophrenia in the news over a 5-
year period (1989-1994) in three American daily newspapers (n=101). Wahl (1996) 
found that the majority of reports pertained to the treatment of schizophrenia with 
drugs, or to the incidence of schizophrenia. Wahl (1996) found that the reportage was 
largely accurate. However, around 10% of the articles reported on schizophrenia in 
relation to criminal acts of a violent nature. Of the articles, 14 pertained to individual 
people’s experiences with schizophrenia, which Wahl (1996) notes were typically 
sympathetic and presented the individuals positively. Wahl concluded that, overall, 
schizophrenia was underreported (however it is unclear whether Wahl is referring to 
articles that use schizophrenia in a medical sense or in a metaphorical sense). 
In a later study, Angermeyer et al. (2005) explored whether there was a link 
between media portrayals of schizophrenia and stigmatising attitudes by assessing 
whether media consumption was related to the desire for social distance from people 
with schizophrenia. They found that participants who read tabloid and regional 
newspapers “express a higher preference for social distance towards people with 
schizophrenia than respondents who regularly read broadsheets (alone or in 
combination with either tabloids or regional newspapers or in combination with both) 
and those who do not read any newspaper at all.” (Angermeyer et al. 2005: 248). 
Angermeyer et al.’s research suggests that there is a link between the media and 
stigma (and therefore stigmatising attitudes can be changed as a result of changing 
information in the media). Their findings also indicate sites to target as part of anti-
stigma campaigns (2015: 249). They write that in order to affect positive change in 
relation to media depictions of mental illness “inaccurate and unfavorable messages 
should be replaced’ by accurate and positive messages. Stories of people living with 
mental disorders should become commonplace in media reports.” (Angermeyer et al. 
2005: 249). 
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Pingani et al. (2018) conducted a diachronic study of the use of schizo in Italian press 
between 2001-2015. Their research aims were to survey articles pertaining to 
schizophrenia to “identify possible predictors reinforcing negative stereotypes about 
people with schizophrenia” (Pingani et al., 2018: 792). The researchers grouped the 
articles into usages of schizo in a medical sense and usages of schizo in a non-medical 
sense. They found that of the 946 articles analysed, 356 “mainly reinforce negative 
stereotypes regarding mental illness” (2018: 792). They found several ‘predictors’ that 
an article would contain negative stereotypes: “unnecessarily dramatic or sensational 
headline or content; inaccurate or not in the correct context use of medical 
terminology; emphasis to the illness rather than to the person; mental disorders are 
the same; disclosure of particular individual has a mental illness.” (2018: 792). The 
researchers found that there was no reduction of negative stereotypes over the time 
period in articles that used schizo in a non-medical sense. Conversely they found that 
in articles that used schizo in a medical sense there was a significant reduction in 
stigmatising features. As the researchers point out, this finding is in contrast to studies 
conducted by Clement & Foster (2008) who found no significant change in the number 
of stigmatising articles on schizophrenia published in 1996 or 2005 in the UK press. 
They did find, however, that articles published more recently were less likely to use 
‘schizophrenia’ in metaphorical contexts (2008: 178). The differences in the findings of 
Clement & Foster (2008) and (Pingani et al., 2018) arguably provide evidence for the 
cultural basis of illness that I discussed in Section 2.2 on social constructionism. 
Gwarjanksi & Parrott (2018) conducted a content analysis of stigma frames to 
explore the representation of schizophrenia in articles taken from eight US news 
websites in 2015 (n=558). Unlike some previous research, Gwarjanksi & Parrott (2018) 
do describe what features were coded as positive and negative, although the 
descriptions are still vague overall, e.g. whether an article featured negative 
statements about people with mental illness, etc. Gwarjanksi & Parrott (2018) found 
that in keeping with research on print media representations of schizophrenia, the 
portrayals were negative (2017: 959). The researchers also found that reader comments 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 
 64 
on the articles in which stigmatising frames were used were more likely to be 
stigmatising. In contrast, articles that contained stigma-challenging frames were more 
likely to feature reader comments that challenged stigma. This finding offers further 
evidence that the media can influence perceptions of mental illness. 
Focusing on the difference in labels for the concept of schizophrenia, Aoki et al. 
(2016) explored whether there was a difference in the way schizophrenia was 
represented before and after the illness was renamed in Japan using data from three 
national broadsheets. In 2002, the name for schizophrenia was changed from 
“’seishin-bunretsu-byo’, which literally means “mindsplit-disease” […] to ‘togo-
sitcho-syo’, which literally means ‘integration disorder’.” (Aoki et al., 2016: 193). The 
researchers found a decline in articles that linked schizophrenia and danger after 
renaming when compared with a control condition. However, Koike et al. (2016) 
analysed newspaper headlines and discourse taken from a TV national TV 
programme before and after the name change and found that, contrary to Aoki et al.’s 
findings, schizophrenia was still reported in reference to criminality and violence 
(2016: 558). The difference in the findings made by Koike et al. (2016) and Aoki et al. 
(2016) may be down to the genre differences associated with the headlines of 
newspaper articles and the main body of the text, e.g. headlines are more 
sensationalised because the purpose of them is to be attention-grabbing (I discuss the 
features of headlines in more detail in Chapter 7) in addition to the fact that Aoki et 
al. (2016) use data from broadsheet newspapers only. Diachronic studies into the 
changing labels for schizophrenia and the effect of these changes such as Koike et al. 
(2016) have also been conducted using newspaper data from South Korean (Park et 
al., 2012) and in Chinese newspapers on psychosis (Chan et al., 2016), with few 
changes observed. 
Up to this point, I have described the content of previous research into mental 
illness that uses language as data. Previous research has shown that that mental illness 
reportage is overwhelmingly and cross-culturally negative, with the levels of stigma 
associated with illnesses varying across illness types. Moreover, previous research has 
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showed that the language used to discuss and report on mental illness has real world 
consequences; for example, it has the potential to influence social policy and override 
the personal experiences of people with mental illnesses. Language, then, is central to 
our understanding of mental illness and the experience of mental illness. 
My report to this point has described the findings of existing research, and has 
discussed some of the problems associated with the methods used in existing research. 
Table 2.1 details the methodological information for each study outlined in the press 
data section of this chapter. Presenting the research in this way allows for a clearer 
view of trends in existing research. Column 1 (C1) details the author and publication 
date, C2 details the main method or approach described in the method section of the 
article, C3 lists the number of newspapers that articles were collected from, C4 lists 
any particular focus of the article (‘-’ indicates no particular focus other than mental 
illness), C5 details the dates the data was collected from, C6 details the number of 
articles analysed, C7 details the country the data was collected from and C8 details 
the discipline of the journal the article was submitted to, and the subject area of the 
first named researcher. The reason for collecting the information listed in C8 is to 
provide insight into the disciplinary tradition the article belongs to (albeit by a rather 
blunt instrument). For example, in cases where discourse analysis is listed as a 
method, whether the author is from a linguistics background or a psychiatry 
background may mean the analysis is quite different in each case.11 
	
11 Table 1 is not exhaustive and is limited by what I have access to. I have endeavored to cover as wide 
a range of articles as possible using the Web of Science tool to assist my search. 
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OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
METHODOLOGICAL INFORMATION 
 
Authors/Date Method/Approach No. of 
sources  
Specific 
focus 
Dates covered Sample size 
(n=) 
Country Journal discipline/lead 
author subject  
Aoki et al. (2016 ) Content 
analysis/Pearson’s 
correlation analyses, 
fishers r-to-z 
transformation 
3 Schizophrenia 
& bipolar, 
stigma 
1992-2012 4677 Japan Schizophrenia/medicine 
Atanasova et al. 
(2019) 
Corpus-assisted frame 
analysis, thematic 
analysis  
N/S Arts 
initiatives 
2007-2015 1,412 UK Health/linguistics 
Bilić & Georgaca 
(2007 
CDA ~10 - 2004-2004 165 Serbia  Psychology /psychology 
Bowen (2016) Content analysis  6 Personality 
disorder 
2001-2012 552 UK Mental health 
nursing/health & social 
care 
Chopra & Doody 
(2007) 
Metaphor identification 
(using Sontag, 1996) 
6 Schizophrenia 
& cancer 
Aug 2004 – 
Nov 2005 
600 UK Medicine/practitioner 
Clement & Foster 
(2008) 
Content analysis  5 Schizophrenia 1996, 2005 1196 UK Schizophrenia/primary 
care/public health 
Corrigan et al. (2005) Bespoke coding scheme 
(developed using Wahl, 
2002) 
70 Stigma 6 week periods 
every 2 
months in 2002 
3353 US Psychiatry/psychiatric 
rehabilitation 
Coverdale et al. 
(2002) 
Thematic analysis  N/S - 4 week period 
in 1997 
600 New Zealand Psychiatry/medical & 
health sciences  
Duckworth et al. 
(2003) 
Content coding  5 Schizophrenia 
& cancer 
1996-1997 1,740 US Psychiatry/N/S 
Flynn et al. (2015) Thematic analysis  N/S Homicide-
suicide 
2006-2012 16,323 England & 
Wales 
Psychiatry, medical & 
human sciences  
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Francis et al. (2004) Bespoke instrument 
measuring responsible 
reporting  
N/S - March 2000-
Feb 2001 
4351 Australia  Psychiatry/ Population 
Health, 
Goulden et al. (2011) Content analysis 4 Stigma 1992, 2000, 
2008 
1361 UK Public health/community 
mental health  
Guarniero et al. 
(2017) 
Content analysis 1 Schizophrenia 2008 184 Brazil Psychiatry/psychiatry  
Gwarjanksi & 
Parrott (2018) 
Content analysis 1 Schizophrenia 2001-2015 946 Italy Psychiatry/psychiatry  
Hallam (2002) Non-specified  N/S - 1992-2000 675 UK Psychiatry/ economics of 
mental health 
Kenez et al. (2015) Content and thematic 
analysis  
3 - 12 weeks in 
2012 
255 Australia  Public health/ psychology 
& public health  
Koike et al. (2016) Test data mining 
analysis  
4 Schizophrenia 1985-2013 23169092 Japan Schizophrenia/mental 
health 
Lampropoulos et al. 
2017 
Intuitive coding scheme 8 Schizophrenia 2015 - France Social psychiatry/ 
Machlin et al. (2014) N/S N/S Depression 
(male) 
July 2012 – 
June 2013 
10 Australia  Official report 
Magliano et al. 
(2011) 
Metaphor identification 
(using Sontag, 1996), v2 
22 Schizophrenia 2008 1087 Italy  Social 
psychiatry/psychology  
Marzano et al. (2018) Bespoke coding scheme 
(for responsible 
journalism) 
N/S Suicide 12 months 8,101 UK and ROI Crisis/psychology 
McGinty et al. (2016) Content analysis  7 - 1995-2014 400 US Health/mental health & 
addiction 
Nairn & Coverdale 
(2005) 
Close reading 
Propositional analysis  
N/S - 4 week period 
in 1997 
600 New Zealand  Psychiatry/population 
health  
Nawka et al. (2012) Content analysis  6 Aggression 2007 375 Czech republic 
& Slovakia  
Psychiatry/psychiatry 
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Nawková et al. 
(2012) 
Content analysis 6 - 5 week –long 
periods in 2007 
450 Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, 
Croatia  
Health communication/ 
psychiatry  
Ohlsson (2017) Thematic analysis  2 - 2009 691 Sweden  Health/ education 
Ottewell (2017) Content analysis  4 - 1987-2014 448 Japan Public mental 
health/social sciences  
Park et al. (2012) Content analysis  3 Schizophrenia 2001-2010 490 South Korea Social 
psychiatry/psychiatry 
Paterson (2006) Frame analysis  6 - 1992-2000 N/S UK Psychiatry/ 
nursing/midwifery 
Philo et al. (1994) Content analysis  N/S - April 1993 562 Scotland  Health education/ media 
Pingani et al. (2018)        
Roberts et al. (2013) Content analysis  4 - 1991, 2001, 
2011 
277 Bermuda Psychiatry/psychiatry 
Rowe et al. (2003) Discourse analysis  N/S Depression 2000 49 Australia  Sociology/psychology  
Rhydderch et al. 
(2016) 
Content analysis  
Coding system  
27 Anti-stigma  2 days of every 
month 
between 2008-
2014 (minus 
2012) 
N/S England  
Scholz et al. (2014) Discourse analysis N/S Depression 
(male) 
Sept 2002-Aug 
2011 
849 Australia Qualitative health 
research/applied 
psychology 
Slopen et al. (2007) Coded using bespoke 
system  
- Age analysis 1-week 
periods in 2002 
every 2 
months 
1253 US Health communication/ 
society & health 
Stuart (2003) Content analysis  1 Schizophrenia  24 months 
(year N/S)  
~362 Canada Psychiatry/ community 
health & epidemiology  
Thornicroft et al. 
(2013) 
Content analysis 27 Anti-stigma 2 days each 
month 
~3000 England 
 
Psychiatry/ health service 
&population research 
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TABLE 2.1. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH DISCUSSED IN SECTION 2.4 “PRESS DATA”
throughout 
2011 
Thornton & Wahl 
(1996) 
Questionnaire  
Experimental  
- - - 3 US Psychology / N?A 
Wahl (1996) N/S 3 Schizophrenia 1989-1994 101 US Psychiatry/psychology 
Wahl et al. (2002) Thematic analysis, 
coded using bespoke 
system  
N/S - 1989-1999 600 US Book/N/S 
Whitley & Berry 
(2013) 
Trend analysis  N/S - 2005-2010 11,263 Canada Psychiatry/psychiatry  
Whitley & Wang 
(2017) 
Trend analysis, chi-
square test  
~20 Anti-stigma 2005-2015 24,570 Canada  Psychiatry/ Psychiatry 
Whitley & Wang 
(2017) 
Thematic analysis  20 Criminality 2015 940 Canada Psychiatry/psychiatry 
Whitley et al. (2015) Content analysis N/S Chivalry 
hypothesis 
Nov 2010-apr 
2011 
1168 Canada  Psychiatry/mental health 
Yang & Parrott 
(2018) 
Quantitative content 
analysis 
8 Schizophrenia 2015 558 US Health comm/journalism 
and media 
Zhang et al. (2014) Framing, content 
analysis  
N/S Depression 2000-2012 1507 China Journalism/media and 
culture 
Zhang et al. (2016) Content analysis  6 Depression 1980-2012 1656 US Applied communication/ 
media & culture 
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2.6 Existing research: an overview 
 
As is evident from Table 2.1, the majority of studies to date that use newspaper 
data have been conducted in the field of psychiatry. Moreover, the existing 
research often uses content analysis or thematic analysis to discuss aspects of 
texts. As I have discussed at various points in this chapter, this means that the 
aspects of texts analysed are those that the analyst deems of interest, which may 
result in overly subjective/interpretative analyses. Furthermore, many of the 
studies use coding schemes which are only used in the field of psychiatry. 
Whilst such studies build on existing knowledge on mental illness reportage in 
psychiatry, they do not offer specific information about mental illness 
reportage to those working in other disciplines. For example, many of the 
coding structures used in the existing research do not go far beyond saying that 
an article is negative or positive, and relatedly whether it is stigmatising or not. 
The issue with research of this kind is that while is it invaluable in providing 
insights into trends in mental illness reportage over the years, it does not 
question what stigma is exactly, or how it is manifested in language (which is 
where researchers must believe stigma is manifested if newspaper articles are 
used as a unit of analysis). This is also true of the studies that use methods 
combining, for example, content analysis and statistical tests. They provide 
great insight into the trends within the data but neglect to recognise the wealth 
of information contained in each text that is more subtle that merely whether 
the text is positive or negative overall. My intention here is not to suggest that 
research of this kind is not useful. It is, and for the most part it is systematic. 
But while the methods employed are sufficient for meeting the research aims 
in psychiatry, there are inevitably analytical gaps that, from a linguistic 
standpoint, are glaring. It is clear that what is needed in research into the 
representations of mental illness in the news is for greater attention to be paid 
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to the systematic analysis of the linguistic structures in the text. This will offer 
a means of providing more nuanced understandings of mental illness. Here 
linguistics has a clear role to play. Very little research has been done by 
linguists in this area (aside from Atanasova et al., 2019), which is surprising 
given that (i) discourse analysis is a method familiar in the field and (ii) the 
linguistic analysis of mental illness more generally is a fertile area in linguistics 
(see for example, Demjen et al., 2019; Kinloch & Jaworska, 2019; Koteyko & 
Atanasova, 2018; Knapton, 2013; Harvey, 2012, 2014; Harvey & Brown, 2012; 
Hunt & Harvey, 2015; Tay, 2017). By way of an example of how linguistics can 
enrich findings in psychiatry, let us revisit the findings reported by numerous 
researchers that violence and criminality are key themes in news reports on 
mental illness. Research has shown that people with mental illness are viewed 
as being out of control of their actions, violent and dangerous. A simple 
collocation and concordance analysis can test whether there is a linguistic basis 
for this belief. I discuss the link between violence and criminality and mental 
illness in Chapter 7. 
  
2.7 The place of the current study 
 
As well as offering insight into some methodological limitations for researchers 
interested in language in mental health reportage, Table 2.1 also reveals some 
gaps in existing research. For example, there has been relatively little attention 
paid to the participants within the data other than their gender or age. In 
response to this gap in the research, Chapter 7 will analyse the naming 
strategies used to refer to people with mental illness within the data. The reason 
for doing this is that investigating how participants are named is a systematic 
and replicable way to explore how people with mental illness are discursively 
constructed in the press. This analysis then in turn gives insight into how 
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people with mental illness are viewed in UK society (because journalists write 
for the public). 
Another gap in the research in UK-based studies is that studies tend to be 
small-scale. This is perhaps due to a tendency in the field to conduct qualitative 
data analysis. However, corpus linguistics offers methods to facilitate the 
detailed analysis of big data. In response to this gap in the research, this thesis 
presents analyses based on a corpus of over 50 million words, comprising 
articles published over a 30-year period. To my knowledge, this makes the 
current project the largest scale project carried out to date in this area. 
Moreover, the data used in this thesis is continuous over the 30-year period and 
does not rely on making diachronic observations of data using discrete datasets 
(e.g. Goulden et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2013). Furthermore, as was noted in the 
previous section, previous research has found variation in the extent to which 
specific illnesses are stigmatised. The design of the data used in this thesis, 
which comprises illness subcorpora and year subcorpora, means that the 
idiosyncrasies of illness can be explored in detail. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that studies into the language of mental illness 
have spanned a variety of disciplines. In the existing research, researchers have 
made efforts to analyse how society views mental health, using mass media – 
and often newspaper discourse specifically – as data. This is based on the 
rationale that the press informs how society think about mental health (and 
arguably that newspaper discourse is a reification of current societal thought 
on mental health and therefore a worthy object of study). This idea that there 
is a link between texts and society is one echoed by Baker who writes 
“considering that corpora contain natural occurring data, they have the 
potential to tell us as much about the values of societies they came from as they 
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do about language” (Baker, 2010: 121). I have shown how this rationale is based 
on the theoretical position of social constructionism (Burr, 1995). To date, 
studies of mental health representations in the press that make use of linguistics 
are few; instead, the methods used are overly interpretative (e.g. close reading 
or content analysis) and applied to small datasets. However, there is an 
emerging body of research in linguistics into the language of mental illness 
(Demjen et al., 2019; Atanasova et al., 2019; Deamer & Hayward, 2018). 
What unites existing studies in linguistics and studies from other 
disciplines into language is that language affects the way we see the world; i.e. 
that meaning is socially constructed. It is my contention that linguistics offers 
the tools to better understand the social constructs that are taken for granted in 
the existing literature on mental illness, constructs such as stigma. Moreover, 
the analysis of language provides a means of seeing social constructs emerge 
from the language, rather than looking for existing social constructs in the data. 
For this reason, a more nuanced approached to language analysis in this area 
offers new ways of looking at mental illness reportage. 
There is, then, a clear gap in current research for studies that combine 
methods from linguistics and insights from mental health studies like those 
reported in this chapter. This thesis uses big data to analyse the discursive 
construction of mental illness with no preconceived expectations of the data 
and with no particular a prioi focus, such as the assumption of stigma or 
positive or negative portrayals of mental illness. 
In this chapter I have described the theory underpinning this thesis, that 
of social constructionism. I have also reviewed the existing literature on stigma 
research and research into mental illness that uses language data. I have 
reported the key findings in the existing research in addition to identifying the 
methodological problems in the existing literature. Furthermore, I have 
positioned by own research in relation to the existing literature. In the next 
chapter, I describe the analytical methods I use from corpus linguistics.   
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3. Analytical Methods 1: Corpus Linguistics 
 
In Chapter 2, I described the theoretical position underpinning the analysis in 
this thesis and reviewed the existing literature into mental illness and language. 
In this chapter, I detail the analytical methods and tools used in this thesis taken 
from corpus linguistics. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I provide a brief overview of corpus linguistics and the key 
debates and schools of thought in corpus linguistics. In addition, I describe each 
analytical method taken from corpus linguistics that I use in this thesis. Each 
section of this chapter will relate to a different method, e.g. keyword analysis, 
key semantic domain analysis. I exemplify each method using data collected 
during a pilot study of this thesis, and a sample of the MI 1984-2014 corpus. 
The two corpora used in this section are the sample corpus containing newspaper 
articles that discuss mental illness (559, 874 tokens) and a more specialised 
corpus containing newspaper articles containing the lemma mania* (271,874 
tokens), called the mania corpus.  
In Section 3.2, I describe briefly the varying ways in which corpus 
linguistics is used, e.g. as a theory and as a method. In this section I set out the 
way that I use corpus methods in this thesis. In section 3.3, I describe the 
different corpus methods used in this thesis.  
 
3.2. Corpus Linguistics 
 
Corpus linguistics is the study of linguistic patterns in large quantities of 
machine-readable text “that defies analysis by hand or eye alone within any 
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reasonable timeframe” (McEnery & Hardie, 2012: 2)12. The texts under scrutiny 
may be written, or transcribed speech. The theoretical underpinnings of corpus 
linguistics can be traced back to the pioneers of contemporary linguistics and 
their work on language documentation, such as Franz Boas who famously 
wrote “While until about 1880 investigators confined themselves to the 
collection of vocabularies and brief grammatical notes, it has become more and 
more evident that large masses of texts are needed in order to elucidate the 
structure of languages” (Boas 1917: 1). In modern linguistics, corpus linguistic 
theory and methods are used in a wide range of subfields, such as those focused 
on the generation of grammars, natural language processing, and pedagogical 
linguistics in both English language and ESL contexts, right through to research 
such as that reported in this thesis that is concerned with analysing a particular 
variety of language within a fairly circumscribed context.  
Broadly defined, there exist two schools of thought in corpus linguistics. 
The first is the neo-Firthian School which originated at the University of 
Birmingham and is rooted in the work of John Rupert Firth, the UK’s first 
professor of linguistics 13  (see, for example, the work of such neo-Firthian 
scholars as Sinclair (1991), Hunston (2002), Louw (1993), Teubert (2005). 
Generally speaking, the neo-Firthian approach views corpus linguistics as a 
“sub-field in its own right” (Hardie & McEnery, 2010: 385) with its own 
theoretical status (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001). This type of corpus linguistics is 
characterised by the belief that the corpus should be the source of hypotheses 
about language, or as Teubert writes, “It is the discourse itself, and not a 
language-external taxonomy of linguistic entities, which will have to provide 
the categories and classifications that are needed to answer a given research 
question” (Teubert, 2005: 4). 
	
12 It is important to note here that early corpus linguistics was not necessarily computerised. 
For example. The Survey of English created at University College London was paper-based.	
13 J. R. Firth was made Professor of Linguistics at the University of London in 1944. 	
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The second school of thought is rooted in the work of scholars such as 
Randolph Quirk at University College London and Geoffrey Leech at Lancaster 
University. In contrast to the Birmingham School, this approach views corpus 
linguistics as a method by which researchers can test hypotheses or intuitions 
about language. It is this approach that underpins much of the research aiming 
to explore ideology in language (e.g. Baker et al., 2008; Partington et al., 2013; 
Wright & Brookes, 2018; inter alia) and test intuitions about, for example, 
literary texts (e.g. McIntyre & Walker, 2019; O'Halloran, 2007; Short et al, 2002; 
Semino & Short, 2004; inter alia). These two schools of thought or ‘traditions’ 
(Hardie & McEnery, 2010) have been termed as ‘corpus-driven’ and ‘corpus-
based’ respectively by Tognini-Bonelli (2001). In line with McEnery & Hardy 
(2012: 6), it is my view that these terms are not particularly useful because it is 
not the case that all corpus research neatly falls into one or the other ‘camp’. 
Indeed the debate surrounding the corpus-based vs. corpus-driven distinction 
(that has come to be known as the ‘bootcamp’ debate)14 has led proponents of 
both persuasions to make rather blunt observations of the other; for example 
Gries (2010: 330) claims that purely corpus-driven work is a “myth at best”, and 
Teubert (2010: 356) writes that corpus linguistics “has been hijacked by 
theoretical linguistics of all feathers”. The bootcamp debate led McEnery & 
Hardie to refer to the two traditions as the ’methodologist’ tradition and ‘neo-
Firthian’ tradition (Hardie & McEnery, 2010: 385). Hardie & McEnery (2010) 
state that they view themselves as methodologists because, as they point out 
elsewhere (McEnery & Hardie, 2012: 6), the binary view of corpus-based vs. 
corpus-driven can be discarded based on the fact that many researchers 
	
14 14 The bootcamp debate gets its name from an email thread posted to the Corpora mailing 
list in which Stefan Gries referred to a corpus workshop as a ‘bootcamp’. Subsequent replies 
to the thread took issue with the content of Gries’ workshop, resulting in the discussion of 
what corpus linguistics was exactly, i.e. method or theory. The email thread came to be the 
basis of a special issue published in the International Journal of Corpus Linguistics (Pope, 2010).  	
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working in the methodologist tradition reject “the notion that the corpus itself 
has a theoretical status, and thus also rejects the binary distinction between 
corpus-based and corpus-driven”.  
It is worth stating here that my own view is that corpus linguistics is a set 
of methods that I can use as a researcher as I see relevant to answer my research 
questions thoroughly and objectively. The reason I subscribe to this view is that 
fundamental to my interest in language is an interest in people and how people 
use language. As a result, a corpus can only help me investigate language usage 
so far. For example, corpus software facilitates the finding of all instances of 
the modal auxiliary verb should in a corpus, but what it cannot do is tell me 
whether each instance of should is deontic or epistemic, or what the effect was 
of using that verb on the participants discussed in the newspaper article. What 
corpus software does allow me to do is (i) triangulate my research by way of 
generating and testing hypotheses based on huge quantitates of data, (ii) test 
my intuitions about texts and (iii) provide me with objective parameters for the 
analysis of sub-corpora. 
While I subscribe to the view that corpus methods should be used and 
discarded as is necessary, it is vital to be mindful of and explicitly state the 
underlying theory that one has to subscribe to when basing any conclusions on 
corpus data at any level, and particularly for thematic corpora. For example, if 
generating hypotheses from corpus findings, it is important to state that these 
hypotheses will be conditioned by the sampling frame used to compile the 
corpus. This is not a weakness of the method but a strength as it provides better 
representation of the variety being analysed. Additionally, it is important to 
draw attention to the fact that corpus linguistics is mostly concerned with the 
language at the level of the token and that this is at odds with other theories in 
linguistics, e.g. pragmatic theories. Even if you are only interested in language 
at the level of the word this entails a set of assumptions about language. It 
would be wrong to assume, therefore, that the methodologist approach is 
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entirely atheoretical. Basing conclusions on corpus evidence requires 
subscribing to very many underlying theoretical positions, the most obvious 
being that frequency analysis offers a means of exploring a word’s significance. 
With this in mind, there is no reason why a linguist engaged in corpus analysis 
for the purposes of supplementing other analyses cannot develop the 
theoretical and methodological understanding of corpus linguistics any less 
than those engaged in research governed by the neo-Firthian tradition.  
For all of these reasons, I will refer to the type of corpus analysis 
conducted here by yet another term, ‘corpus-assisted’ (cf. O’Halloran, 2007), 
which forms part of the bigger approach to the study of texts known as ‘corpus-
assisted discourse studies’ or CADS (Partington, 2004, 2006). The reason for this 
is that this term better encapsulates what I view as my approach in this thesis, 
i.e. that corpus-assisted analysis uses methods from CL and CDA. In line with 
Baker et al. (2008: 274), it is my view that “neither CDA nor CL need be 
subservient to the other (as the word ‘assisted’ in CADS implies), but that each 
contributes equally and distinctly to a methodological synergy”. Moreover, 
CADS is a well-used term in research with similar aims to mine (e.g. Baker et 
al, 2008; Partington et al., 2013; Wright & Brookes, 2018, inter alia).  
In the following sections of this part of chapter 3, I will describe the 
methods used in the analysis section concerned with corpus linguistics. In what 
follows, I present each method separately, as doing so helps make clear the 
utility of the analysis and the statistical tests associated with the particular 
method. This is a somewhat simplistic way to present each method, as many 
need to be used in conjunction with others; for example, it is impossible to 
know the full significance of a particular collocation without concordance 
analysis. This is a view espoused by McEnery & Hardie (2012) who write that 
qualitative and quantitative analyses are “equally important to corpus 
linguists” (McEnery & Hardie, 2012: 3). 	
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 	
 
 
79 
Moreover, the methods described here will be used in conjunction with 
methods taken from critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to semi-
automate the analysis of particular textual practices, e.g. modality. A full 
description of CDA methods is given in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3. Corpus methods 	
In this section, I describe each corpus linguistic method used in this thesis. Each 
section will describe the method using data taken from the sample corpus and 
the mania corpus. I will also describe the statistical tests and statistical cut-offs 
associated with each method. In section 3.3.1 I describe frequency analysis, in 
Section 3.3.2-3.3.4 I describe methods associated with keyness analysis, 
specifically keyword analysis (Section 3.3.3) and key semantic domain analysis 
(Section 3.3.4). In Sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 I describe collocation analysis and N-
gram analysis, respectively. Section 3.2.5 describes concordance analysis and in 
Section 3.2.6, I describe semantic preference and semantic prosody. In section 
3.4, I conclude.  
 
3.3.1. Frequency analysis 
 
In its most basic form, frequency analysis is the measure of how often a word 
or phrase occurs within a corpus. Frequency analysis is often the first stage of 
corpus linguistic analysis, as it gives an indication of the topics discussed in a 
corpus. However, it is often the case that the highest frequency words in a 
corpus are function words that reveal very little about the themes within a 
corpus (this is not to say that function words do not reveal information about 
the corpus, as I will discuss in more detail in my discussion of style markers in 
Section 3.3.2. This means that the analyst may need to explore the lower 
ranking items on the frequency list in order to ascertain salient topics or words. 
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Frequency lists show all the types (distinct words) within a corpus grouped by 
frequency. Frequency lists are also known as wordlists.  
In order to ensure that word frequencies are comparable across corpora 
of different sizes, frequencies are usually normalised to a common base by 
generating a relative frequency15. In the case of Wmatrix (Rayson, 2009), the 
software used to generate the wordlist shown in Table 3.1), the common base 
is 100. This means that the result will show how many times a word occurs per 
100 words. Relative frequency is calculated as follows: 
 
Relative frequency = (frequency of token ÷ total number of tokens) x base 
of normalisation 
 
For example, to manually calculate the relative frequency of the in the sample 
corpus according the raw frequency reported in Table 3.1, we would carry out 
the following calculation: 
 
 (26926 ÷ 559,874) x 100 = 4.81 (to two decimal places) 
 
Generating descriptive statistics, such as calculating relative frequencies, 
provides an overview of the data under scrutiny and allows for the comparison 
of smaller corpora with larger corpora and vice versa. 16 Table 3.1 shows a 
wordlist for the sample corpus with both raw and relative frequencies. 
  
	
15 Also called normalised frequency.	
16 It is worth noting that different corpus tools calculate tokens differently and, as a result, 
frequencies (and therefore relative frequencies) will vary across software. Before manually 
calculating relative frequencies, the conscientious student should make sure to note which 
corpus tool they collected the raw frequencies from in order to save themselves a headache of 
the mathematical kind. This advice comes from bitter experience. 	
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Rank Word Freq. Relative Freq. 
1 the 26926 4.81 
2 to 15025 2.68 
3 of 14980 2.68 
4 and 14156 2.53 
5 a 13068 2.33 
6 in 9639 2.72 
7 that 7118 1.72 
8 is 6796 1.27 
9 it 5572 1.21 
10 I  5211 1.00 
TABLE 3.1. WORDLIST FOR SAMPLE CORPUS (TOP 10 WORDS BY FREQUENCY) 
 
Depending on the software available and the utility of such analyses in 
answering specific research questions, frequency lists can also be generated for 
semantic domains or parts-of-speech (POS). One piece of software that 
automatically tags corpora for semantic category and POS is Wmatrix (Rayson, 
2009). Using the in-built CLAWS17 and USAS18 taggers, Wmatrix can generate 
frequency lists that give information about the wider meaning being discussed 
in a corpus through semantic tagging (semtags), and grammatical information, 
through POS tagging. Table 3.2 shows the 21 top-level semantic categories in 
the USAS tagset. 
  
	
17 Developed at Lancaster University, the Constituent Likelihood Automatic Word-tagging 
System or CLAWS is an automatic part-of-speech tagger for English and achieves 96-97% 
accuracy (see Garside, 1987). 	
18 The UCREL Semantic Analysis System or USAS tagger developed at Lancaster University is 
an automatic semantic tagger based on McArthur’s Longman Lexicon of Contemporary English 
(McArthur 1981). The USAS tagger is 92% accurate.  	
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A 
general and 
abstract terms 
B 
the body and the 
individual 
C 
arts and crafts  
E 
emotion 
F 
food and 
farming 
G 
government and 
public 
H 
architecture 
housing and the 
home 
I 
money and 
commerce in 
industry 
K 
entertainment, 
sports and games  
L 
life and living 
things 
M 
movement, 
location, travel 
and transport 
N 
numbers and 
measurement  
O 
substances, 
materials, objects 
and equipment 
P 
education 
Q 
language and 
communication 
S 
social actions, 
states and 
processes 
T 
time 
W 
world and 
environment 
X 
psychological 
actions, states 
and processes 
Y 
science and 
technology 
Z 
names and 
grammar 
 
TABLE 3.2. TOP-LEVEL SEMANTIC CATEGORIES IN THE USAS TAGSET  
 
The 21 discourse fields can be further subdivided, e.g. semantic category B. THE 
BODY AND THE INDIVIDUAL19 can be divided into B1. ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY, 
B2. HEALTH AND DISEASE, B2+. HEALTHY, B2-. DISEASE, etc. Table 3.3 shows the top 
five key semantic domains in the sample corpus.  
 
Semtag Description of tag Freq. Relative Freq. 
Z5 Grammatical bin 169020 30.19 
Z8 Pronouns 50051 8.94 
A3+ Existing 16471 2.94 
Z99 Unmatched  11224 2.00 
B2- Disease 11068 1.98 
TABLE 3.3. TOP 5 SEMANTIC CATEGORIES IN SAMPLE CORPUS 
	
19 In line with Wmatrix, and for clarity, I will use SMALL CAPS to indicate a semantic domain in 
the rest of this thesis. 	
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Table 3.3 shows the top 5 semantic categories in the sample corpus. The value 
of Table 3.3 is that this allows us to gain insight into the language used in a 
corpus. It is also possible to see how the semantic categories and the highest 
frequency words found in the wordlist are similar. For example, the 
GRAMMATICAL BIN category contains the prepositions, conjunctions, etc. that 
constitute the most frequent words in the corpus shown in Table 3.1. Table 3.3 
also shows some of the problems inherent in automatic semantic tagging. The 
‘Z99. UNMATCHED’ category shows the lexical items that the software has not 
been able to successfully tag. Tagging errors may include lexical items that are 
acronyms such as OCD, neologisms that the software does not yet know, or 
words or phrases containing symbols that the software cannot process, such as 
website addresses or hyperlinks. In addition to the software being unable to 
tag particular lexical items, the mistagging of lexical items can also be a 
problem, especially when automatically tagging thematic corpora where 
lexical items may not be functioning according to their dictionary definitions 
but rather as part of a novel usage. For example, in a corpus of beer 
advertisements featuring heavily gendered language (Price, forthcoming), I 
found that Wmatrix tagged slang usages of the colloquial term ‘tits’ (referring 
to breasts) as ‘LIVING CREATURES: ANIMALS, BIRDS, ETC’. This example is one 
where the mistagging was fairly obvious as this semantic category was 
unexpected in the context of beer advertisements; however, mistagging such as 
this may not be obvious in other corpora. As a result, it is necessary to manually 
check semantic tags as much as is feasible according to the project (and add 
specialised lexis to the Wmatrix dictionary).  
Generating wordlists for corpora is also a necessary preparatory phase in 
order to conduct a keyness analysis. This type of analysis will be described in 
more detail in the next section.  
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3.3.2. Keyness analysis  
 
Keyness analysis is the analysis of words whose frequency is statistically 
significantly higher or lower that would be expected when compared to a 
reference corpus. Scott (1997) writes: 
 
A key word may be defined as a word which occurs with unusual frequency 
in a given text. This does not mean high frequency but unusual 
frequency, by comparison with a reference corpus of some kind. 
 
(Scott 1997: 236, original emphasis) 
 
Keywords can be positive (those words that occur more in one corpus than 
another), or negative (those words that occur less in one corpus than another). 
Keyness analysis gives an indication of the “aboutness” (Scott, 1999) of a 
corpus, or what is idiosyncratic about a corpus. Keyness analysis can be useful 
tool for gaining insight into and describing current or historic cultural trends 
or stereotypes within a text or collection of texts (Scott, 1997: 243) 
(notwithstanding the fact that there is not always a direct link between the use 
of specific lexis and cultural trends). This is clearly a valuable method for 
analysing potential societal change in diachronic thematic corpora. 
Furthermore, the comparison of one text with other (larger) texts is essential in 
defining what is distinctive about a particular text in terms of its ‘style markers’ 
(Enkvist, 1973: 25), or stylistic features of a text that can be seen as deviating 
from a norm particularly function words. 
Keyword analysis is a well-established method for corpus comparison 
and has been part of the WordSmith software package since its first release 
(Scott, 1999, 2016). However, the analysis of POS and semantic keyness is a 
relatively new method made possible by Wmatrix (Rayson, 2009). Keyness 
analysis, or the comparison of one frequency list with another to calculate 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 	
 
 
85 
statistically significant categories, can be carried out on frequency lists 
pertaining to the frequency of individual tokens, POS categories or semantic 
categories within a corpus, resulting in ‘keywords’ (derived from the 
comparison of word lists), ‘key POS’ (derived from the comparison of POS 
frequency lists), or ‘key semantic domains’20 (derived from the comparison of 
semtag lists).  
Keyness analysis is a central aspect in many contemporary corpus 
linguistic studies, attracting much attention in edited volumes (Bondi & Scott, 
2010; Archer, 2009) and analysed in a range of text-types ranging from literary 
texts to email communication; examples of keyness analyses include the 
analysis of keyness in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet (Culpeper, 2009), in 
comparisons of narrators’ voices in a novel (Walker, 2010), in discourses of 
political correctness (Johnson et al., 2003), in NHS direct phone calls (Adolphs 
et al., 2004) and in emails sent by adolescents pertaining to their health (Harvey, 
2013: 90). Keyness analysis is wide ranging as it affords analysts the 
opportunity to explore the semantic and grammatical properties of texts in 
much greater depth than is feasible without computational methods. 
Moreover, as Adolphs et al. (2004) point out, “keyword analysis also serves as 
a powerful hypothesis testing device and enables the analyst to cross-reference 
the results with his/her intuition about the transcripts.” (Adolphs et al., 2004: 
14).  
 
3.3.3. Keyword analysis  
 
Keyword analysis offers insight into what may be idiosyncratic about a target 
corpus (the corpus being analysed) compared with a reference corpus. Such 
analysis may be text internal, i.e. the comparison is being made between 	
20 Sometimes referred to as ‘key concepts’.	
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subcorpora created from the same original data, or text external, i.e. the 
comparison is being made with the text and another general corpus, e.g. the 
BNC. The most basic form of keyness analysis is the comparison of keywords. 
Table 3.4 shows the keywords in the mania corpus21 compared with the sample 
corpus (here, our reference corpus), which contains articles discussing mental 
illness generally. 
 
Item 01 %1 02 %2 LL %DIFF 
Mania 528 0.19 33 0.01+ 955.92 3194.90 
Bipolar  675 0.25 142 0.03+ 876.27 878.90 
Manic 427 0.16 32 0.01+ 748.10 2647.90 
I 4201 1.55 5211 0.93+ 581.04 66.02 
Manic_depression  343 0.13 72 0.01+ 441.13 881.03 
TABLE 3.4. POSITIVE KEYWORDS IN THE MANIA CORPUS COMPARED WITH SAMPLE 
CORPUS (CALCULATED USING WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2009)).  
 
Table 3.4 shows the keywords (under the column header ‘item’), the frequency 
of the keyword in the mania corpus (column header ‘01’) and the percentage 
that this keyword occurs within the whole corpus (‘%1’) before detailing this 
information for the reference corpus (column headers ‘02’ and ‘%2’). A ‘-’ or ‘+’ 
symbol denotes whether the keyword is over or underused in the target corpus. 
Wmatrix then lists the log-likelihood score (LL) and ‘%DIFF’ which is an effect 
size measure, which is the size of the statistical difference between two 
variables.  
Although the results in Table 3.4 may not be interpretatively surprising 
on the surface, i.e. we might expect mania, manic and manic depression to be key 
when compared with a general corpus of articles discussing mental illness, the 
keyword analysis does yield some results that can form the basis for further 
research questions. For example, why is the first-person pronoun overused and 
is this indicative that people are more willing to discuss their own experiences 	
21 The mania corpus contains newspaper articles containing the lemma mania*. 	
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with bipolar disorder than with other mental illnesses? Moreover, overused 
keywords in specialised corpora give the analyst an insight into the words that 
are used to describe bipolar disorder, or that are used in relation to it. In order 
to fully explore the questions raised by a keyword analysis, it is necessary to 
look closer at the keywords in context.  
Unlike calculating word frequencies using descriptive statistics like those 
carried out in Section 3.3.1, keyness is most commonly measured using a log-
likelihood test, which is an inferential statistical test.22 The log-likelihood test is 
used in corpus linguistics over other similar tests because it can account for 
data that does not have a standard normal curve (or normal distribution) 
(McIntyre & Walker, forthcoming: 131). Log-likelihood is essentially a test to 
work out to what extent a word occurs in a target corpus compared with a 
reference corpus more (or less) than would be expected by chance. Although 
corpus software can automatically calculate log-likelihood, it is important to 
know why log-likelihood is used and what steps lie behind a keyness statistic. 
In what follows of this section, I will explain log-likelihood using McIntyre & 
Walker (forthcoming) and Rayson & Garside (2000) as the foundation for what 
I report.  
Log-likelihood is calculated by working out the total frequency of words 
in both the target and reference corpus minus the observed frequency of the 
word in question. Then, the observed frequency (which is the total number of 
times the word in question occurs in both the target and reference corpus) is 
multiplied by the total number of words in the target corpus and then divided 
by the total number of words in both the target and reference corpus in order 
to get the expected frequency for the target corpus (Rayson & Garside, 2000: 
	
22 For a detailed discussion of the validity of inferential statistics in corpus linguistics see 
Gries (2005) in response to Kilgarrif (2005). See also McIntyre and Walker (2019) for an 
explanation of null-hypothesis testing.	
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3)23. This process is then repeated for the reference corpus (this is how negative 
keyness is calculated). The last step in calculating keyness is to measure how 
far the expected frequency is from the observed frequency. This is the log-
likelihood value. The more the observed frequency deviates from the expected 
frequency, the more confident we can be about how ‘key’ the item is in terms 
of its statistical significance. It is the log-likelihood value that “tells us whether 
the word (or item) whose potential keyness we have been calculating is indeed 
key, thereby avoiding the need for us to rely on subjective judgements about 
such matters.” (McIntyre & Walker, forthcoming: 133). A log-likelihood score 
of 3.84 (equivalent to p < 0.05) means the analyst can be 95% sure that they have 
a significant result. All of the results reported in this thesis pertaining to 
keyness will have at a log-likelihood of at least 10.83 (equivalent to p < 0.001), 
meaning that the results reported have a 99.9% likelihood of significance. In 
addition to increasing confidence in results, setting a higher statistical cut-off is 
also a useful way to refine large corpora for detailed analysis.  
 
3.3.4. Key semantic domain analysis  
 
Once an analyst has a frequency list of the semantic domains for a target and 
reference corpus, key semantic domain analysis can be conducted by 
comparing the two lists. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the key sematic domains 
in the mania corpus compared with the sample corpus.  
  
	
23 This information is available at http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/llwizard.html, along with a LL and 
effect size calculator. 	
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Semtag Description 01 %1 02 %2 LL %DIFF 
E4.1+ HAPPY 827 0.30 558 0.10 + 423.78 205.21 
Z8 PRONOUNS 28132 10.35 50051 8.94 + 379.63 15.75 
K2 MUSIC AND 
RELATED 
ACTIVITY 
537 0.20 349 0.06 + 289.16 216.86 
Q4.1 THE MEDIA: 
BOOKS 
800 0.29 690 0.12 + 277.88 138.76 
I2.2 BUSINESS: 
SELLING 
660 0.24 560 0.10 + 236.25 142.70 
TABLE 3.5. POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE MANIA CORPUS COMPARED 
WITH SAMPLE CORPUS  
 
 
Semtag Description 01 %1 02 %2 LL %DIFF 
G3 Warfare, 
defence and the 
army; weapons 
276 0.10 3659 0.65 - 1514.85 - 84.47 
S8+ Helping 992 0.36 4800 0.86 - 714.08 -57.44 
B2 Health and 
disease 
253 0.09 1934 0.35 - 529.90 -73.06 
E6- Worry 586 0.22 3037 0.54 -  507.99 - 60.26 
G2.1 Law and order 417 0.15 2165 0.39 - 363.18 - 60.34 
TABLE 3.6. NEGATIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE MANIA CORPUS COMPARED 
WITH SAMPLE CORPUS  
 
Whilst it is difficult to interpret these results without viewing the lexical items 
within the categories in context, it is possible to see some general semantic 
themes within the mania corpus; for example, the ‘HAPPY’ emotions which may 
be indicative of the mania aspect of bipolar disorder. Moreover, it is possible to 
see potential links between mania and some areas of public life indicated by 
the ‘THE MEDIA: BOOKS’ semantic category which subsumes lexical items such as 
‘writer, biography, memoir’. Using key semantic categories as a starting point, we 
can hypothesise about certain possibilities, e.g. that mania or manic depression 
has been written about more than other mental illnesses.  
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It is also possible to use the initial results of a key semantic domain analysis to 
spot potential noise in the corpus. For example, MUSIC AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 
may be an unexpected category and therefore warrant further exploration. In 
this case, the overuse of this category is partly down to the search term manic 
returning articles pertaining to the UK rock band, the Manic Street Preachers. 
Once a source of noise in the corpus is ascertained, it is possible to account for 
that in further quantitative analyses by removing such instances.  
 
3.3.5. Collocation analysis 
 
Collocation is the name given to the process by which words co-occur 
statistically more significantly than would be expected by chance. For example, 
in British English, the lexical items ‘fish’ and ‘chips’ are collocates because they 
occur together frequently. We can test the collocational strength of two words 
or phrases by conducting statistical tests that show the statistical significance 
of words that co-occur. For example, we can test the collocational strength of 
the lexical items fish and chips in British English by searching for these words 
in the British National Corpus, or BNC, a collection of 100 million words of 
British English. We may wish to search particular lexical items in order to find 
out more about common phrases in a language variety and relatedly, find out 
about the culture of that language, or simply to test an intuition we may have 
about particular words.  
In the BNC, ‘chips’ is the top collocate of ’fish’, occurring in 14.81% of all 
instances of ‘fish’. If we compare the collocates of fish in the BNC with its 
collocates in a corpus of American English, such as the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA), a corpus of 520 million words, we 
see ‘fish’ and ‘chips’ co-occurring in only 1.85% of instances of ‘fish’, then, can 
tell us something about the corpus being analysed by way of revealing set 
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phrases within the corpus; and depending on the data set, collocation analyses 
can allow analysts to generalise from the data being analysed to draw 
conclusions about a particular topic (e.g. common foodstuffs) or language 
variety (e.g. American English).  
Collocation is typically analysed by searching for all the words that occur 
significantly within a 9-word window (referred to as a window of collocation) 
that includes the node word (the word being searched for) and the 4 words to 
the left and right of the node word, or L1-4 and R1-4. Table 3.7 shows the top 
five collocates of mental* in a sample corpus of newspaper articles discussing 
mental illness calculated using AntConc (Anthony, 2018).  
 
Rank Freq. Freq. (L) Freq.(R) Stat 
(MI) 
Collocate  
1 20 20 0 5.19695 Chief  
2 11 11 0 4.18635 Link 
3 11 11 0 3.89046 Stigma 
4 15 15 0 3.14170 Combat 
5 6 6 0 3.08447 MoD 
TABLE 3.7. TOP FIVE COLLOCATES OF ‘MENTAL*’ IN SAMPLE CORPUS (SPAN L4-R4) 
 
Taking each column in turn, from left to right, Table 3.7 shows the rank of the 
collocate in descending order, the total frequency, or how many times the 
collocate occurs in the corpus, how many times the word collocating with the 
searched word is found on the right or left of the node word, and the statistical 
significance of the collocation depending on the statistical test used. The final 
column shows the word that collocates with the node.  
As is shown in Table 3.7, the top collocates of ‘mental*’ all occur to the left of 
the node word. The relatively small size of the corpus (and therefore the 
relatively low frequencies of the collocates) means that we cannot discern 
whether this is a pattern in the language generally, although this would be a 
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useful thing to do if we were interested in whether, for example, the phrase 
‘mental*’ is more commonly pre or post-modified.  
We can explore the collocation shown here in more detail by expanding 
the context of the collocation. Table 3.8 shows the collocations in context.
  
L4 L3 L2 L1 NODE R1 R2 R3 R4 
Chief executive of the  mental health charity  Sane welcomed 
link between cannabis and mental illness, recent  studies  have 
stigma and isolation of mental illness. his  prepared contribution 
combat stress, the  veterans’ mental health charity which  is 
MoD spokesman said: the mental health of service personnel  
 
TABLE 3.8. TOP CONTEXT OF ‘MENTAL*’ IN THE SAMPLE CORPUS
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Collocation is calculated using information about “the frequency of the node, 
the frequency of the collocates, and the frequency of the collocation” (Baker et 
al. 2008). There are a variety of statistical tests to measure collocational strength, 
however one of the standard statistical tests for collocational significance is 
Mutual Information (MI)24. Mutual information tests the dependence of two 
random variables, e.g. the lexical items ‘fish’ and ‘chips’. The higher the MI 
score, the stronger the collocation. Whilst the validity of MI as a marker of 
collocation has been the subject of some discussion due to the fact that it can 
“unduly overvalue infrequent words” (Xiao & McEnery, 2006: 105), MI is the 
standard built-in statistical measure for collocation in much corpus software 
and, as Xiao & McEnery note, concerns about the validity of the measure can 
be partly alleviated by setting a higher minimum co-occurrence cut-off. (2006: 
105).  
McIntyre & Walker explain that if the MI score is higher than three, “then 
this can be taken as indicative of strong collocation” (Barnbrook, 1996; 
McIntyre & Walker, forthcoming; see also Hunston, 2001: 71-2). In contrast to 
this, Baker (2016: 142) argues in line with Durrant & Doherty (2010: 145) that to 
claim that a collocation is ‘psychologically real’25 “e.g. one word to trigger the 
thought of another, an MI of 6 would be required.” (Baker, 2016: 142). My view 
on this is that a collocation need not be psychologically real in order for it to be 
interpretatively significant within the corpus, although of course a higher MI 
score increases the likelihood that the findings can be generalised from to make 
observations about the language as a whole. Moreover, the psychological 
reality of a word, e.g. whether one word is a predictor for another word, cannot 
	
24 Mutual Information is a common test in collocational analyses and is the default test in 
most corpus tools. Mutual Information is the only statistical test used for collocation analyses 
in this thesis. 	25	Durrant & Doherty use ‘psychologically real’ to refer to “psychological priming between 
words” (2010: 144).	
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fully be ascertained within most measures of collocation. As Gries (2013: 141) 
argues, collocational strength is typically calculated based on a bidirectional 
statistical test, which means that the direction of collocation cannot be 
ascertained. 
As the corpora under scrutiny in this thesis are thematic, diachronic and 
representative of a particular variety, i.e. newspaper discourse discussing 
mental illness, the aim is not to generalise about language use beyond the 
specialist population from which the corpus is sampled. Moreover, in reference 
to Baker’s claim that collocates should have an MI score of 6 or above, the 
problem with limiting collocates to particular statistical cut-offs is that it limits 
the ability to trace changes in collocation through time which I see as one of the 
key aims of diachronic analysis. For this reason, the minimum MI score used 
in this thesis will be 3.  
As well as telling the analyst something about a corpus more generally, 
for example features of the topic or variety, collocation is also useful for 
revealing information about the meaning of specific lexical items or units of 
meaning, how they are used and how they interact with other words. Studying 
meaning through collocation, particularly in the field of distributional 
semantics, was pioneered by J. R Firth who famously stated “you shall know a 
word by the company it keeps” (Firth, 1957: 11). The Firthian view of meaning 
encompasses two important features:  
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(a) (in observation) that meaning and context are inextricably linked and 
we cannot analyse meaning without also taking context into 
consideration viz words that commonly occur in similar contexts 
have related meanings,  
 
and,  
 
(b) (in usage) that if meanings are related, then there must be a 
psychological basis for collocation 
 
The Firthian view of collocation being indicative of word meaning has come to 
form the bedrock of many contemporary ‘neo-Firthian’ analyses (Hunston, 
2002; Louw, 1993; Stubbs, 2001). Firth’s original premise also forms the basis of 
semantic prosody (see section 3.2.6) and the theory that underpins the idiom 
principle which states that text production is made up of “semi-preconstructed 
phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear to be 
analysable into segments” (Sinclair, 1991: 110). It is also this view that forms 
the basis of much corpus-driven linguistic research into units of meaning, or 
broadening the unit of analysis in corpus linguistics from word to multi-word 
phrases (see Danielsson, 2013).  
In diachronic corpora, collocation analysis can offer insight into lexical 
and phrasal changes in corpora that focus on particular topics. For example, in 
an analysis of the representation of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK 
press, Baker et al. (2008) posit two methods for dealing with changes in 
collocates over time: determining ‘seasonal collocates’, which they define as 
“collocates that are very frequent in a small number of years” (Baker et al, 2008: 
286), and ‘consistent collocates’ (also known as c-collocates), which are present 
in most of the sub-corpora. Given the underlying assumption made in studies 
that use corpus linguistic analysis to analyse societal issues, analysing changes 
in collocation along with consistent collocates in diachronic corpora offer an 
insight into how a concept has changed or stayed the same over time.  
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3.3.6. N-grams 
 
Related to the concept of collocation is the concept of n-grams26. N-grams are 
strings of lexical items or characters that occur frequently within a corpus (n 
stands for any number). Due to the fact that this thesis will only discuss n-
grams at the level of the word, all future reference to n-grams will relate to 
lexical n-grams. N-grams are typically studied by their frequency rather than 
their statistical significance given that, unlike collocation, n-grams are not tied 
to a node word (a two-word n-gram is known as a bigram).  
N-grams are well-used in the field of natural language processing where 
lexical strings are used as a tool to model and predict, amongst other things, 
the syntax of a given language, or the next word or character within a given 
lexical string 27 . In linguistics more specifically, n-gram analysis has been 
applied in the field of subtitling (McIntyre et al. 2018), in research into 
formulaic sequences (Buerki, 2016), and in the exploration of identifying 
authors based on their language use, e.g. in research into plagiarism (Johnson 
& Woolls, 2009: 112, Johnson, 2013), authorship attribution (Coulthard & 
Johnson, 2010, Grieve, 2007; Wright, 2013) and stylometry (Hoover, 2001). Such 
research provides empirical evidence for the psychological basis for language 
clusters which is a useful starting point for the linguist exploring whether 
language use can reveal societal thought on a particular topic, e.g. mental 
health. In addition to this, n-grams are useful for simply giving an indication 
of common words and/or phrases within texts. 
Table 3.9 shows the top five 4-grams in the sample corpus: 
  
	
26 Sometimes called ‘clusters’ or ‘lexical bundles’. 	
27 It is this type of research that underpins the predictive text systems on smart phones, 
computers, etc.	
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Rank Freq. Range Cluster 
1 386 1 Post traumatic stress disorder 
2 126 1 Traumatic stress disorder ptsd 
3 101 1 Per cent of the 
4 95 1 With mental health problems 
5 90 1 Obsessive compulsive disorder ocd  
TABLE 3.9. TOP FIVE 4-GRAMS IN THE SAMPLE CORPUS 		
Table 3.9 details the rank, frequency, range (how many of the uploaded corpora 
the n-gram appears in) and the string. What can be seen in this example is that 
most of the top n-grams are the names for mental illnesses. This is interesting 
when we consider what this means in the context of labelling mental illnesses. 
For example, the very fact that post-traumatic stress disorder is listed is 
indicative of the recognition of it as a mental illness. PTSD was only recognised 
as a mental illness in the 1980s and PTSD symptoms had been known 
previously as ‘shell shock’ or ‘combat fatigue’. In line with this, the cluster ‘with 
mental health problems’ is also indicative of a change in the nomenclature of 
mental illness as ‘post modifying’ or person first language is now the preferred 
means of describing people with mental illnesses, i.e. person with schizophrenia 
in contrast to a schizophrenic. Further to this, cluster or n-gram analysis can give 
insight into potential data skew. For instance, PTSD makes up around 64% of 
the total cluster tokens in the sample corpus which suggests that many more 
articles have PTSD as their focus than other mental illnesses. In this respect, n-
grams also have a methodological role to play in the process of determining 
representativeness and balance in corpus construction. 
 
3.3.7. Concordance analysis  
 
Concordance analysis is the point at which quantitative and qualitative 
methods in corpus linguistics meet. Most commonly, concordancing involves 
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looking at lexical items in their sentential context (or in the context of the 
utterance if analysing spoken discourse). This involves the close analysis of the 
word or phrase of interest as it appears in the corpus, usually with several 
words either side. However, concordancing need not be focussed at the 
sentence or utterance level. McEnery & Hardie (2012), for example, state that 
concordances may range from the analysis of suffixes to multi-word 
expressions (McEnery & Hardie, 2012: 35).  
 Concordance analysis is a vital step in analysing how a specific word or 
phrase functions in a sentence or utterance in terms of its grammatical 
properties, but also what a word means within a given context.  
In addition to revealing previously undiscovered meaning within a 
corpus, looking at concordance lines is one way that an analyst can check the 
accuracy of automatic taggers. For instance, without concordance analysis, the 
earlier example given in section 3.2.1, in which Wmatrix tagged the lexical item 
‘tits’ as belonging to the LIVING CREATURES: ANIMALS, BIRDS, ETC. semantic 
category, may have gone unnoticed and, with it, a potential line of enquiry into 
the gendered nature of the advertisements being analysed. Furthermore, a 
bird’s eye view of data may not properly convey the meaning of a word in 
context. For example, based on the frequency of the derogatory words ‘psycho’ 
and ‘schizo’ in the sample corpus it might be sensible to assume that a discourse 
of stigmatisation of mental illness exists; however, on further inspection many 
instances of these words appear in articles featuring meta-linguistic discussion 
about correct and incorrect terms for mental illnesses. 
A core endeavour of corpus linguistics is the uncovering of patterns 
across instances of language in use with the aim of discovering grammatical 
patterns within a variety, or gaining insight into a how a particular topic is 
discussed. A key principle of the study of language in use generally, but 
particularly in the corpus analysis that accompanies discourse analysis, is the 
recognition that meaning is co-constructed and that language users negotiate 
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meaning by ‘languaging’ (Halliday, 1985a). It is this presumption of 
(minimally) a message, a sender and a receiver that has to underlie any notion 
of ideology in texts. Therefore, it is vital that researchers using corpus methods 
recognise the equal value of qualitative and quantitative methods in analysing 
texts. This is a sentiment shared by Stubbs who emphasises ‘the need to 
combine the analysis of large-scale patterns across long texts with the detailed 
study of concordance lines’ (Stubbs, 1994: 212). Table 3.10 shows a concordance 
table from the mania corpus.  
 
in which a patient has 
alternating 
moods of mania, or hypomania, and 
depression 
rollercoaster journey through 
extreme 
moods is devastating to spouses, families 
in which the victim has 
alternating 
moods of manic over-excitement and of 
depression 
was used to describe people 
whose 
moods swung from elation to despair  
bipolar disorder is not curable, 
but the 
moods can be controlled, and even 
prevented 
TABLE 3.10. CONCORDANCE OF THE LEXICAL ITEM ‘MOODS’ 
 
Table 3.10 shows the many ways in which ‘moods’ is used within the mania 
corpus and how it functions in sentences designed to describe periods of mania 
(characteristic of bipolar disorder, previously known as manic depression). 
Although we only have access to five concordance lines for this example, it is 
already possible to see features of the language that may not come to light in 
other corpus linguistic analyses that are limited to the word level. One example 
of this is metaphorical language, such as the ROLLERCOASTER metaphors used 
to describe the alternating moods characteristic of mania. Discovering a 
metaphor such as this one opens up a new line of enquiry in the analysis. For 
example, whether it is the case that the ROLLERCOASTER metaphor is commonly 
used in reference to mania and whether this metaphor is only used in reference 
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to mania. An analysis of metaphor falls outside the scope of the analysis in this 
thesis, but such examples show the utility of concordance analysis. This is 
because research questions such as the ROLLERCOASTER metaphor example are 
only possible through close reading of the corpus, as linguistic devices like 
metaphor, which may have no set linguistic form, may not be revealed through 
corpus analyses. Once it is known that mania is described as a journey on a 
rollercoaster, the lexical items searched for within the corpus can be refined in 
order to reveal potential instantiations of a specific metaphor (e.g. ‘ride’, 
‘journey’, ‘ups’, ‘downs’, ‘turns’); however, metaphors cannot be found reliably 
automatically despite much work in this area in NLP28 (see for example, the 
MetaNet project29) and some work in linguistics (see for example, the use of the 
USAS tagger in metaphor identification (Koller et al., 2008; Semino et al., 
2009)30. 
Given that perhaps the main affordance of conducting corpus linguistic 
analysis is that it allows analysts to analyse huge quantities of texts, it is 
unfeasible to analyse every concordance line (and indeed to do so might be 
unnecessary for the research question being investigated). In order to analyse 
concordances in a more rigorous way, corpus tools have been refined to deal 
with more specific search queries. Such tools are referred to by McEnery & 
Hardie (2012: 43-46) as ‘fourth-generation’ concordancers’. AntConc (Anthony, 
2018) and Sketch Engine (Kilgariff et al., 2004), for instance, are optimised for 
regular expressions, while other tools such as CLIC (Mahlberg et al., 2016) even 
	
28 Refining methods for the automatic identification of metaphor has been a pursuit of the 
Natural Language Processing community for some time now; however, the basis for machine 
recognition of metaphor is still reliant on a human input, e.g. eliciting metaphoric set 
expressions from participants. Even if successful, automatic metaphor identification is limited 
in how many metaphors can be identified given that some novel metaphors may never have 
been uttered before, meaning that the software does not have the parameters needed to 
identify it. 	
29 https://metanet.icsi.berkeley.edu/metanet/	
30 http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/en/upmprojects/using-a-semantic-annotation-tool-
for-research-on-metaphor-in-discourse(af625fbc-b8d6-4972-b571-f35ade5e69e0).html	
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have in-built functionality for filtering concordances by subcorpus or search 
term. Despite the ability to refine concordance results, corpus software is still 
fairly limited in affording the analysis of linguistic patterns that fall between 
grammar and semantics such as transitivity processes (Halliday, 1985b; see 
Chapter 4). The first reason for this is that the software it is not yet sophisticated 
enough to code concordances for, e.g. agent, action, patient relationships, that 
require manual annotation. The second reason is a practical one: textual 
analysis requires a consideration of cohesion and viewing a chunk of text 
within a software window is not conducive to this.  
As a result of this, much research combining corpus linguistics and 
(critical) discourse analysis makes use of downsized samples of corpora in 
order to subject them to more in-depth qualitative analysis, e.g. for euphemistic 
language or to identify types of modality. Recent research has explored the 
benefits of combining methods to respond to criticisms of cherry-picking 
examples in CDA and to exemplify the utility of mixed methods for research 
triangulation (Baker & Levon, 2015) and to incorporate methods from corpus 
linguistics into the ‘academic movement’ of CDA (Baker et al., 2008: 274).  	
3.3.8. Semantic preference and semantic prosody 
In this final section on corpus methods, I describe the related notions of 
semantic preference and semantic prosody. This section provides a natural 
segue into the more qualitative methods described in Chapter 4 on methods 
from critical discourse analysis (CDA), as both semantic preference and 
semantic prosody require the interpretation of concordances and expanded 
contexts. 
In Section 3.3.5 on collocation, the notion of semantic preference was 
introduced in reference to neo-Firthian research. An example of this is Sinclair’s 
(1991) work on the idiom principle that states that texts are composed of set 
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phrases or semi-preconstructed phrases rather than discrete words with their 
own individual definitions, e.g. idiomatic expressions, proverbs, phrasal verbs, 
etc. (Sinclair, 1991: 110). The argument for the phrasal basis for language is a 
convincing one, evidenced by research that has observed recurring sequences 
in concordances (Sinclair, 20001, 2004) and convincing psycholinguistic 
evidence that has shown that people with speech and language disorders such 
as aphasias preserve the ability to produce formulaic language (Lum & Ellis, 
1994; Wray & Perkins, 2000). Moreover Wray (2002) reports that speakers pause 
less when producing formulaic utterances. This compelling evidence suggests 
that “formulaic sequence meaning has cognitive reality” (O’Halloran, 2007). 
What unites the notions of semantic preference and semantic prosody with 
Sinclair’s idiom principle is that they are all concerned with collocation in 
language and that they are a product of the ‘phraseological tradition’ (Hunston, 
2007).  
Due to the fact that semantic preference and semantic prosody are both 
“a collocational phenomenon and one which is preferably to be regarded as 
recoverable computationally from large language corpora rather than 
intuitively” (Louw, 2000: 48), they have been conflated in some previous 
research (see (Bednarek, 2008; Hunston, 2007 for a discussion). To avoid the 
problems associate with this, I will focus first on semantic preference and then 
on semantic prosody, but for the sake of clarity it is worth pointing out at this 
early stage that semantic preference is a property of individual lexical items, 
whereas semantic prosody is a property of units of meaning (McIntyre, 2018).  
The semantic preference of a lexical item can be described as the type of 
semantic context it is commonly found in. Semantic preference is defined by 
Sinclair as “the restriction of regular co-occurrence to items which share a 
semantic feature, for example that they are all about, say, sport or suffering” 
(Sinclair 2004: 142). By way of an example, Stubbs (2001) looks at collocates of 
word phrase ripe. He found that ripe was often used in the phrase ripe for and 
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was found in contexts discussing change, and particularly change in reference 
to the climate, conditions, situation or time. Stubbs also found that when a noun 
phrases followed ripe for, it often had negative connotations (2001: 456-457). The 
interpretation of a set of collocates as being typically positive or negative 
through concordancing is the foundation of the notion of semantic preference 
whereby analysts look for robust corpus evidence to suggest that a particular 
word occurs with negative/positive collocates. Bednarek (2008) makes the point 
that whether a set of words are viewed as positive or negative is ultimately 
down to the analyst’s subjective opinion, and that “semantic preference is 
probably context-, genre- and domain dependent” (2008: 123). Bednarek’s 
point here is that whether a word routinely collocates with positive or negative 
words will depend on the context of the text under examination and therefore 
stating that a word has a set negative or positive semantic preference is 
problematic.31  
Semantic prosody is concerned with the discourse function of a unit of 
meaning (Hunston, 2007). Louw (1993: 157) defines semantic prosody as the 
“consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates” 32. 
In a departure from Louw’s original conception of semantic preference, some 
researchers have used semantic prosody to refer to whether the collocates of a 
word are positive or negative (e.g. Partington, 2004) which has caused 
confusion as to how semantic prosody and preference differ. By way of a 
response to this confusion, Hunston (2007: 266) argues that semantic preference 
should be referred to as ‘attitudinal preference’ and semantic prosody should 
	31	It is worth saying here that while I agree with Bednarek’s point as a general rule, I do not 
think this is such an issue in thematic corpora where the analyst’s aim is to look at how 
words/units of meaning function within a specific variety. The possible conclusions that can 
be derived have limited generalizability by the very nature of the corpus being analysed 
anyway. 	
32 Although Louw was the first to use the term semantic prosody in print, he attributes it first to 
Sinclair (see Louw, 2000: introduction). 	
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be restricted to the definition provided by Sinclair (2004) which relates only to 
the discourse function of a unit of meaning. 
For the purposes of this thesis, and to return to the criticisms made by 
Bednarek (2008) (see also Whitsitt, 2005), I take the view that the semantic 
prosody of a unit of meaning and the semantic preference of a word is more 
nuanced than simply being positive or negative, which is what Partington 
(2004) suggests.  
3.4. Conclusion 
 
In this this chapter I have provided a brief overview of corpus linguistics and 
its status as a theory and as a method. Furthermore, I detailed the view of 
corpus linguistics that I take in this thesis where corpus linguistics is used as a 
method. I also provided an overview of the basic corpus methods and analyses 
used in the analysis chapters of this thesis. In Sections 3.3.1-3.3.7 which each 
explored a different method, I also provided a discussion about the utility of 
each method enriched by data from two corpora containing newspaper articles 
reporting on mental illness.  
In the next chapter ‘Analytical Methods 2: Critical Discourse Analysis, I 
provide an overview of CDA and the analyses from CDA that I use in this 
thesis. 
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4. Analytical Methods 2: Critical Discourse Analysis 	
In Chapter 3, I described the analytical methods used in this thesis from corpus 
linguistics. In this chapter I provide an overview of the analytical methods used 
from critical discourse analysis.  
Section 4.1 will provide an overview of CDA covering the early 
manifestations of linguistic inquiry into ideology in texts such as that of the 
East Anglia School (Fowler et al., 1979) to contemporary research into corpus-
assisted discourse analysis that combines these early principles of CDA with 
computational methods. In Section 4.2, I describe the analytical methods used 
in this thesis in turn. In Section 4.3, I conclude.  
 
4.1. Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can be described as an interdisciplinary 
approach to text analysis, which aims to uncover covert meanings in texts, 
usually with a view to uncovering power asymmetry or manipulation 
strategies. Whilst the remit of CDA does not preclude the study of non-
linguistic features of the social artefacts under scrutiny (say, the visual aspects 
of a text), as a linguist working under the umbrella of CDA, I see my role as 
dealing with the linguistic aspects of texts. For this reason, this section will 
describe the linguistic analytical methods associated with uncovering meaning 
in texts. 
CDA can be traced back to the East Anglia School that developed in the 
1970s and the work conducted there into Critical Linguistics. Key figures in this 
movement were Roger Fowler, Bob Hodge, Gunther Kress and Tony Trew, 
whose work on the book Language and Control (1979), formed the basis of much 
of the contemporary work in CDA (see also Kress & Hodge, 1979); that is, the 
analysis of the way that “language functions in social and political practice” 
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(Fowler et al., 1979:1). Like much of the CDA that followed33, Fowler et al. (1979) 
borrowed the functionalist theory from Halliday’s (1978) systemic functional 
linguistics (hereafter SFL) which  
 
grew out of an effort to develop an applicable kind of linguistics […] 
drawing on functional and anthropological approaches to language in 
Europe and North America from the 1920s […] where theory is designed 
to have the potential to be applied to solve problems that arise in 
communities around the world, involving both reflection and action. 
 
(Matthiessen 2012: 436, original emphasis) 
 
Both theorists of SFL and Critical Linguists posit that “language is as it is 
because of its function in social structure” (Halliday, 1973: 65). As such, both 
researchers working in SFL like Halliday, and those working in Critical 
Linguistics like Fowler, Kress and Hodge, are interested in the relationship 
between the form and the function of language and how this can create 
ideological meaning. Fowler & Kress write of the link between form and 
function, “we follow Halliday in requiring that social meanings and their 
textual realizations be included within the scope of a grammatical description” 
(1979: 187). This is based on the assumption that “the structure of a language 
should generally be seen as having been formed in response to the structure of 
the society that uses it” (Fowler & Kress, 188). The study of the form and 
function of language with a view to be ‘socially accountable’ (Mattheissen, 
2012) has led researchers adopting SFL to refer to their work as ‘applicable 
	
33 It is only very recently that researchers have started to propose different methodological 
perspectives for the analysis of ideology in texts. One methodology gaining particular 
traction is Cognitive Linguistic Critical Discourse Studies (Hart & Lukeš, 2007, Hart, 2017) 
which researchers argue provides “something like a conceptual account of Halliday’s 
ideational function of language” (Hart & Lukeš, 2007: xi). 	
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linguistics’ which is a synthesis of the thesis/antithesis34 positions in linguistics 
where researchers are either theoretical or applied (Mattheissen, 2012: 437).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1. APPLICABLE LINGUISTICS AS A SYNTHESIS (TAKEN FROM MATTHEISSEN, 
2012: 437) 
 
The Hallidayan viewpoint that Critical Linguistics borrows (i.e. that 
researchers can conduct linguistic analyses with a view to being ‘socially 
accountable’) is clearly based on the assumptions that underlie linguistic 
relativity. It is clear in Halliday’s writings that the principles of SFL are guided 
by the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and later, the works of Malinowski (1923), who 
saw language as a “mode of action” (Malinowski, 1923: 312). This in turn 
influenced Firth’s (1957) view that context contributes to meaning and that 
	
34 Thesis and antithesis refers here to two contrasting views about what constitutes linguistic 
inquiry.  
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language has a functional basis (i.e. to be meaningful to the participants in a 
linguistic event) (see Bateman, 2017: 14 for a discussion of Firth’s contribution to 
SFL). Context is crucial for Halliday who writes “language does not passively 
reflect reality; language actively creates reality. It is the grammar plus the 
vocabulary […] that shapes experience and transforms our perceptions into 
meanings” (Halliday, 2003 [1990]: 145). Put simply, for Halliday (and for the 
necessary underlying assumptions in Critical Linguistics) “language is a 
system for meaning making” (Halliday, 1985: xvii). In his SFL framework, 
Halliday posited three metafunctions (see Table 4.1 below) or “component[s] 
of meaning” (Halliday, 2003 [1973]: 314) that make up the “basic architecture 
of human language” at the lexicogrammatical level (Halliday, 2003: 16). 
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TABLE 4.1 HALLIDAYAN METAFUNCTIONS 
 
 
METAFUNCTION 
Ideational 
 
“clause as process”  
(Halliday, 2003 [1973]: 315) 
 
Interpersonal 
 
“clause as speech act”  
(Halliday, 2003 [1973]: 315) 
Textual 
 
“clause as message” 
(Halliday, 2003 [1973]: 
315) 
 
DESCRIPTION  
How language creates (and mediates) 
reality.  
  
The ideational metafunction is further 
categorised: 
 
Experiential 
How language shapes our perception of 
the world by “patterns of meaning that are 
installed in the brain” (Halliday, 2003: 15) 
 
Logical  
How language “set[s] up logical-semantic 
relationships between one clausal unit and 
other” (Halliday, 2003: 17). This process is 
iterative unlike the experiential system 
which is configurational. 
 
Associated analyses: 
Transitivity analysis, labelling, agency 
 
How language creates and 
maintains relationships. How 
language is used to communicate 
“expressions of attitude and 
appraisal” (Halliday, 2003: 16).  
 
Associated analyses: 
Modality, sentence mood 
 
 
How language is 
organised to convey a 
message.  
 
 
Associated analyses: 
Information structure, 
theme and rheme  
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It is necessary to present the metafunctions as separate components; however, 
Halliday makes the point that the “structures deriving from the […] 
metafunctions are mapped on to each other” (Halliday, 2003: 18). A key feature 
of the Hallidayan viewpoint is that meaning is tied closely to language use. In 
fact, he labels language “the most complex semiotic system we [humans] have” 
(Halliday, 2003: 2). Crucially for CDA, Halliday’s metafunctions, and in 
particular the ideational metafunction, identify the top-down nature of 
meaning as mediated by language (the experiential function), and the bottom-
up construction of meaning (the logical function). For this reason, it is 
unsurprising that linguists interested in how language shapes human 
understanding of the world and our relationships within it, the critical linguists, 
adopted this model and in particular the view that language has an ideational 
function. Writing of Hallidayan linguistics in Critical Linguistics, Fowler states 
that the benefits of the three functions are that the formal features of language 
are  
 
conceived of functionally: not merely as formally different kinds of 
structure, but as kinds of structure that are as they are because they do 
particular jobs. […] The functions also provide a facility […] a prediction 
by theory of what types of linguistic construction will be partially 
revealing for critical linguistics. It is quite clear that the ideational and 
interpersonal functions are especially valuable […] since critical 
linguistics is particularly concerned with the ordering of experience and 
with the mediation of social relationships and values.  
 
(Fowler 1991: 70) 
 
Fowler’s work in the area of Critical Linguistics was influenced by the 
principles underlying Hallidayan SFL, and although contemporary research in 
CDA can be traced back to the work of the East Anglian School, the term 
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Critical Discourse Analysis was coined by another key figure in the analysis of 
ideology in texts, Norman Fairclough.  
Fairclough’s CDA, unlike that of the East Anglia School, is not primarily 
concerned with linguistic instantiations of ideology in texts. In fact, Fairclough 
argues that “there tends to be too much emphasis upon the text as product, and 
too little emphasis upon the processes of producing and interpreting texts” 
(Fairclough, 1992: 27). Rather, for Fairclough CDA is transdisciplinary (i.e. not 
necessarily linguistic) and as such, ‘discourse’, which Fairclough defines as “a 
mode of action, one form in which people may act upon the world and 
especially upon each other, as well as a mode of representation” (1992: 63) is 
analysed through looking at the semiotics (i.e. any meaningful element – not 
just text) of social life (Fairclough et al, 2004). For Fairclough, CDA is the study 
of discourse in this specific sense, through the analysis of semiosis – or 
networks of meaning - in the social world. Using this definition of CDA, 
Fairclough’s research has focussed on the macro aspects of social life, or those 
that may not have a clear relationship with a linguistic form or device such as 
the process of naturalization (Fairclough, 1989: 76). Naturalization is the 
process whereby an ideological viewpoint that may be initially foregrounded 
becomes accepted as common sense (even though it may not be) through a 
variety of semiotic modes, and as a result, the fact that it remains an ideological 
attitude is backgrounded. It is fair to say, then, that Fairclough’s research is 
concerned with the macro aspects of social life, which may not be easily 
explained by the kind of form/function analysis posited by the Critical 
Linguistics of the East Anglia School. Fairclough’s focus on macro aspects of 
social life such as naturalisation has received criticism precisely because of the 
distance between such sociological descriptions and linguistic form. For 
example, Stubbs (1997), writing about naturalization, states “CDA presents no 
theory about the role of repetition in such influences. In common with 
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linguistics in general, it has no theory of how our ways of seeing the world are 
influenced cumulatively by repeated phrasings in texts” (Stubbs, 1997: 6).  
Fairclough’s notion of CDA has been widely adopted within and outside 
of linguistics, for example in politics (Dillon et al., 1993) and education (Rogers, 
2004). As a combined result of non-linguists adopting methods from CDA, and 
increased attention paid to the macro aspects of social life without attention 
paid to language, some critics have argued that contemporary CDA has moved 
too far away from text analysis, and instead focuses too greatly on power on 
the “contextual (and thus necessarily somewhat vague) features of powerful 
language” (Jeffries, 2010: 1). It is worth stating however, that for some 
prominent critical discourse analysts, such as van Dijk (1995), CDA was never 
a field that belonged to a particular subdiscipline (1995: 17). Fairclough states 
that CDA “is not just the analysis of discourse (or more concretely texts),	it is 
part of some form of systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between 
discourse and other elements of the social process” (Fairclough, 2010 [1995]: 
10)35. Further to this, van Dijk writes that CDA is “problem- or issue-oriented, 
rather than paradigm-oriented. Any theoretical and methodological approach 
is appropriate as long as it is able to effectively study relevant social problems, 
such as those of sexism, racism, colonialism and other forms of social 
inequality” (1995: 17). It is worth stating at this point that van Dijk’s definition 
of CDA differs from that of the Critical Linguistics outlined by the East Anglia 
School, for whom the analysis of social factors was a linguistic endeavour and 
stemmed from an intralingual exposition of the thesis of Edward Sapir and 
Benjamin Lee Whorf (Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1940). Van Dijk’s conception of CDA 
gives rise to two issues. The first is that the object of study in CDA is language 
(and therefore it seems sensible to suggest that linguistic methods be used – 
	
35 Interestingly, Fairclough makes this suggestion that CDA need not be the analysis of texts 
in his 2010 [1995] monograph Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (my 
emphasis).	
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which then negates van Dijk’s suggestion that CDA does not conform to a 
particular paradigm). The second related issue is that if we take van Dijk’s aims 
of CDA literally (i.e. that we have a goal [to study social problems, namely 
finding racism or sexism, etc. in texts] and an object of study [language] but no 
concrete definition of the approach [or in fact what constitutes that approach 
in terms of a set of tools]), then what we are left with is too vague to be usable 
and too goal-oriented to be objective. Arguably, research conducted according 
to these aims cannot purport to abide by the scientific principles that it ought 
to. Moreover, an approach with no set methods or theory but a priori aims (i.e. 
to find and analyse racist language) cannot generate research that is replicable, 
objective and rigorous. Critics of CDA have drawn attention to these issues. For 
example, Jeffries (2010) responds to the lack of a formalised linguistic 
framework in CDA by returning to the linguistically-driven critical analysis 
conducted by Fowler et al. (1979). Jeffries (2010) references Fairclough’s three 
stages of CDA, “description, interpretation and explanation” (Fairclough, 1989: 
26), to state that her impression of “the CDA literature generally” (2010: 11) is 
that researchers in CDA are focussed on the explanation stage rather than the 
linguistic description stage. As a response to this, Jeffries’ (2010) ‘Critical 
Stylistics’ framework uses a set of linguistic tools (types of analysis) based on 
general grammatical analysis, but applied to the analysis of ideology in texts. 
Such analyses include labelling, nominalization, and transitivity under other 
names, e.g. naming and describing, representing actions/events/states. The 
utility of the Critical Stylistics toolkit is not in developing new tools but in 
formalising established ones and explicating their functions more explicitly for 
the textual analysis of power and ideology in texts.  
Critical Stylistics is a useful toolkit for resolving the problems I previously 
detailed with van Dijk’s conception of CDA, where its primarily goal is to look 
for racism, sexism, etc. without letting linguistic description uncover these 
ideologies in texts. I don’t believe it is the case that CDA generally does not 
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focus on linguistic description; there are very many studies in CDA that do this 
clearly. For example, the following articles use nominalization (Dunmire, 2005; 
Flowerdew, 2002), transitivity analysis (Dreyfus, 2017; Fairclough, 1995; Seo, 
2013) and labelling (or naming) (Jones et al., 2017, Page, 2003). However, I do 
believe it to be the case that there is a lack of a systematic linguistic framework 
for text analysis in CDA which can result in the tendency to rely on the 
explanation stage of Fairclough’s (1989) model and a lack of coherent reasoning 
for why one analytical method was picked over another. This is a criticism also 
put forward by Stubbs (1997). 
Related to Jeffries’ (2010) criticisms listed above, the field of CDA has 
received further reproach, the most well-cited of which are the criticisms made 
by Widdowson (1995), who argued that the nomenclature adopted in CDA, 
specifically the term discourse, is so widely used and rarely defined that it is not 
clear what the term pertains to (Widdowson, 1995). Furthermore, Widdowson 
(1995) makes the claim that researchers using the term ‘discourse’ in CDA 
conflate interpretation and analysis. Additionally, he argues that CDA is not 
analysis but interpretation and, crucially, that the analyst’s interpretation is no 
more or less valid than anyone else’s. He writes: 
 
There may be reasons for preferring one discourse to another, and if you 
are ideologically committed you will be inclined to imply that your 
interpretation of a text is the only one which is valid, that it is somehow 
in the text indeed, needing only to be discovered, uncovered, revealed 
by expert exegesis. What is actually revealed is the particular discourse 
perspective of the interpreter. This may be convincing perhaps, but it 
has no more authority than any other. To the extent that critical 
discourse analysis is committed, it cannot provide analysis but only 
partial interpretation. What analysis would involve would be the 
demonstration of different interpretations and what language data 
might be adduced as evidence in each case. 
(Widdowson 1995: 169) 
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Put simply, Widdowson’s criticism is that anyone can have an interpretation of 
a text (e.g. that is contains racist ideology), but it ought to be the role of the 
expert to provide the means of justifying that interpretation through language 
data. Moreover, it is easy to see Widdowson’s claim about an analyst being 
“committed” to a particular interpretation as justified when taking van Dijk’s 
(1995: 17) definition of CDA as being ‘problem-oriented’ into consideration.  
In this sense, Widdowson’s (1995) and Jeffries’ (2010) criticisms of CDA 
are related as both are about a lack of linguistic description (and therefore 
objectivity) within CDA, rather than being criticisms of the existence of CDA 
as a field of study.  
Up to this point, I have given considerable space to paying attention to 
the criticisms of the approach that will make up a significant portion of this 
thesis, and this may perhaps seem a curious thing to do. However, I have done 
this for several reasons. The first is that it is important to be aware of these 
criticisms in order to develop a strategy for addressing them. The second is that 
discussing these criticisms allows me to define the parameters of what I 
consider CDA to be. Third, it allows me to define some of the contested 
terminology used in CDA to avoid any confusion between the terms as they 
are used in this thesis and how they are used in other analyses of this kind.  
To address the first point, I have not relied on any single method of 
analysis. The analysis reported in this thesis is both qualitative and 
quantitative, informed by CDA and corpus linguistics. I do not believe that 
simply using corpus linguistic methods offers a magic bullet for objectivity, but 
it does provide a set of established linguistic tools that are more objective than 
simply offering an interpretation of a text. This is by virtue of the fact that much 
of corpus linguistic analysis is automated by the software36. As such, corpus 
	
36 It is worth stating here that I do not believe any method to be entirely objective. Even in the 
physical sciences objectivity is just the product of controlled variables and clear parameters. 
The observation of some ‘fact’ is still the result of interpretation, e.g. the observation that a 
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linguistic analysis provides a method for research triangulation. Further to this, 
I closely controlled the data for qualitative analysis before any textual analysis 
took place. The data analysed separately from the corpus was sampled using 
stratified random sampling to avoid any cherry-picking of specific articles or 
topics (see chapter 4 for more detail on this process). The analytical methods I 
used to uncover ideology in the data in this thesis were picked because they 
have been demonstrated to be the best way to reveal the attitudes of the 
author(s) of texts, as is evidenced by their wide use in CDA research. These 
methods are used by Fowler et al. (1979) in Critical Linguistics, Fairclough 
(1989) in CDA and Jeffries’ in Critical Stylistics (2010) (albeit under different 
terms). In response to the potential criticism than there is no set linguistic 
framework for the analysis of ideology, each analytical method will be applied 
to each text.  
In response to the second point (that is, defining what I consider CDA to 
be), my own opinion, and what will be reflected in the qualitative part of this 
thesis, is that CDA falls under the umbrella of Discourse Analysis (critical here 
being a premodifier for an already established area of linguistic enquiry; cf. 
interactional sociolinguistics). This definition is crucial in tying what I am doing 
in this thesis to linguistics. The object of study in the analysis reported here is 
language and the methods used to analyse it are taken from linguistics. CDA 
for me is a linguistic endeavour.  
In response to the third point, I need to define what some contested terms 
in CDA mean in this thesis, namely, ‘discourse’, ‘text’ and ‘ideology’. I don’t 
endeavour to define discourse and ideology in a way that will be universally 
agreed upon as I think to do so would be impossible, not least because of the 
interdisciplinary work being conducted in linguistics now that has, if anything, 
	
litmus paper turns blue in alkaline conditions. It is merely the case that the possible 
interpretations in the litmus paper example are fewer than those on offer to the linguist. See 
Short & van Peer (1999) for a discussion of objectivity in stylistic analysis. 	
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increased the variety of ways in which the word discourse is being used. For the 
most part, I will neglect to use discourse to refer to meaning that exists outside 
or above the text (as was the sense that Widdowson, 1995 took issue with). 
Instead I will use ‘discourse’ to refer to the medium in which a text is presented, 
for example newspaper discourse, spoken discourse. By text, I mean the whole 
or part of a document that is bound by the concept of cohesion, i.e. coherent 
meaning and reference (see Halliday & Hassan, 1976). I will use ‘ideological 
meaning’, or ‘potential ideological implications’ to refer to meaning in society 
caused by the attitudes of the author(s) encoded in the text. I will neglect to 
refer to ‘power’ in texts because I see this term as being as problematic as 
‘discourse’. Both ‘power’ and ‘discourse’ imply existing, tangible entities (of 
vague description) and as such, are top-down interpretations bearing on the 
data. I subscribe to the belief that all text encodes ideology (as is implied in the 
Hallidayan metafunctions – particularly the interpersonal metafunction), but it 
is through the analysis of linguistic structure that ideology is revealed and this 
ideology need not be inherently negative (as is suggested by ‘power’, or 
perhaps more specifically what is often meant by researchers analysing power, 
power asymmetry).  
In the next sections, I will describe the two analytical methods taken from 
CDA that I use in this thesis. These are transitivity analysis (Section 4.2) and 
naming analysis (section 4.3).  
 
4.2. Transitivity Analysis 
 
It is important that I detail transitivity analysis in the first part of this section as 
it is transitivity processes that will underpin much of the analytical methods 
that follow. Moreover, transitivity analysis in its most basic form requires the 
study of the very basic constituents of the clause (e.g. the noun phrase, the verb 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 	
119 
 
phrase). Transitivity analysis falls under the ideational metafunction and is 
concerned with the “theory of processes” (Halliday, 2003 [1987]: 127) encoded 
in the verbal group and how the verbs chosen represent “actions, events and 
states” (Jeffries, 2010). The types of processes represented have different 
elements associated with them; for example a material process can take an 
‘actor’ (the doer) and a ‘goal’ (the done to) whereas a relational process may 
take a ‘carrier’ and an ‘attribute’. These process types and their related elements 
are shown in in Table 3.3.2.  
 
Process  Type  Subcategories  Elements 
Material  ‘doing’  Intention (MAI)  
Supervention (MAS)  
Event (if inanimate actor) 
(MAE)  
Actor, Goal 
(optional)  
Verbalization 
Process  
‘saying’  (VP)  Sayer, Verbiage, 
Goal  
Mental  ‘sensing’  Cognition (MC)  
Reaction (MR)  
Perception (MP)  
Senser, 
Phenomenon  
Relational  ‘being’  Intensive (RI)  
Possessive (RP)  
Circumstantial (RC)  
Carrier, Attribute  
TABLE 4.2. TYPES OF PROCESSES IN A TRANSITIVITY ANALYSIS (ADAPTED FROM 
HALLIDAY, 1973, SIMPSON, 1993 AND JEFFRIES, 2010) 
 
For clarity, I will now explain each process type with examples, starting with 
material processes.  
Material processes are subcategorised into Material Action Intention 
(MAI), Material Action Supervention (MAS) and Material Action Events 
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(MAE). The first subcategory is used if the actor is an animate being and the 
action was done intentionally. The second subcategory, MAS is used if the actor 
is an animate being but the process was unintentional. The third subcategory, 
MAE is used if the actor is an inanimate object. See Table 4.3 
 
PROCESS: MATERIAL 
ACTOR PROCESS GOAL TYPE 
The student wrote  her thesis MAI 
The student lost  her train of thought MAS 
The beer packs  a punch MAE 
TABLE 4.3. TYPES OF MATERIAL PROCESS 
 
The second transitivity category is Verbalization Process (VP). This process 
type includes any action that describes communication. The elements the 
category takes include the sayer (the actor ‘doing’ the communication), the verb 
describing how the message was communicated (e.g. said, shouted), the 
verbiage, or what was said, and the target, or who the verbiage was addressed 
to. As is shown in Table 4.4 below, the verbiage and the target are not essential 
elements in the verbalization process.  
 
PROCESS: VERBALIZATION  
SAYER PROCESS VERBIAGE TARGET 
The tutor said the assessment was due Ø 
The tutor shouted Ø Ø 
The tutor  said yes to the students 
TABLE 4.4. TYPES OF VERBALIZATION PROCESS 
 
The next category is mental processes. This category is concerned with how an 
actor perceives, processes or reacts to something in the world. This category 
contains three subcategories. The first is Mental Cognition (MC), which 
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includes verbs of cognition such as think, realise, etc. The second subcategory is 
Mental Reaction (MR), which includes verbs that relate to emotional states such 
as loving or hating. The third subcategory is Mental Perception (MP), which 
relates to verbs that describe sensing something in the world, e.g. hearing or 
seeing. See Table 4.5 below. 
 
PROCESS: MENTAL  
SENSER PROCESS PHENOMENON  TYPE 
The public  realised  the referendum result was void MC 
The student  despaired at the result  MR 
The Prime Minister saw  the protests  MP 
TABLE 4.5. TYPES OF MENTAL PROCESS 
 
The final category is relational processes37, which relate to processes describing 
being or having, e.g. using the copular verb, or describing some attribute of the 
entity being discussed. Relational processes have two modes that either express 
a process of identifying or attributing (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 244). 
Whether a clause is identifying or attributive can be expressed in three types of 
relational process. The first is the Relational Intensive (RI) subcategory, which 
expresses an x is y relationship; the second is the Relational Possessive (RP) 
subcategory, which expresses an x has y relationship; and the third is the 
Relational Circumstantial (RC) category, which expresses an x is at/in/on y 
relationship (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 440; Simpson, 1993: 91-92). Within 
these categories, SFL researchers use further subcategories for elements that 
refer to the types of information conveyed by relational processes at the level 
	
37 This short section is necessarily long in comparison to the other two process types. This is 
because Relational processes are much more complex in their subdivision, and rely much 
more on the theory underpinning SFL. Moreover, I have yet to find a text that coherently 
sums up relational processes without first stating that the process is “complicated”. Given 
that something being complicated does not seem to me to be a satisfactory reason for not 
detailing what it is, I have tried to explain what Relational processes are here, drawing where 
necessary on SFL theory.	
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of the lexical item. For example, in relational clauses that identify someone or 
something, the participants may be described as the identifier and the identified, 
and when something or someone is being assigned a status of some sort, the 
participants may be described as the possessor and the possessed. The complexity 
of the Relational Process has meant that some researchers (particularly those 
working outside of SFL and who use transitivity as a method rather than a 
theory), have used simplified versions of the Relational category, simply 
referring to all participants as carrier and attribute (Jeffries, 2010; Simpson, 
1993), or only adopting the carrier/attribute and token/value elements without 
describing the nature of the process, i.e. possessive, identifying (Canning, 
2013). As can be seen by the table below, for theorists of SFL, the attributive 
mode is concerned with describing the attributes of an entity that classify it as 
part of a group, whereas the identifying mode is about relating two entities in 
some way. A helpful way to distinguish between the two modes is to note 
whether the definite article (identifying) or indefinite article (attributive) is 
used. See Table 4.6 for a summary. 
 
Intensive Emily is a poet attributive 
 Emily is the poet identifying 
Possessive Emily has a piano attributive 
 The piano is Emily’s identifying 
Circumstantial The meeting is on Friday attributive 
 The time of the meeting is 
Friday 
identifying 
TABLE 4.6. TYPES OF RELATIONAL PROCESS (TAKEN FROM HALLIDAY (2004: 239)) 
 
Table 4.7 below shows examples of the three process types with some 
expanded information about the participants in the process.  
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TABLE 4.7. ATTRIBUTIVE AND IDENTIFYING PROCESSES WITHIN THE RELATIONAL 
PROCESSES CATEGORY 
 
Although Jeffries and Simpson do not state this explicitly, the reason the model 
they adopt (Table 3.3.2) is simplified is that they observe delicacy in a lesser 
degree than I do here. Halliday defines delicacy as a “scale of differentiation, 
or depth in detail” (Halliday, 2002: 58) with the primary degree referring to 
“categories of structure and class” (Halliday, 2002: 58) and the secondary 
degree (although Halliday says there is no limit to delicacy [Halliday, 2002: 
405]) referring to the categorisation of lexical choice.38 It seems to be the case 
that delicacy refers in the primary form to the necessary constituents of a 
process. In its secondary form, delicacy refers to the categorization of lexical 
choices or the nature of lexical networks, e.g. in a RC process, the lexis 
contained will usually pertain to place, time or manner. We can conceptualise 
delicacy at this level as being syntagmatic (Hasan, 1987) and as related to the 
	
38 Put simply, delicacy relates to the level of abstraction (Williams et al, 2017). 	
PROCESS: RELATIONAL 
ATTRIBUTIVE PROCESSES 
Carrier 
Dan  
Process 
is  
Attribute 
a brilliant 
supervisor  
 
RI 
Possessor 
Jack  
Possession 
has  
Possessed 
a green bike  
 
RP 
Carrier 
The grammar book 
Process 
is  
Attribute 
in the bin  
 
RC 
IDENTIFYING PROCESSES 
Token: Identified 
Lynn 
Process 
is 
Value: Identifier 
my mother  
 
 
RI 
 
Token: possession 
The thesis 
Process 
was 
Value: possessor 
the student’s 
 
RP 
Token: identified 
Sunday  
Process 
is  
Value: identifier 
tomorrow 
 
RC 
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Firthian concept of collocation, whereby lexical choice is governed by possible 
semantic structures that exist earlier in clause (what Martin, 2016: 45) terms 
“expectancy relations”. The belief that semantic meaning is structured and 
governed by rules just like those on the syntagmatic level led Halliday to state 
that “lexis is the most delicate grammar” (1961: 267).  
 Relational processes are used in varying depths of “delicacy” 
(Matthiessen & Halliday, 1997: 29) or "the degree of detail in which a structure 
is specified" (Butler 1985: 19) by researchers in SFL (specifically for my 
purposes here, the description of more realization options within RI, RP and 
RC processes). For instance, Bloor & Bloor (1995: 127) and Butler (2003: 429) 
discuss the elements “identifier and identified” in reference to Relational 
processes, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 173) refer to token/value elements, 
and Fawcett (1987: 161) further develops the ‘carrier’ element. For clarity, the 
possible elements or participants a process type can take are shown in 3.3.2.
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FIGURE 4.2. A BREAKDOWN OF RELATIONAL PROCESSES AND THEIR PARTICIPANTS 
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Generally speaking, my aim in this thesis is not to account for the description of all 
variations of a clause (or even all the possible lexical choices the producer of a text 
could have made), but rather the general patterns contained in the clauses for the 
purposes of analysing potential ideological effects. As such, my use of the framework 
is one of application (i.e. it is used here as a method) rather than for the purpose of 
furthering the grammar itself. With this in mind, I have adopted an intermediate 
approach to the analysis of relational processes, something between the simplified 
model adopted by Jeffries (2010) and Simpson (1993), and the full model used in 
formal SFL in which the possible subcategories of carrier and attribute appear to vary 
considerably by delicacy. My reason for taking this course of action is that I believe 
that simplifying the model to the degree that Jeffries (2010) and Simpson (1993) do 
would potentially limit some interesting findings within the data – for example, 
whether mental illness in relational clauses is expressed as an attribute, an identifier, 
a possession or a value of a person.39  
As can be seen above in Table 3.3.2 and the examples for each process type, the 
value of transitivity analysis is that it is combines a syntactic and semantic description 
of language, which allows for the analysis of ideological effects. Moreover, it is 
concerned not just with the properties of the verbal or nominal group, but also with 
the meaning potential of the sum of the two. With this in mind, it is important to note 
that in any model that combines the description of a heavily structured system 
(syntax) and a system that necessitates greater interpretation of co(n)textual meaning 
(semantics), categorisation may not be straightforward. Matthiessen & Halliday (1997) 
recognise this and use the lexical item ‘make’ to demonstrate how this item can be 
coded as a material process (as a synonym of ‘produce’) as well as a relational process 
(to mean ‘cause to be’) (Matthiessen & Halliday (1997: 16). Such intermediate cases 
within the relational category have been identified in detail by Cerban (2008) and, 
	
39 With this said, it seems to me that the inclusion of a greater number of subcategories provides more 
variables than is useful in some cases. I refer here to the principle of Occam’s Razor, which states that 
“entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.” (Heuristic of unknown origin).	
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generally speaking, it appears to be the case that the greatest number of intermediate 
cases occur between the Material and Relational categories only. The complex 
structure of SFL, which leads to fuzzy cases like those identified by Cerban (2008), 
mark a potential weakness of SFL – that its complexity eschews clear application in 
some cases (see the principle of Occam’s Razor in footnote 39). SFL is useful because, 
compared to other, more parsimonious models of grammar, e.g. Chomskyan 
minimalism, it takes into account (or perhaps more accurately recognises that it takes 
into account) semantic meaning, which necessitates a more complex theoretical 
architecture (Williams et al., 2017). 
In line with Jeffries and McIntyre, I argue that “[t]he key to dealing with the 
problems of categorisation is not to treat transitivity types as categories at all, but as 
points of reference on a continuous plane of meaning” (Jeffries & McIntyre, 2010: 74). 
Wherever relevant, in problematic cases, I will provide a commentary detailing why 
certain clauses were categorised in the way that they were. Furthermore, my decision 
to adopt an intermediate model for relational processes provides a set of diagnostics 
to aid the categorisation process. For example, the participants in a relational 
attributive process can be reversed (with changes to the grammatical role of the 
subject) but those in an identifying process generally cannot.  
 
IDENTIFYING 
IDENTIFIED VERB IDENTIFIER 
Lynn is my mother 
IDENTIFIED VERB IDENTIFIER 
My mother  is Lynn  
 
ATTRIBUTIVE 
POSSESSOR VERB POSSESSED 
Jack has  brown hair 
* Brown hair has  Jack40  	
40 I feel obliged as a Yorkshire [wo]man to point out here that whilst being ungrammatical, this type 
of usage is acceptable in some British English varieties, such as the Yorkshire dialect, e.g. ‘lovely eyes 
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In this sense, the model I have adopted can account for the grammatical and semantic 
description of language albeit with simplified delicacy.  
 
4.3. Naming Analysis 
 
Naming analysis refers to the ways in which participants or entities are named or 
“packaged-up” (Jeffries, 2010: 19). Naming is “a powerful ideological tool [and] […] 
an accurate pointer to the ideology of the namer [because] different names for an 
object represent different ways of perceiving it” (Clark, 1992: 209). The analysis of 
naming practices is concerned with the nominal group and how the basic unit of the 
nominal group, e.g. a noun, is chosen over another noun, or how information about 
the noun is modified, e.g. through adjectival and prepositional phrases or 
complements that convey extra information about the thing being discussed. 41 
Sentences (1) and (2) illustrate these two types of naming practice via fictional 
newspaper headlines: 
 
(1) A woman was attacked while out walking 
(2) A blonde in a miniskirt was attacked while walking 
  
In (1) we see that the entity contained in the nominal group has been represented using 
the lexical item ‘woman’. This is a fairly unsurprising lexical choice given that the 
purpose of crime reporting is to give some information about the crime, the victim 
and if possible, the perpetrator. The choice to use ‘woman’ in this headline over, for 
example, ‘a person’ may be guided by the nature of the attack (for example, if the 
motivation for the attack led police to believe that women were at greater risk than 
	
has my mum’. (This usage is one of the lesser known linguistic links between Doncaster and the 
Dagobah system).	
41 Verbal processes may also be realized as nouns as is the case in nominalized forms or deverbal 
nouns. 	
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men). Furthermore, other naming options may not be possible for legal reasons or for 
reasons of confidentiality, for example, using the person’s full name  
In (2) the nature of the naming practice is different from that in (1), as the noun 
has changed (‘woman’ to ‘blonde’ – where blonde is a meronym42 denoting a blonde 
woman) and is also post-modified by a prepositional phrase (“in a miniskirt”). This 
sentence is much more clearly ideological than that shown in (1). The reasons for this 
are multiple. For example, the choice to use ‘blonde’ (which has connotations of 
attractiveness and sexuality – particularly a conscious effort to be conventionally 
attractive [cf. dyed/platinum blonde])43 over ‘woman’ foregrounds the appearance of 
the woman and provides unnecessary information. It is hard to see any purpose for 
including this information about the woman other than to suggest that her appearance 
was in some way linked to the attack. This is furthered by the choice to include what 
the woman was wearing (an item of clothing that displays her legs) in a post-
modifying prepositional phrase. As a result of these linguistic choices, what looks on 
the surface to be a simple description of the woman and her clothing allows for the 
presentation of covert, ideological meaning – specifically, that the woman was not 
innocent in the attack or that by simply wearing a particular item of clothing and 
having a particular hair colour, the woman is not blameless for the attack. Naming 
practices then, have an important ideological function in that they reveal information 
about an author’s ideological viewpoint. Moreover, naming practices can reveal the 
connotations that particular lexical items have in society. By way of qualifying this 
final point, consider sentence (3).  
 
(3) A grey in jeans was attacked whilst out walking 
 
	
42 In lexical semantics, meronymy is a sense relation whereby part of something is used to describe the 
whole of something, e.g. “boots on the ground” to refer to soldiers. 	
43 The top 100 collocates of ‘blonde’ in the BNC include ‘dumb’, ‘attractive’, ‘dyed’, ‘buxom’, ‘sexy’, 
‘legs’, ‘chest’.	
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Sentence (3) retains the structure of the original sentence but the nominal group has 
been altered to include lexical items that do not carry the same associations as those 
in (2) by way semantic substitution test. Most people (at least in an Anglo-western 
context) would struggle to parse (3) because grey as a referent is not 
conventionalised44. Moreover, the relevance of what the woman was wearing is more 
easily questioned because ‘jeans’ do not carry the same connotations as ‘miniskirt’ 
despite the fact that what clothing the woman was wearing is in both instances 
irrelevant.  
The sentences I have presented to illustrate naming practices so far may seem 
fairly extreme. However, existing research into naming practices has analysed 
headlines taken from national newspapers that use very similar naming practices to 
the ones used here. For example, Clark (1992) analysed newspaper articles that 
appeared in The Sun between 1986-1987 that reported on male to female violence. 
Clark found that female victims were referred to as (amongst many other referents) 
‘blonde’, ‘prostitute’, ‘divorcee’, ‘unmarried mum’ and ‘Lolita’. Clark found that the 
terms used to refer to the victims of violence served to label them without 
individualising them, e.g. “Sex-starved squaddie strangled blonde” (Clark, 1992: 218). 
Such constructions, Clark argues, portray the victim “in terms of her sexual 
attractiveness as something which any man, especially one named as ‘sex-starved’, 
could not help responding to” (Clark, 1992: 218). Moreover, such constructions leave 
little room for any sympathy for the victim; rather the naming practices hold the 
women responsible.  	
44 I believe it to be the case that this example is not just deviant for the reasons I have pointed out 
above, but also because of the maxim in Anglo-western culture that stipulates that we have to respect 
our elders, meaning that, as a result, referring to an elder by their physical characteristics, e.g. a ‘grey’, 
would be deemed rude. Conversely, referring to (young) women by their physical characteristics 
seems to be an accepted feature of mainstream society. The closest examples of hair being used to 
identify a man that come to mind are the set phrases: ‘talk, dark and handsome’ which seems not to 
have the negative connotations that ‘blonde’ does, and ‘silver fox’ which is also positive and is 
usually used to refer to middle-aged men only. The only potentially negative term is ‘baldy’ which 
only occurs 12 times in the entire BNC with only 4 instances referring to men (the referents in the 
other instances were inanimate objects, animals, unknown, or women). 	
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So far, the examples I have explored have relied on information about the entity being 
foregrounded (e.g. physical features) which works to background other features that 
may not fit with the representation the author of a text wishes to convey. In 
foregrounding certain aspects of a person or entity, creators of texts are exploiting the 
unavoidable nature of nouns (i.e. that they name entities) in order to establish a person 
or thing in the world according to their opinion. As a result, it is hard to unpick the 
ideology a nominal group contains because the very nature of naming something 
presupposes its existence (especially in less extreme cases than the ones I have offered 
so far). Jeffries writes of this phenomenon “the nominal component […] does not form 
the proposition of the clause or sentence but instead labels something that is thus 
assumed (technically, presupposed) to exist” (Jeffries, 2010: 21, original emphasis). 
Consider for example, sentences (4) and (5) where the ideological content encoded is 
less obvious. 
 
 (4) When I went to the hospital I saw a lovely lady doctor  
 (5) Mr and Mrs May walked out of Number 10 
 
The nominal groups of interest in (4) and (5) are much less obviously ideological than 
the previous examples and for some people (particular, perhaps, older people) may 
not appear to be marked at all. This is due to the fact that both naming practices shown 
in (4) and (5) reflect ways of referring that are entrenched in British society, and which 
draw upon traditional views about the roles of women in the workplace and in 
marriage. For example, in sentence (4) the choice to pre-modify ‘doctor’ with ‘lady’ is 
indicative of the view that most doctors are men. This is despite the fact that there is 
no formal semantic reason why ‘doctor’ can’t be used to refer to a woman. 
Furthermore, the noun phrase ‘doctor’ does not require pre-modification to be 
syntactically complete. So, if the semantics do not encode maleness and the syntax 
does not require pre-modification, then the need to include ‘lady’ has to be an 
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ideological decision45. As such, its usage provides insight into what society (or more 
specifically people in a society) deems the norm to be. In sentence (5), the ideology 
encoded in the naming of the referent is harder still to identify. The reason for this is 
that it is more removed from language than that shown in (4), i.e. there is no syntactic 
reason for this naming practice to be marked. The reason (5) is of interest is that the 
referent named as ‘Mrs May’ (who might also be named as ‘the former Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom or ‘destroyer of hopes, dreams and fundamental human 
rights’ according to your ideological viewpoint) is named in relation to another 
person, specifically her husband. The choice to name Theresa May in this way is 
indicative of how cultural practices affect naming options, e.g. it is tradition (and still 
very much conventional) in an Anglo-Western context for a woman to take her 
husband’s name after marriage46. The decision to name Theresa May in relation to her 
status as a wife and not by her status as the former Prime Minister demonstrates again 
how naming can be used to foreground aspects of a person or entity (her status as a 
wife) and background others (her status as a head of state)47. The decision to use ‘Mrs 
May’ and not ‘Theresa May’ or ‘the former Prime Minister' could be a useful strategy 
for conveying traditional values about marriage and the family unit, which may be in 
line with Conservative Party ideals. Conversely it may be a sexist strategy to 
downplay May’s status because of her gender (it may also, of course, be entirely 
unconscious and unintended to have an ideological effect; but the usage still generates 
an ideological meaning). Moreover, the structure of (5) does allow for nominal 
apposition, where two grammatical elements (usually nouns) placed together identify 
the same referent using different descriptions (6). And, the same proposition could be 
expressed without placing ‘Mr May’ in subject position, see (6) and (7). 
   	
45 This is also good evidence to suggest that semantics and syntax alone are not enough to describe 
language; at the very least we have to recognise a semantics/pragmatics interface. 	46	It will be interesting to see whether same-sex marriages start to change this convention.	
47 As an interesting aside, a search for “Mr and Mrs May” in the News tab of Google yields around 
twice as many hits than “Mr and Mrs Cameron”. 	
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(6) Mrs May, the Prime Minister, and Mr May walked into Number 10  
(7) The Prime Minister, Theresa May walked into Number 10 with her husband  
 
It can be said, then, that in a general sense, the analysis of naming practices offer two 
vantage points from which to analyse current and societal views because, (i) naming 
shows how people are limited in their naming choices because of societal norms (e.g. 
‘Mr and Mrs’) , and (ii) society is constructed based on how people name things within 
it (e.g. the view that the most important elements of a women are her physical 
attributes, such as in the ‘blonde’ example). Point (i) here refers to the deterministic 
view that changing the labels in a language will change the way that people think 
about that thing. Point (ii) refers to a social constructivist perspective (See Chapter 2) 
on the relationship between language and society, where a change of the status of 
something in society results in a change in language. However these two frameworks 
are not distinct, as Mills (2003) writes: “language items both affirm and contest the 
status quo and changes in social structures necessitate the development of new 
vocabulary” (Mills, 2003: 88-89). Page (2003) shares this sentiment, writing of naming 
practices in media discourse: 
 
This relationship with social reality is complex and dialectical. At one level, as 
a cultural artefact, media discourse is part of social reality itself. However, the 
relationship is not static, but the discourse operates within particular social 
contexts, and is said to both be affected by and able to affect the power relations 
embedded therein 
 
(Page 2003: 559-60) 
 
Both the deterministic view and the social constructivist view have relevance to the 
analysis of naming practices as both imply that naming practices (as part of language) 
can offer insight into the identity construction of the human participants named 
within the text from an emic perspective (i.e. how a person constructs their own 
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identity through language) and an etic perspective (i.e. how a person’s identity is 
contrasted by others through language). These insights are invaluable in this thesis 
because many of the terms used to label mental illness and people with mental illness 
are contested, still emerging and, most importantly, have real world consequences for 
the individual’s sense of self and access to resources. Moreover, the diachronic nature 
of the corpus used in this thesis allows for the analysis of naming practices across time, 
for instance the use of ‘person-first’ language (e.g. ‘a person with schizophrenia’ 
instead of ‘a schizophrenic’) or the avoidance of certain descriptions for people with 
a mental illness (e.g. ‘sufferer’ to ‘patient’ or ‘service user’). I conduct a naming 
analysis of these aspects of the corpus in Chapter 7. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I outlined the analytical methods I use in this thesis that are taken from 
CDA. In section 4.1, I described CDA from its beginnings in Critical Linguistics to 
contemporary research like that conducted in this thesis, that combines methods from 
CDA and corpus linguistics. In Section4.1, I also reviewed the existing research into 
ideology in language making the argument that some of the existing research in CDA 
is open to criticisms of overreliance on interpretation. I also discussed the notion that 
combining methods from CDA with corpus analysis provides a magic bullet for 
objectivity in research exploring ideology in language. Along with Chapter 3, then, 
this Chapter outlines the analytical methods I use in the analysis I report in this thesis. 
Specifically, I conduct naming analysis in Chapter 7 to explore the salient ways that 
people with mental illness are named in the press. Furthermore, I conduct a 
transitivity analysis to explore how the press describe people as ‘having’ or 
‘experiencing’ mental illness in Chapter 8.  
 In the next Chapter, I describe the process of constructing the MI 1984-2014 
corpus.   
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5. Corpus construction 
 
This chapter outlines the method for data collection used in this thesis, focussing on 
the process of compiling the Mental Illness 1984-2014 corpus and its related 
subcorpora. In the following sections, the various stages of corpus construction will 
be detailed. In Section 5.1, I focus specifically on what role search terms play in the 
process of building corpora, but also the role they play in the analysis stages. In 
Sections 5.2 - 5.3, I describe how the search terms for the Mental Illness 1984-2014 
Corpus were generated and describe the sampling frame for the data collection. 
Section 5.4 discusses the corpus cleaning procedure. In section 5.5, the procedure for 
constructing subcorpora is outlined. I discuss the practical issues arising from the 
subcorpus construction procedure in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 shows how the final 
corpus is representative of the target population using some basic frequency and 
dispersal tests. Section 5.8 discusses and responds to any methodological caveats 
before I conclude this chapter in Section 5.9.  
 
5.1. Search terms: interpretatively neutral? 
 
Critical corpus linguistic studies rarely discuss the role of semantic content in the 
compilation of search terms, preferring instead to focus on linguistic form 48 . 
Discussion of search terms tends to focus on (i) general issues of how analysts can use 
lemmatisers and basic regular expressions (e.g. wildcards49) to ensure that all possible 
derivations of a root word are captured effectively (e.g. ‘immigr*’ to capture 
‘immigrant’ and ‘immigration’); and (ii) whether the search parameters effectively 
capture the medium the researcher wants to represent, e.g. tabloids or broadsheets 
	
48 My argument here is mainly in reference to studies that make use of data from press publications.  
49 A wildcard (e.g. *,!) is a regular expression used in searches to allow the search to return particular 
strings of characters.  
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(see Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008). Discussion about search term syntax is arguably due 
to the fact that many of the analytical methods used in corpus linguistics are 
continually being developed and, as a result, shared techniques to capture all 
instances of a lemma when building corpora are still useful and relevant in the 
research community. This aside, the focus of the process of compiling search terms in 
studies that adopt CL and CDA methods tends to be on discussion of the data sources 
used, such as tabloids and broadsheets, and their historic position on societal issues 
such as Islamaphobic views (Baker et al. 2013), rather than how to best capture the 
language used to represent that societal issue, or the medium the analyst wants to 
represent. Indeed in their 2013 article, Baker et al. write that their search term was 
developed “using trial and error” (2013: 259). This approach to data collection 
suggests that instead of letting the data reveal the textual practices at play within it, 
analysts are collecting data with a priori research objectives50 and aiming to validate or 
invalidate particular hypotheses (e.g. ‘tabloids are more negative in the representation 
of immigration than broadsheets’ or ‘right-wing newspapers stigmatise Islam’). This 
practice has been described in the CDA literature as ‘problem-oriented social research’ 
(Baker et al, 2008: 279), which raises an issue for corpus linguistic informed CDA 
studies generally: how does a researcher represent a population for the purposes of 
studying objectively the ideologies in that population? It has to be the case that search 
terms are used to build a corpus that contains instances of the type of language that 
the analyst wishes to study, to allow for cross analysis of related terms (see, for 
example, Baker et al.'s, 2008 study on ‘immigrant’, ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’, etc.). 
However, researchers doing this could be accused of lacking the objectivity that the 
	
50 Arguably, this is particularly true of fields like CDA where identifying ideologies is the aim of 
analysis rather than a potential research finding. This is the result of a difference in focus between 
traditional corpus linguistic ideas (i.e. representing a type and /or domain of language such as 
spoken, written, scientific or fiction) and the ideas of CDA (i.e. looking for particular ideologies 
within a variety). Put simply, traditional CL analysis was about mapping patterns of language 
without any focus on ascribing value to usage. CDA is inherently about ascribing value to usage. This 
difference in focus is a result of the tendency in CDA to observe the notion of ‘discourse’ over the 
notion of linguistic ‘tokens’.  
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field of corpus linguistics was developed to afford them. The issue of objectivity in 
CDA has been criticised from another perspective also; Koller and Mautner (2004) 
have argued that the texts used in CDA (and relatedly, critical corpus linguistics) have 
been cherry-picked (consciously or not) in order to give positive evidence for a 
discourse or ideology, rather than letting discourses be identified in a bottom-up 
approach: 
 
The hidden danger is that the reason why the texts concerned are singled out 
for analysis in the first place is that they are not typical, but in fact quite unusual 
instances which have aroused the analyst’s attention. 
  
(Koller and Mautner, 2004: 218) 
 
Furthermore, Sinclair writes of researchers constructing corpora with specific insight 
into its content that there is “a danger of a vicious circle arising if they construct a 
corpus to reflect what they already know or can guess about its linguistic detail” 
(Sinclair, 2005: 1). In fact, for Sinclair, a corpus should be built without any insight into 
what the texts contain (Sinclair, 2005). However, building a corpus without knowing 
what the corpus contains poses problems for the critical corpus linguist working 
outside the theoretical tradition of corpus linguistics, and whose research necessitates 
the construction of a corpus based on its internal criteria; that is, the topic the text 
discusses. Moreover, the very construction of specialised corpora requires specific 
words to be present in order for potential constituent texts to be deemed relevant for 
inclusion. What is deemed good practice in corpus construction when using corpus 
linguistics as a method in CDA research, then, is clearly different from that advocated 
by Sinclair (2005). This is not to say that the corpora created with these research aims 
are any less valid than those created observing the criteria Sinclair (2005) sets out. 
However, what it does mean is that researchers building specialised corpora ought to 
pay attention to the role of search terms in corpus construction as the search terms 
play a huge role in the analysis – because they constitute the data. In Section 2, I draw 
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attention to this otherwise neglected topic in the discussion of (critical) corpus 
linguistic methods, which is the inherently interpretative process of collecting data 
through search terms. I suggest that paying greater attention to the compilation of 
search terms could go some way towards addressing criticisms about objectivity in 
critical discourse analysis from the outset, simply by making the analyst aware that 
words are in themselves social constructions; i.e. to search for a word in a corpus, the 
analyst is recognising (tacitly or not) that the word means something in society51. This 
brings me to my next point. In many CDA projects, researchers do not acknowledge 
that the search terms used are in themselves a form of interpretation (or at least work 
to prime an interpretation of the data before it is analysed). If what we are trying to 
do when building corpora is model a population, then identifying key search terms as 
a way to model that population necessarily indicates that a degree of interpretation is 
taking place before the formal stage of analysis begins. Instead of recognising this, 
however, some researchers have even suggested that corpora built with specific 
research purposes in mind facilitate objective analysis because corpus linguistic 
methods ‘enable the researcher to approach the texts (or text surface) (relatively) free 
from any preconceived or existing notions regarding their linguistic or 
semantic/pragmatic content’ (Baker et al, 2008: 277). Clearly this is a problematic line 
of argument when corpora are built with the very intention that they contain specific 
semantic and pragmatic content. The techniques used to analyse the semantic and 
pragmatic content of the corpus may be (relatively) neutral; the content of the corpus 
being analysed is not. 
To use an analogous example from another sub-field of linguistics, I propose that 
critical corpus linguists should view corpora constructed to represent a particular 
societal issue in the same way that Conversation Analysts view transcripts of 
conversation. A transcript is not the data. Rather, it is an interpretation of the data and 
necessarily contains some interpretative decisions, e.g. the decision to transcribe 	
51 This is to say, the word means something in society more than simply being a noun or a verb, or as 
being a feature of a particular discourse type, e.g. spoken discourse.  
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laughter with a particular vowel quality. Just like transcripts, so too do search terms 
encode interpretation. For this reason, researchers constructing specialised corpora 
using search terms (and particularly those that target a potentially contentious social 
issue) ought to be able to ask themselves questions such as: Why are the words chosen 
significant? Why did I pick these words from the other words available? Has my own 
position on this societal issue led to terms being missed or added without good 
reason? 
To view the search terms as almost an aside to the corpus construction process 
should be a concern when one considers that the whole analysis is predicated on the 
data elicited using those search terms.  
 
5.2. Search terms and sampling frame for the MI 1984-2014 corpus  	
In this section I outline the process of determining search terms for the MI corpus in a 
way that avoids the pitfalls I identified in the previous section. I begin by explaining 
the rationale for the search terms. 
 
5.2.1. Generating search terms 
 
In order to accurately represent the population I was sampling from, I first turned to 
the UK based mental health charity Mind, given that “An obvious starting point for 
the compilation of a query is lexis denoting the entities, concepts, states, relations or 
processes that are to be investigated” (Gabrielatos, 2007: 6). The reason for choosing 
the Mind website over other sites offering information on mental health and illness 
was that it features an A-Z of mental health (Mind, 2018). This provided a near 
exhaustive list of mental health terms that included accessible terms for illnesses. For 
example, the terms featured were referenced by their common names, not by medical 
jargon. The preference for using common names for illnesses in the press over medical 
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jargon was something I observed in a small-scale pilot study I conducted during the 
search term generation process. For this reason, I made the informed decision to use 
Mind’s A-Z over the terms listed in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (Fifth Edition) 
(DSM-V) which offers an exhaustive list of mental illnesses and symptoms aimed at 
practitioners. A further reason for opting to use Mind’s A-Z over the DSM-V was that 
the typology of mental illness included in the DSM-V has to be very broad and include 
specific information because it is used by practitioners. As a result, the illnesses it 
includes are more for the purposes of diagnosis than description. Furthermore, given 
that my interest in the current study was to track the social construction of mental 
illness by people who may not be medical experts in the field of mental illness, I felt 
using accessible terms for the illnesses would better reflect the view of mental illness 
in society (i.e. the view of the non-expert). Moreover, I made the decision not to 
include pejorative or euphemistic terms for referring to mental illnesses in my search 
terms (e.g. nutcase or bonkers) in order to focus my analysis on medicalised terms. 
There is, of course, the high probability that such terms are included in the final corpus 
despite this methodological decision.  
Section 5.2.2 provides some information about Mind and the A-Z of Mental 
Health.  
 
5.2.2. Mind  
 
Mind is a mental health charity founded in 1946. The charity covers England and 
Wales and works with local authorities to help people suffering with mental ill health 
and their families to access services. On their website, Mind state: 
 
We provide advice and support to empower anyone experiencing a mental 
health problem. We campaign to improve services, raise awareness and 
promote understanding. We won't give up until everyone experiencing a 
mental health problem gets support and respect.” 
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(Mind, 2019b; original emphasis) 
 
In addition to working with individual service users, Mind is also associated with 
several public-facing schemes to raise awareness of mental health in society. They 
have Mind celebrity spokespeople (Stephen Fry is the President of the charity) and 
work across platforms to reach different target groups. A recent example of this was 
Mind’s digital ambassador scheme, for which they made the YouTuber Zoe ‘Zoella’ 
Sugg 52  the charity’s first digital ambassador, to launch their #DontPanicButton 
campaign aimed at raising awareness of anxiety and panic attacks in young people. 
In addition to their work raising awareness of mental health through celebrities, Mind 
also have a ‘Media Office’ section of their website that allows users to access 
spokespeople to talk about mental health. As part of their media work, Mind also offer 
a service on how to report on mental health in which they give a list of the Press 
Complaints Commission Code of Practices on reporting on mental health and how to 
report on specific issues such as suicide, violence and eating disorders. This is also a 
service offered by Rethink Mental Illness, another charity that Mind collaborate with. 
Knowing this, it is clear that Mind have expertise on the issue of mental health 
but also how societal perceptions of mental health are created, maintained or changed 
by language. For this reason, I used Mind as the starting point when compiling search 
terms for the Mental Illness 1984-2014 corpus. 
 
5.2.3. Using the Mind ‘A-Z of Mental Health’ to build search terms 
 
The Mind ‘A-Z of mental health’ lists all the terms Mind see as the key terminology of 
mental health, including diagnosable conditions and symptoms. The criterion for 
	
52 A YouTuber is a person who creates and features in YouTube videos. Zoella’s YouTube channel has 
nearly 12,000,000 subscribers. A video posted on her channel titled ‘Dealing with Panic Attacks & 
Anxiety’ has been viewed over 4,000,000 times.  
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inclusion in my search terms was that the term had to relate to a diagnosis but not be 
a symptom of a diagnosis (e.g. panic attacks are a symptom of the diagnosable 
condition anxiety). The rationale for this was that articles on the topic of anxiety would 
contain ‘panic attack’ and therefore the term would be captured by the search terms 
anyway. Moreover, many of the symptoms related to multiple illnesses, which meant 
that should an article on anxiety not capture ‘panic attack’, another search term may. 
Another reason for not including symptoms was that some symptoms could introduce 
noise into the corpus. ‘Stress’ is an example, as it does not necessarily refer to mental 
illness.  
Restricting the terms in this way raised an important issue about how mental 
health disorders are grouped, as although the difference between symptoms and 
diagnosis looks to be clear, the waters are muddied by conditions like dissociative 
disorder, which has several sub-diagnoses within it but whose symptoms 
(dissociation) are also symptoms of other disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar and 
borderline personality disorder. The complex phobias (social phobia and 
agoraphobia) were included, but specific phobias were not (specific and complex are 
terms taken from Mind).  
Once the terms for specific mental illnesses were collected using the Mind A-Z, 
general terms to refer to mental illness and health were added to ensure that articles 
reporting on the issue generally without reference to specific illnesses would be 
captured. These include ‘mental illness’, ‘mental health’, ‘mental ill health’, ‘mentally 
ill’, ‘mentally un!53’. In addition to these general terms, ‘autism’ was also added as a 
search term. The rationale for including autism was that people with autism are more 
likely to experience mental illness than members of the general population (National 
Autistic Society, 2019), and yet despite this, “the mental health of autistic people is 
often overlooked” (National Autistic Society, 2019). For this reason, including autism 
allowed for the capture of articles that may have not been captured otherwise, and 
	
53 Recall that ‘!’ used in search terms is a wildcard.	
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also provided the opportunity to explore the overlooked relationship between autism 
and mental illness. It is important to state at this point that there are very many other 
groups of people in which the prevalence of mental illness is higher than average (e.g. 
those below the poverty line or those living alone). The reason for including ‘autism’ 
and not these other groups however was due to the fact that ‘autism’ has a clear lexical 
item associated with it while these other groups do not. Including search terms that 
are not immediately relevant to the other search terms but are related can offer insight 
into the topic being studied because they can identify articles that discuss mental 
illness without using terminology directly related to it. Gabrielatos (2007) writes on 
this topic in reference to a study into the words ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’:  
 
if an article reports on or discusses issues related, directly or indirectly, to 
refugees or asylum seekers, these two groups may not necessarily be referred to 
explicitly. If, however, the query string includes as many other terms as possible 
referring to the same or similar groups, then it is expected to capture a large 
proportion of those articles in which the groups in question are not mentioned 
explicitly 
 
(Gabrielatos 2007: 8) 
 
This final search term collection process resulted in 26 lexical items/phrases. The terms 
selected from Mind also cover a broad range of disorder types as described in the 
DSM-V. Figure 5.1 shows the search terms grouped by disorder type: 
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FIGURE 5.1. LEXICAL ITEMS GROUPED BY DISORDER TYPE AS CATEGORISED IN DSM-V. 
 
Once these terms were decided upon, the lexical items were prepared for 
incorporating into a search term by using wildcards to ensure that all variants of the 
lexeme would be captured in a search. This included starting with the nominalised 
form of the word, e.g. ‘psychosis’, and working through the different parts of speech 
it could take, e.g. adjectival forms such a ‘psychotic’. Some of the lexical items have a 
nominal form that can perform an adjectival function, e.g. ‘he was bipolar’, ‘he has 
bipolar’. For others, the adjectival form was needed, e.g. ‘he was psychotic’ (c.f. ‘he 
has psychosis’). Issues such as these were alleviated by using wildcards in the specific 
Eating	Disorders	Bulimia	Anorexia	Binge	eating	disorder	
Depressive	Disorders	Depression	Seasonal	Affective	Disorder	-	(depression	with	seasonal	pattern)	Postnatal	Depression		
Psychotic	Disorders	Psychosis	Schizophrenia	 Anxiety	Disorders	Agoraphobia	Social	Phobia	
Autism	Spectrum	
Disorders	Autism	
Bipolar	Disorders	Bipolar	Mania	Hypomania	Hypermania	
Obsessive	Compulsive	
Disorders	Obsessive	Compulsive	Disorders	Body	Dismorphia	
Trauma	Disorders	Post-traumatic	Stress	Disorder	 Dissociative	Disorders	Dissociative	identity	disorder		
	
Personality	Disorders	Personality	Disorder	Borderline	Personality	Disorder	
General	Terms	mental	illness,	mental	health,	mental	ill	health,	mentally	ill,	mentally	un!		
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terms e.g. ‘agoraphobi*’. However, wildcards were not used in lexemes such as 
‘anxiety’, since high frequency words like ‘anxious’ would create noise in the corpus, 
as the term is used most commonly outside of a mental health context. . Similarly, 
with terms like ‘seasonal affective disorder’ that have common initialised forms, i.e. 
‘SAD’, only the full term was searched for to avoid further noise. Any initialisms in 
the search terms only refer to the mental health disorder, e.g. ‘BPD’ for borderline 
personality disorder.  
 
5.2.4. Final search terms 
 
As far as possible, the final terms comprising the search term were designed to capture 
a variety of spelling variants of words, (e.g. ‘posttraumatic stress disorder’, ‘post-
traumatic stress disorder’), acronyms of conditions, (e.g. ‘OCD’), and a variety of 
possible ways to refer to a condition (e.g. ‘bulimia’, ‘bulimia nervosa’, ‘eating 
disorder’). The design of the overall search term means that it captures a minimum of 
49 ways of referring to mental health phenomena. These include diagnosable illnesses 
(e.g. hypomania), assessments of states of mind (e.g. mentally unstable) and mental 
health literature (e.g. mental health act). Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of the 
constituent search terms and the final overarching search term. 
Condition or lexical 
item 
With wildcard (if 
added) 
What it will capture 
mental health (mental health!) mental health, mental health 
act 
mental ill health (mental ill health) mental ill health 
mental illness (mental illness!) mental illness, mental 
illnesses 
mentally ill (mentally ill) mentally ill 
mentally un (mentally un!) mentally unwell, mentally 
unstable, mentally unsound, 
mentally unhinged, mentally 
unfit 
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agoraphobia (agoraphobi!) agoraphobia, agoraphobic 
anorexia (anorexi!) anorexia, anorexic, anorexia 
nervosa 
anxiety (anxiety) anxiety 
autism, autistic (autism) or (austistic) autism, autistic 
binge eating disorder (binge eating disorder) binge eating disorder 
bipolar (bipolar!) bipolar, bipolar disorder 
body dismorphia (body dismorph!) body dismorphia, body 
dismorphic 
borderline personality 
disorder 
(borderline personalit!) 
or (bpd) 
borderline personality, 
borderline personality 
disorder, bpd 
bulimia (bulimi!) or (bulimia) bulimia, bulimic, bulimia 
nervosa 
depression (depress!) depression, depressed, 
depressive, depressing 
dissociative identity 
disorder 
(dissociative disorder) 
or (dissociative identity 
disorder) 
dissociative disorder, 
dissociative identity disorder 
eating disorder (eating disorder) eating disorder 
hypomania (hypomania) hypomania 
hypermania (hypermania) hypomania 
mania (mania) or (mania!) or 
(manic) or (manic!) 
mania, manic, maniacal, 
maniac, manic depression, 
manic depressive 
multiple personality 
disorder 
(multiple personality 
disorder) or (mpd) 
multiple personality disorder, 
mpd 
obsessive compulsive 
disorder 
(obsessive compulsive 
disorder!) or (obsessive 
compulsive) or (ocd) 
obsessive compulsive 
disorder, obsessive 
compulsive disorders, 
obsessive compulsive, ocd 
paranoia (paranoia) paranoia 
personality disorder (personality disorder!) personality disorder, 
personality disorders 
postnatal depression (postnatal depression) postnatal depression 
posttraumatic stress 
disorder 
(posttraumatic stress) 
or (post traumatic 
stress) or (post-
traumatic stress) or 
(ptsd) 
posttraumatic stress, post 
traumatic stress, post-
traumatic stress, ptsd 
psychosis (psychosis) or 
(psychotic) 
psychosis, psychotic 
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TABLE 5.1. BREAKDOWN OF THE SEARCH TERMS. 
 
Once the search terms had been collected and wildcards added, each term was joined 
using the OR Boolean operator denoting that the software should return articles that 
include any of the terms. This resulted in the final search term to be used in the 
LexisNexis database: 
 
FIGURE 5.2. SEARCH TERM FOR THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS  
 
In the next section, I discuss the rationale for the sampling from the dates covered. 
 
5.3. Rationale for dates covered 
 
In this section I discuss the rationale for the time period covered by the MI 1984-2014 
corpus. My aim was to create a resource that represents the topic of mental health in 
the UK press and which is sizable enough for the findings generated by corpus 
analysis to be generalisable to the population from which the sample is drawn. For 
this reason, the dates covered had to be wide ranging enough to give adequate access 
schizophrenia (schizophreni!) or 
(schizo) 
schizophrenia, schizophrenic, 
schizo 
seasonal affective 
disorder 
(seasonal affective 
disorder!) 
seasonal affective disorder, 
seasonal affective disorders 
social phobia (social phobia) social phobia 
(mental illness!) OR (mental health!) OR (mental ill health) OR (mentally ill) OR (mentally 
un!) OR (agoraphobi!) OR (anorexi!) OR (anxiety) OR (autism) OR (autistic) OR (binge 
eating disorder) OR (bipolar!) OR (body dismorph!) or (borderline personalit!) OR (BPD) 
OR (bulimi!) OR (depress!) OR (dissociative disorder) OR (dissociative identity disorder) 
OR (eating disorder) OR (multiple personality disorder) OR (mpd) OR (obsessive 
compulsive disorder!) OR (obsessive compulsive) OR (ocd) OR (paranoia) OR 
(personality disorder!) OR (postnatal depression) OR (posttraumatic stress) OR (post 
traumatic stress) OR (post-traumatic stress) OR (ptsd) OR (psychosis) OR (psychotic) OR 
(schizophreni!) OR (seasonal affective disorder!) OR (social phobia) OR (bulimia) OR 
(hypomania) OR (hypermania) OR (mania) OR (mania!) OR (manic) OR (manic!) 	
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to the population I was trying to represent whilst also including any potential 
diachronic or synchronic changes.  
In order to ascertain relevant periods of history to sample from, I researched the 
history of mental illness legislation. The most recent major mental health act was 
passed in November 1983 (subsequent amendments have been made since) and so I 
decided to start the data collection period in the January of 1983 to cover this period. 
In order to ensure that the data collected would be sizable enough, I chose to sample 
from 30 years of newspaper reports as this length of time is likely to be enough to 
cover changes in textual practices in newspaper reportage. As a result of this, the data 
is continuous and longitudinal, which facilitates diachronic analysis with a greater 
degree of nuance than other studies into newspaper reports on mental illness (for 
example, those that use discrete data to make claims about longitudinal trends in 
reporting, e.g. Goulden et al., 2007; Roberts et al., 2013). Due to the fact that the 
function of the corpus is to be broad in its coverage, it is also significantly larger than 
the corpora used in the few existing studies in linguistics that explore mental health 
reportage. For example, Atanasova et al. (2019) sampled from articles published 
between 2007 and 2015, creating a corpus of 485,186 words.  
A further reason for selecting 30 years from 1983 was that the time period 
covered a relatively active area in legislation related to mental health. The time period 
covers The Mental Health Act 1983, The Mental Health (Patients in the Community) 
Act (1995), The Mental Capacity Act (2005), the amendments to the 1983 Mental 
Health Act in 2007 and the 2013 Mental Health (Discrimination) Act. For this reason, 
the dates chosen are broad enough to provide insight into any diachronic change but 
are also fitted to relevant time periods in the history of mental illness in a UK context. 
Moreover, collecting data from every week during the time period provides data that 
can be analysed for any synchronic changes, (e.g. how different newspapers report on 
the same story).  
Some of the changes made as a result of changes in legislation on mental health 
and illness pertained to language and definitions of roles and mental illness terms. 
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Moreover, the reaction to some of these acts has received much press attention 
(particularly in relation to the move towards outpatient care). For this reason, the key 
changes stipulated by the Acts are detailed in Table 5.2.	
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Mental Health Act 
1983 
• First Mental Health Act since 1959 
• Defined mental disorder as “mental illness, 
arrested or incomplete development of mind, 
psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or 
disability of mind”  
• Stipulated that a person with a mental disorder 
can be detained against their will for treatment 
(sectioning) if a professional deems this necessary  
The Mental Health 
(Patients in the 
Community) Act 1995 
• Provided provision for people with mental 
disorders to receive community care and 
community supervision 
Mental Capacity Act 
2005 
• Listed the rights of patients who do not have the 
mental capacity to make decisions (including 
people with mental illness) 
Amendments to 
Mental Health Act 
1983 (2007) 
• Change in definition of mental disorder from 
“any disorder or disability of the mind” 
• Introduced community treatment orders which 
mean that ‘non-compliant’ patients are treated in 
the community without their consent rather than 
be admitted back to hospital to be treated without 
their consent (move closer to care in the 
community model over inpatient care) 
• Widened definition of mental health 
professionals to include ‘approved clinician’ 
• Changed title of approved social worker to 
‘approved mental health professional’ 
• Stated that Electroconvulsive therapy may not be 
used without consent from the patient 
Mental Health 
(Discrimination) Act 
2013 
• Changed rules on whether members of 
parliament, jurors and company directors can 
serve in their relevant positions after being 
sectioned 
TABLE 5.2. OVERVIEW OF MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION 1983-2013 
 
The next section will discuss the software used to collect the data, LexisNexis. 
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5.3.1. LexisNexis 
 
LexisNexis (https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/) is subscription-based software 
containing a database of legal and journalistic documents. Nexis is the part of this 
software that contains historic newspaper articles (from 1981 onwards) available for 
download in multiple file formats. The software allows researchers to set criteria for 
the articles it returns which means that it is routinely used in studies of this kind in 
both corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis (see, for example, Baker et al, 
2008; Baker & Levon, 2015; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Grundmann & Krishnamurthy, 
2010; inter alia). Nexis allows researchers to input their search terms and specify 
whether these should be present in the entire document, the headline of the article, 
the byline, etc. Furthermore, the researcher can stipulate both the date range of returns 
(e.g. last week, last month, custom range, etc.) and the source (e.g. UK Newspapers, 
UK Broadsheets, All English Language News, etc.). The researcher can select whether 
to group duplicate articles by high similarity and whether to include newswires, etc. 
The Nexis database of UK Newspapers contains broadsheets, tabloids and regional 
newspaper articles from the 1980s and is updated daily. A screenshot of the software 
is shown in Figure 5.3:  
FIGURE 5.3. NEXIS SEARCH HOMEPAGE 
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Once the sampling frame has been selected, files can be downloaded from Nexis, in 
groups of 500 articles. The downloaded files also contain metadata listing the date and 
source of the publication, the byline of the article and the section of the newspaper 
that the article appeared in. An annotated screenshot of a Nexis file is shown in Figure 
5.4.
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FIGURE 5.4. SCREENSHOT OF A NEXIS FILE AFTER DOWNLOAD  
Name of Nexis database  
No. of file and total files 
in document Name of publication 
Search term 
Body of article 
Article title 
Section of newspaper the article was 
taken from 
Date of article 
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To the best of my knowledge, there is currently no way to automate the process of 
downloading files from Nexis, which poses problems for the researcher. The first of 
these is the issue of time. Downloading articles from Nexis often requires the 
researcher to download multiple files for just one category of interest, e.g. a week. For 
example, my sampling frame required me to search every seven days and often the 
number of articles returned required 3 or 4 separate downloads of 500 for this period. 
Each download takes around 5 minutes. Clearly, then, this is a manual and time-
consuming process. Another problem is that Nexis does not allow the researcher to 
specify a naming strategy for the downloaded files. This means that after download, 
the files have to be renamed manually to preserve the chronological order.  
 
5.3.2. Sampling frame for MI 1984-2014 
 
The search terms and sampling frame were designed to be broad to allow for 
representative sampling and also to assess how much data was available for each 
period. The sampling frame I used in the data collection process was the search term 
detailed in the Section 5.2 within the Nexis UK Newspapers database with articles 
grouped by similarity and excluding newswires. The reason for choosing UK 
Newspapers over UK National Newspapers was that doing so allowed for the 
representation of both national and local news reports. This enabled me to identify 
local/national press journalistic differences as a variable should the need arise. 
Furthermore, as Atanasova et al. (2019) point out, sampling from local newspapers is 
a novel methodological decision as previous research has not focussed on 
investigating the variation between local depictions vs. national depictions of mental 
illness. Furthermore they note that 
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Contrary to national media, local newspapers cater to smaller communities. It 
is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the readers and, indeed, writers of news 
articles published in local newspapers may personally know the individuals 
involved in the reported stories, resulting in more positive writing 
 
(Atanasova et al., 2019: 12) 
 
Given that the final corpus may be used as resource to help answer a wide range of 
research questions and test hypotheses that exceed the scope of this thesis (for 
example, exploring the link between local newspapers and national newspapers), I 
wanted to make sure that these questions could be asked of the corpus at a later date 
should the need arise. I placed no restriction on where the search terms could appear 
(i.e. the search could return hits with just one instance of a word anywhere in the 
whole document). Given that the software restricts the amount of articles available for 
download, I searched for the terms of interest in 7-day periods54 throughout the 30 
years. Due to the sampling frame using a week as a sampling unit, some articles were 
collected from the first few days of January 2014. These articles were also collected.  
As stated in Section 2.2.1, the Nexis database only contains newspaper articles 
from 1981 onwards. It also only holds certain newspapers in these years. For example, 
in the early 1980s the only newspaper stored in the Nexis database is The Guardian. 
For this reason, the number of hits returned from searches at the start of the 1980s was 
much lower than that of the end of the decade55 . Files collected during the data 
collection process were named using this structure: 
 	 YEAR_MONTH_DAY_YEAR_MONTH_DAY 
Example: 1998_09_21_1998_09_28 
(would contain articles published between 21 to 28 September 1998) 	
54 When collecting data from LexisNexis in the early years of the search period, the search time was 
broadened as fewer hits were returned. For example, during 1984 it may have only been necessary to 
download files in a one month or two month period; however, in the later periods it was necessary to 
download the files by week. 
55 Indeed, the search results yielded no hits in 1983.  
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For 7 day periods that returned more than 500 hits and therefore required more than 
one file and additional specification, a number corresponding to the number of file 
was added to the file name: 
 
YEAR_MONTH_DAY_YEAR_MONTH_DAY_NO. OF DOWNLOAD FOR THAT 
WEEK 
 Example: 1998_09_21_1998_09_28_01 à would contain files 1-499 
     1998_09_21_1998_09_28_02 à would contain files 500-999 
     1998_09_21_1998_09_28_03 à would contain files 1000-1499  
     Etc.  
 
During the data collection process, all information about the files was added to a 
master spreadsheet for each year that detailed which week the data was from, how 
many hits the search had returned before similarity analysis, how many hits the search 
returned after similarity analysis and how the files were split if the 7-day period 
returned more than 500 articles.  
 
FIGURE 5.5. SCREENSHOT OF MASTER SPREADSHEET FOR 1997 
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The initial download yielded 3343 documents comprising c. 1,414,660 individual 
newspaper articles. Given that the articles range in length from relatively short articles 
(c. 600 words to over 7000 words) the number of words in this initial data collection 
was too large for any detailed analysis to be feasible, and moreover, would not be 
computable by mainstream corpus tools. In order for the data to be useable, it first 
needed to be sampled from and then cleaned. These issues will be discussed in more 
detail in the following section.  
 
5.4. Data cleaning 
 
One of the first ways to downsize the data was to rid it of any noise. Gabrielatos (2007) 
writes of noise in specialised corpora: 
 
there is a tension between, on the one hand, creating a corpus in which all the 
texts are relevant, but which does not contain all relevant texts available in the 
database, and, on the other, creating a corpus which does contain all available 
relevant texts, albeit at the expense of irrelevant texts also being included. Seen 
from a different perspective, the trade-off is between a corpus that can be 
deemed incomplete, and one which contains noise (i.e. irrelevant texts) 
 
(Gabrielatos 2007: 6) 
 
In order to ensure that no highly relevant articles were removed, whilst also ensuring 
that noise was significantly reduced, a series of steps were designed in collaboration 
with Dr Hugo Sanjurjo-González, a programmer. These steps were then incorporated 
into a Python script. The first stage of the script was designed to do the following: 
 
1. Split the files so that each individual article is in its own file 
2. Delete duplicate files 
3. Name the files to preserve the chronological order of the articles 
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4. Remove default metadata from the files (byline, author, newspaper 
section) but keep basic information about the article (title, date 
published) 
5. Remove articles that do not contain at least three instances of a search 
term item 
6. Remove any articles that contained the search term depression that also 
contained the words economy, finance, money 
 
After this initial step, a wordlist was generated to assess any additional noise. At this 
point it became clear that some noise has been created as a result of the wildcards used 
on *mania and manic*. This resulted in a final cleaning step: 	
7. Delete articles that have been included as a result of *mania and manic* 
that do not pertain to mental illness (e.g. articles containing words such 
as manicure and Romania)56  
 
 
The rationale for setting a cut off of three instances of a search term was that the data 
collection process had yielded a considerable amount of data to be analysed and had 
to be significantly reduced. Moreover, after initial assessment of the files returned in 
the data collection, it became clear that some regular features in the newspapers were 
creating a considerable amount of noise in the corpus as they did not relate to mental 
illness. For example, the ‘Text Maniacs’ feature in The Sun.  
The procedure was successful in greatly reducing the number of tokens and 
increasing the overall relevance of the articles contained in the corpus. During this 
procedure, it also became apparent that due to the sampling frame, which searched 
for articles by week, the articles published in the first few days of January 2014 had 
been collected. Given that the earlier period of the sampling frame (1983 and up to 
July 1984) returned no or very few articles, the small number of articles collected from 
2014 were included which resulted in the corpus representing articles published from 
	
56 Articles that contained one of these items (Romania, manicure) plus another search term, e.g. bipolar 
disorder were left in the corpus.  
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mid-1984 to early 2014. After the cleaning procedure was complete, additional file 
naming strategies were implemented. For example, the .txt file named 
‘1986_01_01_1986_02_23_127.txt’ relates to the 127th57 article collected between the 1st 
January 1986 and the 23rd February 1986. The final streamlined corpus contains 
newspaper articles from 1st August 1984 to 5th January 2014 and comprises 64,521 
articles and 50,972,932 words (calculated using AntConc-4).  
 
5.5. Construction of subcorpora 
 
Once the data had been cleaned, the next step involved the creation of subcorpora. I 
made the decision to create subcorpora for each year and for each illness. The reason 
for doing this is that creating subcorpora for each of the predictor variables (i.e. time 
and illness type) allowed for diachronic analysis (e.g. how each year differs in the 
reports on mental illness) as well as synchronic analysis (e.g. how news articles report 
on each illness type and how that compares with how other illnesses are reported). 
Furthermore, creating specific subcorpora based on the predictor variables allowed 
for more precise analysis of textual differences (or output variables) and how they 
pattern across each illness type, e.g. transitivity categories.  
The construction of the subcorpora was again done in conjunction with a 
programmer. Based on the new naming schemes, which gave specific information 
about the day and year of publication, the year subcorpora (e.g. 1984, 1985, and so on) 
were created based solely on publication date. A python script written by the 
programmer was designed to read the year and date of publication of the article and 
add it to the relevant year subcorpus. The criteria for the illness subcorpora (e.g. 
AnxietyCorpus, BipolarDisorderCorpus) required more planning however. This was 
due to the fact that I wanted to avoid duplicating articles in the different illness 
	
57 This number relates to the position of the article in the original data collection period, not the final 
data contained in the corpus.  
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 	
160 
 
subcorpora. This meant that a very specific workflow had to be created to automate 
the process of adding files to the relevant subcorpus using some information 
contained in each individual article. The reason for not adding articles containing 
multiple terms to every relevant illness subcorpus was to allow for reliable results 
when making comparisons between the illness subcorpora. The first step in creating 
the illness subcorpora was to revisit the search terms and group them by illness. 
Wherever the search term was a general term, e.g. mental illness, and therefore did 
not pertain to a specific illness, it was added to a general mental illness subcorpus. 
The decisions in this step are shown below: 
 
Subcorpus name Terms to include 
MentalIllness corpus mental illness*, mental illness, mental 
ill health, mentally ill, mentally un* 
Agoraphobia corpus agoraphobi* 
ASPD corpus antisocial personality disorder, 
antisocial personality disorder*, aspd 
Anorexia corpus anorexi* 
Anxiety corpus anxiety  
Autism corpus autism, autistic 
BingeEating corpus binge eating disorder 
BipolarDisorder corpus bipolar*, bipolar, bipolar disorder, 
hypomania, hypermania, mania*, 
mania, manic*, manic, manic depressi* 
BodyDismorphia corpus body dismorph* 
BPD corpus borderline personalit*, borderline 
personality disorder, BPD 
Bulimia corpus bulimi* 
Depression corpus depressed, depression, depressive 
DID corpus dissociative disorder, dissociative 
identity disorder 
EatingDisorder corpus eating disorder, eating disorders* 
MPD corpus multiple personality disorder, multiple 
personality disorder*, mpd 
OCD corpus obsessive compulsive disorder*, 
obsessive compulsive, ocd 
PostnatalDepression corpus postnatal depression, postpartum 
depression, puerperal depression 
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PTSD corpus posstraumatic stress, post traumatic 
stress, post-traumatic stress, ptsd 
Psychosis corpus psychosis, psychotic  
Schizophrenia corpus schizophreni!, schizo*,  
SAD corpus seasonal affective disorder*, seasonal 
affective disorder 
SocialPhobia corpus social phobia 
TABLE 5.3. INITIAL LIST OF SUBCORPORA AND TERMS INCLUDED  
 
It is important to state that at this stage, interpretation of the search terms was 
reintroduced again (albeit much more limited interpretation), as the categories 
required some conflation of terms. For example, by adding ‘mania’ and its related 
terms to the BipolarDisorderCorpus and not having it as a distinct illness it itself, I 
have imposed my view on the best way to group those illnesses. However, my 
rationale for my decision to do this is based on the observation that many articles 
featuring search terms related to mania were also often used in relation to Bipolar 
Disorder or symptoms of Bipolar Disorder, rather than as distinct illnesses.  
In addition to the conflation of categories, some terms were added to enrich the 
terms added to the subcorpora. These were based on observations since the initial 
search terms were generated (for example, the use of ‘puerperal depression’ in the 
PostnatalDepression subcorpus). This again was based on the observation that this 
term was more frequent than postnatal depression in the data and, as a result, would 
be helpful in getting a representative sample of reports on postnatal depression. Once 
these terms were compiled, the first step in the workflow was to add the articles to the 
relevant subcorpus using the following decisions: 
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Decision Example 
If the article contains terms from only 
one subcorpus à add it to that 
subcorpus 
An article contains only the words 
autism and autistic à it is added to the 
AutismCorpus 
If the article contains terms from more 
than one subcorpus à add it to the 
corpus that the majority of the terms 
relate to  
An article contains 5 instances of 
depression and 3 instances of agoraphobi* 
à add to the DepressionCorpus 
TABLE 5.4. INITIAL WORKFLOW DECISIONS FOR ILLNESS SUBCORPORA CONSTRUCTION  
 
Once the script had been developed, written, and run, it became apparent that there 
were too many conflicts in the script (where an equal number of terms occurred in one 
article, each pertaining to a different subcorpus) for the current design of the 
subcorpora to be feasible. The reason for this was that it was not simply the case that 
articles reported on one illness and one illness only, and, as stated in the discussion of 
search terms earlier, many illnesses are related, i.e. in their symptoms. As a result, it 
was often the case that an article reported on mental illness generally, making 
reference to multiple illnesses in the article. In cases like this, there had to be a decision 
made (and a decision that was possible to automate) for which subcorpus to attribute 
the article to. With this in mind, I decided to conflate some of the illness subcorpora 
further. First, the bulimia, anorexia, eating disorder and binge-eating subcorpora were 
merged to create one EatingDisorderCorpus58. Second, I also decided to conflate the 
multiple personality disorder (MPD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD) 
subcorpora to create one PersonalityDisorderCorpus. The rationale for this was that 
the illness subcorpora are to be used for cross comparison only and therefore specific 
differences between the terms are not pertinent to the analysis. Moreover all these 
terms would be categorised as eating disorders or personality disorders in DSM-V 
anyway and therefore the terms are still representative. Once this was done, the 
number of conflicts in the script was greatly reduced. The second decision to limit 	
58 This is an interesting initial insight into the corpus as the number of conflicts indicates that the 
terms are often reported together and therefore related linguistically to a certain extent.  
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common conflicts in the script was to set a rule that stated that any articles containing 
‘mania’ and ‘depression’ (or some variety of those lemmas) should not be attributed 
to the DepressionCorpus, but rather the BipolarCorpus. The reason for this was based 
on the fact that these two words pertain to the symptoms of bipolar disorder 
specifically, and therefore it is sensible to assume that the article as a whole discusses 
bipolar disorder. Despite the number of conflicts being greatly reduced by this stage, 
there was still an issue with terms occurring equally often in some articles. To remedy 
this, I decided to prioritise some subcorpora over others. This resulted in a third step 
to the workflow:  
 
Decision Examples 
If the article contains an equal number 
of search terms from two or more 
corpora à then prioritise the 
subcorpora in the following way (in 
descending order of priority) 
 
(All other subcorpora) 
AnxietyCorpus 
DepressionCorpus 
MentalIllnessCorpus 
AutismCorpus  
 
An article contains 4 instances of 
depression, 4 instances of autism and 3 
instances of bipolar disorder à it is 
added to the DepressionCorpus 
 
An article contains 4 instances of 
anorexia and 4 instances of mental 
illness à it is added to the 
EatingDisorderCorpus 
 
An article contains 3 instances of mental 
illness, 3 instances of depression and 3 
instances of autistic à it is added to the 
DepressionCorpus 
TABLE 5.5. WORKFLOW DECISIONS FOR ILLNESS SUBCORPORA CONSTRUCTION (THIRD PHASE) 
 
Low priority status was only given to four subcorpora in order to reduce the number 
of conflicts. The reason for giving low priority to the AutismCorpus was that autism 
was not a key area of study in this analysis; rather it was included as a search term to 
identify articles that may not have been otherwise accessed by LexisNexis, for this 
reason it was an obvious decision to prioritise the other subcorpora over the 
AutismCorpus. The reason for giving low priority to the MentalIllnessCorpus was 
that it was a designed to catch any articles that were not covered by specific illnesses; 
P
R
I
O
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I
T
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as such, the MentalIllnessCorpus was another obvious candidate to reduce the 
number of conflicts. The reason for giving low priority to the DepressionCorpus and 
the AnxietyCorpus was that depression and anxiety are symptoms of many other 
illnesses and as a result the articles containing words pertaining to depression and 
anxiety may have been reporting on another, more specific illness. In addition to this, 
ranking depression lower than anxiety was a practical decision. This was done to limit 
the number of articles added to the depression corpus automatically that did not 
directly report on depression but were added to the depression corpus because there 
were more instances of ‘depression’, ‘depressed’, ‘depressive’ than the specific illness 
in the article. These decisions greatly reduced the number of conflicts further. After 
this stage, the conflicts in the script were minimal (<20). This then meant that the 
remainder of the items could be manually added to the relevant corpora. Using the 
decisions described above, the workflow can be summarised (with examples) as 
follows: 
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FIGURE 5.6. SUMMARY OF WORKFLOW DECISIONS FOR ILLNESS SUBCORPORA CONSTRUCTION 
 
An overview of the illness subcorpora, including the revised version of the illness 
subcorpora, terms included and number of articles in each illness subcorpus is 
detailed in Table 5.6. The subcorpora for ASPD, body dismorphia and postnatal 
depression are not present because no articles reporting on those illnesses and those 
illnesses only were present in the data collected (instead they will have been attributed 
to the relevant corpora due to the decision tree in the cleaning process.) In addition to 
the Table 4 that provides an overview of the illness subcorpora, Table 5.7 provides an 
overview of the year subcorpora. 
  
Workflow: 
 
    I.     Check for most frequent term in article  
   II.     If there are two terms then: 
a.   If one term belongs to BipolarDisorderCorpus and the other to 
DepressionCorpus, à include term into BipolarDisorderCorpus 
b.   If it is not the case then discard MentalIllnessCorpus terms if any 
c.   If there is still more than one term then discard DepressionCorpus 
terms if any 
d.   If there is still more than one term then discard AnxietyCorpus 
terms if any 
  III.     If there are more than two: 
a.   If the terms occur equally often and belong to the same corpus, the 
document must be included in that corpus. 
b.   If there are the same quantity of terms from two or more corpora 
then: 
                          i.   Discard terms from MentalIllness_corpus if any 
                          ii.   If there are still terms from more than one subcorpus then discard 
DepressionCorpus terms if any 
                         iii.   If there are still terms from more than one subcorpus then discard 
AnxietyCorpus terms if any 	
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Illness 
subcorpus Terms included 
No. of 
articles 
Average 
article 
length 
No. of 
tokens 
Percentage 
of total 
Agoraphobia agoraphobi* 198 875 173,292 0.35% 
Anxiety anxiety  3572 924 3,301,718 6.63% 
Autism autism, autistic 11209 549 6,153,039 12.36% 
Bipolar 
bipolar*, bipolar, 
bipolar disorder, 
hypomania, 
hypermania, mania*, 
mania, manic*, 
manic, manic 
depressi* 
624 709 
442,325 0.89% 
DID 
dissociative 
disorder, 
dissociative identity 
disorder 
7 1669 
11,685 0.02% 
Depression 
depressed, 
depression, 
depressive 
33628 831 
27,937,710 56.11% 
Eating 
Disorder 
anorexi*,  binge 
eating disorder, 
bulimi*, eating 
disorder, eating 
disorders 
5781 782 
4,523,057 9.08% 
Mental Illness 
mental illness*, 
mental illness, 
mental ill health, 
mentally ill, 
mentally un* 
3066 670 
2,053,493 4.12% 
OCD 
obsessive 
compulsive 
disorder*, obsessive 
compulsive, ocd 
644 784 
505,034 1.01% 
PTSD 
posstraumatic stress, 
post traumatic 
stress, post-
traumatic stress, 
ptsd 
1166 805 
938,521 1.89% 
Personality 
Disorder 
multiple personality 
disorder, multiple 
personality 
1171 936 
1,096,012 2.20% 
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disorder*, mpd, 
borderline 
personalit*, 
borderline 
personality disorder, 
bpd  
Psychosis psychosis, psychotic 854 769 656,321 1.32% 
SAD 
seasonal affective 
disorder*, seasonal 
affective disorder 
23 860 
19,775 0.04% 
Schizophrenia 
schizophreni!, 
schizo*, 
2542 763 
1,940,789 3.90% 
Social Phobia social phobia 44 798 35,118 0.07% 
TABLE 5.6. OVERVIEW OF THE ILLNESS SUBCORPORA  
 
Illness 
subcorpus 
No. of 
articles 
No. of 
tokens 
Average article 
length 
Percentage of 
total 
Agoraphobia 198 173,292 875 0.35% 
Anxiety 3572 3,301,718 924 6.63% 
Autism 11209 6,153,039 549 12.36% 
Bipolar 624 442,325 709 0.89% 
DID 7 11,685 1669 0.02% 
Depression 33628 27,937,710 831 56.11% 
Eating Disorder 5781 4,523,057 782 9.08% 
Mental Illness 3066 2,053,493 670 4.12% 
OCD 644 505,034 784 1.01% 
PTSD 1166 938,521 805 1.89% 
Personality 
Disorder 
1171 1,096,012 936 2.20% 
Psychosis 854 656,321 769 1.32% 
SAD 23 19,775 860 0.04% 
Schizophrenia 2542 1,940,789 763 3.90% 
Social Phobia 44 35,118 798 0.07% 
TABLE 5.7. OVERVIEW OF THE YEAR SUBCORPORA  
 
The next section will discuss some of the practical issues of constructing a corpus 
and reflect on this process.  
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5.6. Practical issues: linguistics, programming and the nature of language 
 
The process of dealing with huge quantities of electronic language data brings to light 
one of the issues for researchers using corpora, which is that in many ways the 
expertise needed to build corpora and conduct corpus analysis crosses 
(inter)disciplinary boundaries. Research of this kind necessitates knowledge of 
programming languages, regular expressions, how to exploit existing databases, how 
to use existing corpus software and understand the programming decisions built into 
them, how to carry out statistical tests and which statistical tests to use for which 
analytical method59, and practical issues such as having the facility to store the sheer 
amount of data needed to build a corpus. All of this is before an in-depth knowledge 
of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of any linguistic analysis.60 The 
interdisciplinary nature of corpus linguistics (particularly the link between corpus 
linguistics and programming) is a topic that has received some attention over the past 
few years in particular. One notable example was a British Association for Applied 
Linguistics (BAAL) special interest group meeting which was centred around the 
question “Does a corpus linguist need to be a computer programmer?”61. It is evident 
from the processes I have outlined here that had I not been fortunate enough to work 
with a programmer, the final corpus would have been a much lesser product, or 
would have taken an unfeasible amount of time to compile. For instance, without the 
advantages of automation, it would have been necessary to carry out each task 
manually, and this would have resulted in a corpus that covered a considerably 
narrower selection of years and illness types.  
	
59 This is a useful skill to have simply to defend the statistical tests chosen to other researchers. 
60 When confronted with this task, a researcher can take solace in the fact that the difficulty of needing 
to wear numerous analytical ‘hats’ has long been documented. In his essay on statistics and style, 
Bailey (1969; cited in Stubbs 1994: 216) states that “the history of statistics and style shows few cases 
in which genuine expertise in language, literature and statistics have been combined in one 
investigator.”  
61 BAAL Corpus Symposium, held at Aston University, May 6, 2016.  
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However, there were some steps in the process of creating the illness subcorpora 
where I felt there to be a tension between what was needed to make the project 
sensible from a programming point of view and what I felt was important as a linguist. 
An example of this was the prioritising of one illness subcorpus over another. My 
feeling on this was that it imposed a hierarchy on the significance of particular 
illnesses which I felt was not how language works. That is, the tendency in corpus 
linguistics is to privilege the word over the text (criticisms of this tendency in corpus 
linguistics have been made by Egbert & Schnur (2018) in relation to keyness analysis, 
for example) and production over comprehension. To give an example of what I mean 
by this, consider an article that features terms relating to a range of illnesses. Despite 
this, it may be the case that on reading the article we are clear that the text overall 
relates to schizophrenia. In taking frequency of terms as the basis for decisions about 
which subcorpus to add the text to, we have to prioritise the frequency of individual 
words over textual coherence. In creating the subcorpora using the computational 
methods I did, I have to rely on the belief that, at least to a certain extent, the topic of 
a text is indicated by how frequently a word appears in a text (i.e. generally speaking, 
the more a term from a subcorpus appears, the more likely it is that the text is 
reporting on the relevant illness).  
The fundamental tension caused by having to make these decisions is that, as a 
linguist, my belief is that language is produced by individuals and therefore the texts 
may exhibit nuanced differences. However, the greater the number of automated 
decisions (i.e. to which subcorpus an article is added), the more it is necessary for the 
linguist to treat the text as being part of a homogenous group (resulting in the 
possibility that these nuanced differences become harder to identify). This is not to 
say that creating subcorpora using automatic methods should be avoided; because 
using programming opens up many avenues of exploration to the linguist.  
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5.7. The MI 1984-2014 Corpus: assessing relevance and distribution of terms  
 
In this section, I will provide a brief overview of the final data to demonstrate that the 
terms searched for are present and evenly distributed across the MI 1984-2014 corpus. 
I will show this using concordance plots. In order to view the distribution of terms 
across the whole corpus, I used the Bash62 concatenate command to merge the year 
subcorpora into a single file. As a result of this, the occurrence of the terms should be 
in rough date order, where the leftmost section of the concordance plot represents 
1984 and the rightmost represents 2014. The box represents the corpus; the vertical 
lines represent instances of terms caught by the lemma across the sample. Whilst 
concordance plots are limited in what they can show (for example they do not show 
all the relevant words for each illness type), and they do not show the dispersion in 
great detail, the plots do show that the terms searched for appear to be well 
represented and evenly dispersed in the corpus. This suggests that the cleaning 
process has been successful in eliminating unnecessary noise from the corpus. Table 
5.8 shows the concordance plots for each lemma searched.  
 
Lemma Concordance Plot Generated using AntConc (Anthony, 2017) 
agoraphobi* 
 
anxiety  
 
autism 
 
	
62 Bash is a command language. It is the default command line interface on Unix-based systems such 
as macOS.  
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bipolar 
 
disassociative 
identity 
 
depression 
 
eating 
disorder 
 
mental health 
 
mental 
illness  
 
obsessive 
compulsive 
 
ptsd 
 
personality 
disorder 
 
psychosis 
 
seasonal 
affective 
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schizophreni* 
 
social phobia 
 
TABLE 5.8. CONCORDANCE PLOTS SHOWING A SAMPLE OF TERMS IN THE MENTAL ILLNESS 
1984-2014 CORPUS  
 
In addition to this, a keyword comparison of the data sample and the SiBol English 
Broadsheet Newspapers 1993-2013 corpus63, conducted using Sketch Engine (Kilgariff 
et al., 2004), shows that the top 50 keywords are what one would expect to see in a 
corpus of mental illness discourse. Moreover, the keywords are relevant even in 
comparison to another specialised corpus of newspaper data. These top keywords 
suggest that the data sample is representative of the population targeted (newspaper 
representations of mental health) because they are overrepresented in the MI 1984-
2014 corpus compared with the SiBol corpus, and is further evidence that unnecessary 
noise in the corpus that would affect the analysis has been sufficiently minimized 
(aside from BODY, TITLE and DATE which refer to the metadata that was purposely 
kept in the files). This suggests that the final corpus is representative of the population 
and, as a result, generalisations to follow from the analysis will be reliable. Table 5.9 
shows the top 40 keywords in the corpus.
	
63 The SiBol English Broadsheet Newspapers 1993-2013 corpus comprises 650 million words of 
English Broadsheet Newspapers. The corpus was compiled by research teams at the Universities of 
Siena and Bologna and is available on Sketch Engine.  
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Rank Term Keyness Score Freq Ref Freq Rank Term 
Keyness 
Score Freq Ref Freq 
1 depression 3.72 83676 14363 21 depressed 1.8 24764 9122 
2 BODY 2.97 57812 597 22 anxiety 1.79 25008 13023 
3 DATE 2.97 57716 442 23 problems 1.73 37536 123916 
4 TITLE 2.97 57706 445 24 Dr 1.7 35658 117536 
5 mental 2.72 56460 28731 25 treatment 1.68 29426 75209 
6 autism 2.46 43320 3290 26 feel 1.67 41785 174739 
7 she 2.41 216741 957729 27 drugs 1.64 25285 52173 
8 I 2.28 646631 3511339 28 disorders 1.64 19300 4969 
9 her 2.23 244554 1227478 29 condition 1.63 24441 47762 
10 health 2.1 57028 155325 30 patients 1.62 26386 65995 
11 illness 2.08 34702 18872 31 parents 1.59 32676 127019 
12 She 2.04 80769 324171 32 suffering 1.57 21269 37251 
13 my 2.02 145281 750596 33 symptoms 1.57 18242 13234 
14 children 2.01 74375 294050 34 autistic 1.56 16724 1663 
15 me 1.95 107377 536782 35 stress 1.54 18889 25659 
16 help 1.87 62849 262574 36 says 1.52 82859 585562 
17 eating 1.84 28930 29974 37 MMR 1.51 15155 1306 
18 disorder 1.83 25743 10387 38 brain 1.51 18751 32821 
19 people 1.82 141883 847693 39 child 1.51 29004 122503 
20 life 1.81 74135 364707 40 suicide 1.5 18411 33827 
TABLE 5.9. TOP 40 KEYWORDS IN MI 1984-2014 CORPUS COMPARED WITH SIBOL ENGLISH BROADSHEET NEWSPAPERS 1993-2013.
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5.8. Caveats of the corpus construction procedure 
 
Before moving on to the conclusion section of this chapter it is first important to state 
the methodological caveats identified and offer responses to them. The first caveat is 
that the section of the newspaper the article appears in (e.g. editorial, opinion piece) 
is unaccounted for in the final corpus (i.e. this information was removed prior to 
uploading the corpus to the various corpus tools). The section of the newspaper that 
the article appears in may be meaningful in determining variation across it. However, 
the decision to remove information from the articles pertaining to newspaper section 
was based on the findings reported by Ohlssen (2017: 301), who found that mental 
health was talked about in “practically all the newspaper sections”. Furthermore, this 
information, although not contained in the files included in the final corpus, is 
available in the raw files should this variable need to be explored in more detail.  
A second caveat relates not to the design of the corpus, but rather the nature of 
newspaper data generally and newspaper data downloaded from LexisNexis 
specifically. Unlike newspaper articles generally, that are heavily multimodal, the 
newspaper articles contained in a corpus have to be stripped of any images or 
multimodal aspects relating to the size and colour of fonts in order to be read by the 
software. As a result of this, it is the case that some meaningful elements of the texts 
will be lost. This is important to state because prior research into the representation of 
mental illness suggests that images do play a role in creating stigma (Angermeyer et 
al., 2005). However, this is an unavoidable issue related to the methods adopted in 
corpus linguistics, although recent developments in multimodal corpus tools promise 
exciting developments in this area (see Knight, 2011). Another caveat related to data 
sampled from local and national newspapers is the issue of article duplication. As 
outlined in Section 5.4, exact duplicates have been removed from the corpus; however, 
because some national newspapers have regional editions (e.g. The Daily Telegraph 
Scotland Edition) that may feature very similar, although not identical, articles, the 
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possibility that some minor duplication may occur in the corpus is possible. However, 
this noise has been greatly reduced by removing exact duplicates. Moreover, one 
could take the view that duplication is necessary in order to accurately represent the 
population (e.g. all UK reporting on mental health and illness in this period).  
 
5.9. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have described the process and rationale for building the Mental 
Illness 1984-2014 corpus, focussing specifically on the compilation of search terms. I 
made a case for why researchers working in corpus linguistics should pay greater 
attention to their search terms when compiling corpora but also when analysing 
existing corpora, as the terms used are in themselves a reflection of the (compiler’s 
view of the) target population. In this chapter I have also introduced the Mental Illness 
1984-2014 corpus and demonstrated that the methods underlying its compilation have 
ensured that it is representative, that the terms targeted are well distributed and, as a 
result of this, that the results stemming from an analysis of it will be generalizable 
beyond the corpus. 
In sections 5.2-5.3, I described the rationale for the sampling frame used in the 
data collection process, showing how the time period and search terms selected were 
relevant and fitted to the time, showing that the period was one in which major 
legislation changes in mental health and illness happened. I also discussed how the 
sampling frame used was wide enough to facilitate the analysis of synchronic and 
diachronic aspects of the texts, and outlined how the corpus and subcorpora have 
been designed to make the comparison of the years and different illness types 
straightforward. Moreover, I have exemplified how this method of compiling the data 
means that a significantly longer time period is covered, resulting in significantly 
more data being available for analysis than is used in other studies in linguistics 
exploring mental illness reportage to date. I have also shown how the data in this 
thesis is continuous and therefore better represents mental illness discourse than 
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previous longitudinal studies in research into mental illness in the press. Taken 
together, these decisions demonstrate that the Mental Illness 1984-2014 corpus is a 
representative corpus that can be used to answer a wide range of research questions, 
even those that fall outside the scope of this thesis. As a result, the creation of this 
resource constitutes one of the significant innovations of this thesis.  
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 outlined the corpus cleaning procedures and the decision 
making process for the creation of subcorpora. By providing transparent information 
about the decisions made during the corpus construction process, I have shown that 
the method is replicable. Additionally, section 5.6 offered a reflective account of the 
practical issues associated with combining perspectives from linguistics and 
computer programming. I showed how the terms from the search term were 
distributed in the MI 1984-2014 corpus in Section 5.7. In Section 5.8, I outlined and 
responded to any methodological caveats.  
In the next chapter, which is the first analysis chapter in this thesis, I use the MI 
1984-2014 corpus to explore the terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’.  
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6. The shifting meaning of mental health and mental illness 
 
In this chapter I address the following research question listed in the introduction 
“How are the terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ used in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus?”. I argue in this chapter that the meaning of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental 
illness’ has changed over the time period sampled (1984-2014). Furthermore, I argue 
that the change in the meanings of these concepts is consistent with pragmatic 
accounts of language change whereby change is socially-motivated (Ariel, 2008; Clark, 
2016; Traugott & Dasher, 2002). Specifically, I argue that the changes in meaning I 
have identified are in keeping with accounts of language change that focus on 
euphemistic usages of a lexical item. In this chapter then, I explore the labels 
associated with the topic of this thesis: ‘mental illness’64 and ‘mental health’. The 
reason for exploring the labels associated with these concepts is that no study to date 
has explored diachronic change in these terms which suggests that researchers have 
presumed the meaning associated with these labels to have been fixed over time. As 
a result of taking these labels for granted (i.e. presuming their meaning is fixed over 
time) no study to date has explored the diachronic change in these labels, particularly 
in studies reporting on mental illness in the press. Moreover, my initial observation 
from the MI 1984-2014 corpus was that ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ are used 
interchangeably and therefore the notion that these labels were being used as near 
synonyms provided a hypothesis (i.e. ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ are used as 
near-synonyms) that could be tested using real-world language data. 
Examining in more detail how these terms are used makes it possible to provide 
a usage-based definition of the two terms. Moreover, how the concepts associated 
with these two terms are discursively constructed could have a bearing on the possible 
participants and processes that are also discursively constructed. For example, if 	
64 I use italics to denote a concept, e.g. the concept of mental health, and scare quotes to denote the 
linguistic form used to refer to a concept, e.g. ‘mental health’ can be used to refer to the concept of 
mental illness. 
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mental health is conceptualised as being in a state of mental wellness, i.e. not illness, then 
one might expect to find fewer references to medical experts in newspaper reports on 
mental health due to the fact that mental health (relating to wellness) is not a 
pathology, and therefore may not warrant medical expert spokespeople. In contrast, 
where ‘mental illness’ is referred to, we might expect to see a greater number of 
medical experts being referred to, because mental illness is pathologised and therefore 
expert voices on this topic may offer insight into, for example, the diagnosis and 
treatment of a mental illness. Furthermore, in articles where ‘mental illness’ is referred 
to, we might expect to have more instances of processes such as ‘diagnose’ or ‘treat’ 
in contrast to articles discussing mental health, which may place greater emphasis on 
‘maintaining’ or ‘supporting’. The way that participants are named and what 
processes are represented in the data will be explored in more detail in Chapters 7 and 
8 respectively, so it is important to outline before then what the concepts associated 
with ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ are. 
As previously stated, despite the existence of many studies of mental illness and 
health in the press (e.g. Sapogna et al., 2017; Søgaard et al., 1995; Stuart, 2003; Whitley 
& Wang, 2017), no study to date has explored the semantic content of these terms. This 
raises questions about the results of studies into the representation of mental health 
and illness in the press because the uncritical use of the terms ‘mental illness’ and 
‘mental health’ means that any findings are predicated on the assumption that the 
users of the language being analysed conceptualise ‘mental health’ and/or ‘mental 
illness’ in the same way that the researcher does (which is unlikely given that the 
majority of existing research into this area has been conducted by psychiatrists, or 
specialists in the field). Furthermore, some of the existing research is diachronic 
(Goulden et al, 2011; Roberts et al., 2013; Whitley & Berry, 2013) and rests on the 
assumption that the concepts associated with the labels ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental 
health’ have stayed static across the time periods in question. It could be argued that 
differences in the concepts associated with the two labels are irrelevant because the 
researcher is only interested in the discourse surrounding the labels, and not the labels 
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themselves. However, diachronic analyses that treat ‘mental health’ and ‘mental 
illness’ as having fixed meanings across the time period leave no space for observing 
subtle changes in the discourse across time, which may have implications for any 
possible findings and for advancing the field, e.g. by identifying more specific 
research questions. For example, Whitley and Berry (2013) explore the representation 
of mental illness in Canadian print media between 2005-2010 using ‘mental illness’ 
and ‘mental health’ as a search terms. They adopt content analysis as their 
methodological approach citing that such an analytical approach ensures 
“consistency, validity, and reliability.” (2013: 109). In their research, they do not query 
any change in the terms ‘mental health’ or ‘mental illness’ during the time period, 
neither do they offer any definition of ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental health’ to provide 
insight into how these two terms are related or how they differ. Whitley & Berry’s 
(2013) research aims to analyse whether there has been a change over the time period 
in whether the newspaper reports they collected portray mental illness negatively 
using a coding scheme that centred around three themes: violence, criminality and 
danger. Whitley & Berry (2013) state explicitly how their coding scheme and 
methodological approach were controlled to allow for consistency and reliability, yet 
they appear to overlook two key variables – whether the meaning of ‘mental health’ 
and ‘mental illness’ differed across the time period. Further evidence that the authors 
overlooked any diachronic change in the labels ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ is 
that throughout the research, the authors use ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ 
interchangeably, which suggests that they view the two concepts as closely related or 
synonymous. In treating ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ as near synonyms with 
fixed meanings, a vast amount of potential variation has been neglected, e.g. whether 
and when new terms are added to the discourse of mental illness. For the non-linguist, 
new terms may not be an area of interest, however, I argue that if the discourses 
around mental illness are of interest then new terms should be too, as new terms are 
revealing of how the existing terms are conceptualised, e.g. why would a new term be 
introduced to the discourse of mental illness if the existing terms were sufficient to 
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convey the meaning a person wants to communicate? Exploring possible language 
change in the labels ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’, then, provides insight into 
societal views on mental illness.  
Moreover, if we look closer at ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ in use, it is 
possible to see clear distinguishing features between the two terms. The findings 
reported in this section then, contribute to our understanding of the concepts of mental 
health and mental illness in a British English context, but also provides evidence to show 
that research that uses search terms to collect newspaper articles on mental health and 
illness should be mindful of variation in the semantic content of the terms searched 
for during the data collection procedure. 
To illustrate this last point, I will refer to the existing literature in psychiatry, as 
this is the discipline in which most research into press representations of mental health 
have been conducted. A well-cited publication by Wahl et al. (2002) into press 
representations of mental illness in the US refers to prior research conducted by Day 
& Page (1986) in a Canadian context. Wahl et al. (2002) argue that few studies like that 
of Day & Page (1986) have been conducted in a US context, and this is how they set 
their own work in context. What we can presume then, is that the phenomenon that 
Day & Page (1986) analyse and the phenomenon that Wahl et al. (2002) analyse is the 
same and only the context changes (e.g. geographic location). However, if one looks 
in more detail at the methods sections of the two publications there is a difference. 
Day & Page (1986) construct their collection of newspaper articles based on the 
newspaper index term ‘mental health’ and Wahl et al. (2002) collect theirs using the 
search term ‘mental illness’. No attention is paid to this difference, but as I show in 
Section 6.1 such differences in labels could potentially bias analysis.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how the meanings of terms contained in the 
semantic field of mental health and mental illness have shifted using evidence from 
language in use. Through my analysis, I argue that linguistic analysis provides 
researchers working in mental illness studies with insight into how mental illness is 
perceived in society. I argue that this insight is more robust than static and dated 
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dictionary definitions, making the case that linguistic analysis provides a means of 
tracking emergent semantic change.  
 
6.1. Exploring mental illness and mental health in the MI 1984-2014 corpus 
 
The first step in ascertaining whether there is a difference between the labels ‘mental 
illness’ and ‘mental health’ was to establish their usage across the time period. Figure 
6.1 shows the relative frequency per million words (hereafter pmw) of the labels 
across the year subcorpora. In order to remove instances where ‘mental health’ formed 
part of a bigger phrase, i.e. ‘mental health act’, ‘mental health legislation’, relative 
frequencies were only taken for instances of ‘mental health’ that did not occur within 
5 words to the left or right of ‘act’ or ‘legislation’. Linear trend lines have been added 
for both terms to show the overall trend for each term more clearly.  
 
FIGURE 6.1. FREQUENCY OF ‘MENTAL ILLNESS’ AND ‘MENTAL HEALTH’ ACROSS THE YEAR 
SUBCORPORA 
 
Figure 6.1 shows that both terms increase in use over the time period, however the 
increase in ‘mental health’ is significantly higher than that of ‘mental illness’. The 
graph also shows that the usage of both terms rise and fall in the same years up to 
c.2008. In addition, exploring the shape of the overall trend of the two terms reveals 
that the pattern for both the terms over the time period is the same. This indicates that 
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periods of increased usage of ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ are correlated, i.e. 
increased usage of ‘mental health’ correlates with increased usage of ‘mental illness’. 
The fact the two terms are positively correlated indicates that the two terms are closely 
related within a semantic field. Moreover, the increase in both terms over the time 
period is indicative that the number of articles on the topic of mental health and 
mental illness are increasing overall, which would support previous findings that 
mental illness is a topical, and popular press issue (Ohlsson, 2017). By way of 
attempting to contextualise the fact that usages of ‘mental health’ are more frequent 
and are rising more substantially than ‘mental illness’, one may hypothesise that 
mental health (i.e. the full range of mental states – illness and wellness) is more 
prevalent societal issue than it was previously which has resulted in a greater number 
of articles on this issue. However this is not the case. The increase in ‘mental health’ 
usage is not due to an increase in articles that report on a range of mental health states 
(including good mental health) in society, but rather an increase in articles reporting on 
mental illness. I show my linguistic evidence for this claim throughout this chapter, but 
my interpretation is attested by statistics on mental illness in the UK. For example, the 
number of detentions65 under the mental health act (MHA) has increased year on year 
since the Care Quality Commission started measuring the use of the MHA in 2009. 
Furthermore, the proportion of the English population with a mental disorder 
increased from 15.5% in 1993 to 17.6% in 2007. What the increase in ‘mental health’ 
suggests in light of these statistics showing that mental illness is rising is that there 
could be a developing preference to refer to all phenomena related to mental health 
(including mental illness) as ‘mental health’. What the increase in ‘mental health’ over 
‘mental illness’ suggests is that ‘mental health’ is potentially being used as a 
euphemistic term for the illness dimension of mental health to avoid the discussion of 
an ‘emotionally marked domain’ which is considered taboo (Blank, 1999). Burridge 
(2012: 67) identifies both madness and disease as taboo subjects that give rise to 	65	Detention here refers to the forced hospitalisation of someone where the hospitalisation was due to 
an enforcement of the Mental Health Act.	
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euphemistic forms, stating that “Since the 1980s, gender, sexuality, disability and race 
have become so highly-charged that speakers will shun anything that may be 
interpreted as discriminatory or pejorative” (Burridge, 2012: 67). It is possibly the case 
then, that the more general term ‘mental health’, is being used as a means of 
“obscuring and disguising disagreeable reality.” (Burridge, 2012: 66). Furthermore, 
the use of a general term to refer to a specific subject that is deemed taboo has 
previously been identified as a feature of euphemistic language change. For example, 
Allen & Burridge (2006) identified that people use a “general-for-specific 
substitution”, particularly in relation to disease or illness to avoid taboo subjects (e.g. 
‘mental health’ to refer specifically to mental illness). They state that this substitution 
process is a feature of euphemism creation (Allen & Burridge, 2006; see also 
Grondelaers & Geeraerts, 1998). There is also precedent for the use of general terms to 
refer to specific subjects in language more generally. For instance, theories of 
generalised conversational implicature in pragmatics. I discuss implicature and it’s 
role in socially-motivated language change in Section 6.6. 
At this point, readers may argue that the increased use in ‘mental heath’ may not 
necessarily be indicative that ‘mental health’ is becoming to mean mental illness 
because a newspaper may report on someone being sectioned under the “mental 
health act” where clearly the use of ‘mental health’ refers to mental illness. However, 
further evidence for the interpretation that ‘mental health’ is being used to refer to a 
greater number of mental states over the time period is that the increase in the usage 
of ‘mental health’ is not linked to the instances of ‘mental health’ used within a bigger 
phrase, i.e. ‘the mental health act’. The shift in the use of ‘mental health’ is visible 
through looking at the relative frequency pmw of ‘Mental Health Act’ at the start and 
end of the period for which we have robust data (1985-2013). In 1985 the relative 
frequency of ‘Mental Health Act’ is 159.11pmw compared with 23.08pmw in 2013. 
This again supports the notion that the meaning of mental health has broadened, as in 
the early years of the time period covered, ‘mental health’ is almost entirely used in 
reference to the Mental Health Act. Frequency information then is indicative of shifts 
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in usage but if we are to get a better sense of how the concept of mental health has 
changed, we need to look in more detail at lexical items related to ‘mental health’. 
 
6.2. Mental health ‘problems’, ‘conditions’ and ‘issues’ 
 
In the previous section I showed that ‘mental health’ is increasing in usage. I argued 
that one explanation for this rise is that ‘mental health’ is used in the corpus to refer 
to mental illness. To explore this possibility, I will examine the collocates of ‘mental 
health’ in more detail, particularly the modifiers of ‘mental health’. The reason for 
doing this is that (as argued in Chapter 3) collocation is a useful analytical method for 
revealing information about the meaning of a lexical item and how a lexical item 
interacts with other words. In particular, collocation can be revealing of how take on 
related meanings by their co-occurence, as suggested by Firth who said of collocation 
“you shall know a word by the company it keeps” (Firth, 1957: 11). In order to 
ascertain new usages pertaining to the concept of mental illness, e.g. the use of 
modifiers of ‘mental health’, I explored the hypothesis that such an analysis would 
reveal negation in some sense. Table 6.1 shows the top 20 collocates of ‘mental health’ 
in the corpus. 
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Collocate MI score Collocate MI score 
1. Problems  
2. Act 
3. Issues 
4. Charity 
5. Services 
6. Mind 
7. Foundation 
8. Problem 
9. Under 
10. Trust  
8.03 
9.53 
8.39 
7.87 
7.64 
8.61 
8.82 
6.33 
6.37 
7.08 
11. People 
12. Sectioned 
13. Professionals 
14. Care 
15. Charities 
16. Service 
17. With  
18. Stigma 
19. Team  
20. Executive  
4.62 
8.82 
7.20 
5.26 
8.02 
5.79 
4.06 
7.17 
5.85 
6.81 
TABLE 6.1. TOP 20 COLLOCATES OF ‘MENTAL HEALTH’ LISTED BY FREQUENCY (CALCULATED 
USING SKETCH ENGINE, R3-L3, MIN FREQ. = 5, MI CUT-OFF = 3) 
 
Table 6.1 shows that ‘mental health’ does not collocate with any inherently positive 
lexical items. The collocates of ‘mental health’ are either negative (‘problems’, 
‘stigma’) or neutral (‘people’, ‘act’, ‘trust’). We can interpret this as demonstrating that 
‘mental health’ can be used to refer to official, formal organisations, e.g. in phrases 
such as ‘mental health charities’ and ‘mental health trusts’, as well as on its own to 
refer to negative mental states, e.g. ‘mental health problems’. Taken with the 
frequency information for ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ presented in Figure 6.1, 
Table 6.1 indicates further that ‘mental health’ could be being used to refer to mental 
illness rather than mental health generally. The hypothesis that ‘mental health’ is being 
used to refer to mental illness in the corpus is explored in more detail in Section 6.4 
where I explore the concordances and collocates of ‘mental illness’.  
So far, I have suggested that ‘mental heath’ conventionally refers to a range of 
mental states as well as positive mental states. Definitions of ‘mental health’ support 
this interpretation. For example the World Health Organisation (WHO) implicitly 
suggest that mental health is a continuum (WHO, 2014), i.e. ‘mental health’ refers to 
states of mental wellness as well as states of mental illness, by describing positive 
mental health as the “positive dimension of mental health”. This mental health 
continuum may be represented in the following way, where the lexical form ‘mental 
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health’ refers to the concept of the continuum of mental states as well as the positive 
dimension of that continuum: 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.2. THE MENTAL HEALTH CONTINUUM AS SUGGESTED BY THE WHO DEFINITION 	
 
Further evidence from the corpus that attests my interpretation that ‘mental health’ is 
used to refer to the concept of mental illness, and therefore that mental health is rarely 
used the corpus to refer to the positive dimension of the mental health continuum is 
that ‘positive mental health’ occurs 51 times in the corpus (0.12 pmw) whereas 
‘negative mental health’ occurs 7 times (0.87 pmw). If ‘mental health’ were being used 
to refer to the positive dimension of the continuum then the term would not need to 
be marked to convey that it referred to positive mental health, i.e. ‘positive’ would be 
redundant because positive would be denoted by ‘mental health’. Battistella (1990) 
defines semantic markedness as “a relation between a very specific linguistic sign (the 
marked term) and a sign that is unspecified for the grammatical or conceptual feature 
in question” (Battistella, 1990: 2). The fact that the ‘mental health’ needs to be marked 
to convey positive mental health then, provides further linguistic evidence that the 
concept of mental health does not encode positive mental states in the corpus.. The need 
to use the marked form is interesting because the definition of mental health given by 
WHO (2014) above does not preclude its use to refer to positive mental states. This 
suggests that ‘mental health’ is being used to refer to a concept (i.e. mental illness) that 
is semantically more specific that its dictionary definition suggests it can be. Battistella 
(1990) writes of contextual markedness that “markedness values are also 
(Mental) health Mental illness 
NEGATIVE DIMENSION  POSITIVE DIMENSION  
MENTAL HEALTH  
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contextualised within a language. Values are not fixed, but rather are relative: cultural 
and linguistic structure acts as a context within which categories are evaluated” 
(Battistella, 1990: 24). What Battistella (1990) is referring to in this quotation is how 
markedness can reveal the sense of a lexical item within a particular culture or 
discourse. The example he gives to exemplify context dependent markedness is the 
noun ‘nurse’ which can refer to both male and female nurses, but which is 
conventionally marked when it is used to refer to a man, i.e. ‘male nurse’66. This 
marked form reveals that within the context of nursing (at least at the time Battistella 
was writing), ‘nurse’ usually refers to a female nurse. Markedness then, can be 
revealing of what is considered the norm within a particular context. To return to the 
mental health example, the modification, or markedness of “positive mental health” 
suggests that within the context of mental health reportage, ‘mental health’ is not used 
to refer to positive states of mental health.  
To explore any other terms that may be used to modify ‘mental health’ to convey 
negative states, I searched for ‘problem’ using the Sketch Thesaurus feature on Sketch 
Engine (Kilgariff et al., 2014). The Sketch Thesaurus function uses the corpus to 
generate usage-based synonyms, i.e. words that occur in the same, or very similar 
linguistic contexts which may not be conventional synonyms but which are being 
used within the corpus in similar contexts. The reason for exploring ‘problem’ 
specifically was that it was the most frequent collocate of ‘mental health’ (as shown in 
Table 6.1). Further, the idea behind exploring ‘problem’ in more detail using the 
Sketch Thesaurus function was that it would reveal any other nouns that post-
modified ‘mental health’ that were similar to ‘problem’ that could then inform further 
searches for terms conveying states of negative mental health, e.g. ‘issues’ or 
‘disorders’. This search yielded the additional terms ‘condition’, ‘symptom’ and 
‘disease’. ‘Mental health disease’ and ‘mental health symptom’ were discounted on 
the basis that only a few instances of each term occurred in the corpus. Arguably, 
	
66 My intuition is that this usage has become less frequent since 1990 when Battistella was writing.  
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however, the fact that these terms feature at all indicates that the meaning of ‘mental 
health’ is changing, specifically that mental health is not conceptualised as a continuum, 
but rather as a state. Evidence that the meaning of ‘mental health’ is changing to refer 
to a specific mental state (i.e. illness) and not the continuum of mental states is that 
there are 18 instances in the corpus of ‘mental health symptom’ which, if we consider 
mental health to refer to the continuum of mental states is semantically incongruous 
as one cannot have a symptom of a continuum. A ‘symptom’ of mental health is 
semantically under-specific unless ‘mental health’ in the 18 instances is being used to 
refer to a state of mental illness. To explore the patterning of ‘mental health problem*’, 
‘mental health condition’ and ‘mental health issue’ across the time period, relative 
frequencies were plotted for each term. Figure 6.2 shows the relative frequency of 
‘mental health problem’, ‘mental health condition’ and ’mental health issue’ over the 
time period covered in the MI 1984-2014 corpus. In order to show the relative 
frequency of ‘mental health issue’ and ‘mental health condition’ clearly, Figures 6.3 
and 6.4 show the relative frequency of ‘mental health issue’ and ‘mental health 
condition’ respectively. To avoid cases where ‘mental health issue’ was used to relate 
to something other than a mental state, only ‘mental health issue’ was searched for, 
and not ‘mental health issues*’ which may have returned hits pertaining to usages 
such as “the Government’s record on mental health issues is the total antithesis of its 
alleged intention”, where mental health issue refers to schemes surrounding mental 
health and not a mental state. 
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FIGURE 6.3. FREQUENCY OF ‘MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEM/ISSUE/CONDITION’ OVER THE TIME PERIOD.  
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FIGURE 6.4. FREQUENCY OF ‘MENTAL HEALTH CONDITION OVER THE TIME PERIOD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.5. FREQUENCY OF ‘MENTAL HEALTH ISSUE’ OVER THE TIME PERIOD
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Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 show that we have developed, and are developing, 
increasingly common terms to convey the concept of negative mental health, i.e. the state 
of being mentally unwell. A closer inspection of the concordances of these terms 
further indicates that ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ are used as near synonym 
(see Table 6.2). This can be seen through anaphoric and cataphoric reference whereby 
‘mental health issue’ is used to refer to a mental illness, e.g. OCD, or the lexical item 
‘mental illness’. The first instance occurred in 2001 with the second two instances 
occurring in 2005. 
 
According to Watters, traditional ways of treating mental illness are not always 
best for asylum seekers. "It takes a lot of time to work through a mental health 
issue and you need a degree of stability to do it 
obsessive compulsive disorder is the most common mental health issue after 
depression 
One in four people will suffer from a mental health issue such as depression at 
some point in their life 
TABLE 6.2. CONCORDANCE LINES FOR ‘MENTAL HEALTH ISSUE’ 
 
These concordances and Table 6.2 give further support to the notion that ‘mental 
health’ is now used to refer to states of mental illness. Moreover the fluctuating 
frequencies of ‘mental health issue/problem/condition’ and the fact that they start to 
occur around the same period (c.2000-2004) suggests that we can expect the frequency 
of these terms to continue to rise after 2013 as they are becoming established terms 
within the semantic domain of MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS. Further evidence for this 
claim can be found by identifying the total number of instances of ‘mental health’ in 
the corpus and calculating what percentage of those total instances refer to cases 
where ‘mental health’ is used with ‘condition’, ‘problem’ or ‘issue’. Figure 6.6 shows 
the overall trend for ‘mental health’ to be used within the phrases ‘mental health 
problem’, ‘mental health illness’ and ‘mental health condition’.  
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FIGURE 6.6. PERCENTAGE OF INSTANCES OF ‘MENTAL HEALTH’ THAT OCCUR IN THE PHRASES 
‘MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEM’, ‘MENTAL HEALTH ILLNESS’ AND ‘MENTAL HEALTH CONDITION’ 
 
Figure 6.6 shows that the usages of ‘mental health’ to indicate negative mental health 
has increased from zero in 1985 to 25% in 2010. This result provides evidence that this 
shift is happening, and the terms within the semantic domain of MENTAL HEALTH AND 
ILLNESS are shifting towards the negative end of the continuum.  
 
6.3. The rise of ‘wellbeing’ 
 
As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, the analysis of new lexis added to (or 
emerging in) a semantic domain or discourse provide insight into what concepts the 
existing terms in that semantic domain are taken to refer to (because the addition of 
new words may indicate that existing words in that semantic domain cannot convey 
some meaning) . So far, I have argued that in the corpus there is a strong tendency for 
‘mental health’ to refer to the concept of mental illness. I have argued that this 
broadening of meaning is a result of euphemistic language use. Furthermore, I 
showed that ‘mental health’ is marked in the corpus to refer to the concept of mental 
wellness (e.g. “positive mental health”). If we accept that the meaning of ‘mental 
health’ has broadened and shifted to refer to the concept of mental illness then we 
might predict that another term is emerging in the semantic domain of MENTAL 
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HEALTH AND ILLNESS that only refers to the concept of mental wellness (because ‘mental 
health’ has become associated with the concept of mental illness and is therefore less 
frequently used to refer to mental wellness). I explore this process of language change 
in more detail using linguistic evidence that demonstrates this change (Traugott & 
Dasher, 2002) in Section 6.6, but for now I will use this prediction to explore what new 
terms are emerging to refer to mental wellness.  
In order to ascertain whether a term has emerged to convey the concept of 
mental wellness, I used the Word Sketch function on Sketch Engine (Kilgariff et al., 
2014) which shows statistically significant collocates of a query term (grouped by 
frequency of the collocation, using the logDice statistical calculation). I explored the 
syntactic frame ‘[mental health and]’ to see which lexical items followed. I did this on 
the basis that the additive property of ‘and’ grammatically connects two NPs, creating 
one subject, object or complement comprising a complex NP or NP embedded in a PP. 
Doing this then provided a selection of refined terms for concordance analysis as it 
allowed for closer, more specific inspection of the surrounding text of ‘[mental health 
and…]’. Focussing in on the data means that is it easier to conduct more specific, 
qualitative analysis, as it is possible to see whether the semantic content of the 
surrounding context of ‘[mental health and…]’ suggests that the two lexical items 
were being equated discursively. Through this analysis, I established that the two 
most common items following ‘[mental health and…]’ was ‘wellbeing’ (98 instances, 
1.67 pmw) and ‘well-being’ (45 instances, 0.77 pmw). An example of the concordance 
of ‘mental health and wellbeing’ (top six randomly generated examples in the corpus) 
is shown in Table 6.3. 
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Aspects of life vital for  mental health and 
wellbeing 
- sleep, diet, exercise, 
recreation and relationships 
 
As a nation, we have much 
to gain from an investment 
in  
mental health and 
wellbeing: 
confidence, resilience and 
the improved ability of our 
people translate into greater 
opportunities 
 
The government's recent 
inquiry into 
mental health and 
wellbeing 
 
in later life estimates 2.4 
million older people in 
Britain suffer from 
depression 
'This report highlights the 
fact that the  
 
mental health and 
wellbeing 
of individuals, not only 
from the farming 
community but also from 
other rural businesses and 
those working to tackle the 
outbreak on the frontline, 
was affected and these 
effects may go on for some 
time 
'Projects such as this fit very 
much with the aims of the 
Executive's national 
programme for improving  
 
mental health and 
wellbeing 
- 
Weeks after John died, 
Isabel and her son Hugh 
planted the seeds of Theatre 
Nemo a charity-based 
theatre group to promote 
good  
 
mental health and 
wellbeing 
while aiming to challenge 
stigma 
 TABLE 6.3. CONCORDANCE OF FOR ‘MENTAL HEALTH AND WELLBEING’.  
 
Table 6.3 shows that at some level, ‘mental health’ and ‘wellbeing’ are being 
semantically linked because in all the examples the surrounding context describes 
both ‘mental health’ and ‘wellbeing’, i.e. “sleep, diet, and exercise” are vital for both 
‘mental health and wellbeing’ and “investment in the areas of mental health and 
wellbeing” result in the same outcome: “confidence, resilience”. ‘Mental health’ and 
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‘wellbeing’, then, are discursively constructed as being closely related. Furthermore, 
in concordance line 3 in Table 6.3, an “inquiry into mental health and wellbeing” is 
reported as being linked to statistics regarding the incidence of depression in later life. 
This suggests again that ‘mental health’ and ‘wellbeing’ are being linked, namely, that 
the concepts of mental wellness and wellbeing are being linked. 
‘Wellbeing’ is a potential candidate to take on some of the sense of mental wellness 
in the absence of a term to denote mental wellness only (because ‘mental health’ now 
increasingly refers to the concept of mental illness). The reasons for this hypothesis 
include the fact that ‘wellbeing’ relates only to a state of mental wellness (as opposed 
to illness) and is associated primarily with the maintenance of that state (i.e. 
‘wellbeing’ only refers to the positive end of the mental health continuum). Dodge et 
al. stated in 2012 that ‘wellbeing’ was still largely undefined (2012: 222) which attests 
to its relative newness as a concept within the time period being analysed in this thesis. 
The newness of wellbeing is also attested by its frequency over the time period, which 
shows that despite low raw frequencies, the term is rising significantly from around 
half way through the time period. Figure 6.7 shows the frequency of ‘wellbeing’ over 
the time period. 
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FIGURE 6.7. FREQUENCY OF ‘WELLBEING’67 OVER THE TIME PERIOD 
 
The discursive meaning of ‘wellbeing’ can be investigated using the Thesaurus 
function on Sketch Engine (Kilgariff et al., 2014), which uses the collocates of a query 
word to generate a list of synonyms based on usage. Figure 6.8 is the Sketch Thesaurus 
visualisation for ‘wellbeing’ and ‘mental health’. The visualisation shows that 
‘wellbeing’ is used to describe positive emotional states, e.g. ‘happiness’, but also to 
discuss methods for maintaining a state of positive mental health. It also shows that 
‘health’ (used here to refer to ‘mental health’ because Sketch Engine does not allow 
for multiword searches) appears to collocate with words to do with illness, which 
supports the idea detailed above that ‘mental health’ is now used to refer to mental 
illness. 
 
	
67 Figure 6.9 includes instances of both ‘well-being’ and ‘wellbeing’.	
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FIGURE 6.8. SKETCH THESAURUS VISUALISATIONS FOR ‘WELLBEING’ AND ‘HEALTH’ 
 
From Figure 6.8 it is possible to see how the meaning of ‘wellbeing’ is associated with 
lexical items that one may associate with mental wellness, e.g. ‘happiness’ and ‘self-
esteem’. In contrast, ‘health’ is associated with more negative lexis such as ‘problem’, 
‘disorder’, ‘illness’ and ‘condition’. This supports the idea that ‘wellbeing’ is 
concerned with the concept of mental wellness and ‘mental health’ is concerned with 
the concept of mental illness. Another indication that ‘wellbeing’ is becoming 
established as a term within mental health discourse is that there is evidence that it is 
becoming lexicalised (where a new word is added to the lexicon) via a process of 
compound fusion, where morphological boundaries are erased resulting in “unified 
lexemes over time” (Brinton & Traugott, 2005: 44). Brinton & Traugott state that such 
lexicalisation is commonly the result of institutionalisation which refers to “the spread 
of a usage to a community and its establishment as the norm” (Brinton & Traugott , 
2005: 45). Information about the spelling conventions of ‘wellbeing’ provide evidence 
for the possibility that ‘wellbeing’ is becoming lexicalised. In 1987, 75% of instances of 
wellbeing were spelled ‘well-being’, however in 2013 ‘wellbeing’ became the 
conventionalised spelling with 74% of all instances spelled this way. This convention 
in spelling is a strong indication that wellbeing is being lexicalised, i.e. added to the 
lexicon. Figure 6.9 shows this process of lexicalisation using percentages of the total 
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number of ‘wellbeing’ and ‘well-being’. Figure 6.10 shows the raw frequencies of the 
two terms. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.9. PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ‘WELLBEING’ AND ‘WELL-BEING’ 
 
 
FIGURE 6.10. FREQUENCY OF ‘WELLBEING’ VS. ‘WELL-BEING’ 
 
Despite fairly low frequencies of these lexical items, Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show that at 
the year 2000, ‘wellbeing’ became the dominant spelling. Since 2000, the use of 
‘wellbeing’ has been increasing in line with other terms to do with mental illness shown 
in Figure 6.1. Given that the data contained in the MI 1984-2014 corpus is newspaper 
data (and newspapers have style guides), it could be the case that ‘wellbeing’ is being 
spelled using both variants due to style guides for individual publications; however, 
if that were the case we could expect to see ‘well-being’ drop out of use as style guides 
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adopt ‘wellbeing’ only, but it does not. We can hypothesise, then, that in future 
‘wellbeing’ will become the only form used. Taken together, the lexicalisation in 
progress of ‘wellbeing’ and the increase in its usage support the argument that new 
terms are becoming established within the discourse of mental health and illness, i.e. 
a set of semantically related and static terms to refer to the continuum of mental 
health. 
 
6.4. Assessing similarity and difference through collocation 
 
In Sections 6.1 through 6.3, I used frequency analysis, concordance analysis, and 
collocation analysis to explore similarities and differences in the terms ‘mental health’, 
‘mental illness’ and ‘wellbeing’. In this section I focus more specifically on looking at 
shared and distinct collocates of terms as a means of identifying similarities and 
differences in the labels that have been identified in Sections 6.2-6.3. To do this, I use 
the Word Sketch Difference tool on Sketch Engine (Kilgariff et al., 2014), which shows 
the shared and distinct collocates for two query items. The Word Sketch Difference 
function is useful for looking at nuanced differences in items that share a semantic 
field, within which similarities between terms may be harder to evidence using 
frequency and concordance analysis. Figure 6.11 shows the Word Sketch Difference 
for ‘illness’ and ‘health’ in the corpus. 
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FIGURE 6.11. WORD SKETCH DIFFERENCE FOR ‘ILLNESS’ AND ‘HEALTH’ 
 
Figure 6.11 shows, in line with the argument made so far, that the meaning of wellbeing 
is closely related to health (evidenced by the fact that ‘wellbeing’ and ‘well-being’ 
collocate with ‘health’. So far, I have demonstrated this through qualitative 
concordance analysis and relative frequencies. The collocation analysis provided by 
the Word Sketch Difference tool is another indication that the two concepts potentially 
share meaning. Figure 6.12 shows the Word Sketch Difference for ‘problem’ and 
‘illness’. The reason for this analysis is that, prior to this point, I have argued that 
‘mental health problem’ is a candidate term to convey the concept of mental illness. 
Knowing this, one might expect to see more negatively-valenced lexical items at the 
‘problem’ end than at the ‘illness’ end. The reason that we might expect to see more 
negatively-valenced lexical items at the problem end is that the number of articles 
from later years is greater than those in the early years in the corpus, and as a result, 
the shift from ‘mental illness’ to ‘mental health problem’ would be more pronounced 
when looking at the corpus as a whole to reflect this change in the meaning of ‘mental 
health problem’ and ‘mental illness’.  
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FIGURE 6.12. WORD SKETCH DIFFERENCE FOR ‘ILLNESS’ AND ‘PROBLEM’ 
 
Looking at Figure 6.12, it appears that the hypothesis regarding ‘mental health 
problem’ bears out. As can be seen, most of the terms included occur equally 
frequently with both terms. Using collocation as a benchmark for usage-based 
synonymy, then, we can be fairly confident that these two items are have some shared 
sense. This indication of usage-based synonymy is also echoed in Figure 6.13, which 
shows the Word Sketch difference for ‘health’ and ‘wellbeing’. 
 
 
FIGURE 6.13. WORD SKETCH DIFFERENCE FOR ‘WELLBEING’ AND ‘HEALTH’ 
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Figure 6.13 shows that ‘wellbeing’ and ‘health’ share a large number of collocates that 
occur equally frequently, which again could suggest that, when taken together with 
qualitative analysis, these terms are usage-based synonyms within this discourse 
context, or at least closely related within a shared semantic field. ‘Wellbeing’ then, 
appears to be a good candidate term to convey mental wellness in light of the fact that 
‘mental health’ is being used to refer to mental illness via nominal modification such as 
‘problems’ and ‘issues’. Moreover, ‘wellbeing’ has been added to the discourse of 
mental health and illness within a short and recent period of time, which indicates 
that ‘wellbeing’ has been taken up in this context by UK journalists, writing for people 
within UK society. This in turn suggests that wellbeing is a recognisable concept for 
people within UK society. 
If we step back for a moment from the linguistic analysis conducted here and 
consider the idea of the stigma around mental illness that is often mentioned in the 
literature reported in Chapter 2, arguably, ‘wellbeing’ is a good candidate term to 
denote mental wellness as no link exists in the MI 1984-2014 corpus between ‘wellbeing’ 
and ‘stigma’. For example, in a search of collocates of ‘stigma’, both ‘health’ and 
‘illness’ appear as collocates, whereas no such relationship occurs between ‘wellbeing’ 
and ‘stigma’. In fact, there were no instances in the corpus where ‘stigma’ occurred 
with ‘wellbeing’. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show example concordances (top three randomly 
generated concordance lines) in the corpus for ‘stigma’ and ‘mental health’/’mental 
illness’. 
 
tackle the stigma of mental health 
because of the  stigma attached to mental health 
break the  stigma around mental health 
TABLE 6.3. CONCORDANCE FOR ‘STIGMA’ + ‘MENTAL HEALTH’  
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break down  stigma attached to mental illness 
hopes to address the stigma surrounding mental illness 
aiming to end the stigma attached to mental illness 
TABLE 6.4. CONCORDANCE FOR ‘STIGMA’ + ‘MENTAL ILLNESS’  
 
Furthermore, if we look at the Word Sketch collocates returned for the syntactic frame 
‘[wellbeing and…] (as I did previously in Section 6.3 to provide some evidence for a 
link between ‘mental health’ and ‘wellbeing’), we see that ‘wellbeing’ is routinely 
associated with terms that denote a positive state of mind and maintaining a positive 
state of mind.  
Wellbeing and… 
1. health 
2. happiness 
3. relaxation 
4. safety 
5. committee  
6. fitness 
7. quality 
8. self-esteem 
9. satisfaction 
10. morale 
11. euphoria 
12. confidence  
13. comfort  
14. function 
15. future 
16. mood 
17. relationship 
18. session 
19. emotion 
20. development 
TABLE 6.5. WORD SKETCH COLLOCATES OF “WELLBEING AND…” 
 
Moreover, the fact that ‘wellbeing’ occurs in phrases such as “wellbeing committee” 
provides further evidence that this term is being adopted in an official capacity 
because it is being recognised by groups of people in an institutional setting.   
 In the next section I explore the idea that the terms ‘mental illness’, ‘mental 
health’ and ‘wellbeing’ have positive or negative associations, using the concepts of 
semantic preference and semantic prosody (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.8 for a 
description of semantic preference and semantic prosody). 
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6.5. The collocational context of ‘mental health’, ‘mental illness’ and ‘wellbeing’ 
 
In Section 6.4, the terms ‘mental health’, ‘mental illness’ and ‘wellbeing’ were explored 
using the Word Sketch function. This analysis offered insight into whether terms were 
more positive or negative than a comparison term. In this section, I conduct a more 
specific analysis of the positive or negative associations of each term separately. Table 
6.3 shows the top 10 collocates of each term. 
 
Mental illness Mental health Wellbeing 
stigma, severe, serious, 
rethink, suffering, 
history, suffer, people, 
form, attached 
problems, act, issues, 
charity, services, mind, 
foundation, problem, 
under, trust  
emotional, overall, 
physical, mental, health, 
improve, suffolk, sense, 
psychological, promote 
TABLE 6.6. TOP 10 COLLOCATES OF ‘MENTAL ILLNESS’, ‘MENTAL HEALTH’ AND ‘WELLBEING’ 
(CALCULATED USING SKETCH ENGINE). 
 
Table 6.6 reinforces my argument that ‘mental health’ is now being used to refer to 
mental illness (as indicated by ‘problems’) it also reinforces the assessment made in 
Section 6.1 that ‘mental illness’ can also refer to official organisations, such as “Trusts” 
and “Foundations”. Similarly, Table 6.6 supports the point made in the previous 
section that ‘wellbeing’ is also becoming established through official campaigns, e.g. 
“Suffolk Health and Wellbeing month”, “had been awarded the Suffolk wellbeing service 
contract”, “a clinical psychologist with the Suffolk wellbeing service” 
Table 6.6 also suggests that mental illness is viewed as the most negative concept 
of the three. Evidence for this is that the collocates of ‘mental illness’ have a negative 
semantic prosody whereby lexical items in particular units of meaning take on 
negative associations due to the negative meaning of the words they collocate with, 
e.g. one does not “suffer” from something positive, “stigma” does not surround 
something good, and good things don’t tend to be described as “severe” or “serious”. 
This last point is attested by a collocation analysis of ‘severe’ in the British National 
Corpus (BNC) in which the top 10 collocates (ranked by frequency, L4-R4) of ‘severe’ 
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include ‘problems’, ‘damage’, ‘difficulties’, ‘suffered’ and ‘patients’, and the top 10 
collocates of ‘serious’ include ‘problems’, ‘injury’, ‘threat, ‘offence and ‘damage. The 
table also suggests that compared with ‘mental illness’, ‘mental health’ is viewed as a 
more neutral term (although this is shifting towards being a more negative term 
indicated by ‘problem’ and ‘problems’) and that ‘wellbeing’ is a more positive term. 
Evidence for the view that ‘wellbeing’ is more positive than ‘mental illness’ and 
‘mental health’ is that the collocates of ‘wellbeing’ have a more positive semantic 
meaning. For example, in the BNC the top 10 collocates (ranked by frequency, L4-R4) 
of ‘promote’ include ‘development, ‘health, ‘interests’, ‘growth’ and ‘awareness’. The 
fact that these words are positively valanced suggests that the action of ‘promoting’ is 
seen positively. For instance, ‘actively’ usually premodifies verbs that convey positive 
aims. As an example, in the BNC ‘actively’ premodifies ‘engaging’, ‘pursuing’, 
‘participating’ and ‘growing’. Another example of the positive semantic prosody 
associated with ‘wellbeing’ is the collocate ‘sense’ which, under closer concordance 
analysis, forms part of a bigger unit of meaning – “a sense of”. The collocates of this 
unit of meaning in the BNC are ‘humour’, ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’, which again 
convey positive emotions, particularly around the notion of affirmation of oneself. 
Another interesting insight into ‘wellbeing’ and how it fits into the continuum of 
mental health discourse is provided by ‘improve’ (see Table 6.6). The collocates of this 
lexical item in the BNC are ‘efficiency’, ‘performance’, ‘quality’, ‘relations’ and 
‘standards’, which appear superficially to fit neither a negative nor a positive semantic 
prosody. However, if we attempt to categorise these words by their semantic 
preference we can see that several of these terms invoke the idea of a continuum, i.e. 
all these words describe a series of states. Moreover, from a semantic perspective, 
often the word used to indicate a continuum also performs the function of denoting 
the positive end of that continuum; e.g. ‘quality’, which both refers to the continuum 
of quality and describes the state of something being good quality. This phenomenon 
was demonstrated in Figure 6.2 (‘the mental health continuum’) which was based on 
the WHO definition of mental health, where ‘mental health’ was a term to describe 
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both the continuum and, in the absence of another term, the positive end of the scale. 
The reason such words are interesting is that their occurrence with ‘wellbeing’ 
suggests that ‘wellbeing’ triggers a continuum and yet evidence in my analysis so far 
suggests that ‘wellbeing’ is viewed as a wholly positive thing. This raises interesting 
questions about the future of ‘wellbeing’ as a positive term, as it may be the case that 
as it becomes adopted into common parlance, new ways of negating its meaning of a 
positive mental state may be created, as has been the case for mental health. There is 
however, a vital difference between the labels ‘mental health’ and ‘wellbeing’. This 
difference is that ‘mental health’ is associated with mental states by virtue of its lexical 
construction, i.e. the word ‘mental’ is a constituent of the lexical item. For this reason, 
‘wellbeing’ may well be a good candidate for anti-stigma initiatives in light of ‘mental 
health’ shifting towards negative associations. This is because wellbeing does not have 
a marked form to denote negation, and nor does it have a conventionalised antonym, 
e.g. ‘unwellbeing’ and ‘non-wellbeing’ do not exist in the English Language. 
Consequently, another term would have to be adopted that is lexically (as opposed to 
semantically) distinct from ‘wellbeing’, which would mean that ‘wellbeing’ would not 
be contained in the term to denote opposite wellbeing. This argument explains to a 
certain extent why ‘mental health’ has shifted to the negative end of the continuum of 
mental health discourse because health has a conventionalised negative form – 
‘illness’. 
 
6.6. The contemporary view of mental health: pragmatic accounts of language 
change 
So far I have argued that the data suggests ‘mental health’ is increasingly used as a 
euphemistic term to refer to the concept of mental illness. I have provided evidence for 
this argument by showing that ‘mental health’ is increasingly being modified to 
convey this meaning, e.g. mental illness. I have also showed that ‘wellbeing’ is used in 
the corpus to refer to the positive dimension of mental health.. What I argue in this 
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section is that this diachronic change, whereby ‘mental health’ can now refer to mental 
illness, is entirely consistent with patterns of language change around euphemistic 
terms, whereby semantic change is instigated by “the strategic use of language for 
communicative purposes” (Traugott & Dasher, 2002: 58). Furthermore, euphemistic 
language use has been identified as an instigator of language change due to the fact 
that taboo and euphemisms “provide an emotion trigger for word addition, word loss, 
phonological distortion and semantic shift” (Burridge, 2012: 65). Furthermore, 
euphemistic usages result in semantic language change because  
 
words may come to be perceived as unpleasant […] because they are linked to 
some […] culturally sensitive material or behaviour. This may trigger tabooing 
and subsequent loss of the original term and/or euphemistic extension of another 
item 
 
(Urban 2015: 375) 
 
A pragmatic account of lexical change can be used to explain the euphemistic use of 
‘mental illness’. Such a shift in usage is motivated by social-cultural impulses 
(Traugott, 2010: 551; Urban, 2015), specifically our desire to avoid taboo subjects by 
the use of euphemisms. The taboo nature of mental illness is attested by the fact that 
the syntactic frame ‘[taboo is…]’68 returns instances of ‘mental illness is a taboo’. 
Taboo and euphemism were identified by Bréal (1964) as motivations for language 
change. In essence, the meaning of the word being used euphemistically is broadened 
such that the original taboo referent is gradually lost. Traugott and Dasher (2002) 
illustrate Bréal’s point using the example of the lexical item toilet, which broadened in 
meaning from referring to the cloth used to wrap one’s head, to the activities 
associated with grooming generally, and finally to “the fixture for disposing of bodily 
excretions, and the room containing it” (Traugott & Dasher, 2002: 59). The usage of 
toilet to refer to activities associated with grooming declined because of its status as a 	
68 This syntactic frame captures both ‘X is a taboo’ and ‘taboo is X’ 
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euphemism for things to do with excretion. Then, because toilet became more 
associated with excretion than grooming, it became taboo again, so toilet was replaced 
with “terms such as restroom, or bathroom (even when no bath is expected or known to 
be present) (Traugott & Dasher, 2002: 59). Figure 6.14 shows the process of pragmatic-
led semantic change for ‘toilet’.
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FIGURE 6.14. PROCESS OF SOCIALLY-MOTIVATED LANGUAGE CHANGE FOR ‘TOILET’ (TAKEN FROM TRAUGOTT & DASHER, 2002: 59) 
Toilet:	
Cloth used for 
wrapping one’s 
head	
c.1538 	
Came to refer to more 
activities associated 
with grooming	
EXTENSION	
Then came to refer to 
the receptacle into 
which one defecates 
or urinates 	 EUPHEMISM	
“General for specific” 
(Allen & Burridge, 2006) 	
Toilet then becomes 
taboo leading to 
euphemisms like 
‘restroom’ and 
‘bathroom’	
TABOO	
The more it was used 
to refer to the 
receptacle for 
defecation, the less it 
was used for 
grooming	
NARROWING	
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The case of the changing meanings of toilet described by Traugott & Dasher (2002) 
provides a clear example of how the avoidance of taboo subjects via euphemism is 
managed in language. However, the corpus used in my thesis does not cover a large 
enough time span for me to be able to document a complete cycle of euphemistic 
language change. The first recorded use of toilet in the first sense that Traugott and 
Dasher (2002) describe was in 1538. Such a change, then, happens over a considerable 
period of time, and our understanding of the changing meaning of lexical items is 
always at least partially retrospective. However, I argue that the fact that we can 
observe change within the 30-year period documented in the corpus demonstrates the 
significance of the changes I have identified. Moreover, such findings show how 
powerful (corpus) linguistic tools are for tracking emergent semantic change in 
electronic data. I cannot claim to have witnessed a full cycle of change in the data 
available, where ‘mental health’ refers to something far removed from mental states. 
What I can claim, however, is that, societally, ‘mental illness’ is viewed as taboo to a 
certain extent (evidenced by its co-occurrence with words like ‘taboo’ and ‘stigma)’, 
and that ‘mental health’, which did not have negative associations during the early 
years of the time period, was used as a euphemistic term to refer to mental illness. 
‘Mental health’ was then modified to refer more obviously to mental illness via the 
addition of ‘mental health problem’/’issue’. Considered in relation to the ‘toilet’ 
example of semantic change over centuries , this change within thirty years is 
significant and provides evidence for the fact that the contemporary discourse of 
mental health and illness is still emerging. Figure 6.15 shows this emergent language 
change using the processes of language change identified by Traugott & Dasher 
(2002). To reflect that the diagram is based in part on prediction, the two leftmost 
boxes in the diagram are marked in gradient colour to show that this possible 
language change is still ongoing.
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FIGURE 6.15. PREDICTED PROCESS OF SOCIALLY-MOTIVATED LANGUAGE CHANGE FOR ‘MENTAL ILLNESS’ (FROM MI 1984-2014 CORPUS) DATA)  
Mental health: 
Invokes continuum of 
mental health, usually 
refers to the positive end 
of continuum 	
Marked forms 
suggest ‘mental 
health’ has become 
associated with 
negative end of 
continuum	
EXTENSION	
‘Mental health’ refers 
to mental illness 	
EUPHEMISM	
“General for specific” 
(Allen & Burridge, 2006) 	
? 
‘wellbeing’ becomes 
the new term to 
describe mental 
wellness 	
TABOO	
The more it refers to 
mental illness the less 
it is used to refer to 
mental wellness?  
(cf. “positive mental 
health”	
NARROWING	
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So far in this chapter I have shown that definitions of ‘mental health’ published by 
major stakeholders in global mental health organisations suggest that ‘mental health’ 
is a term used to describe the scale of mental states, and also, in the absence of a 
positive term, to the state of mental wellness. I have argued that through a process of 
language change, specifically euphemism, the data suggests that ‘mental health’ now 
increasingly refers to mental illness in contexts where it does not refer specifically to 
organisations (e.g. trusts, foundations and charities). I argue that the reason ‘mental 
health’ is being used to refer to mental illness can be explained by using insights from 
pragmatics, because the shift in meaning from mental illness to mental health is the 
result of a socially-motivated language change (e.g. people do not refer to ‘mental 
illness’ in order to avoid the taboo associated with it). Due to this taboo avoidance 
strategy, the use of ‘mental health’ to refer to the mental illness constitutes a 
conversational implicature, because what is meant is more than what is said (Clark & 
Lucy, 1974; Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983). The semanicization69 (what might be termed 
the conventionalisation) of conversational implicature has been identified as a main 
mechanism for semantic change. For example, Sagi et al. (2009) write of pragmatic 
approaches to semantic language change that 
the main mechanism of semantic change is argued to be the semanticization of 
conversational implicatures, where conversational implicatures are a 
component of speaker meaning that arises from the interaction between what 
the speaker says and rational principles of communication  
(Sagi et al. 2009: 107) 
 
Sagi et al’s (2009) point is based on Levinson’s account of pragmatic meaning (adopted 
by Traugott (2010) and Traugott & Dasher (2002), specifically his work on I-
implicature which is a renovation of the Gricean approach (Grice 1975) to implicature, 
	
69 Traugott (2010) has previously referred to her work in theorizing semantic change as the the 
“semanticization of pragmatics”.  
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and is particularly focused around a reformulation of Grice’s (1975) Maxim of 
Quantity. Levinson’s (2000) I-Principle (related to (I-Implicatures) refers to the 
informativeness of an utterance and can be used to explain the relationship between 
words within a semantic set, as well as why certain words are used over others within 
that set. Levinson (2000) posits a speaker’s maxim for the I-Principle (“do not say more 
than is required” [Levinson, 2000: 100]) and a recipient’s corollary (“what is generally 
said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified [Levinson, 2000: 100]). What this 
means is that speakers usually make their utterance informative enough for their 
recipients to understand the intended proposition, and that the recipient interprets 
the speaker’s utterance as being designed in order to be informative enough. An 
example used by Atlas & Levinson (1981: 41) to exemplify an I-implicature is the 
utterance “John was reading a book” which implicates that John was reading a book 
that was not a dictionary (because when we read books we are not stereotypically 
reading a dictionary). As a result, “the hearer is licensed to derive the informationally 
enriching implicature that narrows down the non-specific predicate “book” by 
excluding dictionaries” (Carston, 1998: 194). In this example, what is said is more 
general than what is implicated. This fits with what we see in the data discussed in 
this chapter, e.g. why the more semantically general lexical item ‘mental health’ is 
used over the semantically more specific ‘mental illness’ to describe the concept of 
being mentally unwell. For my purpose here, the theory of I-Implicatures provides a 
useful means of explaining why ‘mental health’ may be used in the data to refer to 
mental illness. This is because ‘mental health’ is deemed informative enough to mean 
mental illness. That is, the term ‘mental health’ is taken to observe Levinson’s (2000) I-
Principle. Relatedly, I-implicatures explain this process because the way ‘mental 
health’ is being used in the data (i.e. to refer to mental illness) is not part of the formal 
semantic structure of the word; rather it arises from the specific discourse context and, 
as a result, it has taken on what Levinson calls “presumptive meaning” (2000) or a 
“preferred interpretation” (Chapman 2011: 101). Moreover, the ideas underlying the 
concept of I-Implicatures provide a useful means of conveying what I see as the 
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impetus for the language change outlined so far in this chapter – which is based on 
the conventionalisation of an I-Implicature. Specifically, ‘mental health’ has shifted 
meaning via the systematic use of ‘mental health’ to implicate mental illness (which 
happened as a result of the euphemistic language change that Traugott & Dasher 
(2002) identified in combination with speakers and hearers adhering to the I-
Principle). In effect, ‘mental health’ has become conventionally associated with mental 
illness because a new definition of mental illness has been discursively constructed 
through the conventional use of ‘mental health problem’, etc. As a result, ‘mental 
health’, which traditionally referred to the continuum of mental health (comprising 
both good and bad) has taken on the presumptive meaning of referring to mental 
illness. It can be argued then, that the conventionalisation of ‘mental health’ to refer to 
mental illness in the data is due to an adherence to the I-principle (and relatedly, Grice’s 
Maxim of Quantity [1975]) that stipulates that we do not say more than is necessary 
(i.e. if ‘mental health’ can refer to mental illness, there is no need to use the term ‘mental 
illness’ specifically).  
Taken together, the preference for using a general term (e.g. ‘mental health’) 
over a specific one (e.g. ‘mental illness’), and the preference for using the less taboo 
term fits with Traugott & Dasher’s (2002) account of language change led by 
euphemism; i.e. the general expression ‘mental health’ is less taboo than ‘mental 
illness’ and therefore we can predict that the use of ‘mental health’ to mean mental 
illness will become conventionalised . This process is summarised in Figure 6.16. 
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FIGURE 6.16. A PRAGMATIC ACCOUNT OF LANGUAGE CHANGE: MENTAL HEALTH TO MENTAL 
ILLNESS 
 
Pragmatic accounts of language change provide a theoretically sound means of 
describing the change in usage within the data which shows that prior to the later 
‘Mental health’ refers to the scale of mental 
states, both positive and negative 
‘Mental health’ is used to refer to 
mental illness to avoid the taboo and 
stigma associated with mental illness 
(euphemistic language use) 
‘Mental health’ takes on a new, more 
specific, presumptive meaning based 
on how it is routinely used, i.e. to 
refer to mental illness 
‘Mental health’ refers to the concept of mental 
illness. Reflecting this change, speakers start to 
modify ‘mental health’, e.g. ‘mental health 
problems’ 	
In the absence of a term to describe the concept 
of positive mental health, ‘wellbeing’ starts to 
become lexicalised and used more frequently. 	
Mental illness is an increasingly important 
societal issue. As a result, mental illness needs 
to be discussed more in society. ‘Mental health’ 
can refer to mental illness. Speakers usually 
prefer a general term over a specific one 
(Huang, 2007), and according to the I-
Principle, speakers do not need to make their 
contribution more informative than necessary 
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years contained in the corpus, mental health discourse has been underlexicalised 
(Fowler, 1977) (i.e. there is no term to denote mental wellness and mental wellness only). 
Arguably, the absence of a term conveying mental wellness has precluded discussion 
of mental health as a dynamic and changeable entity in the newspaper data contained 
in the corpus because mental health is most often represented as an issue of negative 
mental states and therefore discussion about maintaining mental wellness is rare. 
Moreover, because of the fact that the use of ‘mental health’ in the corpus can invoke 
mental illness but not vice-versa, the first concept invoked by ‘mental health’ will be 
mental illness which reiterates the view that there are only two states: mentally ill (which 
is referred to using the terms ‘mental health’/’mental illness’) or not mentally ill, which 
we don’t have a term for. This binary view, which has possibly been compounded by 
the lack of terms denoting mental wellness only, is not an accurate representation of 
mental health, which can change at various points in a person’s life. As previously 
stated, however, the increasing visibility of mental health and illness in society has 
meant that we are seeing lexicalisation in progress around this semantic domain. To 
return to the notion of I-implicatures, then, what we have in ‘wellbeing’ is a term that, 
unlike ‘mental health’ does not implicate mental illness.  
Using the evidence presented since section 6.2, where I first outlined the mental 
health continuum based on the WHO definition of ‘mental health’, we can now revisit 
the continuum of mental health enriched by our understanding of how the data 
suggests these concepts, i.e. mental illness, mental health, mental health 
problems/issues/conditions, and wellbeing occur. 
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FIGURE 6.17. THE CONTINUUM OF MENTAL HEALTH DISCOURSE BASED ON TERMS FROM 2013  
 
Figure 6.17 shows that during the period examined, ‘mental health’ was not always 
viewed as a term to describe the continuum of states between mental health and mental 
illness. Rather it is used as a neutral term to describe legislation or official bodies 
concerned with mental illness. Furthermore, it is used in an increasing number of 
cases to refer to negative mental states. Taken together, these factors suggest that 
within newspaper discourse across the years sampled, ‘mental health’ has taken on a 
new discursive meaning, distinct from that of the official discourse of mental health 
outlined by WHO, which suggests ‘mental health’ refers to the scale of mental states. 
This discursive meaning of ‘mental health’ emergent in the data conveys mental illness. 
If we compare the contemporary picture of mental health discourse to that of just 
over 30 years ago (1984), we see that it is not at all surprising that a new positive term 
has started to emerge. The reason for this is because ‘mental health’ is used solely to 
refer to legislation, specifically the Mental Health Act and any other mental states 
were covered by the label ‘mental illness’. A possible reason for the fact that ‘mental 
health’ was used solely to refer to legislation is that mental wellness or the maintenance 
of it was not discussed in the mainstream media. The only state on the continuum that 
was discussed was mental illness because the absence of mental illness was not viewed 
MENTAL HEALTH DISCOURSE  
Mental health Mental illness 
More negatively represented  More positively represented  
Wellbeing  
Mental health 
problems/issues/conditions 
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as mental health or wellbeing but as, presumably, ‘normal’ which did not require a term. 
What we can conclude from this, then, is that over the time period the visibility of 
issues to do with mental health and illness has increased, which has meant that new 
terms for this in this discourse have emerged, as would be the case in the lexicalisation 
of any semantic domain. What this means in real-world terms is that whilst mental 
illness is still the focus of press reports by a significant margin, mental wellness is being 
discussed more and more. This is a hopeful change in the discourse around mental 
illness as it works to normalise the idea that mental health can fluctuate, that mental 
health and illness are not binary, that speaking about experiencing a range of mental 
states is societally acceptable, and relatedly that the absence of mental illness is not 
necessarily ‘normal’. 
Further to the changes perceived in the data, an interesting observation I have 
made since the start of 2014 (the corpus only covers January 2014) that attests to 
‘wellbeing’s’ role as a new term to denote mental wellness, can be seen on the WHO 
website which was updated in 2014. The definition of ‘mental health’ listed there is: 
 
Mental health is defined as a state of well-being in which every individual 
realizes his or her own potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can 
work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to her or his 
community. 
 
(WHO 2014) 
 
Furthermore, the Mind website in the year of writing (2019) defines wellbeing as “how 
you are feeling and how well you can cope with day-to-day life” (Mind, 2019c). This 
definition of wellbeing shares some of the semantic content of the WHO definition of 
health, which is “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” (WHO, 2019), thus supporting the 
argument that since 2014 ‘wellbeing’ has gained traction as a term meaning mental 
wellness. 
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6.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued, using evidence from language in use, that the labels for 
concepts within the semantic domain of MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS are distinct and 
shifting. This study is the first to my knowledge that has used large quantities of 
authentic language data to track semantic change within the semantic domain of 
MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS. In doing this, I have laid the groundwork for Chapters 
7 and 8, in which I explore the participants (through naming analysis) and processes 
associated with mental health and illness.  
The findings from the analysis conducted in this chapter relate to the point I 
made at the beginning of this chapter concerning the terms used to collect data (the 
Day & Page [1986] and Wahl et al. [2002] examples). I have shown throughout the 
analysis that the terms ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ are distinct enough to 
potentially bias data collected using one term over another term (e.g. ‘mental health’ 
often refers to mental illness). For this reason, the findings reported in this chapter have 
wider implications for the methodological best practice of studies whose aims are to 
model the semantic domain of MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS. Moreover, to the best of 
my knowledge, no research has been conducted into the terms ‘mental health’ and 
‘mental illness’, despite the fact that much research has been conducted into the terms 
for individual illnesses, e.g. schizophrenia. This lack of research suggests that the 
terms may be taken for granted. Through the analysis conducted in this chapter, then, 
I have shown that the meanings behind ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ cannot be 
taken for granted. 
In summary, in this chapter I have shown that the terms ‘mental health’ and 
‘mental illness’ have increased and continue to increase across the time period 
studied. I have suggested that this indicates that mental health and mental illness are 
increasing in both importance and visibility in UK society. Through an exploration of 
‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’, it appears to be the case in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus that ‘mental illness’ is becoming the dispreferred term to refer to negative 
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mental states, while ‘mental health’ is becoming more common and subsuming some 
of the sense of mental illness. This finding is supported by the increasing use of 
modifiers of ‘mental health’ that carry negative meanings, such as ‘mental health 
problems’ and ‘mental health disorders’. Moreover, the MI 1984-2014 corpus contains 
more articles reporting on ‘mental illness’ than ‘mental health’ due to the sampling 
frame used to collect the data. Due to the data collection procedure adopted in the 
creation of the MI 1984-2014 corpus, then, it would be sensible to assume that there 
would be a higher proportion of instances of ‘mental illness’ than ‘mental health’ but 
this does not bear out in the data. Despite the fact that the corpus contains a higher 
proportion of articles reporting on mental illness, the analysis conducted in this 
chapter has shown that ‘mental health’ is a more frequent term than ‘mental illness’, 
and that ‘mental health’ is rising. This provides further evidence for my argument that 
‘mental health’ has taken on some of the sense of ‘mental illness’ in this discursive 
context70. I have also argued that if ‘mental health’ is now being used to refer to 
negative mental states, then, just as ’mental health problem’ emerged to convey mental 
illness (negative meaning the other end of the health continuum), it could be expected 
that a new term will emerge in order to convey mental wellness. One candidate term to 
fill this lexical gap is ‘wellbeing’. Evidence from the MI 1984-2014 corpus shows that 
the use of ‘wellbeing’ is increasing considerably, despite the term appearing to be 
relatively new within the semantic domain of MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS. Moreover, 
I have provided evidence to show that ‘wellbeing’ is undergoing a process of 
lexicalisation, which offers further evidence for the claim that ‘wellbeing’ is becoming 
an established term in this semantic domain. The diachronic development of this term 
is something that warrants further exploration and which unfortunately requires 
more contemporary data than is contained in the MI 1984-2014. However, it is possible 	
70 Without data to compare the frequency of mental health and mental illness in other discourse types, 
e.g. in clinical settings, it is impossible to test whether this is true of other settings. My intuition is that 
‘mental illness’ would still be the preferred term to refer to mental ill health by medical experts, 
although anti-stigma initiatives in the UK refer to ‘mental health’ and they are supported by mental 
health campaigners and medical experts.	
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at this early stage of the term’s development to make hypotheses about ‘wellbeing’. 
One such hypothesis is that it could be a useful alternative in mental health awareness-
raising initiatives, as the term has not yet been linked to the word ‘stigma’. Moreover, 
based on qualitative observations from the year of writing, it does appear that the term 
‘wellbeing’ has developed significantly since 2014, giving an early suggestion that the 
semantic processes outlined in this chapter have borne out, thus demonstrating the 
utility of the linguistic analysis of societal discourses. 
Using methods from pragmatic theory, I have demonstrated that the diachronic 
change observed in the analysis is entirely consistent with socially-motivated, 
pragmatic accounts of language change, wherein euphemism (e.g. using ‘mental 
health’ to refer to mental illness) provides a catalyst for shifting semantic meaning. 
Further to this, using the concept of I-Implicatures (Levinson, 2000), I have also shown 
how ‘mental health’, came to refer to mental illness. This happened via a process of 
implicature relating to the informativeness of utterances, specifically the process by 
which ‘mental health’ took on the presumptive or preferred meaning of ‘mental 
illness’. This chapter, then, has synthesised a range of evidence to give an overall 
picture of the contemporary discourse of mental health and illness contained in the 
corpus. In the next chapter I explore the naming practices used in the corpus to refer 
to people with mental illness.  
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7. Named, labelled and referred to: people with mental 
illnesses in the MI 1984-2014 corpus 	
7.1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 6, I showed that the terms used to describe mental illness and mental health 
have shifted and are continuing to shift. I focused my analysis of these changing labels 
on the semantic and pragmatic content of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’. 
Specifically, I argued in Chapter 6 that the changing meanings of ‘mental illness’ and 
‘mental health’ were an example of pragmatic-led language change guided by 
euphemistic language use. In this chapter I explore the labels used to describe mental 
illness in more detail; however, in this chapter I focus on the way that labels can 
encode ideology (as opposed to what they mean semantically). Specifically, in this 
chapter I explore the labels that are used by journalists to describe people with mental 
illness in more detail. My analysis in this chapter, then, addresses two of the research 
questions listed in the introduction to this thesis. These are: 
 
1. What linguistic strategies are used to name, label and describe people with 
mental illness? 
1.1. To what extent is person-first language present in the MI 1984-2014 corpus? 
2. What themes are present in the corpus for referring to people with mental 
illness?  
As previously stated, this chapter is concerned with the ideological content associated 
with using certain labels to name and refer to people and entities in the world. The 
reason for conducting naming analysis is because, as I described in Chapter 2, it allows 
for the exploration of how participants or entities are “packaged-up” (Jeffries, 2010: 
19). I argued in Chapter 4, in line with previous research on naming (Clark, 1992; 
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Jeffries 2010; inter alia), that naming analysis constitutes a linguistic method for 
analysing ideology in texts. The reason that naming analysis is particularly useful 
when applied to newspaper discourse is that, as Bell (1994) states, “journalists do not 
write articles. They write stories. A story has structure, direction, point, viewpoint” 
(Bell, 1994: 100). Put simply, what may appear to be an accurate depiction of an event 
has often undergone a process of what we might term ‘storification’; i.e. the elements 
of the story that are the most attention-grabbing or shocking are foregrounded 
(sometimes literally via headlines) whilst other elements (which may contextualise the 
event) are backgrounded. This storification process is useful for the analyst because it 
makes salient those elements of the reports that the journalist deems attention-
grabbing or shocking, which in turn allows for the linguistic analysis of what 
constitutes newsworthiness and news values (Bednarek, 2006; Fowler, 1991; 
Richardson, 2007), or “values that exist in and are constructed through discourse“ 
(Bednarek & Caple, 2014: 135, original emphasis). More interesting, however, for my 
purposes is how those attention-grabbing elements (for example, salient social actors 
and salient circumstances) are named in order to be attention-grabbing or shocking. 
For example, a woman with a mental illness may be described as ‘bipolar mother’ 
despite the fact that her maternal role is not pertinent to the story. Why is it relevant 
that the journalist mention that she is a mother? Moreover, what does naming the 
woman in this way indicate about society’s views of motherhood as well as society’s 
views on bipolar disorder, and how does this relate to the newsworthiness of the 
story? The answer to these questions, I argue, is to be found in the tendency of the 
press to put people into categories or socially-constructed groups. Fowler (1991) 
describes such groups as being an “instrument for handling discrimination, for sorting 
unequally” (Fowler, 1991: 94). To return to the ‘bipolar mother’ example, the story is 
arguably newsworthy because the woman belongs to the category ‘people with 
mental illness’ who are of a particular ‘group’ and who are routinely represented in 
the press as being criminal, violent and unpredictable (Bowen, 2016; Whitley & Berry, 
2013; Paterson, 2006, inter alia). As a result, her belonging in this category clashes with 
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her belonging to the other ‘group’ – that of ‘mothers’ (e.g. women who are stable, 
dependable, etc.). Presenting the woman as ‘bipolar mother’ then is one way that 
journalists can create covert associations that constitute damaging and baseless 
ideological content (e.g. that a diagnosis of bipolar disorder affects the ability of a 
woman to be a good mother according to common associations of what motherhood 
constitutes). Naming, then, is both a referential device, in that it allows for texts to 
point at people in the world (who may be mothers and may have a mental illness), 
and a narrative device, in that it constructs them as a particular character in a story 
(the bad mother, the neglectful mother, the unpredictable mother). Naming practices, 
then, are the link between the complex and multifaceted people and things in the 
world and the story constructed in texts (a story that, for our purposes here, has been 
constructed by journalists). This is because categorisation is necessarily a 
simplification of a person or a thing (Rosch, 1975). As Fowler (1991) writes  
Having established a person as an example of a type, our relationship with the 
person is simplified: we think about the person in terms of the qualities which 
we attribute to the category already preexisting in our minds […] the category 
may harden into a stereotype, an extremely simplified mental model which 
fails to see individual features, only the values that are believed to be 
appropriate to the type 
 
(Fowler, 1991: 92) 
 
In addition to the role that language plays in creating and perpetuating stereotypes 
(for example presenting a group of people in an unfavorable and untrue way), the 
way that the press chooses to categorise and name people has implications for the 
people categorised and named. Consider, for example, the relationship between 
personal identity (how we identify ourselves) and our social identity (how others 
identify us) discussed by Ryan et al. (2009): 
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we are not solely who we think we are, but also who others believe us to be; we 
come to learn about ourselves through the reactions of others […] 
Consequently, we are all in danger of being socially positioned in unfavorable 
ways; that is, to having our desired projected selves rejected and other 
undesirable selves thrust upon us 
 
(Ryan et al. 2009: 146) 
 
Ryan et al. (2009) essentially argue that the way we are represented (for our purposes 
here, represented in language) affects not just how others perceive us but also how we 
perceive ourselves; i.e. we start to internalise negative stereotypes about ourselves. 
This point brings us back to some of the findings of previous research reported in 
Chapter 2 on self-stigma, such as that conducted by Schomerus et al. (2012) who found 
that self-stigma resulted in people not recognising their symptoms as being related to 
mental illness, and also resulted in people not engaging with mental health 
professionals (recall that self-stigma relates to a person devaluing themselves as a 
result of stigmatising attitudes about them projected by others (Corrigan et al., 2010; 
Goffman, 1963)). For this reason, mental illness is an important topic matter to explore 
in terms of naming strategies because the ways in which people with mental illness 
are named can not only present a simplified and stereotypical view of people with 
mental illness in public life generally, but can also have real-world, personal health 
consequences for individuals with mental illnesses. 
 In the next section, I discuss prescribed linguistic forms for referring to people 
with mental illness. In Section 7.2, I detail the analytical method deployed in this 
chapter before I report the results of the naming analysis in section 7.3. In section 7.4, 
I discuss my findings and conclude. 
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7.1.1. A linguistic prescription for mental illness stigma? 
 
In addition to the reasons I have given above for why naming analysis is of interest 
for analysing ideology in language, the data itself presents some interesting 
ideological issues. The reason for this is that during the period represented by the MI 
1984-2014 corpus there have been preferred and prescribed ways to refer to people 
with mental illness. For example, in the 1990s organisations such as the American 
Psychiatric Association (hereafter APA) advocated for ‘person-first language’ 
(Granello & Gibbs, 2016; Halmari, 2011). Person-first or people-first language refers to 
when a particular diagnosis (sometimes called a designation) follows the head noun 
in a prepositional phrase or a relative clause (e.g. a person with mental illness or a person 
who is experiencing mental illness vs. a mentally ill person). As Granello & Gibbs (2016) 
write, “Person-first language was offered as a mechanism to separate the identity of 
the individual from any clinical diagnosis, disability, or chronic condition.” (Granello 
& Gibbs, 2016: 31). Due to the fact that other forms by contrast do not distance the 
identity of the individual from the diagnosis, some researchers refer to non-person-
first language as ‘identity-first’ (Gernsbacher, 2017). 
Since the 1990s, prescribed forms such as person-first language have become 
more widely adopted and are promoted by anti-stigma initiatives such as the Time to 
Change campaign launched in 2007 by the UK mental health charities Mind and Rethink 
Mental Illness and funded by the UK Department of Health and Social Care. On their 
website, Time to Change list several naming strategies that they advise journalists to 
avoid using including many identity-first forms (although Time to Change do not use 
that term). They write that “Choosing the right language to describe people with 
mental health problems is important. Using inaccurate terms can reinforce stereotypes 
and stigma” (Time to Change, 2019). In their guidelines, Time to Change advise 
journalists to avoid using derogatory terms formed by shortening mental illnesses 
such as ‘a psycho’ and ‘a schizo’, and identity-first terms such as ‘a schizophrenic’ ‘the 
mentally ill’ and ‘victims’. In their guidelines, Time to Change promote the use of 
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person-first terms such as ‘a person who has experienced/is experiencing depression’ 
and unmodified nouns that are not, by definition, related to mental illness such as 
‘patients’, ‘service users’ and ‘clients’ (Time to Change, 2019). Time to Change list several 
reasons why certain linguistic forms should be avoided. For example, avoiding words 
such as ‘maniac’ and ‘mad’ is advised because “These words are usually linked to 
dangerousness or strange behaviour” (Time to Change, 2019). Despite giving these 
reasons (and the fact that to a speaker of English the associations Time to Change 
mention seem intuitively to be correct), Time to Change do not cite any linguistic 
research into the link between the terms listed and those associations. For this reason, 
I will return to the issue of person-first and identity-first language in relation to 
naming strategies used in the MI 1984-2014 corpus in Section 7.3.1. In addition to 
exploring the naming strategies used to refer to people with mental illness mandated 
by Time to Change in this chapter, I will revisit the prescribed forms promoted by Time 
to Change in relation to transitivity processes in Chapter 8.  
To briefly return to the linguistic features of newspaper discourse discussed in 
Section 7.1 in the context of person-first language, previous research has shown that 
newspaper articles are prone to storification and simplification (e.g. through 
stereotyping) in order to sensationalise events. On the one hand, newspapers 
constitute a major source for public information about mental illness (Nawková et al., 
2012: 22); on the other hand, the stories need to be succinct and engaging. The purpose 
of newspaper articles, then, is to inform but also to entertain. In addition to its 
entertainment function, newspaper discourse utilises particular structural features 
into which person-first language may not be easily incorporated; for example, 
newspaper headlines that are intended to be shocking or eye-catching. Halmari (2011) 
writes that person-first language (which she refers to in this extract as politically 
correct, or ‘PC’ language) is not always conducive to the brevity associated with 
headlines: 
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Newspaper headlines are notorious in doing away with function words in 
order to save space. The ‘people first’ language, by contrast, is not interested in 
saving space; it is notorious for its circumlocutionary style. ‘People first’ 
circumlocutions frequently necessitate the use of function words such as 
prepositions […] and relative pronouns. […] headlines, hence, have a natural 
need to resort to non-PC language, if it were only to save space. 
  
(Halmari, 2011: 837) 
 
As Halmari (2011) alludes to, the naming strategies used to refer to people with mental 
illness raise interesting questions for the analyst because, unlike other topics, the 
semantic field of mental illness has prescribed linguistic forms; however, newspaper 
discourse has fairly rigid textual features (both in terms of linguistic structure and 
genre norms to do with engaging writing). For this reason, the analysis of the naming 
strategies in this chapter is novel in that (I) it provides new systematic research into 
practices used to refer to people with mental illness and mental illnesses themselves, 
and (ii) because it also explores in more detail the linguistic basis of person-first 
language in relation to mental illness (see Halmari (2011) for a linguistic analysis of 
person-first language in general). I return to person-first language and other 
prescribed linguistic forms in Chapter 10. 
In the next section, I outline the analytical method used in this chapter. 
 
7.2. Analytical method 
 
As explained in the introduction, naming analysis is concerned with how people and 
entities are labelled in texts, and what ideological effect these labels may have. In order 
to collect instances of labels in the corpus so as to conduct naming analysis, I collected 
headlines from the corpus using stratified sampling by year. To sample from the 
corpus, I collected the first and last three headlines from each year that pertained to 
people with mental illness or a mental illness (I refer to this sample as ‘the headline 
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sample’ in the analysis). When sampling from the headlines, I did not include articles 
on autism or articles on issues only tangentially related to mental illness. The reason 
for collecting headlines, as opposed to collecting the labels used in whole articles was 
that, as Page (2003) (in line with Bell, 1991 and White, 2000) argues, “the headline 
occupies a position of textual and evaluative prominence in the news report (Bell, 
1991; White, 2000) [and] it might be predicted that […] these fragments would be of 
particular importance and indicative of the emphases assigned to the identities 
associated with the various naming choices” (Page, 2003: 563-64). Furthermore, as 
Conboy (2007: 15) writes, “headlines are in themselves a distinctive contribution to 
the news values of a newspaper in the ways that their syntactic structure can give 
patterned evidence of stylistic preference”. Headlines, then, are a useful starting point 
from which to commence naming analysis of newspaper articles because (i) they are 
indicative of who journalists deem to be newsworthy participants (i.e. people) and (ii) 
they often provide a summary of the article (i.e. the circumstances the person is 
described as being involved in or related to). Furthermore, headlines provide “a lens 
on, stance towards or angle on the rest of the story” (Caple, 2013: 276). Furthermore, 
although I am not analysing the multimodal aspects of newspaper articles in this 
thesis, it is worth noting that headlines are typically printed in larger font, and in some 
cases capitalised. As a result, headlines are visually prominent in addition to being 
textually prominent. By the terms of foregrounding theory (e.g. van Peer 1986) then, 
headlines are more likely to be remembered by readers than the main body of the 
article. This is another reason why headlines provide rich data to the critical linguist 
interesting in analysing ideology in texts: headlines are remembered in a way that the 
specific circumstances of the article are not (take for example, the ‘Bonkers Bruno’ 
headline example I referred to in Chapter 1).  
Once I had collected the headlines, I then qualitatively analysed each headline 
for salient naming strategies (e.g. ‘the mentally ill’) and key themes in the way that 
people with mental illness were referred to (e.g. referring to people with mental illness 
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as quantities such as ‘1 in 4’). An example of the categorisation I used is shown in 
Table 7.1 below: 
 
Referent type Instance of naming 
Mentally ill Mentally ill  
The mentally ill  
Mentally ill homeless  
Mentally ill offenders  
Mentally ill people  
patient Bulimia patient  
Cheltenham patients  
Patient  
Patients  
PATIENTS WHO SUFFERED TORMENT  
second patient free to kill victims  
TABLE 7.1 EXAMPLE OF CATEGORISATION TABLE FOR NAMING PRACTICES BY REFERENT TYPE 
 
 
In addition to the headline analysis, I also used stratified random sampling by year to 
explore the salient naming practices and themes in references to people with mental 
illness in whole articles. I did this by assigning a random number to each article and 
randomly selecting three whole articles from each year (I refer to this sample as the 
‘sample by year’ in the analysis section). For this sample, I categorised each referent 
in the data according to four categories: (i) ‘person with mental illness’, (ii) ‘medical 
expert’, (iii) ‘other’ and (iv) ‘terms for mental illness’’. Due to the fact that this sample 
included the main body of newspaper articles, I was also able to categorise reference 
chains (e.g. ‘John’, ‘Mr Smith’, ‘John the schizophrenic’) in more detail than the headline 
sample allowed (because headlines are shorter in length and therefore are less likely 
to feature anaphoric or cataphoric reference). This sample, then, allowed me to explore 
in detail whether the naming practices identified in the headlines were also a salient 
feature of other articles in the corpus, as well as to explore anaphoric reference in more 
detail. The salient naming practices identified in the two samples then formed the 
basis for corpus analysis wherever relevant; for example, to explore the frequency of 
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certain naming conventions over the time period covered by the MI 1984-2014, or to 
explore the collocates of certain labels attributed to people with mental illness. In the 
next section, I present my analysis. 
7.3. Analysis 
 
As previously stated, the analysis in this section is concerned with what naming 
strategies are present in the data, and what ideological implications these naming 
strategies may have. For this reason, the analysis section is presented in three sections, 
each addressing a separate facet of naming practices in the corpus. In the first of these 
sections, Section 7.3.1, I explore the frequency of person-first vs. identity first forms in 
the data samples and in the MI 1984-2014 corpus because these forms of labelling have 
previously been reported as contributing to negative ideologies about mental illness. 
The second section, 7.3.2, explores in more detail the ways that the press name people 
with mental illness. The third section, 7.3.3, reports on a salient theme identified in the 
data for referring to people with mental illness as quantities. I then discuss my 
findings and conclude this chapter in Section 7.4.  
 
7.3.1. ‘A person experiencing a mental illness’ or ‘a mentally ill person’? Exploring 
person-first and identity-first labels in the MI 1984-2014 corpus 
 
In Section 7.1.1 I introduced person-first and identity-first language as two ways in 
which a person may be described in relation to their illness. Person-first terms 
typically relate to postmodified nouns, e.g. a person with mental illness, whereas 
identity-first forms relate to premodified nouns, e.g. a mentally ill person. The theory 
behind person-first language is, as Granello & Gibbs (2016) state, “ideologically 
grounded in the principle of linguistic relativity (popularly known as the Sapir–Whorf 
hypothesis), which states that language shapes perceptions of the world and 
significantly influences cognitive processes” (2016: 31). The version of linguistic 
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relativity subscribed to by Granello & Gibbs (2016) leads to the suggestion that 
changing the way we talk about people with mental illness will change the way we 
think about people with mental illness. If we accept that this is the case, as a result of 
removing stigmatising language we may well predict that a reduction in stigmatising 
attitudes towards people with mental illness. Given that my aim in this section is to 
explore the frequency of person-first language in reference to naming and not to 
analyse the linguistic basis of prescriptive forms, I will not problematise the theory 
underpinning person-first language in this section. I will, however, return to the 
linguistic theory underpinning prescribed linguistic forms such person-first language 
in the conclusion of this thesis in Chapter 10.  
In addition to introducing person-first language in Section 7.1.1, I also 
discussed how person-first language is the linguistic form preferred by anti-stigma 
initiatives in the UK such as the Time to Change campaign. In addition to listing several 
identity-first labels to avoid in their media guidelines, Time to Change also state that 
terms that label people with mental illness as their illness, such as ‘a schizophrenic’, 
should also be avoided due to the fact that “People are more than their illness, it 
doesn’t define them.” (Time to Change, 2019). In this section, I provide an initial 
analysis of the sample headlines and the MI 1984-2014 corpus to explore the frequency 
and distribution of preferred forms and terms deemed to be problematic for naming 
people with mental illness. 
 To establish whether person-first forms were present in the corpus, I explored 
the sample headlines. Of the 186 headlines in the sample, only three featured person-
first language and two of those three featured other descriptions deemed problematic 
by Time to Change. Table 7.2 shows the headlines: 
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Date Headline Publication/ 
Author 
Feb 18 
1988 
Thursday Women (Life Forces): Seeing the light - 
People suffering from winter blues are being 
treated with artificial sun rays 
Guardian, By 
JILLIE COLLINGS 
Jan 2 
1999 
Suicidal acne drug 'victims' are to sue for 
compensation; LANDMARK CASE LOOMS AS 
PATIENTS WHO SUFFERED TORMENT WIN 
LEGAL AID 
Daily Mail, By 
Emily Wilson 
Dec 29 
2008 
Diet-battle teens get place of own; HEALTH: New 
centre offers specialist help for children with 
eating disorders 
Birmingham 
Evening Mail, By 
Alison Dayani 
TABLE 7.2. HEADLINES INCLUDING PERSON-FIRST LANGUAGE IN THE HEADLINE SAMPLE 
 
In the first two headlines (taken from 1988 and 1999), the person-first forms “people 
suffering from winter blues” and “patients who suffered torment” (where torment 
refers to suicidal thoughts) are both used in conjunction with the verb ‘suffer’, which 
Time to Change state is a word to be avoided (I conduct an analysis of ‘suffering’ in 
Chapter 8). The third example features person-first language, “children with eating 
disorders”, and while it does not include the verb ‘suffer’, it does include a summary 
of the story in which the journalist has chosen to represent the children with eating 
disorders using the hyperbolic label “diet-battle teens”. The fact that the person-first 
form was applied to child referents is in line with Halmari’s (2011: 828) finding that 
“postmodification is reserved for children or non-criminal adults”.	The low frequency 
of person-first language in the headlines is perhaps unsurprising given that, as 
previously stated, headlines are necessarily short; therefore, circumlocutory language 
such as person-first language may be avoided. For this reason, I will now report the 
frequency of person-first forms in the MI 1984-2014 corpus as a whole. 
In order to assess how often person-first forms were used in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus in contrast to other forms, I selected labels for mental illnesses that could be 
used to identify the individual as well as those which could be used in a person-first 
frame (e.g. ‘a schizophrenic’ and ‘a person/people with schizophrenia’). Figure 7.1 
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shows the relative frequency for each variant (i.e. the -ic suffix variant, the person with 
variant, and the people with variant). 
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FIGURE 7.1. FREQUENCY OF IDENTITY-FIRST VS. PERSON-FIRST FORMS FOR AGORAPHOBIA, BULIMIA, ANOREXIA AND SCHIZOPHRENIA) 
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Figure 7.1. shows that the identity-first form is much more common in the corpus 
overall than person-first forms. Moreover, of the person-first forms, the plural variant 
is much more common overall that the singular variant. This is indicative of another 
theme in the naming of people with mental illness in the corpus, which is to refer to 
people with mental illness as quantities (and therefore plural forms are more common 
than singular forms). I will discuss this theme in more detail in Section 7.3.3. In order 
to explore the trend in use of person-first forms in the MI 1984-2014 corpus over time, 
I plotted the relative frequency of “person with” and “people with” over the 31-year 
period covered by the corpus. The reason for looking at the diachronic distribution of 
person-first forms was to explore the hypothesis that despite the fairly low frequency 
of person-first forms in relation to identity-first forms (as shown in Figure 7.1), the 
overall trend for person-first forms would be positive; i.e. due to the press adhering 
to prescribed forms, there would be an increase in person-first language over time. 
The reason for this is that the findings I reported in Chapter 6 also give indirect 
support for this hypothesis. These findings showed that there was an overall 
preference in the corpus for people to refer to mental illness via euphemistic reference 
such as ‘mental health’ and ‘mental health problems’. As a result, those findings 
provide further support for the hypothesis that language over time becomes more 
euphemistic (i.e. increasing use of person-first language). Figure 7.2 shows the 
frequency of [person with (a) mental], [people with (a) mental] and [people/person 
with schizophrenia]
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FIGURE 7.2. FREQUENCY OF PERSON-FIRST FORMS OVER TIME IN THE MI 1984-2014
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Figure 7.2. reveals that despite the low frequency of person-first forms over the time 
period, the frequency overall is increasing. This is in support of the hypothesis that, 
in general, euphemistic forms for referring to mental illness are increasing. The 
increased usage of person-first language over time is in line with the research findings 
of Barnish (2014), who found that in a collection of research articles on disability, 
“There was a significant increase in the use of person-first language […] over the time 
period 1994-2013, although it remained a minority usage” (Barnish, 2014: 505). The 
increased usage in person-first forms shown in Figure 7.2 start to rise around the late 
1990s, which is in accordance with Granello & Gibbs’ (1990s) description of person-
first language as being adopted by various organisations in this period. Furthermore, 
politically correct (or PC) language (a category that person-first forms fall into) has 
previously also been identified by linguists as a 1990s phenomenon. For example, 
Cameron (1995) refers to political correctness as “the 1990s zeitgeist” (1995: 116). 
In addition to including person-first forms for mental illness generally 
(collected using the search term [person/people with (a) mental], I also included 
person-first references to the specific condition of depression. The reason for doing 
this was to assess whether person-first language was also increasing in reference to 
specific illnesses. I used ‘depression’ as a search term over the other illnesses 
contained in the corpus because depression is the most common illness referred to in 
the MI 1984-2014 corpus. In addition to providing further evidence that person-first 
forms are rising over time, including the depression condition (i.e. [person/people 
with depression] also supports the finding I have mentioned previously in this section 
that singular referents are less commonly referred to than plural referents; i.e. there 
are more instances of (plural) people with schizophrenia than there are references to 
the singular ‘[person with (a) mental]’. This is noteworthy because we might have 
expected references to mental illness generally (e.g. a person with mental illness) to be 
more common than references to specific mental illness (e.g. a person with depression) 
according to the pragmatic principles outlined in Chapter 6, whereby euphemistic 
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language is typically more general than specific (e.g. referring to a specific mental 
illness as ‘mental health’. Recall that Allen & Burridge (2006) identified euphemisms 
as being created by a ‘general-for-specific’ substitution. What my finding means is that 
in the corpus, journalists are more likely to refer to plural ‘people’ than singular 
‘person’ in person-first forms, even when they are referring to specific illnesses. I will 
discuss the tendency in the corpus to refer to people in groups or quantities in Section 
7.3.3. 
 So far in this section I have explored the use of person-first language and looked 
at the frequency of person-first forms in the headline sample and in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus as a whole. Now I will look in more detail at the context of person-first and 
identity-first forms in the corpus to explore whether person-first forms occur in more 
positive or favourable contexts to people with mental illness as the theory behind 
person-first language would suggest. Table 7.3 shows the top three randomly 
generated concordances for the person-first structure ‘people with mental illness’ in 
the MI 1984-2014 corpus. 
Person-first examples 
‘people with mental illness’  
(Raw freq. 797, Rel. freq. 13.61pmw) 
This film has its facts totally 
wrong and turns  
 
people with mental 
illness 
into figures of fun 
 "It is a fact that there are 
many more murders by so-
called normal people than 
by  
 
people with mental 
illness 
 
its vision is to get people to 
realise the implications of 
placing stereotype and 
stigma labels on  
 
people with mental 
illness 
 
TABLE 7.3. CONCORDANCES FOR ‘PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS’ TAKEN FROM THE MI 1984-
2014 CORPUS  
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Table 7.3 shows that in all of the concordance lines featuring person-first language, 
the surrounding context features metacomment on the representation of people with 
mental illness in the media. For example, the first two concordances discuss the 
misrepresentation of people with mental illness in the media. More interestingly still, 
the third concordance line discusses the labels used to describe people with mental 
illness, particularly in reference to labels that stigmatise individuals. Further analysis 
of other examples of ‘people with mental illness’ in the corpus also reveal that 
metacomment (particularly in relation to stereotypes of people with mental illness) is 
a common feature of person-first forms. Further evidence for the finding that person-
first language occurs in contexts in which people are challenging stigma around 
people with mental illness is that the statistically significant collocates of ‘people with 
mental illness’ include the words ‘myth’, ‘discrimination’, ‘stigmatised’, ‘belittle’, 
‘stigma’ and ‘prejudice’, which all relate to challenging prejudices around mental 
illness. Table 7.4 shows examples of these collocates in context. 
 
MYTH:  
 
People with 
mental illnesses 
are violent and unpredictable 
FACT: People with mental 
illness are more likely to be a 
victim of violence  
Some  
 
people with 
mental illness  
say the discrimination can be 
worse than the symptoms 
The problem is that if this 
language is making  
 
people with 
mental illness 
feel stigmatised, ashamed and 
isolated then the amount of 
thought behind it as it is used 
casually is largely irrelevant.  
Mr Miliband will speak out 
against articles written by Mr 
Clarkson and broadcaster 
and journalist Janet Street 
Porter, which he claims 
belittled  
 
people with 
mental illness 
and contributed to a national 
taboo on the issue.  
 For many  
 
people with 
mental illness 
, stigma is regarded as the 
single largest obstacle to 
improving their quality of life 
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Mrs Brown, from Bath 
parliamentary Labour party, 
called for the prejudice 
against  
 
people with 
mental illness . 
who wanted to work to be 
addressed 
TABLE 7.4. CONCORDANCE FOR ‘PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS’ WITH CONCORDANCE LINES 
FEATURING THE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT COLLOCATES ‘MYTH’, ‘DISCRIMINATION’, 
‘STIGMATISED’, ‘BELITTLE’, ‘STIGMA’ AND ‘PREJUDICE’ 
 
Table 7.4 shows that the texts in the corpus reveal a high level of awareness of the 
stigma faced by people with mental illness and even the stigma manifest through 
language specifically. This awareness is further evidenced by the fact that the lexical 
item ‘stigma’ is a relatively frequent word in the corpus, occurring 4,237 times (rel. 
freq. 72.37 pmw). To contextualise this frequency, ‘stigma’ occurs just 279 times (rel. 
freq. 2.48 pmw) in the BNC which contains 10 million words of British English. 
Furthermore, the frequency of ‘stigma’ is higher in the MI 1984-2014 corpus than the 
lemmas ‘violent’ (rel. freq. 71.14 pmw) and ‘criminal’ (rel. freq. 52.96 pmw). This is a 
noteworthy finding when one considers that the majority of previous research into 
media representations of mental illness have reported that criminality and violence 
are key themes. This is not to say that violence and criminality are no longer salient 
aspects of media reports on mental illness, but it does indicate that self-reflective 
commentary and an awareness of particular linguistic forms and their ideological 
content is now an established aspect of news reports on mental illness. 
 The analysis so far has indicated that person-first language correlates with 
discursive contexts that are supportive of people with mental illness (i.e. contexts in 
which the article is challenging prejudices and stereotypes about people with mental 
illness). I will now look at the concordances for the identity-first forms to explore the 
context in which non-person-first language is used. Table 7.5 shows the top three 
randomly generated concordances for the identity-first structure ‘the mentally ill’: 
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Identity-first examples 
‘the mentally ill 
(Raw freq. 2,071, Rel. freq. 35.37pmw) 
Many of these organizations 
have been highlighting the 
stress to both individuals 
and their families resulting 
from the early rundown of 
hospitals for  
the mentally ill 
 
in advance of adequate 
provision being made to 
receive patients into the 
community. 
However, a high-quality 
health service for 
 
the mentally ill - which would protect 
patients and society as a 
whole - requires 
resources in any event 
 "We must have equalisation 
of benefits for  
 
the mentally ill ," he said. "There is still this 
terrible slur on the 
mentally ill 
TABLE 7.5. CONCORDANCES FOR ‘THE MENTALLY ILL’ TAKEN FROM THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS  
 
Based on the findings of the person-first concordance analysis and the theory behind 
person-first labels, we might hypothesise that the identity-first forms would occur in 
contexts that are not as supportive to people with mental illness. However, Table 7.5 
shows that this hypothesis does not bear out. Although ‘the mentally ill’ is listed as a 
problematic form by anti-stigma initiatives like Time to Change, the contexts 
surrounding this form in the samples taken from MI 1984-2014 are all concerned with 
bringing attention to adequate medical care and benefits for people with mental 
illness. At least from these concordances then, identity-first labels do not appear in 
any stigmatising context as would be expected if, as person-first advocates suggest, 
identity-first language was inherently stigmatising (as proscribing their use suggests). 
Collocates of ‘the mentally ill’ are also indicative of this label not being inherently 
stigmatising. For example, the top five collocates of ‘the mentally ill’ include ‘rights’, 
‘plight’ and ‘care’. However, if we look in more detail at the collocates of the label 
‘mentally ill’ (e.g. as a premodifer), which is closely related to ‘the mentally ill’ 
semantically, we see many more collocates that contribute to stigma such as ‘murders’, 
‘homicides’ and ‘killings’. This finding is indicates that a more stigmatising form than 
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‘the mentally ill’ is any naming strategy formed by premodifying a head noun with 
‘mentally ill’. That is, linguistic evidence suggests that ‘the mentally ill’, which is a 
term identified by Time to Change as problematic, is arguably less problematic than 
‘[mentally ill + noun]’ forms. This is due to the fact that the collocates of the label 
“mentally ill” reveal that this label is closely associated with criminality. Table 7.6 
shows the L1 nominal and adjectival collocates of ‘mentally ill’ in addition to its R1 
nominal collocates. 
 
L1 Collocate 
(Adj or N) 
MI Score MENTALLY 
ILL 
R1 collocate MI 
score 
1. Severely 10.62 1. offenders  9.08 
2. chronically 9.82 2. inmates 8.20 
3. severely 9.42 3. prisoners  8.13 
4. seriously  8.50 4. criminals  7.85 
5. acutely 8.38 5. offender 7.35 
6. elderly 8.28 6. defendants 7.22 
7. gravely 8.14 7. persons 7.14 
8. seriously 7.90 8. patients 6.96 
9. homeless 7.77 9. attacker 6.83 
10. elderly  7.33 10. pensioners 6.42 
TABLE 7.6. L1 AND R1 COLLOCATES OF ‘MENTALLY ILL’ (MIN FREQ. 5) IN THE MI 1984-2014 
CORPUS 
 
Table 7.6 shows that “mentally ill” often modifies a head noun (shown in the R1 
collocate column) that relates to criminality with two of these collocates referring to 
people who are incarcerated (inmates and prisoners), and who, therefore, have 
presumably been found guilty of an offence and deemed dangerous to society. This 
finding is in accordance with previous research into person-first language that found 
that “the ‘modifier + head-N’ pattern tends to appear in contexts where the NP refers 
to ‘undesirable’ societal elements (e.g., people in prison)” (Halmari, 2011: 838). The 
fact that ‘mentally ill’ collocates statistically significantly with lexis related to 
criminality suggests that criminal offences committed by people with mental illness 
are over represented in press reports on mental illness (particularly when one 
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considers that a person with a mental illness is more likely to be a victim of a crime 
than the perpetrator of one). The ideological effect of this textual association between 
mental illness and criminality contributes to the view that people with mental illness 
are dangerous. Furthermore, the L1 collocates of mentally ill such as ‘severely’, 
‘seriously’ and ‘acutely’ also arguably present people with mental illness as dangerous 
because they are not in control of their illness; e.g. they are unpredictable or 
uncontrollable. Taking the L1 and R1 collocates of ‘mentally ill’, then, people with 
mental illness are presented as being out-of-control criminals. An analysis of the 
identity-first form [mentally ill + noun] indicates that the context is more stigmatising 
that person-first forms because it misrepresents people with mental illness by 
overrepresenting criminality in this population. Taken in the context of newspaper 
discourse, the overrepresentation of articles reporting on offences committed by 
people with mental illness could be taken as a way for journalists to ‘storify’ or 
sensationalise events. On the link between identity-first and news discourse, Halmari 
(2011: 838) writes “the non-PC syntactic pattern […] seems to be motivated by the 
editor’s desire to make the story more newsworthy”.  
 In the next section, I will discuss the salient naming practices identified in the 
headline sample. 
 
7.3.2. ‘Patients’, ‘sufferers’, and ‘victims’: Exploring salient naming practices in the 
headline sample 
 
In section 7.3.1, I showed the distribution of person-first language in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus. The reason for this was that there were very few instances of person-first 
language in the headline analysis. I suggested that the reason for the low frequency of 
person-first forms in the headline sample was possibly due to the competing aims of 
journalists, who want to write newspaper headlines which are concise and attention-
grabbing, and the aims of person-first language, which is necessarily circumlocutory 
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(and therefore not well-suited to the conventional structure of headlines). In this 
section, I will explore the salient naming practices identified in the headline analysis 
for referring to people with mental illness. I do this to explore what labels are being 
used in the headlines if person-first forms are not. Specifically, in this section I explore 
the head nouns ‘patients’, ‘sufferers’ and ‘victims’71. In my analysis, I examine how 
these head nouns are modified (e.g. “PATIENTS WHO SUFFERED TORMENT”), as 
well as how these labels pattern across the time period covered in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus, and the illness subcorpora. 
 Of the three labels I discuss in this section, two have been identified by anti-
stigma initiatives as problematic. These are ‘victim’ and ‘sufferer’. The reason that 
Time to Change give for deeming these two terms problematic is that they do not 
accurately reflect the fact that “Many people with mental health problems live full 
lives and many also recover.” (Time to Change, 2019). In the headline analysis, ‘patient’ 
is the most commonly used term of the three. The label ‘patient’ is also the most 
common label of the three in the corpus more generally. Figure 7.3 shows the 
frequency of ‘sufferer’, ‘victim’ and ‘patient’ across the year subcorpora in the MI 
1984-2014 corpus. It is also noteworthy that the frequency of ‘victim’, ‘sufferer’ and 
‘patient’ have levelled across the time period, which suggests that the terms are 
established (i.e. they have started to plateau). 
	
71 In addition to ‘patient’, ‘victim’ and ‘sufferer’, the label ‘the mentally ill’ was also a very frequent 
label in the headline analysis. However, due to the fact that I discuss ‘the mentally ill’ in Section 7.3.1, 
I do not discuss it here.  
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FIGURE 7.4. FREQUENCY OF SUFFERER, VICTIM AND PATIENT ACROSS THE YEAR SUBCORPORA IN THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS
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Figure 7.4 shows that ‘patient’ is the most frequently used label of the three terms 
followed by ‘sufferer’. Victim is the least frequent of the three. In terms of the semantic 
content of the three labels, one may intuitively expect this order of frequency (i.e.’ 
patient’ being the most frequent, then ‘sufferer’, then ‘victim’) because these three 
terms vary in severity; or, to use Time to Change’s words, they vary in the scope the 
person has for recovery. For example, ‘patient’ (compared with ‘sufferer’ and ‘victim’) 
is neutral in terms of severity but suggests that the person is undergoing treatment, 
‘sufferer’ is more severe than ‘patient’ because it suggests the person is actively 
suffering, and ‘victim’ is the most severe because it is a label that encodes finality or 
irreversibility, i.e. once a person is a victim they have no recourse to change their 
‘victim’ status. These three labels, then, may be placed on a cline of severity that 
corresponds to whether or not recovery is possible. A concordance analysis of the 
phrase “victim of” in the BNC confirms my interpretation of ‘victim’ as being the most 
severe in terms of scope for recovery from an illness. Table 7.7 shows these 
concordance lines. 
 
1 man who paid the price of 
gold with a bullet in the back,  
 
victim of Garrimpero gun law 
2 TOWARDS the end of her life 
my mother was in hospital, a  
 
victim of Alzheimer's Disease 
3 Rescuers tend a badly-injured  
 
victim of the fireball nightmare 
4 THE 3,000th  
 
victim of Ulster's violence paid the 
price of a brief moment of 
fame 
5 n one recent case the  
 
victim of a stabbing died two and a 
half years after the incident 
TABLE 7.7. CONCORDANCES OF ‘VICTIM OF’ IN THE BNC 
 
Table 7.7 shows that the context in which someone is described as a ‘victim’ relates to 
states that cannot be treated. For example, the thing that a person has been a ‘victim 
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of’ is death (specifically murder) in concordance lines one, four and five. In 
concordance line four, the person is a victim of life-changing injuries, and in 
concordance line two, the person is a ‘victim’ of Alzheimer’s disease, a disease from 
which recovery is not possible at this time. Further evidence for the interpretation that 
‘victim’ is often used to refer to people in irreversible circumstances is the fact that, in 
the sample by year, ‘victim’ is often used in reference to suicide, e.g. “suicide victims”. 
In addition to ‘victim’ occurring in contexts where it is not possible to recover from 
the state or illness described, ‘victim’ also encodes a sense of powerlessness or 
passivity on the part of the person described in this way. This is also the case with 
‘sufferer’ because typically people do not suffer from things intentionally (see Chapter 
8 for a discussion on the semantics of ‘sufferer’ and ‘suffering’). In order to explore the 
usage of ‘victim’ in the corpus, I will now examine in more detail the instances of 
‘victim’ in the headline sample. Table 7.8 shows the instances of ‘victim’ in the 
headline sample. 
 
Victim  Victims 
Victims of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Victims of winter disorder 
Survivors who are victims 
TABLE 7.8. NAMING PRACTICES IN THE HEADLINE SAMPLE CONTAINING THE HEAD NOUN 
‘VICTIM’ 
 
Of the instances of ‘victim’ in the headline sample, half relate to PTSD. One of the 
headlines that relates to PTSD, ‘survivors who are victims’, is arguably a reference to the 
disparity between the sense of ‘survivor’ and the sense of ‘victim’, specifically that one 
person is not typically associated with being both a survivor and a victim. The play 
on words in this headline constitutes further evidence for the interpretation that 
‘victim’ is less likely to be associated with recovery (e.g. ‘surviving’ something) than 
‘patient’ or ‘sufferers’. A substitution test confirms this interpretation, e.g. ‘survivors 
who are sufferers’ and ‘survivors who are patients’ are not marked in the way that 
‘survivors who are victims’ is. This is possibly to do with the association between 
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victimhood and death e.g. calling a ‘sufferer’ or a ‘patient’ a survivor is not marked 
because these forms are not so closely associated with death in the way that being a 
‘victim’ is. The association of ‘victim’ with PTSD over other illnesses raises the 
question of whether there is a patterned usage of particular naming strategies for 
people who have particular illnesses. In order to explore any such patterns, I plotted 
the frequency of ‘patient’, ‘sufferer’ and ‘victim’ across the illness subcorpora. Figure 
7.5 shows the frequency of each term in each of the illness subcorpora. 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 	
250 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.5. FREQUENCY OF ‘SUFFERER’, ‘VICTIM’ AND ‘PATIENT’ ACROSS THE ILLNESS SUBCORPORA IN THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS
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Figure. 7.5 reveals that the pattern between describing people with PTSD as victims 
in the headline analysis is also a pattern in the MI 1984-2014 corpus more generally. 
In addition to the link between PTSD and ‘victim’, Figure 7.5 also shows a pattern 
between ‘patient’ and the related conditions schizophrenia and psychosis. The 
symptoms of psychosis include delusions and hallucinations and these symptoms are 
also the symptoms of schizophrenia. The fact that ‘patient’ occurs most often in the 
schizophrenia and psychosis corpora is arguably indicative of these two illnesses 
being the most pathologised of those represented in the illness subcorpora; i.e. to be a 
patient denotes medical care, medical care is necessary for the treatment of a 
condition). The interpretation of ‘patient’ denoting pathological conditions is 
supported by collocates of ‘patient’ in the MI 1984-2014 corpus, which include lexis to 
do with medical intervention. Collocates of ‘patient’ include ‘doctor’, ‘professionals’, 
‘GPs’ and ‘therapist’. A collocation analysis of ‘sufferer’ and ‘victim’ reveals that 
neither term shares these collocates. This provides further evidence that ‘patient’ 
denotes pathology in a way that ‘sufferer’ and ‘victim’ do not. The pattern between 
articles on schizophrenia and psychosis and the label ‘patient’ which suggests that the 
person is experiencing a pathological illness (or is experiencing “abnormal mental 
conditions” (OED, 2019)) could be a reason why schizophrenia has been found to be 
one of the most stigmatised illnesses in the news media (Goulden et al., 2011: 5; Mann 
& Himlein (2004); Nawka et al., 2012: 1).  
Related to the link between ‘patients’ and medical professionals, an analysis of 
‘patient’ in the headline sample as well as in the Schizophrenia corpus reveals that 
‘patient’ occurs in contexts concerning detention of some sort, particularly against the 
backdrop of deinstitutionalisation policy in the 1980s, which resulted in a transition 
from treating people with mental illness as in-patients to ‘care in the community’, 
where people were treated in their homes. An example of ‘patient’ used in the context 
of community care taken from the headline sample is “second patient free to kill 
victims” (The Times, Dec 23, 1998). The article reports on a man who killed his 
neighbour months after being discharged from a psychiatric institution where he was 
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treated for potential schizophrenia. Collocates of ‘patient’ in the schizophrenia corpus 
include the verbs ‘discharged’ and ‘released’. These collocations provide further 
evidence of a link between the label ‘patient’ and in-patient care; or to be more precise, 
‘patients’ leaving in-patient care to be cared for at home. Sample concordance lines for 
these collocates (as lemmas) are shown in Table 7.9. 
 
1 But as the movement 
advanced, more severely ill  
 
patients  were discharged in need of 
greater support, and that was 
lacking 
2 Discharged  
 
patients who refuse to comply with 
treatment such as a weekly visit 
to a clinic for an injection. 
3 Health Minister Rosie 
Winterton denied that the 
Government was failing to 
protect people from the 
dangerous mentally ill, but 
conceded the Government 
could not force discharged . 
 
patients to take their medication 
4 The possibility that the 
attacker has a history of mental 
illness again highlighted the 
grave concern being felt over  
 
patients being released under the care in 
the community programme  
5 Many of these highly 
vulnerable  
 
patients are released prematurely, placing 
them at even more risk of suicide 
and self harm. 
TABLE 7.9. CONCORDANCE LINES FOR ‘PATIENT’ COLLOCATES ‘DISCHARGED’ AND ‘RELEASED’ 
IN THE SCHIZOPHRENIA CORPUS (L3, R3, MIN FREQ.5) 
 
Table 7.9 shows that the issue of care in the community was a newsworthy item in the 
corpus overall. The phrase ‘care in the community’ occurs 992 (16.94 pmw) in the MI 
1984-2014 corpus, and ‘community care’ occurs 1,145 times (19.56) in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus. Of the total instances of ‘care in the community’ in the MI 1984-2014 corpus, 
28% (121.95 pmw) occur in the Schizophrenia corpus. Furthermore, 25% (125.91 pmw) 
of the total instances of ‘community care’ occur in the Schizophrenia corpus. This 
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demonstrates that not only is community care deemed newsworthy in mental illness 
reporting generally, but it is deemed newsworthy in particular reference to 
schizophrenia. 
The concordance lines in Table 7.9 all share similar propositions; specifically 
they problematise the ‘discharge’ or ‘release’ of ‘patients’ into the community under 
the care in the community policy. However, only one concordance line (number one), 
problematises the policy in reference to the support provided by the government (and 
by extension, local authorities). Concordance line five alludes to the fact that people 
moving to community care may need additional support (e.g. it refers to patients as 
‘highly vulnerable’ and references the fact that some ‘patients’ may have experienced 
discharge from hospital prematurely); however, the focus of the sentence is on the 
‘vulnerable patients’ who are at higher risk of ‘suicide and self-harm’ rather than the 
reasons why these people were prematurely discharged from hospital without 
adequate home support. The rest of the concordance lines do focus on the discursively 
constructed ‘patient’ however. Concordance lines two and three discuss patients 
(consciously) not taking their medication, e.g. the complex noun phrase (comprising 
an NP and a PP) that constitutes concordance line two “Discharged patients who 
refuse to comply with treatment such as a weekly visit to a clinic for an injection.” The 
reporting of patients discharged from hospital not taking their medication is 
represented in the verb phrases encoded in one and two as being something that 
‘patients’ are wilfully not doing: 
 
Concordance line 
two:  
 
Discharged patients who refuse to comply with treatment 
Concordance line 
three:  
 
the Government could not force discharged patients to take 
their medication 
 
As indicated above (see italics), the head verbs that the journalists have chosen both 
encode a conscious choice on behalf of the people with mental illness to not take 
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medication (when, in fact, it could be the case that people are not taking medication 
due to failures in the community care system rather than from a desire to not engage 
with treatment (Rose, 1998)). Further, concordance lines two and three feature logical 
presuppositions in that they presuppose that (a) discharged patients should comply 
with treatment, and (b) the government should be able to force people to take 
medication. Taken together, the presentation of people with mental illness (here 
‘patients’) as being out of control, and the implication that the government should be 
in control, contributes to the idea that people with mental illness are dangerous people 
in the community rather than active agents who can negotiate their own care in 
partnership with care workers if necessary. The link between presenting people with 
mental illness as violent and the community care policy contributes to the attitude that 
community care “has resulted in violent madmen being let loose to roam the streets 
and prey on an innocent public” (Rose, 1998: 213). The presentation of people with 
mental illness living in the community as a threat to the public can be seen in 
concordance line four, below (this theme is also present in concordance three where 
people with mental illness are referred to as “the dangerous mentally ill”):  
 
Concordance 
line four:  
 
The possibility that the attacker has a history of mental illness 
again highlighted the grave concern being felt over patients 
being released under the care in the community programme  
 
In concordance line four, patients living in the community under the community care 
policy are being cited in reference to a violent attack committed by someone who may 
or may not have a mental illness. Specifically, the article discusses the possibility that 
the care in the community policy will increase future attacks by mentioning previous 
events in which violent offences have been committed by people with mental illness. 
Concordance line four, then, includes the speculation that community care will 
increase violent attacks (using historical and isolated events) in addition to 
speculating about whether the attack being reported was actually committed by a 
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person with mental illness (indicated by ‘the possibility that the attacker has a history 
of mental illness). As a result, the article links violence and mental illness, as well as 
an increase in violence and the community care policy, based entirely on speculation. 
Given that the news media constitutes a significant source of public information on 
mental illness, such speculation perpetuates damaging and inaccurate ideologies 
about people with mental illness on a large scale, and as a result contributes to 
stigmatising attitudes about people with mental illness. To return to the notion of 
storification of events in news articles, it is hard to view the kind of speculation shown 
in concordance line four as serving any other purpose than to sensationalise the event 
in the absence of newsworthy facts. Such sensationalist reporting may not just result 
in stigmatising attitudes about people with mental illness however. Previous research 
has shown that sensationalist reporting can create societal panic. This societal panic 
can then influence mental health care policy (Paterson, 2006). Moreover, such 
sensationalist reporting may hinder community integration because, as Hannigan 
(1999: 431) states, “Public tolerance of, and non-discrimination towards, people with 
mental health problems are key factors on which success in achieving the goal of 
community-based mental health care”. 
 In this section I have described the salient naming practices associated with 
mental illness reporting. I have discussed the frequency of these labels and explored 
how they are patterned across the time period and the illness subcorpora. In the next 
section I explore themes in the naming practices identified in the headline sample and 
the sample by year. I enrich my analysis with examples taken from the MI 1984-2014 
corpus.  
 
7.3.3. ‘Groups’, ‘cases’ and ‘the 1 in 4’: referring to people with mental illness as 
quantities 
 
In this section I describe a salient theme identified in the data analysis. This theme is 
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the tendency in the corpus to refer to people with mental illness as quantities; for 
example, ‘one in four adults’ or ‘x per cent of the population’. Although my interest is 
still related to the linguistic analysis of naming strategies used in the press reports on 
mental illness, in this section I take a wider view of naming to include the ways in 
which people with mental illness are referred to. 
 I have previously stated at several points in this chapter that there is a tendency 
in the corpus to refer to people with mental illness in the plural. For example, I showed 
in Section 7.3.1 that ‘people with mental illness’ was more common that ‘person with 
mental illness’. Furthermore, the randomly sampled concordances shown for the 
lemma ‘patient’ in Section 7.3.2 were all in the plural form. So too, were all the 
instances of ‘victim’ shown in Table 7.8. It is the case, in fact, that all three of the labels 
explored in Section 7.3.2 (‘victim’, ‘patient’ and ‘sufferer’) are more commonly used 
in the plural form in the MI 1984-2014 corpus. Table 7.10 shows the frequency of the 
three labels in their plural and singular form. 
 
Label Freq. in singular Freq. in plural % of total (plural)  
Patient 8,916 23,386 72% 
Victim 3,531 4,496 56% 
sufferer 2,227 10,688 82% 
TABLE 7.10. FREQUENCY OF SALIENT NAMING STRATEGIES USED IN PLURAL AND SINGULAR 
FORM IN THE MI 184-2014 CORPUS. 
 
Table 7. 10 provides further evidence for the fact that there is a very strong tendency 
in media reports on mental illness to refer to people with mental illness in the plural. 
In addition, there is also the related tendency in the corpus to refer to people with 
mental illness as quantities or statistics. The headline analysis provides examples of 
this tendency: 
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People as numbers/ 
statistics 
Numbers 
One in four 
One in four adults  
One in four of us 
HALF US POPULATION 
TABLE 7.11. REFERRING TO PEOPLE AS NUMBERS OR STATISTICS IN HEADLINE SAMPLE 
 
The reference to the statistic ‘one in four’ relates to how many people will experience 
a mental health problem in their life, and is frequent in the headline sample and 
relatively frequent in the corpus more generally (1595 instances, 27.24 pmw). In 
addition to being a prevalent feature of the headline analysis, I identified the practice 
of referring to people with mental illness as quantities or statistics as a salient feature 
of the sample by year. Table 7.12 shows some examples of these prevalent themes. All 
the examples were used in context to refer to people with mental illness: 
 
People as quantities or statistics in the sample by year 
Numbers/Statistics A worrying number of people 
more than three quarters  
one third of the population  
1.5m Brits with an eating disorder 
36,729 people 
21,058 who have mixed anxiety or depression 
8,955 with a general anxiety disorder 
19 suicides  
an increasing number of men  
two thirds of all female prisoners 
1 IN 3 YOUNG WOMEN  
one in three 16- to 25-year-old	
one in four people  
one in five older people 
one in six  
1 in 200 women affected by anorexia 
women twice as likely to suffer from 
depression  
40 per cent of young 	
10% of all women 
5% of men 
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54 per cent of women aged 16 to 25  
Quantities  The majority of the mentally ill  
some patients 
most schizophrenic patients 
Nouns denoting groups this group of people  
The remainder 
the group of patients 	
cases of mental illness 
more cases  
TABLE 7.11. PEOPLE DESCRIBED AS QUANTITIES OR STATISTICS IN THE SAMPLE BY YEAR 
 
As Table 7.12 shows, there are many examples in the sample by year that attest the 
finding that people with mental illness are often referred to as quantities or statistics. 
In addition to being referred to as quantities in terms of numbers or percentages (e.g. 
one in six, 5% of men), people with mental illness are also referred to in this way via 
nouns or determiners denoting quantity (e.g. ‘the majority of’, ‘some patients’). 
Furthermore, people are also quantified through the use of nouns denoting groupings 
or quantities (e.g. ‘cases’, ‘this group’). Taken together, Tables 7.10 and Table 7.11 
show that people are discursively grouped or quantified through morphological 
marking (i.e. plural suffixes), as well as at the lexical level (e.g. through lexical items 
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denoting groups). Further evidence for this tendency is the fact that an n-gram 
analysis of the top 100 5-grams in the MI 1984-2014 corpus show that percentages, 
numbers and describing the different states between numbers (e.g. increase, rise) is a 
salient feature of the corpus. 
 
Rank 5-gram Raw frequency 
15 Per cent of the population  665 
30 Million people in the UK 448 
34 Increase in the number of  423 
65 Rise in the number of 310 
TABLE 7.12. 5-GRAMS RELATING QUANTITY OR NUMBER IN THE MI-1984-2014 CORPUS 
 
It could be proposed at this stage that the tendency to report issues in the news in 
terms of percentages and quantities is a feature of newspaper discourse more 
generally because, as I have previously stated, part of the ‘storification’ of events 
involves establishing the event in some social context (for example the speculative 
links created between violence and schizophrenia described in Section 7.3.2). 
However, an analysis of the top 100 5-grams in the SiBol Corpus (a corpus of 650 
million words comprising 1.5 million articles from UK broadsheet newspapers 
between 1993-2013) reveals just one shared 5-gram (‘increase in the number of’) which 
occupies a fairly low rank (no. 72) in comparison to its rank in the MI 1984-2014 corpus 
(no. 34). This suggests, then, that the quantification of people (and things more 
generally) is not just a feature of newspaper discourse, but specifically a feature of the 
newspaper discourse contained in the corpus. Because of this, we may hypothesise 
that quantification (e.g. the overrepresentation of statistics) is a feature of mental 
illness discourse. 
 The n-gram analysis is also revealing of another feature of quantifying people 
and entitles related to mental illness – that of shifting quantities, particularly verbs 
denoting increasing numbers such as increase and rise. A concordance analysis of the 
collocates that modify ‘rise’ reveal that the nature of the increase reported in the 
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corpus is in the majority of cases a sharp increase. Table 7.14 shows the modifiers of 
‘rise’ that denote a sharp increase in the MI 1984-2014 corpus: 
 
Modifier MI score 
sharply  10.83 
dramatically 10.01 
rapidly 9.36 
steeply 8.79 
tenfold 8.46 
fast 8.33 
inexorably 8.09 
significantly 7.88 
threefold 7.83 
exponentially 7.81 
substantially 7.75 
TABLE 7.13. COLLOCATE MODIFIERS OF ‘RISE’ IN THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS 
 
Table 7.13 shows that not only are numbers and statistics a prevalent feature of news 
articles on mental illness, but so too is the reporting of those numbers as increasing in 
unprecedented ways. A closer inspection of the modifiers of ‘rise’ in context reveals 
that the things ‘rising’ include (but are not limited to) mental illness, psychotic 
problems after drug abuse, autism, suicide and self harm, and concern. Further 
examination of the verbs that collocate with ‘mental illness’ shows that both ‘rise’ and 
‘increase’ are statistically significant collocates. Table 7.14 shows some example 
concordance lines featuring ‘mental illness’ + ‘rise’. 
 
 He repeated the exercise in 1985 
and found the number with 
'psychiatric morbidity' which 
means they showed symptoms 
of  
 
mental illness 
 
had risen from 22 per cent to 
nearly a third  
the number of murders 
committed by people with  
  
mental illness  rose from 54 in 1997 to over 70 
in 2004 and 2005 
nationally the prevalence of  mental illness has increased by 14% 
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It is not surprising that officers 
are dealing with more incidents 
involving mental health issues 
as the incidence of  
 
mental illness is increasing and more people 
are being cared for in the 
community. 
TABLE 7.14. EXAMPLE CONCORDANCE LINES OF [MENTAL ILLNESS + RISE/INCREASE] IN THE MI 
1984-2014 CORPUS 	
Table 7.14 shows that it is not just the case that there is a tendency in the corpus to 
refer to people in quantities, but that there is also a tendency to quantify the incidence 
of mental illness. Specifically, there is a tendency to report that the rates of mental 
illness are rising (and therefore the number of people with mental illness is rising). As 
shown in Table 7.14, the nature of this rise is presented as being fast, significant in 
number and (as indicated by ‘inexorably’) in a manner that is out of control or 
impossible to prevent. This is despite the fact that the “overall number of people with 
mental health problems has not changed significantly in recent years” (Mind, 2019a). 
Taken in the context of violence and criminality that I explored in the previous section, 
what the over-representation of rising quantities results in is the implication that the 
rise in cases of mental illness will result in a rise of violence or criminality. 
Furthermore, this reported rise is one that is purportedly out of control. The link 
between a rising incidence of mental illness and criminality and violence, then, looks 
on the surface to be a logical extrapolation from facts; however, these links are based 
on untruths because there is no evidence that the incidence of mental illness has 
increased significantly (at least since in recent years as Mind (2019a) state. 
Furthermore, the rise in numbers, statistics and quantities reported are never 
contextualised; e.g. statistics about the incidence of mental illness are never reported 
alongside statistics about other types of illness, and statistics concerning violent crime 
committed by people with mental illness are never reported alongside statistics on 
violent crime committed by people who do not have a mental illness. As a result, it is 
impossible for the average reader to comprehend these rising numbers in context. To 
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return again to the notion of ‘storification’ that I presented in Section 7.1, I argue that 
the overrepresentation of decontextualized, rising quantities by journalists 
sensationalises or ‘storifies’ events. Specifically, the overrepresentation of numbers 
and statistics provide a means for journalists to create a moral panic (Cohen, 1972) 
around mental illness. I will return to the sociological notion of moral panic later in 
this section. 
 The overrepresentation of statistics and numbers (and in particular rising 
numbers) provides a basis for journalists to speculate and create links between events 
and mental illness that may not exist. Recall, for example, the way that the journalist 
speculated about whether an attacker was mentally ill and used that conjecture to 
further speculate about increase risk of violence committed by people with mental 
illness more generally: 
 
The possibility that the attacker has a history of mental illness again 
highlighted the grave concern being felt over patients being released under 
the care in the community programme  
 
As a result of the overrepresentation of increasing quantities, speculation like that 
shown in the concordance line above is harder to spot (and therefore question) 
because there is a societal assumption (created through language) that people with 
mental illness pose a threat to society. This threat is not just the result of the 
overrepresentation of increasing quantities, but is the composite effect of this 
overrepresentation and the problematic naming strategies identified in the previous 
sections (e.g. the link between being ‘patient’ and criminality). The type of speculation 
shown in the concordance line above, then, is supported by, and provides support for, 
the false belief that the number of people with mental illness is rising and that this rise 
poses a risk to society. 
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In this section, I have systematically analysed the occurrence of numbers and statistics 
in the corpus. I did this in an exploratory fashion that was not guided by any particular 
theoretical angle. As a result of the findings of this exploratory analysis, I raised the 
hypothesis that the overrepresentation of people as quantities was a feature of news 
reports on mental illness because such quantification was not a feature of general 
newspaper corpora. However, previous linguistic research has shown that the 
“rhetoric of quantification” (Fowler, 1991: 166) is not necessarily a feature of news 
reports on mental illness, but one way that journalists contribute to “press hysteria” 
(Fowler, 1991: 146). In fact, all of the features I have described up to this point are in 
line with Fowler’s (1991) analysis of “press hysteria”. In an analysis of the news 
reportage on the salmonella outbreak 72 , Fowler (1991) identified “the rhetoric of 
quantification” as the “dominant stylistic feature” of “press hysteria” (1991: 165). One 
such linguistic feature of ‘the rhetoric of quantification’ identified by Fowler (1991: 
168) was the prevalence of “verbs, or nouns derived from verbs – designating changes 
in numbers”. We can now see that the salient 5-grams that denoted number changes 
described above are also a contributing factor in the creation of press hysteria 
surrounding mental illness. Fowler (1991) writes of the rhetoric of quantification that 
The result is a blurring, a diminution in analytic precisions; an impressionist 
style comes over, especially in conjunction with the ubiquitous mentioned of 
large but constantly shifting numbers. The discourse is constantly alarming and 
hyperbolic but in an obscure way: a problem of considerable propositions is 
always being alleged; we are bound to be concerned about it, but its outlines 
are indistinct, like some huge threatening shape on the horizon in a bad horror 
movie  
 
(Fowler 1991: 168-169) 
	
72 The salmonella outbreak refers to a public scare in the UK in 1988 caused by Edwina Currie MP 
who was then a Junior Health Minister. Currie quoted some unpublished government statistics on 
national television about the number of eggs that contained the salmonella bacteria which can cause 
serious food poisoning.  
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Fowler’s (1991) findings indicate that the rhetoric of quantification is not simply a 
feature of mental illness then, but rather a feature of news reports on issues that are 
deemed to be a threat to society. Fowler’s (1991) analysis, however, is concerned with 
the threat that bacteria poses, and not people. The rhetoric of quantification has much 
wider and more serious implications when used in reference to mental illness because 
this “huge threatening shape” with “indistinct outlines” described by Fowler does take 
shape when applied to the language used to report on mental illness – it takes the 
shape of people, with thoughts and feelings, who are also consuming these logical 
falsehoods and, as I reported in the introduction, are internalising these negative 
representations and feeling unable to seek help as a result. 
 I have shown in this section so far that the grouping or quantification of people 
with mental illness is linguistically encoded at the morphological level (e.g. the 
overuse of plural forms on nouns describing people with mental illness) as well as at 
the lexical level (through the overrepresentation of numbers, statistics, and words 
denoting groups (e.g. cases, groups). In addition to these linguistic features of the 
‘rhetoric of quantification’ there are also specific naming strategies that imply that the 
rate of mental illness is increasing. Take for example the following way of naming 
mental illness in the headline sample and sample by year: 
 (1) THE SEROTONIN SOCIETY (1997) 
 (2) The Prozac Generation (2008) 
These two headlines also have the effect of presenting the incidence of mental illness 
as much higher than it actually is. Specifically, in (1) the implication is that so many 
people are depressed that we have become a society that needs serotonin (serotonin 
is the chemical in the brain that contributes to feelings of happiness). The idea of 
mental illness being widespread in society is also the implication that underlies (2) 
which is the headline of an article reporting on the number of people taking the anti-
depressant Prozac. The headline reiterates the message of the article which is that anti-
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depressant use is so widespread that it has resulted in a whole generation of people 
that take Prozac. Both the headlines are existential presuppositions, i.e. they 
presuppose the existence of the entities that they discuss, which has the effect of 
representing them as realities. Existential presuppositions are typically comprised of 
the definite article + NP, as is the case in (1) and (2). The use of the definite article in 
(1) and (2) presents ‘the serotonin society’ and ‘the Prozac generation’ as given 
information. As a result, these two entities (the serotonin society and the Prozac 
generation’) are discursively constructed as things that are recognisable to the 
assumed readers because they are “presupposed to exist by virtue of being in definite 
noun phrases” (Jeffries, 2010: 95). Compare, for example, how the meaning of (1) and 
(2) are permuted if the NPs are broken down and the definite article swapped for the 
indefinite article: 
 
The serotonin society à a society that is dependent on serotonin 
The Prozac generation àa generation that is dependent on Prozac 
 
By changing the structure of (1) and (2) the implications they contain (that the whole 
of society is depressed, and the whole of a generation is depressed, respectively) is 
easier to question because what was presented as given information (contained in a 
single NP) is now presented as new information (in a relative clause). As a result, the 
new information is syntactically constructed as circumstantial information about the 
entity the noun describes (society, a generation) rather than as information that 
comprises the entity described by the noun. The headlines constitute another example 
of how the prevalence (existing cases) and incidence (new cases) of mental illness (in 
this case depression) are overrepresented. An extract from the ‘Prozac Generation’ 
article demonstrates that the theme of quantification is also present in the main body 
of the article: 
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In 2006, the NHS issued 31 million scripts for Prozac in the UK. Anti-
depressant prescriptions cost the health service £3.3 billion last year, almost 
three per cent of the entire NHS budget. But research has surfaced that claims 
they have little effect on mild depression and we may as well have lifted the 
mood making paper chains with all that cash. 
 
(Daily Record, February 29, 2008) 
 
The fact that the main body of the article contains statistics that the headline relies on 
provides further evidence that the rhetoric of quantification is not just a feature of 
headlines but it also forms part of what makes articles coherent. The extract also 
provides another example where it becomes harder to question one part of the article 
(here the headline) because of the sheer number of statistics (and numbers relating to 
all different entities) contained in the main body of the article. Furthermore, the extract 
above provides another example of how numbers and statistics related to mental 
illness are not contextualised in news articles (i.e. the amount of scripts and money 
spent on other illnesses are not included in the article to allow for comparison). 
Moreover, the presentation of these facts as newsworthy suggests that the expense 
incurred in treating mental illness is not justified, which raises a question as to why 
this would be the case. Taken in the context of the findings reported in this chapter so 
far, then, press reports create a paradoxical situation in how they report on mental 
illness: the number of people with mental illness is rising (which poses a threat to 
society) and yet the treatment of mental illness is not a worthy way to spend NHS 
money. 
 Earlier in this section I referred to the tendency for texts in the corpus to label 
people and entities related to mental illness as quantities as contributing to a ‘moral 
panic’ about mental illness. In light of the analysis conducted so far in this section, I 
will now conclude this section by arguing that the linguistic analysis of news reports I 
have conducted in this chapter provides further evidence to support the findings of 
research conducted outside of linguistics that news reports on mental illness 
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constitute a ‘moral panic’ (Pearson, 2000). Cohen (1973) defines a period of moral 
panic as  
 
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined 
as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized 
and stereotypical fashion by the mass media  
 
(Cohen 1973: 2) 
 
Cohen identifies three ways that events or issues are reacted to in the media that 
contribute to the creation of a moral panic. These strategies are: “exaggeration and 
distortion”, “prediction” and “symbolization”. (Cohen, 1973: 25). The first strategy, 
‘exaggeration and distortion’, relates to “exaggerating grossly the seriousness of the 
events […] such as the number taking part, the number involved […] and the amount 
and any effects of any damage or violence” (Cohen, 1973: 26). As I have shown at 
various points in this section, this strategy is visible in the MI 1984-2014 corpus 
through the tendency to overrepresent the number of people with mental illness, 
including numbers related to incidence, numbers related to those seeking treatment, 
and numbers related to crimes committed by (or even possibly by) people with mental 
illness. Moreover, figures reported in news articles on mental illness are distorted 
because they rarely include any comparable figures, which means that the figures are 
not clear enough to comprehend in any meaningful way for the average, non-
specialist reader. In addition to the features of the corpus that contribute to the 
‘exaggeration and distortion’ of mental illness, the second strategy for creating moral 
panic, ‘prediction’, is also present in the corpus. Prediction refers to “the implicit 
assumption […] that what happened was inevitably going to happen again” (Cohen, 
1973: 35). Due to the fact that there is an overrepresentation of numbers with no 
comparative figures provided, predictions can be made that are not easily 
questionable because the ‘exaggeration and distortion’ stage has resulted in mental 
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illness being described as an existential problem. The example I gave earlier in which 
a journalist speculated about supposed future attacks committed by people with 
mental illness constituted a prediction. In the example I gave earlier, the journalist 
speculated that an attack may have been committed by a person with mental illness 
(whether the person did have a mental illness was not known at that time). The 
journalist then used that speculation to state that there was “grave concern” in society 
that there would be more violent attacks committed by people with mental illness. 
Finally, ‘symbolization’ refers to the process by which “neutral words […] can be 
made to symbolize complex ideas and emotions” (Cohen, 1973: 36). Cohen (1973) 
discusses symbolization in relation to concrete nouns such as place names (which 
become associated with particular events), but I argue that salient naming practices 
such as those I identified in Section 7.3.2, for example ‘patient’, also constitute 
symbolization. The reason for this is, as I showed in Section 7.3.2, the use of particular 
naming strategies is patterned and the use of particular strategies can therefore 
symbolize something much more complex than their surface form would suggest, e.g. 
the link between the label ‘patient’ and schizophrenia. 
In addition to the symbolization of labels such as ‘patient’, symbolization also 
occurs in the corpus in relation to the names of people with mental illness who have 
committed violent crimes, or where the names of the individuals symbolize a social 
issue. A salient example of this is the label ‘Clunis’ (which I briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 2 and which has attracted much media and academic attention; see Hallam, 
2002 and Rose, 1998). ‘Clunis’ relates to the case of Christopher Clunis, who was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and who killed another man in London. The ‘Clunis 
case’ attracted much media attention and was framed as an example of the failures of 
community care. As a result, ‘Clunis’ is used in the corpus to symbolize the “complex 
ideas and emotions” (Cohen, 1973: 36) associated with community care and violence 
committed by people with mental illness. In addition to the Clunis case, another oft-
cited case used by the press to discuss the failures of community care is that of Ben 
Silcock. Silcock, who had schizophrenia, climbed into the lions’ enclosure at London 
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Zoo whilst experiencing a schizophrenic episode and was seriously mauled. Table 
7.14 shows examples of the symbolization of ‘Clunis’ and ‘Silcock’ to refer to failures 
of community care (both ‘Clunis’ and ‘Silcock’) and to violence committed by people 
with mental illness (‘Clunis’ only): 
 
Why is it we only ever 
hear about the mad 
axeman; the  
 
Christopher Clunises and those who drive the 
wrong way up a motorway 
inflicting untold damage on 
anyone who happens to get in 
their way? 
It was clear that the 
system was failing the  
 
Clunises of this world almost as 
brutally as it had failed Jon 
and me 
There are hundreds of 
thousands - yes, hundreds 
of thousands - of  
 
Ben Silcocks in our land 
 We can and must do more 
for the quarter of a million  
 
Ben Silcocks of Britain and for their 
families. 
Down almost any street in 
this land there are  
 
Ben Silcocks  
TABLE 7.15. EXAMPLES OF ‘CLUNIS’ AND ‘SILCOCK’ USED TO SYMBOLIZE VIOLENCE COMMITTED 
BY PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS  
 
In this section I have shown that people and entities related to mental illness are 
routinely quantified and presented as statistics. I have showed how the 
overrepresentation of statistics and numbers contributes to ‘press hysteria’ (Fowler, 
1991) and creates a ‘moral panic’ around mental illness. However, an ideological effect 
of the overrepresentation of quantities in the corpus is not just that such reporting 
presents mental illness as a bigger issue or a bigger threat to society than it is, but also 
that the quantification of people necessarily detracts from the presentation of people 
as individuals. I argue, then, that in addition to contributing to ‘press hysteria’, the 
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‘rhetoric of quantification’ that Fowler (1991) identifies (which I argue is present in the 
naming strategies I have identified) also constitutes a ‘rhetoric of depersonalisation’. 
What I mean by this is that the systematic representation of people as numbers 
backgrounds the individual experiences of people. As a result, it is much less likely 
that readers will empathise with individual people and their experiences of mental 
illness. 
 In the next section I offer some final discussion and conclusions arising from 
the analysis I have conducted in this chapter. 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued for the particular value of naming analysis in mental 
illness discourse. I have shown that, in line with previous research, naming practices 
constitute a linguistic basis for discrimination and therefore can perpetuate stigma 
about certain populations. I explored the naming strategies that arose from the 
qualitative analysis of the headline sample and sample by year, in addition to the 
frequency of naming strategies prescribed by anti-stigma initiatives such as Time to 
Change. In my analysis I showed that overall the use of person-first language is less 
frequent than non-person-first language. However, corpus evidence shows that 
person-first forms are rising. This rise suggests that prescribed forms are being more 
widely adopted by journalists writing about mental illness. In addition, I showed that 
person-first forms occur in contexts that are supportive of people with mental illness, 
which I argue constitutes a relationship of correlation between person-first language 
and positive representations of mental illness (rather than causation, as person-first 
advocates suggest). The reason for this was that positive representations of mental 
illness were also found to occur in with non-person first labels. The specific example 
I gave to exemplify that person-first labels were not the only naming strategy to occur 
in positive contexts was the label ‘the mentally ill’, which Time to Change advise 
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journalists to avoid on the basis that it is a non-person first and therefore stigmatising 
form. I showed in Section 7.3.1 that in comparison to ‘the mentally ill’, the adjectival 
modifier ‘’mentally ill’ is a label better to avoid because it is typically followed by 
nouns that link mental illness, violence and criminality. 
 In addition to the findings I reported in reference to person-first language, I 
also showed that the labels ‘patient’, ‘victim’ and ‘sufferer’ are salient head nouns in 
naming practices for people with mental illness. I showed that there are semantic 
differences in the naming strategies that contribute to the frequency of each term; e.g. 
‘patient’ is pathologized and ‘victim’ has connotations of irreversibility. Related to the 
sematic differences between each word, I also showed that the use of particular 
naming strategies is patterned across the mental illness subcorpora. Specifically I 
showed that if we are to base the naming practices for each illness on the frequency of 
each term in the relevant illness subcorpus, people with PTSD in the corpus were most 
likely to be labelled as ‘victims’ and people with schizophrenia were most likely to be 
labelled ‘patients’. I also discussed how the semantic associations ‘victim’, ‘patient’ 
and ‘sufferer’ carry may contribute to how people with certain illness are perceived. 
For example, schizophrenia ‘patients’ are constructed as dangerous to the community. 
In the final section of the analysis in this chapter, I showed that people and entities 
related to mental illness are routinely labelled as statistics or quantities which are 
presented as rising both quickly and significantly. I argued that this 
overrepresentation of statistics constituted what Fowler (1991) calls ‘the rhetoric of 
quantification’ which contributes to a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1973) around mental 
illness. I argued that the quantification of people depersonalizes them and that for this 
reason, the overrepresentation of people as numbers was not just a feature of ‘the 
rhetoric of quantification’ but also is a feature of the rhetoric of depersonalisation.  
 In the next chapter I explore the ways that ‘having’ mental illness is encoded in 
language, particularly in reference to Hallidayean transitivity analysis. In Chapter 7 I 
also revisit the notion of prescribed linguistic forms but in reference to processes (i.e. 
verbs) rather than naming practices.  
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8. ‘Suffering’ illnesses and ‘experiencing’ symptoms: ways 
of talking about having mental illness 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I address research questions 3 and 3.1. These are “What processes are 
associated with mental illness?” and “What terms do the press use to refer to having 
mental illness”. Specifically, I explore the ways in which the press talk about 
‘suffering’ from mental illness and ‘experiencing’ mental illness. The reason for 
focussing specifically on these two processes only is due to the fact that I identified 
‘suffering’ as an interpretatively significant and frequent collocate in the initial 
qualitative analysis (detailed in section 8.4), which warranted further 
lexicogrammatical analysis. The reason for exploring the verb ‘experiencing’ is that 
anti-stigma initiatives have identified ‘experiencing’ as the preferred term for 
journalists to use when writing about people having mental illness (Time to Change, 
2019).  
As stated in Chapter 4, transitivity analysis is concerned with how authors 
encode meaning in texts, specifically how they choose to represent actions, events and 
states. Transitivity analysis is an analysis of the “clause as process” (Halliday, 2003: 
315), and unlike a purely syntactic grammatical analysis, which is concerned with 
“position and sequence of elements, rather than their propositional meanings and 
functions” (Fowler, 1991: 77), transitivity analysis allows for the analysis of the 
‘semantic configurations’ of structures of meaning (Fowler, 1991: 71). As a result, 
transitivity analysis allows for the systematic analysis of ideology in texts because it 
allows the researcher to question why particular linguistic choices were chosen over 
others. For example, it can offer insights into why a journalist may choose to represent 
the state of having mental illness as ‘suffering’ from it rather than ‘experiencing’ it. As 
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Fowler (1991) states, “transitivity has the facility to analyse the same event in different 
ways, a facility which is of course of great interest in newspaper analysis” (Fowler, 
1991: 71). The possible ways that a journalist may choose to represent actions, events 
and states are of particular interest in the analysis of newspaper discourse. This is 
because, as Hall (1978) writes, “the media do not simply and transparently report 
events which are ‘naturally’ newsworthy in themselves. ‘News’ is the end-product of a 
complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and 
topics according to a socially constructed set of categories” (Hall, 1978: 53). Adopting 
transitivity analysis for the purposes of analysing what processes and participants are 
associated with mental illness in the press, then, can also be said to give an indication 
of the way that those participants and processes are constructed in social life.  
Section 8.2 will outline the method for the data collection and analysis in this 
chapter. In section 8.3, I discuss the experiential basis of language in reference to the 
language prescribed by anti-stigma initiatives. In section 8.4, I analyse ‘suffer’ in the 
most prototypical texts for each year and explore the verb ‘experience’ as an 
alternative to ‘suffer’. In section 8.5, I explore the lexicogrammatical features of 
‘suffer’, ‘experience’ and ‘suffer from’ to demonstrate that each of these usages 
functions differently in the MI 1984-2014 corpus and in general language corpora. In 
section 8.6, I discuss my findings and conclude. 
 
8.2. Method for this chapter 
 
Due to the fact that transitivity analysis sits between a semantic and a syntactic 
description of a language, it is not easily automated because it does not always deal 
with elements of linguistic form. The decision about whether a particular verb 
constitutes one process type or another requires a detailed exploration of the 
surrounding context of the verb in that particular context. For this reason, the analysis 
in this chapter will be much more qualitative (and therefore smaller in scale) than the 
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analyses conducted in the other analysis chapters. This zeroing-in on the data is 
necessary for transitivity analysis but is also beneficial to the project as a whole due to 
the fact that both micro and macro analysis is essential for the analyst to build an 
accurate picture of what phenomena are contained in the data under investigation. 
Moreover, as I have stated at various points in this thesis, one of the innovations of 
my work here is that the analysis is integrated. That is to say that it takes account of 
both the micro (for example the use of a particular verb in a particular instance) and 
macro (for example keywords in the corpus compared with a reference corpus) 
features of the data. Practically I have combined qualitative and quantitative methods 
by using the corpus to identify areas of the data for qualitative analysis; I have also 
used qualitative analysis in order to inform quantitative analysis, i.e.  
 
Quantitative to qualitative à e.g. exploring statistically significant lexical 
items through concordance analysis  
Qualitative to quantitative à e.g. noticing an interpretatively significant 
usage in an article and exploring its 
distribution in the corpus as a whole  
 
In order to downsize the corpus to conduct the transitivity analysis, I used stratified 
sampling by year, using ProtAnt (Antony & Baker, 2017) to identify the most 
prototypical text for each year included in the MI 1984-2014 corpus. ProtAnt calculates 
the most prototypical text (i.e. individual newspaper article, in my case) in a corpus 
based on the number of keywords the text contains when compared to a reference 
corpus (comprising all other years). This means that the text that contains the most 
keywords will be the most prototypical for that year. 
Once I had collected the most prototypical texts (n=31), I then selected sections 
of the articles for further analysis guided by how relevant the part of the text was to 
exploring the research question (i.e. What processes and participants are associated 
with mental illness?). I then analysed each extract for interpretatively significant 
processes. This process led to the identification of ‘suffer’ as an interpretatively 
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significant collocate in the sample (occurring in just over a third of all the articles). The 
next section describes the theoretical basis for the analysis I conduct in this chapter. 
 
8.3. The experiential basis of language and the linguistic basis of experience 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, I described transitivity as an analysis of the way 
actions, events and states are represented in language. What I did not explicitly state, 
which is vital to my point in the analysis here, is that from exploring those 
actions/events and states we obtain insight into human experience; that is, how people 
perceive the world and their experiences within it. In his 1998 article, ‘On the grammar 
of pain’, Halliday explores the various ways that pain can be created in language, 
specifically pain as a participant and pain as a process. On the utility of transitivity 
analysis for exploring words such as ‘pain’, he writes:  
 
The grammar of every natural language is a theory of human experience, and 
it is a powerful theory in that it covers every aspect of that experience both real 
and imaginary; yet pain does not fit easily and naturally into the 
phenomenological model the grammar provides, despite the fact that it has 
obviously been a part of it from the beginning. But, on the other hand, and for 
that very reason, I think it is important to locate the grammar of pain in the 
context of the lexicogrammar as a whole, to see it as an aspect of the overall 
construal of experience. Whether by analysing the grammar we could in any 
way contribute to the practical alleviation and management of pain I do not 
know. It might seem odd even to raise such a possibility. But I do believe that 
in order to understand any complex aspect of the human condition it is helpful 
to think about it grammatically. The boundary between the semiotic and the 
material worlds is by no means totally impermeable. 
 
(Halliday, 1998: 2) 
 
Unlike Halliday, I am not interested as such in pain per se (for examples of work which 
examines this concept and how it is represented in language, see Semino, 2010, 2011; 
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Semino et al., 2017) However, I am interested in the linguistic encoding of ‘felt’ or 
affective experience (e.g. mental illness) and the encoding of the experience of mental 
illness in language. Because of this, I want to explore Halliday’s final point in more 
detail, specifically the idea that the material world (what we can take to mean illness 
of some sort for our purposes here), and the semiotic world (what we can take to mean 
language). In answer to the question Halliday indirectly raises, I do not believe that 
prescribed changes in the language we use to describe illness may alleviate that illness 
to some extent (if this were the case then linguists may be more popular than they 
currently are). However, the notion that language and our experiences of the material 
world (specifically, in this case, having mental illness) can affect each other forms the 
theoretical basis for many mental illness anti-stigma campaigns that prescribe 
particular linguistic forms over others. For example, the Time to Change campaign 
launched in the UK in 2007 by the mental health charities Mind and Rethink Mental 
aims to end stigma around mental illness. On the Time to Change website is a resource 
called “Mind Your Language’ which includes media guidelines on how to report on 
mental illness responsibly. The ‘Mind Your Language’ pages advise journalists to 
avoid referring to people with mental illnesses as ‘patients’ and instead use ‘service-
users’. Furthermore, they advise not to use the word ‘suffer’ in the context of mental 
illness, e.g. ‘person suffering from mental illness’, instead advising journalists to write 
‘person experiencing mental illness’ (Time to Change, 2019). Although Time to Change 
do not state it explicitly on their website, these prescriptions about language use are 
based on the ideological content of ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’, which most speakers of 
English would agree convey different meanings. However, unsurprisingly, no 
linguistic evidence to support these claims is cited on the Time to Change website. In 
the following sections, I explore the grammatical form and ideological function of 
‘suffer’ vs. ‘experience’ in order to explore whether there is linguistic evidence to 
support these linguistic prescriptions.  
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8.4. On the grammar of ‘suffering’ 
 
In the previous section, I discussed the ideological weight of using certain words over 
others. Yet there is a quandary in that the report of the linguistic analysis that has to 
be conducted in order to explore that ideology inevitably requires words which may 
be ideologically loaded themselves. This is that the description of the semantic (and 
ideological) content of words necessarily requires words. This quandary is well 
documented by semanticists talking about the metalanguage of linguistic analysis (de 
Swart, 1998). In linguistic analysis of the sort conducted in this chapter, the 
metalanguage needed may present a further issue which is that the words used to 
describe ideology in a language may also carry ideological content. What I mean by 
this is that it is not the case that I can discuss the language representing the process of 
experiencing/suffering/having mental illnesses neutrally because my metacomment 
on the language may include ideologically loaded words. Indeed, Halliday (1998) 
writes of the process of ‘having’ pain that through using ‘have’ or ‘has’, “the grammar 
sets up a structural configuration of possession (process type “relational: possessive”). 
Some person […] becomes the owner of this thing” (Halliday, 1998: 4). For this reason, 
in contrast to the other chapters in this thesis where I have described people’s ‘having’ 
of mental illnesses as ‘experiencing’ mental illnesses, I will refer to the process of 
having mental illness as just that - ‘having’- in order to distinguish the concept of 
‘having’ mental illness from my analysis of how that ‘having’ is representing through 
transitivity processes in the language, although I do note that even this most basic 
description of ‘having’ mental illness contains ideology. In this section I look at how 
the process of ‘having’ mental illness is represented through verb processes in the 
most prototypical texts for each year and in the MI 1984-2014 corpus more generally. 
I start by exploring the verb ‘suffer’. To serve as a reminder of the process types in 
transitivity analysis, I reintroduce Figure 4.2 from Chapter 4 below (Table 8.1).  
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Process  Type  Subcategories  Elements 
Material  ‘doing’  Intention (MAI)  
Supervention (MAS)  
Event (if inanimate actor) 
(MAE)   
Actor, Goal 
(optional)  
Verbalization 
Process  
‘saying’  (VP)  Sayer, Verbiage, 
Goal   
Mental  ‘sensing’  Cognition (MC)  
Reaction (MR)  
Perception (MP)   
Senser, 
Phenomenon  
Relational  ‘being’  Intensive (RI)  
Possessive (RP)  
Circumstantial (RC)  
Carrier, Attribute  
TABLE 8.1. TYPES OF PROCESSES IN A TRANSITIVITY ANALYSIS (ADAPTED FROM HALLIDAY, 
1973, JEFFRIES, 2010 AND SIMPSON, 1993) 
 
Of the most prototypical texts, 11 out of 31 include the verb ‘suffer’ in the context of a 
person having a mental illness, with some articles using the verb up to three times. 
The frequency of ‘suffer’ as a verb in the prototypical text sample is indicative of the 
high frequency of ‘suffer’ in the corpus more generally (10,925 instances; 186.59 pmw). 
In addition to these verbal usages of ‘suffer’ in the prototypical text sample, it is also 
important to note that nominalised forms of the verb are also present; for example, 
‘care given to sufferers’ (1987), ‘anxiety sufferers’ (1996), and ’bulimia sufferer’(2008). 
Whilst these usages are interesting and will be mentioned in passing in this chapter, 
the naming strategies that journalists use to refer to people with mental illness, such 
as ‘sufferer’, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Table 8.2 shows instances of 
the verb ‘to suffer’ in the prototypical texts sample.  
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DATE Element Process Element  
1984 73 per cent of women sent to 
Holloway prison's psychiatric 
unit, C1 wing, during that 
time had already been 
diagnosed as  
suffering from mental illness 
1985 He cites as an example the 
current psychiatric fashion of 
diagnosing young black 
people as who present 
disturbing behaviour as  
suffering  from a 'cannabis 
psychosis' 
1988 Mr Dukakis  suffered  a deep depression  
1992 'She was  suffering the sudden worsening of 
depressive illness 
1999 A DRUG DEALER who 
stabbed a man to death in an 
argument over £500 of 
cannabis was  
[…] 
Trelfa began  
suffering  
 
 
 
 
suffering 
from clinical depression  
 
 
 
 
from depression  
2001 I've known people who've  suffered  with depression  
2002 Scientists from Tilburg 
University, in Holland found 
women  
suffering  severe attacks 
2005 Psychiatrists agreed that Eltom 
was  
 
Eltom had already  
suffering  
 
 
suffered  
from severe depression,  
 
 
a bout of severe 
depression  
2008 I don't think we have any idea 
how many men  
suffer  with Bulimia  
2012 he diagnosed Bonser as  suffering  from a personality 
disorder 
2013 Last week the inquest into 
tragic Linzi Mannion showed 
she had been  
[…] 
Emma Cadywould, who threw 
herself in front of a train after  
[…] 
More than 15% of new 
mothers  
suffering  
 
 
 
suffering  
 
 
 
suffer  
from postnatal depression  
 
 
what the coroner called 
one of the worst cases of 
postnatal depression he 
had seen  
 
with this illness. 
TABLE 8.2. EXAMPLES OF ‘SUFFER’ IN THE PROTOTYPICAL TEXTS SAMPLE 
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As would be expected from ‘suffer’ in this context, where the experiencer of the 
suffering is animate (e.g. new mothers, women, people), all the examples relate to 
mental processes of perception (MP) or processes that “are best described as states of 
mind or psychological events” (Bloor & Bloor, 1995: 116). The elements in mental 
processes are Senser and Phenomenon, as detailed in Table 8.3: 
 
Participant: Senser Process: Mental Participant: Phenomenon 
She (had been) suffering (with) this illness 
 
Participant: Phenomenon Participant: Senser Process: Mental 
The bulimia she (had been) suffering (from) 
 
TABLE 8.3. EXAMPLE PARTICIPANTS AND PROCESSES IN MENTAL PROCESSES 
 
Matthiessen & Halliday write of mental clauses that “a mental clause construes 
sensing […]” and includes “a process of consciousness involving a participant 
endowed with consciousness” (Matthiessen & Halliday, 1997: 18). I will return to the 
semantics of ‘suffer’ and the process types it can be coded as in Section 8.5 
‘Experiencing symptoms and suffering from illnesses’. First, however, I will discuss 
‘experience’ and ‘suffer’ in the particular context of Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 shows that ‘suffering’ from mental illness is never a phrase used by a 
person with a mental illness in the sample; instead, ‘suffering’ is attributed to others, 
e.g. ‘new mothers suffer with this illness’. This is interpretatively interesting because 
it removes any agency from the discursively created ‘sufferer’ because people 
typically suffer from things outside of their control. Furthermore, R1 noun collocates 
of ‘suffer’ (those collocates that appear one word to the right of the node word) in the 
BNC demonstrate that ‘suffer’ is a negatively valenced word. The collocates of ‘suffer’ 
include damage, injury, pain, loss, harm and torture. A concordance analysis of ‘suffer 
from’ in the BNC attests the interpretation that people typically suffer from things 
outside of their control. 
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innocent families having to  suffer from that 
people who make the laws aren’t 
the people who 
suffer from them 
we have to  suffer from such incompetence  
Bangladeshi communities suffer from the effects of poor housing  
unable to replace management, the 
company may 
suffer from inept leadership 
TABLE 8.4. CONCORDANCES FOR THE PHRASE ‘SUFFER FROM’ TAKEN FROM THE BNC 
 
In the instances of ‘suffer from’ in the BNC shown in Table 8.4, the people and entities 
‘suffering from’ something are all doing so as a result of someone or something out of 
their control. This interpretation is supported by Shweder who writes “to suffer is to 
experience a disvalued and unwanted state of mind, body or spirit” (Shweder, 2003: 
76). What is more, it appears in the examples that the result of the action that led to 
suffering (e.g. being unable to replace management, the creation of laws), is that the 
people affected have little or no ability to rectify or deal with the thing that caused the 
suffering. For example, bad management has caused inept leadership and there is no 
possibility of rectifying the bad management situation, and the public have little or no 
say in changing the laws passed by people who do not represent them. What these 
instances of ‘suffer from’ in the BNC illuminate about the instances of ‘suffering’ in 
the prototypical texts sample, then, is that the choice to represent the process of having 
mental illness as ‘suffering’ creates the discursive role of the agentless ‘sufferer’ in the 
texts. Moreover, the instances of ‘suffer from’ in the BNC show that there is a 
precedent for ‘suffer from’ to convey a sense in which the ‘sufferer’ is precluded from 
dealing with the cause of their suffering. 
The use of ‘suffering’ over another candidate term to convey the process of 
having mental illness may seem appropriate in some of the extreme cases in the 
prototypical texts. For example, an article from 2014 describes a new mother jumping 
in front of a train, because arguably, ‘experiencing’ does not convey the severity of her 
mental condition in the same way that ‘suffering’ does. However in some of the texts 
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in the sample, an alternative way of representing having mental illness may well have 
been possible without permuting the meaning in the same it would have in the 2014 
article; as, for example, in an article from 2001, whose wider context reads ‘I’ve known 
people who’ve suffered with depression and have had to take anti-depressants’. In this 
example, it is clear that the people with depression are, at least to some degree, in 
control of and managing their depression, as they have sought medical intervention 
and are taking medication to control it. In this case then, ‘experiencing’ rather than 
‘suffering’ may be argued to better represent the process for the reasons outlined 
above, where ‘suffering’ seems to suggest a lack of ability to deal with the cause of the 
suffering (recall that the media guidelines suggest using the verb ‘experiencing’ over 
‘suffering’ when describing mental illness). In replacing ‘suffer’ with ‘experience’ in 
this case, the process stops being one where the agency of the actor is removed and 
instead becomes a process that is consciously experienced, and which creates the 
Senser the discursive role of ‘experiencer’. Changing ‘suffer’ to ‘experience’ not only 
reinstates agency to the Senser but also recasts the illness (in these cases, depression) 
as a Phenomenon that is experienced (and then dealt with) and not something that is 
‘suffered’ from indefinitely because the actor has no agency. 
A concordance analysis of verbal usages of ‘experience’ in the BNC shows that 
the lexical item ‘experience’ conveys the sense of ‘learned’, i.e. through experiencing 
something, a person is better equipped to deal with it (or other related things) at a 
later date. In contrast, ‘suffer’ cannot encode this sense because it removes the agency 
of the Senser, and, as previously stated, there is precedent in the language more 
generally for ‘suffer’ to carry a sense of powerlessness to deal with a negative cause. 
Table 8.5 shows concordances of the verb ‘experience’ in the BNC. The table shows 
that unlike ‘suffer’, ‘experience’ is neither negatively nor positively valenced, but does 
convey a sense of actively living through something and is bounded, i.e. temporally 
fixed. For example, in (1) the experience lasts for the amount of time the visitors are in 
the park; in (2) the experience is caused by, and lasts as long as a particular sporting 
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event; and in (3) the experience is temporally bound by the amount of time spent 
visiting a tourist attraction. 
 
1 Visit Murtonpark to  
 
experience the joys of the countryside 
2 I was the first one to  
 
experience this sort of pressure, while 
players like Ian Wright and 
Keith Curle 
3 Discover the answers as you  
 
experience for yourself the sights and 
sounds of their daily lives 
4 Disabled visitors may  
 
experience difficulties due to gravel 
surfaces, slopes and steps. 
5 long-lasting relief from 
sensitive, embarrassing 
external itching you can  
 
experience at any time of the month 
6 as many as 61% of women  
 
experience it and suffer a certain amount 
of discomfort as a result. 
TABLE 8.5. CONCORDANCE FOR THE VERB ‘EXPERIENCE’ IN THE BNC 
 
Further to exploring the usage of ‘experience’ as a verb in the BNC, an analysis of 
‘experience’ as a noun in the BNC attests the argument that experience implies 
‘learned’ through examples such as ‘He was in great pain but he used his skill and 
experience to escape’, ‘with 24 years experience behind us we know what it takes to make an 
event stand out’, and ‘that person has gained the skills and experience to get another job more 
easily’. Further evidence for the interpretation that ‘suffer’ creates powerless 
participants in a way that ‘experience’ does not is that a statistically significant 
collocate of ‘victim’ is ‘suffer’ (MI = 7.14), whereas ‘experience’ (whilst still a 
statistically significant collocate) collocates much less frequently with ‘victim’ (MI = 
5.62). This is an interesting finding because the media guidelines outlined by Time to 
Change suggest that journalists should avoid using ‘victim’. This association between 
‘victim’ and the verb ‘to suffer’, then, suggests that it could be the case that an increase 
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in frequency of the verb ‘experience’ may not only be a more appropriate way to 
describe the process of ‘having’ mental illness (because it suggests that the person is 
more in control of their illness than ‘suffer’ suggests and is more positively valenced), 
but may also result in a decrease in the use of ‘suffer’, which would also result in a 
decrease in the usage of other related problematic forms identified by Time to Change, 
such as ‘victim’. 
To return to the media guidelines published by Time to Change, I will now 
investigate whether ‘suffering’ is a verb used by people with mental illness in the 
corpus. I do this (1) to explore my earlier observation that all the instances of ‘suffer’ 
in the sample are used in reference to a person with mental illness and not by the 
person ‘having’ the mental illness, and (2) because if ‘suffer’ is negative in the way 
that Time to Change suggest it is, then we can expect people not to use ‘suffer’ to 
describe their own experiences with mental illness. To do this I searched the corpus 
for [first person pronoun + was suffering from/was suffering with/am suffering 
with/was suffering from]. Table 8.6 shows a summary of my findings with example 
concordances. 
 
Phrase Raw 
freq. 
Freq. pmw Example concordance 
I was suffering 
from 
240 4.1 it was by chance that I discovered I 
was suffering from anxiety attacks 
I was suffering 
with 
12 0.02 the doctor decided I was suffering 
with depression. 
I am suffering 
from 
42 0.72 My guilty secret is that I am 
suffering from mental illness. 
I am suffering with 3 0.05 I am suffering with anorexia, 
binge-eating, purging, laxative 
abuse and exercise  
TABLE 8.6. INSTANCES OF [FIRST-PERSON PRONOUN + SUFFER] IN THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS 
 
Table 8.6 shows that people with mental illness do refer to their ‘having’ of mental 
illness as ‘suffering’. However, whilst this finding gives an indication that ‘suffering’ 
is used self-reflexively, it shows that ‘I + [the verb to suffer]’ is much less common in 
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the corpus than ‘suffering’ more generally (the lemma ‘suffer’ as a verb occurs 46,546 
times in the corpus without “I” within 5 words right and left of it). The low frequency 
of first-person accounts from people with mental illness is due in part to the 
underrepresentation of first-person accounts in the corpus more generally. However, 
a search of [I + experience] indicates that there are other ways of referring to having 
mental illness in the corpus using the first-person pronoun. A concordance search 
shows that although first person voices in the corpus are few, examples of people 
talking about ‘experiencing’ mental illness are present. Table 8.7 shows examples of 
each usage. 
 
Phrase Raw 
Freq. 
Freq. pmw Example concordance 
I was 
experiencing 
70 1.2 After my daughter was born, I was 
experiencing post-natal depression 
and instead of cutting I burned 
myself, deliberately, with paint-
stripper. 
I am 
experiencing 
8 0.14 It often means that I am 
experiencing difficulties with my life 
that I wasn't aware of and I need to 
deal with my feelings, rather than 
push it down with food and 
anaesthetise myself. 
I experienced 166  2.84 It's been so long since I 
experienced these things that it took 
me a while to catch on that I was 
actually depressed, as opposed to 
suffering an iron deficiency or being 
slothful. 
I experience 40 0.68 I experience all the high highs and 
the low lows. 
TABLE 8.7. INSTANCES OF [FIRST-PERSON PRONOUN + EXPERIENCE] IN THE MI 1984-2014 
CORPUS 
 
Taken together, Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show that, in terms of relative and raw frequency, 
there is minimal difference between whether first-person accounts describe the 
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process of having mental illness as ‘suffering’ from a mental illness (total relative 
frequency of all forms 4.89), or ‘experiencing’ a mental illness (total relative frequency 
of all forms 4.86). However, ‘experience’ as a verb (10,925 instances; 186.95 pmw) is 
much less frequent in the corpus than ‘suffer’ (50,404; 860.87 pmw) overall. This means 
that that although [I + ‘suffer’] is the more frequent of the two forms, [I + ‘experience’] 
is proportionally four times more frequent in the corpus that [I + suffer]73. 
In addition to frequency information, Tables 8.6 and 8.7 reveal a qualitative 
difference in how ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ are used that indicates that unlike ‘suffer’, 
‘experience’ foregrounds the person’s individual experiences of mental illness such as 
discovering that their symptoms constituted a mental illness and their reaction to their 
feelings during this process. The concordances of ‘suffer’ reveal no such description 
of experiences; rather, ‘suffer’ appears to only relate to a diagnosable illness as a 
complete thing (as opposed to a collection of symptoms that one experiences). I will 
explore this conceptual difference between ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ in Section 8.4. 
Another interesting finding from Tables 8.6 and 8.7 is that there is a preference 
in first-person usages of ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ for the process to be described in the 
past tense (i.e. was suffering with/from, experienced/was experiencing), with 488 of the 
total 581 instances referring to the past tense. The preference to refer to mental illness 
in the past tense in the corpus is perhaps unsurprising, given that the majority of 
newspaper reports discuss events that have already happened; however, arguably, 
the preference for representing mental illness as occurring in the past does not 
accurately represent the reality of many mental illnesses that occur throughout 
peoples’ lives. The tendency for people to refer to having mental illness in the past 
provides further support for the argument that ‘experience’ is a more fitting way to 
	
73 I arrived at this number by dividing the raw frequency of [I + verb] (here ‘experience’ or ‘suffer’) by 
the total number of instances of ‘experience’ or ‘suffer’ as a verb in the corpus. I then multiplied the 
number by 100 to get a percentage (suffer = 0.6%, experience = 2.6%) and then divided the percentage 
of ‘suffer’ by ‘experience’. 
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describe having mental illness, as ‘experience’, unlike ‘suffer’ was shown to refer to 
bounded phenomena in Table 8.5. 
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 reveal that ‘suffer’ occurs slightly more frequently in the 
corpus with the first-person singular pronoun in raw terms of raw and relative 
frequency; however, ‘experience’ is proportionally more frequent. This suggests that 
[I + ‘experience’] is the more common form overall. The fact that there is a tendency 
for first-person accounts of having mental illness to not use ‘suffer’ is further attested 
by the fact that in one first-person account in Table 8.6 which does included [I + 
‘suffer’], this is contained within indirect reported speech: 
 
the doctor decided I was suffering with depression. 
 
In the example, [I + ‘suffer’] is a process attributed by another actor, e.g. a medical 
expert, in which the ‘I was suffering with depression’ clause constitutes the 
grammatical direct object of a sentence in which the grammatical subject (the doctor) 
‘decides’ the person is suffering. The MI 1984-2014 corpus provides further evidence 
for the finding that many instances of [I + suffer] are reported speech. Table 8.8 show 
a sample of instances in which [I + suffer] is presented as indirect speech or free 
indirect speech (Leech & Short, 2007; McIntyre et al., 2004): 
 
doctor told me  I was suffering 
from 
anxiety neuroses and 
offered me Valium 
 
I started having palpitations and 
the doctors said 
I was suffering 
from 
panic attacks. 
Then he explained simply and 
rationally that  
I was suffering 
from 
a bipolar illness. 
I explained my symptoms to a 
student nurse who I had just 
met and she said it sounded like 
I was suffering 
from 
panic attacks 
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He told me  I was suffering 
from 
depression and that I 
was shocked and 
frightened 
My GP said  I was suffering 
from 
an acute stress reaction 
 
He said I was suffering 
from 
acute anxiety and ECT 
I know that my doctor says that  
 
I am suffering with  severe shock 
TABLE 8.8. CONCORDANCE FOR [I AM SUFFERING] IN THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS 
 
Although we cannot know how faithful the reported speech is (i.e. whether the health 
professional actually said what they are reported to have said), Table 8.8 shows that 
the apparent frequency of reflexive [I + suffer} is less than Table 8.6 suggests. This 
finding gives evidence for the notion that people with mental illness do not refer to 
their experience of it as ‘suffering’. Interestingly, a concordance search of [said I was 
experiencing] (as opposed to [said I was suffering]) in the corpus yielded just one hit 
from 2011 which reads: 
 
I went to my doctor and said “something is not right” and he said I was 
experiencing postnatal depression again”. 
 
What the low frequency of [said I was experiencing] indicates is that, at least in the 
corpus, ‘suffer’ is a more common way to refer to having people having mental illness 
by mental health professionals. 
 Interestingly, this finding is in keeping with a theme in the corpus more 
generally which is that ‘experts’ are the people in the corpus that ‘say’, ‘think’ and 
‘find’ things, whereas people with mental health illnesses are constructed as the 
people things are said about, thought about and found out about. 
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8.5. ‘Experiencing’ symptoms and ‘suffering’ from illnesses 
 
So far in this chapter I have presented evidence to suggest that the mental processes 
‘experience’ and ‘suffer’ encode different meanings. I have argued that the two 
processes are different in the way that they encode temporality, i.e. ‘experiencing’ is 
bounded whereas ‘suffering’ is not. I have also argued that concordance evidence 
from the BNC shows that ‘suffer’ occurs in negative contexts, whereas ‘experience’ 
does not appear to occur in a wholly positive or negative context (see Tables 8.4 and 
8.5). Another difference that was revealed in the analysis conducted in Section 8.4 is 
that ‘suffer’ appears to remove agency from the Senser in a way that ‘experience’ did 
not.  
In this section I explore the lexicogrammatical differences between ‘experience’ 
and ‘suffer’. The reason for doing this is that in addition to the differences between 
‘experience’ and ‘suffer’ listed above, an interesting observation to come from the 
concordance analysis of ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ in Section 8.4 was that there appears 
to be a conceptual difference between ‘experiencing’ mental illness and ‘suffering’ 
from mental illness in the corpus. I argued that this conceptual difference appears to 
be related to the nature of the Phenomenon in the process. Specifically, I raised the 
possibility that ‘suffer’ appears to relate to diagnosable illnesses in the majority of 
cases, whereas ‘experience’ appears to relate to symptoms in the majority of cases. I 
will explore this in more detail now. 
A concordance analysis of sentences in the corpus that contain both ‘experience’ 
and ‘suffer’ as verbs suggests that this conceptual difference provides further evidence 
for the thesis that whether ‘suffer’ or ‘experience’ is used is related to diagnostic status; 
i.e. if a person has symptoms but no diagnosis of mental illness then the process is 
described as being one of ‘experiencing’. In contrast, where there is a diagnosis (or 
where there is a reference to a diagnosable mental illness, as opposed to a set of 
symptoms (e.g. ‘depression’ rather than ‘low mood, fatigue and insomnia’) then the 
process is described as one of ‘suffering’. Of course, there are instances in the corpus 
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where ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ are used as synonyms, presumably to provide 
linguistic variety in the newspaper article; however, an analysis of the 639 instances 
(10.91 pmw)74 in the corpus indicates that there is a pattern in which having symptoms 
of an illness is described as ‘experiencing’, and living with a diagnosable condition is 
described as ‘suffering’. This is curious when presumably the symptoms a person 
experiences constitute the illness and therefore experiencing those symptoms is the 
cause of the suffering; e.g. suffering from depression means also suffering from low 
mood. Table 8.9 shows a series of concordances attesting this interpretation. Note that 
depression can be both a symptom and a diagnosable condition in itself. 
 
men suffering from postnatal depression experience paranoia, delusions and, in 
some cases, thoughts of suicide 
mothers suffering from postnatal illness will be experiencing a sustained and 
pervasive depression and lowness of mood  
People who suffer from phobias are afraid of the feelings they experience when 
they get anxious  
If you are experiencing these symptoms in combination you could be suffering 
from depression and should seek medical advice  
Many of those who experience panic attacks also suffer from depression 
A further 213 claimed they had experienced suicidal thoughts and 407 said they 
were suffering depression  
Mr Morrison was found to be suffering from chronic schizophrenia after 
experiencing a delusion that he was being shot at with poison darts 
There are a range of support mechanisms for people suffering from depression 
and we strongly recommend anyone experiencing signs of depression consults 
an appropriate health professional 
She was suffering from an acute psychotic episode despite never previously 
experiencing mental illness 
People who suffer from SAD experience a lack of energy, have sleep problems 
and mood changes and they feel anxious and have difficulty concentrating  
TABLE 8.9. CONCORDANCE ANALYSIS OF SENTENCES CONTAINING THE LEMMAS ‘EXPERIENCE’ 
AND ‘SUFFER’ IN THE MI 1984-2014 
 
	
74 These 639 instances were returned from the following search: [lemma search ‘suffer’ within 10 
words L&R of lemma ‘experience’] 
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What this tendency suggests is that once something is named as a diagnosable illness, 
the process of ‘experiencing’ becomes one of ‘suffering’ (even if, prior to diagnosis, 
the person was experiencing all the symptoms of an illness anyway). This finding is 
an interesting one because it raises the question of why it should be the case that 
‘suffer’ relates to diagnosis but ‘experiencing’ the symptoms does not. I argue that a 
plausible reason for this conceptual difference is that along with a diagnosis comes a 
diagnostic label (e.g. ‘a schizophrenic’, ‘a bulimic’), and, as previous research has 
attested, those labels are stigmatising because such labels define the person by their 
illness. Indeed, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) recognised that the use 
of labels such as ‘schizophrenic’ in which the person is described by their illness “had 
the potential to promote bias, devalue others, and express negative attitudes” 
(Granello & Gibbs, 2016: 31; APA, 1992; Haghighat & Littlewood, 1995). 
An analysis of nouns that form the subject collocates of the lemmas ‘suffer’ and 
‘experience’ reveals that labels that define a person by their illness are more likely to 
occur with ‘suffer’ than ‘experience’. There are no instances in the MI 1984-2014 corpus 
in which a subject collocate of ‘experience’ is a label that defines a person by their 
illness. 
 
Subject collocate of ‘suffer’ MI score 
victim 7.14 
schizophrenic 4.97 
alcoholic 4.24 
anorexic 4.19 
TABLE 8.10. SUBJECT COLLOCATES OF THE LEMMA ‘SUFFER’ IN THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS.  
 
In addition to the APA’s identification of the problems associated with using language 
that defines people by their illness, Time to Change also state that such forms should 
be avoided. Knowing this then, Table 8.10 reveals again that ‘suffer’ is not just a 
problematic form on its own, but is also associated with problematic forms like 
‘schizophrenic’, ‘anorexic’ and ‘sufferer’ (recall also that ‘suffer’ was identified as a 
collocate of ‘victim’ in Section 8.4). ‘Suffer’ as a verb, then, is not just problematic 
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because it misinterprets many peoples’ experiences of mental illness (because it is 
possible to live well with a mental illness); arguably ‘suffer’ also provides a linguistic 
trigger for stigma creation and perpetuation in language. 
In section 8.4, I described ‘suffer’ in the prototypical text samples as a mental 
process (MP) and said I would return to the semantics of ‘suffer’ in this section. I will 
now summarise my findings so far and discuss them in relation to the transitivity 
categories outlined in the introduction to this chapter. 
So far in this chapter I have argued that ‘suffer’, unlike ‘experience’, occurs in 
contexts in which the Senser (i.e. the person suffering) has little or no agency in 
controlling their ‘suffering’. I evidenced this claim by showing concordances of ‘suffer 
from’ in the BNC (see Table 8.4). Furthermore, in this section I have argued that there 
is a conceptual difference between ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ which results in ‘suffer’ 
being used when referring to a diagnosable illness, and ‘experience’ being used when 
referring to symptoms. Consider, for example, ‘John suffered from bipolar disorder’ 
and ‘John experienced mood swings, low mood and delusions’. In this section I will 
examine in more detail the semantic and syntactic properties that I argue underlie the 
conceptual difference between ‘experience’ and ‘suffer’. I will do this by looking in 
specific detail at invented sentences to explore the semantic and syntactic possibilities 
of ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’. 
As previously stated in Section 8.4, ‘suffer’ in the examples shown in Table 8.2 is 
a mental process of perception, a process which requires a conscious and animate 
Senser and a Phenomenon (a state of mind or psychological event). Just like ‘suffer’, 
‘experience’ is also a mental process. An indication that both ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ 
are mental processes is that ‘experience’ can be used (in SFG terms) in the same way 
that ‘suffer’ can be used. Note that in terms of syntax, the two do not function in the 
same way because ‘experienced with’ is syntactically ungrammatical. Examples (A) 
and (B) show this:  
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(A) He suffered with depression [Senser + Mental Process + Phenomenon] 
(B) He experienced depression [Senser + Mental Process + Phenomenon] 
 
However, there is a difference between ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ that is not evident 
from examples (A) and (B). This difference is that unlike ‘experience’, which is always 
a mental process, ‘suffer’ can also be a material process (recall that material processes 
describe “doings or happenings” [Matthiessen & Halliday, 1997: 17] and have an 
Actor + Material Process + Goal configuration). As described in Table 8.1, material 
processes can be further subdivided into material supervention processes (hereafter 
MAS) where the process is unintentional (e.g. ‘the woman fell’), material action events 
(hereafter MAE) where the actor is inanimate (e.g. ‘time ran away with me’), and 
material intention processes (hereafter MAI) where the actor is animate and the 
process is intentional (e.g. ‘the woman wrote her thesis’). The reason that ‘experience’ 
cannot be a material process is because the process of ‘experiencing’ necessarily 
requires a conscious entity, but ‘suffering’ does not. Furthermore, unlike ‘suffer’ used 
in a mental process which is intransitive (i.e. does not require an object), the ‘suffer’ 
used in a material process is transitive; that is, it requires an object. Compare, for 
example, (A) and (B) with (C) and (D): 
 
(C) The fence suffered damage from the wind [Goal + MAE + Circumstance + Actor] 
(D) Ben suffered a broken leg [ Goal + MAS + Circumstance + ∅Actor] 
 
In (C) the process ’suffered’ is an MAE process because the Actor (the fence) is 
inanimate; in (D) the process ‘suffered’ is MAS because the Actor (Ben) is animate and 
the process is one that does not encode intention, i.e. people do not suffer broken legs 
intentionally. What (D) shows is that ‘suffer’ can function in a very similar way to the 
example shown in (A), but as a material action. If we try to do the same test for 
‘experience’, we see that it cannot be a material action. See for example, (E): 
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(E) The fence experienced damage from the wind*75  
 
I argue that in (E), ‘experience’ is semantically incongruous (and therefore 
semantically “unacceptable” if we are to borrow the parlance from syntax research – 
see footnote 75) because fences cannot ‘experience’ – they do not have consciousness 
as they are not animate.76 The point of showing these examples here is that I argue that 
they show that ‘suffer’ has very close contextual associations (as is the case in (D)) 
with mental processes which are in turn associated with inanimate, non-conscious 
actors with no agency; for example, ‘the fence’ in (C). In terms of the ideological effects 
of using ‘suffer’ over ‘experience’, then, it could be argued that ‘suffer’ can be used as 
a device to represent the ‘having’ of mental illness in a way that reduces the person’s 
agency in mental processes because of its association with non-conscious things 
without agency77. 
In addition to there being a conceptual difference between ‘suffer’ and 
‘experience’, however, there also appears to be a further conceptual difference 
between ‘suffer’ and ‘suffer from’. For example, consider the semantic differences 
between [suffer + preposition] (i.e. where suffer is intransitive) and [suffer + noun] (i.e. 
where suffer is transitive) in examples (F) – (I): 
  
	
75 As is the convention in syntax research, I use an asterisk to denote that the sentence described is 
unacceptable. However, in this context the acceptability is based on semantic in/congruity and not 
syntactic in/congruity. 
76 The reader may at this point be thinking about other examples where ‘experience’ is acceptable 
with inanimate actors; for example, “Flight 123A experienced extreme turbulence”. In cases such as 
this one, I would argue that the nominal group constituting the Actor (the Flight 123A) is a 
metonymic substitution and actually refers not to the plane but the passengers. As such, I think my 
point above is still sound. 
77 The reader may argue that ‘suffer’ can also appear in material actions of intention processes, such as 
“she didn’t suffer fools”, and therefore my point about ‘suffers’’ association with agentless actors may 
be weakened because in this context, ‘suffer’ does encode intention. However, I argue that this is an 
idiomatic usage and is therefore an exception.	
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 Sentence Syntactic 
Properties 
Proposition 
(F) Ben suffered a broken leg Transitive 
Verb + NP  
(MAS) 
 
Ben sustained a broken 
leg 
(G) Ben suffered with a broken 
leg 
Intransitive  
Verb + PP  
(MP) 
Ben suffered with the 
effects of his broken leg, 
e.g. his (mental) 
experience of dealing 
with a broken leg 
(H) The table suffered a broken 
leg 
Transitive 
Verb + NP 
(MAE) 
The chair sustained a 
broken leg 
(I) The chair suffered with a 
broken leg* 
Intransitive  
Verb + PP (no 
transitivity 
classification)  
Semantically incongruous 
– a chair cannot suffer 
with something  
TABLE 8.11. INVENTED SENTENCES FOR [SUFFER + PP] AND [SUFFER + NP] 
 
Table 8.11 shows that in the cases where the verb ‘suffer’ is followed by a preposition, 
the thing(s) being suffered from relate to mental experiences or affective states (e.g. 
requiring some cognition) because the meaning of (F) is distinct from (G). The reason 
for this, then, must be the addition of a preposition. Example (I) provides further 
evidence for this interpretation as (I) is semantically incongruous, which suggests that 
‘suffering with’ cannot be a process attributable to an inanimate object. Put simply, 
this finding suggests that ‘suffer + preposition’ indicates a mental process. In light of 
this finding, consider examples (J) and (K) below, which relate to suffering in a mental 
health context: 
 
(J) Ben suffered with depression 
(K) The bulimia she suffered from 
 
Like the majority of the instances of ‘suffer’ in the prototypical text sample, examples 
(J) and (K) show a preference for describing the suffering of mental health conditions 
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as ‘suffering from’ something rather than ‘suffering’ something, e.g. ‘suffering from 
bulimia’ and not ‘suffering bulimia’. What the findings in Table 8.11 suggest is that it 
is not just that there is a tendency in the language for diagnosable illnesses to be 
‘suffered’ rather than ‘experienced’; in addition, there also appears to be a tendency 
for linguistically encoded mental illnesses to be ‘suffered from’ and physical illnesses 
to be ‘suffered’. This is an interpretively interesting tendency because it suggests that 
there is not just a conceptual distinction between ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ but also a 
conceptual difference between mental ‘suffering’ and the ‘suffering’ caused by 
physical things. This could be taken as linguistic evidence for a perceived duality 
between physical/mental illnesses, i.e. physical illnesses are ‘suffered’ and mental 
illnesses (or the mental effects of physical illness) are ‘suffered from’. Examples (F) 
and (G) support this interpretation as do the R1 noun collocates of ‘suffer’ and ‘suffer 
from’ in the BNC (see Table 8.12).  
 
R1 noun collocates of  
‘suffer’ in BNC 
 R1 noun collocates of  
‘suffer from’ in BNC 
1 fools 1 asthma 
2 injury 2 chronic 
3 damage 3 stress 
4 pain 4 malnutrition 
5 loss 5 severe 
6 death 6 lack 
7 torture 7 mental 
9 harm 8 having 
8 withdrawal 9 animosity 
9 losses 10 incontinence  
TABLE 8.12. R1 NOUN COLLOCATES OF ‘SUFFER’ AND ‘SUFFER FROM’ IN THE BNC.  
 
Table 8.12 shows that the hypothesis that mental suffering is ‘suffered from’ and 
physical suffering is ‘suffered’ appears to bear out in the language generally. For 
example, the things being ‘suffered’ in the BNC have a tendency to relate to physical 
things such as ‘damage’, ‘loss’ and ‘torture’. In comparison, things that are described 
as being ‘suffered from’ appear to have a tendency to relate to non-physical things, 
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e.g. ‘stress’, ‘mental’ and ‘animosity’. It is the case, of course, that mental and physical 
‘causes’ can both result in mental illness, and therefore what I present here is 
simplistic, but Table 8.12 and the examples given above do, I argue, provide evidence 
for the perception that there is a duality. Moreover, it is important to state that this 
lexicogrammatical quirk is just that – a quirk; it is a tendency rather than a rule and 
there are examples in the corpus that contradict this interpretation; for example, “the 
frequent result is that the wife suffers depression’ (1987), “he still suffers depression, 
but rarely acutely” (2002). However, a concordance search for ‘suffers depression’ (40 
instances; 0.7 pmw) vs. ‘suffers from depression’ (310 instances; 5.29 pmw) reveals a 
marked tendency in the corpus to refer to ‘suffering’ using the latter structure. 
We may now consider where ‘experience’ fits here. To do this, I will summarise 
my findings of ‘suffer’, ‘suffer from’ and ‘experience’ so far. My findings include that 
‘experience’ is not necessarily positive or negative, whereas ‘suffer’ does occur in 
negative contexts. Furthermore, ‘experience’ necessarily requires a conscious entity in 
order to be semantically congruous, whereas ‘suffer’ does not (note that 
grammatically a non-conscious entity can ‘experience’ things). I have also argued that, 
unlike ‘suffer’ which is not temporally fixed (rather it appears to relate to a state of 
indefinite ‘suffering’), ‘experience’ does appear to be temporally fixed. Finally, I 
argued that there appears to be a tendency in the language generally for ‘suffer’ to 
occur with physical things, whereas ‘suffer from’ occurs with non-physical things. 
Taking these findings together, we may categorise the features of ‘experience’, 
‘suffer’ and ‘suffer from’ in a feature matrix as follows: 
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experience suffer suffer [+ prep] 
+ animate +/- animate +/- animate 
– negative + negative + negative 
+ mental +/- mental + mental 
+ bounded  – bounded  + bounded 
TABLE 8.13. FEATURE MATRIX FOR ‘EXPERIENCE’, ‘SUFFER’ AND ‘SUFFER + PREPOSITION’ 
 
One of the reasons that Table 8.13 is illuminating (other than the fact that it allows for 
the description of how ‘suffer’, ‘experience’ and ‘suffer from’ are used in the corpus 
and in general language corpora) is that it provides a more nuanced meaning of the 
verb ‘suffer’. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) lists several senses of 
‘suffer’ which are related by identical etymologies (from Latin sub-ferre). The 
grammatical difference between the senses of ‘suffer’ are to do with whether the verb 
takes a grammatical object. For example: 
 
Sense Definition Example usage  
Suffer, v. (transitive) To undergo, endure “Every one who does wrong is 
to suffer punishment by way of 
admonition.” 
Suffer, v. 
(intransitive) 
To undergo or submit 
to pain, punishment, 
or death. 
“She was suffering from what she 
was pleased to call a fit of 
depression.” 
 
TABLE 8.14. SENSES, DEFINITION AND EXAMPLE USAGES FOR ‘SUFFER’ (TAKEN FROM THE 
OED) 
 
Table 8.14 shows that there is little discernible difference between the senses of ‘suffer’ 
(intransitive) and ‘suffer’ (transitive). For example, both describe suffering as being 
concerned with enduring things and undergoing things. Knowing this, I argue that 
the analysis in this chapter has consistently shown (in the MI 1984-2014 corpus and 
the BNC) that there is a difference between ‘[suffer’+ noun] (transitive) and [suffer + 
prep] (intransitive), namely that [suffer + prep] has a tendency to occur in contexts in 
which the suffering relates to a non-physical thing (i.e. mental), e.g. ‘suffer from 
depression’, whereas [‘suffer + noun] occurs in material acts, e.g. ‘suffered a broken 
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leg’. As such, the analysis I have conducted here provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the verb ‘suffer’. Moreover, what I have shown here builds on 
previous research in linguistic anthropology and linguistics on the semantic content 
of ‘suffer’, such as that of Shweder who states that “suffering is a state of mind” 
(Shweder, 2003: 76), and that of Wierzbicka (2016) who in her explication of the 
differences between ‘suffering’ and ‘pain’ states that “suffering implies consciousness 
whereas pain does not” (Wierzbicka, 2016:29). My findings suggest that ‘suffering’ is 
not always state of mind as Shweder (2003) suggests (because inanimate objects can 
suffer things), and does not necessarily imply consciousness (as Wierzbicka (2016 
suggests) for the same reason. It is the case, however, that [‘suffer’ + prep] is a mental 
state and implies consciousness because ‘suffer from’ usually occurs in a mental 
process, i.e. with a Senser and Phenomenon. 
By way of an overview of the syntactic features of ‘[suffer’+ noun] (transitive) 
and [suffer + prep] (intransitive) described above, and the semantic features described 
in the feature matrix (Table 8.13), Table 8.15 provides a delineation of a set of 
lexicogrammatical heuristics: 
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SENSE 1: Suffer, v. transitive 
[subject = animate; object = concrete] à event is material and 
bounded  
 
Examples: 
Ben suffered a broken leg 
Ben suffered a twisted ankle 
Ben suffered a fall* 
 
NB: in some cases where an NP complement of a PP is bounded the 
resulting clause can be semantically marked, e.g.  
‘Ben suffered from a ball to the face’, however if the temporally 
bound event may have lasting consequences then it is acceptable, e.g. 
‘Ben suffered from a blow to the head’ 	
* semantically marked 
subject = animate; object = 
abstract] à event is mental and 
bounded 
 
Examples: 
Helen suffered intense pain 
Helen suffered toothache 
Helen suffered embarrassment 
 
subject = inanimate; object = 
concrete] à event is material 
and bounded 
 
Examples: 
The car suffered a serious engine 
failure 
The fence suffered wind damage  
The house suffered water damage 
 
N.B. As stated earlier, inanimate 
objects cannot appear with 
abstract subjects e.g., the fence 
suffered embarrassment* 
SENSE 2: Suffer, v. intransitive 
[subject = animate; object = 
concrete] à event is mental and 
unbounded 
 
Examples: 
Ben suffered from a broken leg 
Ben suffered from a twisted ankle 
Ben suffered from a fall 
 
[subject = animate; object = 
abstract] à event is mental and 
unbounded 
 
Examples: 
Helen suffered from intense pain 
Helen suffered from toothache 
Helen suffered from embarrassment 
 
[subject = inanimate; object = 
concrete]à event is material and 
unbounded 
 
Examples: 
The car suffered from a serious 
engine failure 
The fence suffered from wind 
damage  
The house suffered from water 
damage 
[subject = inanimate; object = 
NONE] à event is mental and 
unbounded 
 
Examples: 
John suffered 
It suffered  
The car suffered* 
 
* semantically marked 
TABLE 8.15. LEXICOGRAMMATICAL HEURISTICS FOR ‘SUFFER’ 
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Taking all the information detailed in Table 8.15 together, it makes sense that a 
diagnosable condition, which is by its very nature unbounded (i.e. not temporally 
fixed; rather, boundless), will appear with ‘Sense 2’ (intransitive ‘suffer’). In contrast, 
symptoms, which may be bounded (e.g. ‘suffered from a bout of depression’), or may 
not be bounded (‘suffered a bout of depression’) may appear with both senses. 
In this section, I have discussed the conceptual differences between ‘experience’ 
and ‘suffer’. I argued that this difference was to do with the diagnostic status of the 
Senser in the clause. Specially, I argued that the corpus revealed a tendency to refer to 
‘experiencing’ symptoms of an illness whereas diagnosable conditions (such as, for 
example, schizophrenia) are described as being ‘suffered’ from. I also showed that, 
unlike ‘experience’, ‘suffer’ collocates with labels that both the American Psychiatric 
Association and the anti-stigma initiative Time to Change have both identified as 
problematic ways to refer to people with mental health, such as ‘schizophrenic’ and 
‘anorexic’. Furthermore, I have argued that there is also a lexicogrammatical 
difference between ‘suffer’ in intransitive and transitive contexts. Specifically, I 
argued that there is a tendency in the corpus, and in general language corpora, for 
[‘suffer’ + noun] to refer to suffering from physical things (e.g. a broken leg), and for 
[‘suffer’ + prep] to exhibit a tendency to be used to refer to affective states of suffering 
mentally. I argued that this tendency could provide some linguistic evidence for the 
notion that there is a perceived duality between physical/mental illnesses. 
In the next section, I bring together the findings of this chapter and offer some 
further points for discussion.  
 
8.6. Conclusion 
 
I started this chapter by introducing transitivity analysis and its utility for analysing 
ideology in texts. I also introduced Halliday’s (1998) argument that a language is a 
theory of human experience and that “in order to understand any complex aspect of 
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the human condition it is helpful to think about it grammatically” because “the 
boundary between the semiotic and the material worlds is by no means totally 
impermeable.“ (Halliday, 1998: 2). I used Halliday’s point about the link between the 
material and semiotic worlds (viz. the social world and language respectively) to 
argue that it was this link that formed the basis of many anti-stigma initiatives that 
prescribe language use in order to change the way mental illness is discussed in the 
media. I then explored the verb ‘suffer’ which I identified as a frequently used verb in 
the sample of prototypical texts (occurring in 11 out of 31 texts). I analysed the 
lexicogrammatical function of ‘suffer’ and showed that ‘suffer’ was a mental process 
of perception in the sample taking a Senser, Process, Phenomenon configuration. I 
showed that in the sample from the MI 1984-2014 corpus, and in general language 
corpora, ‘suffer’ occurred in contexts in which the Senser has little or no control over 
their suffering, and that suffering was negative. I then explored the verb ‘experience’ 
because this word has been identified by the UK anti-stigma initiative Time to Change 
as a less stigmatising way to describe having mental illness than ‘suffer’. My analysis 
of ‘experience’ showed that ‘experience’, unlike ‘suffer’, did occur in contexts where 
people had control over the thing they were experiencing. Furthermore, I argued that 
the discursive role created by ‘experience’, i.e. ‘experiencer’, encoded greater agency 
than the discursive role created by ‘suffer’, i.e. a sufferer. I also showed that ‘suffer’ 
collocates with other problematic labels such as ‘schizophrenic’ and ‘anorexic‘ (which 
identify a person by their illness), as well as ‘victim’. An analysis of self-reflexive uses 
of [I + suffer] vs. [I + experience] also reveals that ‘suffer’ is proportionally less likely 
to be used in first-person narratives because ‘suffering’ is attributed to people with 
mental illness by others e.g. medical professionals, in reported speech. I also argued 
that my corpus and the BNC reveal a conceptual difference between ‘suffer’ and 
‘experience’ that is concerned with the diagnostic status of the Senser in the process. 
Specifically, I found that ‘experience’ was more likely to occur in relation to 
symptoms, whereas ‘suffer’ was more likely to occur where the Sensor has a diagnosis 
of an illness. Further to this, I argued that the MI 1984-2014 corpus revealed that there 
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is not just a conceptual difference between ‘experience’ and ‘suffer’ but also ‘suffer’ 
and ‘suffer with/from’. I explored this difference and demonstrated that there is a 
tendency in the MI 1984-2014 corpus and the BNC for ‘suffer’ (intransitive) to occur in 
contexts where the suffering is material (i.e. physical), while ‘suffer’ (transitive) has a 
tendency to occur in mental processes and relate to affective states, e.g. mental 
suffering. 
 I did this analysis to answer the research question ‘What processes are associated 
with mental illness?’ What my analysis has found, then, is that ‘suffering’ is a frequent 
and salient process associated with mental illness, whereas ‘experience’ is less 
common. Despite this, a linguistic analysis of the instances of ‘experience’ in the 
corpus reveal it to better represent the reality of having a mental illness because it 
encodes agency and consciousness and implies learnedness. Moreover, I have shown 
that the way ‘suffer’ is used (i.e. intransitive = material suffering vs. transitive = mental 
suffering) reveals linguistic evidence for a perceived duality between mental and 
physical suffering, and by extension, mental and physical illness. 
In Chapter 5, I reviewed the existing literature on the representation of mental 
illness in the press. I argued that whilst there are many studies investigating stigma 
in mental illness reporting, those studies do not account for how stigma is discursively 
created. Often, stigma in the previous literature was predicated on the topic matter of 
the articles as a whole, such as whether the articles described mental illness in the 
context of criminality or violence. Clearly, this macro, thematic analysis of stigma in 
mental illness reporting is useful and provides insight into the salient features of the 
stigmatisation process in articles reporting on mental illness. However, none of the 
previous research provides a comprehensive account of how language has the 
potential to shape our perception of the world by creating and perpetuating stigma. 
Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, the Time to Change media guidelines (e.g. 
avoid ‘suffer’ and instead use ‘experience’) are not based on any linguistic research, 
and as a result the suggestion that ‘suffering’ is more problematic than ‘experiencing’ 
must be based on dictionary definitions and intuitive responses to these words, rather 
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than the analytical findings of a linguistic study. Recent research that forms part of the 
Time to Change campaign from 2016 does feature references to ‘pejorative language’ in 
their coding schema as a ‘stigmatising element’ (Rhydderch et al., 2016); however, this 
term is never explained, and no part of the research describes what constitutes 
pejorative language, or how the research team coded for it. Existing research 
commissioned by Time to Change, then, is thematic (in that the analysis takes place at 
the level of the article rather than at the level of the word/clause/sentence) and is 
primarily quantitative78. 
In bringing attention to this fact, I do not wish to suggest that I disagree with 
Time to Change’s assessments about ‘suffer’ or replacing ‘suffer’ with ‘experience’. I 
believe it is a sensible intuition and one that I agree with as a user of the language. 
What I do believe, however, is that linguistic research should underpin such 
prescriptions. I argue that the research I have conducted here into the choices that 
journalists make when representing the process of experiencing mental illnesses as 
‘suffering’ provides this because it offers evidence that supports Time to Change’s 
suggestion that ‘experiencing’ is a more appropriate form than ‘suffering’. I argue that 
the findings reported in this chapter, for example the collocational associations 
between words like ‘suffer’ and ‘schizophrenic’, ‘anorexic’ and ‘victim’, are evidence 
of the pernicious and subtle textual associations that create stigma. Micro linguistic 
analysis, then, provides a method that is more nuanced than thematic analysis of the 
kind reported in the existing research. Moreover, nuanced textual analysis of this kind 
is precisely what Halliday describes when he writes that the experiential basis of 
language is concerned with “patterns of meaning that are installed in the brain” 
(Halliday, 2003: 15). Knowing this, the contribution of this chapter is not only to give 
greater insight into salient processes associated with mental illness, but also to 
illuminate nuanced textual associations that could be said to create stigma. 
	
78 This is something that the research manager at Time to Change is aware of, and Time to Change are 
interested in different methods (Time to Change, personal communication, September 26, 2017). 
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In the next chapter I explore whether news articles accurately portray the symptoms 
of mental illnesses.  
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9. Do newspaper reports accurately represent the symptoms 
of mental illness? 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
So far in this thesis, I have explored the terms ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ and 
showed how their meanings have changed over the time period covered by the 
corpus. I have also demonstrated the utility of linguistic analysis for revealing 
ideological meaning through naming practices in Chapter 7 and through transitivity 
analysis in Chapter 8. These previous chapters have exemplified a bottom-up 
approach in that they have let the data reveal how mental illness is discussed in the 
press. In these chapters, I have made very little reference to the medical context or 
reality of mental illness, as my aim was merely to describe the way in which mental 
illness is discussed in the corpus. For example, I have reported that particular naming 
strategies appear to be more closely associated with particular illnesses, but I have not 
spent a great deal of time dealing with whether this association is grounded in the 
reality of the illness, e.g. whether the illness affects these particular people more than 
others. In this chapter, then, I will depart from a purely linguistic analysis and move 
on to an analysis that is informed by the medical context in which these illnesses lie. 
In doing so, I address the following research question listed in the introduction to this 
thesis:  
 
5. Is the depiction of mental illness realistic?  
5.1. Are the symptoms of each disorder type (e.g. depressive illnesses) 
accurately portrayed in the press? 
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My intention is that the findings in this chapter will be useful to linguists interested 
in mental health discourse and practitioners engaged in the field of mental health 
alike. Moreover, I hope that these findings will begin, in some small sense, to provide 
insight into which areas to target to make the reporting of mental illness more 
realistic.  
However, before I conduct my analysis, it is worth explaining my use of the 
terms ‘realistic’ and ‘accurate’ in relation to the reporting of the symptoms of mental 
illnesses. The first point to note is my own understanding of these terms in this 
context. I take ‘realistic’ and ‘accurate’ to refer to the how closely the press report the 
symptoms as stipulated by Mind and by the NHS; that is, if a press report of a mental 
illness includes the list of symptoms of that illness given by Mind or the NHS then it 
is a realistic report of that illness. Interpreting and analysing 'realistic’ in this way 
provides parameters for my analysis; however, I am aware that the clinically 
recognised symptoms (i.e. those symptoms listed by the NHS) are general and 
therefore imperfect. For instance, it is important to note that there is sometimes a 
distinction between being scientifically accurate and reflecting a person’s lived 
experience.  That is, a person with a mental illness may not experience that illness (i.e. 
through the symptoms they experience) in the way described by clinicians. 
Nonetheless, in order to ensure the replicability and falsifiability of my analysis, I 
have chosen to use the symptoms listed by Mind and the NHS. Furthermore, this 
analysis constitutes one of the first explorations of the representation of symptoms in 
news reports. As such, my analysis is intended to provide a baseline measure of how 
the press discuss the symptoms of mental illnesses. As Filer (2019: 7) writes 
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“it would be a grave mistake to dismiss any of this as unimportant. Yes, it’s a 
dispute about language, but in the mad, mad, world of mental healthcare 
language is everything. A simple truth […] is that the overwhelming majority of 
psychiatric diagnosis aren’t arrived at by looking at blood tests or brain scans 
or anything of the sort. Rather, it is the words people say – or do not say – as 
interpreted by professionals, that as much as anything else will determine a 
diagnosis 
 
(Filer, 2019: 7) 
 
In addition to the points above about being realistic, we need also to consider the 
extent to which news reporting can be expected to be ‘accurate’. By ‘accurate’ I mean 
the degree to which a newspaper represents the symptoms (recall that by this I mean 
clinical symptoms) of mental illnesses. Although there are constraints on news reports, 
such as article length and news values (Bednarek & Caple, 2017), it is not unreasonable 
to expect journalists to observe a baseline level of accuracy in their reports due to the 
fact that part of the purpose of the press is to inform. It is also important to note that 
being accurate is not simply about what is included in an article, but also what is 
routinely omitted.  
The way I bring together the medical knowledge of mental illnesses and 
language about mental illnesses is via two analytical processes, each containing 
several steps. The processes are designed to include linguistic analysis that is enriched 
by information about the real-world context of mental illness; in particular, the 
statistics about, and symptomology of, particular mental illnesses. Combining these 
processes allows for the exploration of the linguistic representations of mental illness 
(i.e. whether the symptoms of a particular illness are represented accurately). The 
reason for exploring symptoms specifically is that the inaccurate representation of 
symptoms of mental illnesses in the press has been identified by Wahl et al. (2002) as 
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a means of contributing to stigma around mental illnesses. In their research, Wahl et 
al. (2002) analysed 300 articles (collected using the generic search term ‘mental illness’) 
to identify various themes that contributed to whether mental illness reportage had 
changed over time (specifically whether it has become less stigmatised). Wahl et al. 
(2002) noted that despite the significant body of research into negative portrayals of 
mental illness (e.g. associations between mental illness and violence or criminality) 
some aspects of mental illness reportage had been neglected in the previous literature. 
They write  
 
little attention has been paid in previous research as to whether or not 
psychiatric labels are explained or defined (for example providing information 
about the symptoms or behaviors that characterize the mental illness 
mentioned 
 
(Wahl et al. 2002: 13) 
 
Despite identifying this gap in the existing research, Wahl et al. (2002), only analysed 
whether any symptoms were present in the articles (a simple yes or no on their coding 
scheme) and not what constituted the symptoms, or whether the symptoms were 
accurate or not. As a result of this methodological decision, Wahl et al. (2002) were 
only able to report that it was rare for news articles to include symptoms of mental 
illnesses. The analysis conducted in this chapter, then, can enrich Wahl et al’s (2002) 
study in two ways. First, the data is more specific than the data Wahl et al. (2002) used 
(i.e. it is illness-specific) which means that the data I analyse in this chapter is more 
likely to contain references to symptoms because it contains articles on specific 
illnesses and not articles reporting on mental illness generally. Moreover, the MI 1984-
corpus is larger and more representative of mental illness discourse than Wahl et al’s 
(2002) data. Second, the corpus linguistic methods I use in this chapter are more 
systematic and rigorous than the thematic analysis conducted by Wahl et al. (2002) 
who rely on the interpretation qualitative data. Adopting methods from (corpus) 
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linguistics (e.g. keyness analysis) allows for the comparison of particular features of 
the language (e.g. whether a series of texts discusses a particular symptom) across 
large datasets  
Table 9.1 outlines the analytical processes I use to explore whether the 
symptoms of mental illnesses are (accurately) represented in the MI 1984-2014 corpus.  
 
Process 1: 
Exploring the social reality of 
illness(es) 
Process 2: 
Exploring the linguistic manifestation of 
illness(es) 
1. Generate list of mental 
illnesses in culture under 
investigation (here Anglo-
western, British) 
2. Group illnesses into 
disorder types (e.g. 
personality disorders or 
trauma disorders 
informed by DSM-V) 
3. Check symptomology for 
each illness type 
(informed by Mind A-Z of 
Mental Health 
 
 
1. Compile subcorpora to target specific 
mental illnesses (done using method 
outlined in Chapter 5) 
2. Use corpus linguistic analytical tools to: 
a. Generate a keyword list and key 
semantic domain list for each 
illness subcorpus to see whether 
the specific corpus contains 
words in keeping with 
symptoms 
b. Compare findings from steps 2a 
with the most prototypical text in 
the corpus 
c. Use concordance analysis using 
syntactic search frame [query 
term and…] to see what 
symptoms, or other mental 
illnesses the query term is being 
textually equated with 
d. Conduct sketch thesaurus search 
to compare findings 
TABLE 9.1. PROCESS OUTLINE FOR COMPARING THE SOCIAL REALITY OF THE MENTAL ILLNESS 
DISCOURSE DOMAIN WITH THE LINGUISTIC MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DISCOURSE DOMAIN 
 
The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to working through the processes outlined 
in Table 9.1. 
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9.2. Grouping mental illnesses 
 
In Chapter 5, I introduced ‘Figure 5.1 Lexical items grouped by disorder type as categorised 
in DSM-V’ that detailed how the mental illnesses covered in the corpus are grouped 
according to disorder type. I compiled the figure using a range of information I 
collected from the Mind A-Z of Mental Health and the description of the illnesses listed 
in the DSM-V. A slightly amended version of this figure is shown below (Figure 9.1). 
It is important to note that the groupings of the illnesses do vary according to which 
source you consult. For example, Mind describe OCD as an anxiety disorder, whereas 
DSM-V describes it as an obsessive compulsive disorder. I have taken the grouping 
listed by DSM-V in the majority of cases. The variation in the groupings serves as 
evidence that greater transparency is needed in how mental illnesses are named (and 
therefore the associations they trigger in the minds of the people reading literature on 
them). Moreover, such groupings have changed over time and continue to change 
between the editions of the DSM. One example of this is PTSD (posttraumatic stress 
disorder) which was, until DSM-V, listed as an anxiety disorder not a trauma disorder 
(McNally, 2009). With this variation in mind, the categories listed in the DSM-V and 
the Mind A-Z of Mental Health serve as rough groupings rather than exact categories. 
Moreover, researchers of mental health and illness have to be mindful of the unfixed 
and culturally specific nature of mental illness. Mind write on the subject of describing 
mental health problems in different cultures: 
 
Different cultures have different approaches to mental health and mental 
illness. Most western countries agree on a similar set of clinical diagnoses and 
treatments for mental health problems. However, cultures in which there are 
other traditions or beliefs may not use these terms[.] 
(Mind, 2019d) 
 
Knowing this, all groupings and linguistic descriptions of mental disorders (i.e. labels) 
are imperfect (cf. the research reported in Chapter 2 by van Os (2016) who argues that 
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the label ‘schizophrenia’ doesn’t exist79). This notwithstanding, the categories outlined 
in Figure 9.1 do provide a reflection of the different mental disorder types used by 
medical professionals, and as a result, offer a starting point from which to analyse the 
linguistic patterns within each disorder type. It should be noted that any grouping of 
this kind is always a simplification of the whole picture (where many illnesses share 
symptoms with others and many people who experience a specific mental illness will 
also experience other mental illnesses). In addition to showing the different groups of 
mental disorders and how specific illnesses fit within them. Figure 9.1 details the 
illness subcorpora I use in this chapter to target texts discussing disorder types. For 
example, depressive disorders include depression, seasonal affective disorder (SAD) 
and postnatal depression (PND); however, I only used the depression subcorpus as 
the target corpus. The reason for this decision is a practical one: Wmatrix (Rayson 
2008), the corpus tool I use in this chapter to conduct keyness analyses has a limit on 
the size of corpus that can be uploaded to the tool. Wmatrix’s size limit precluded me 
from merging some of the corpora (e.g. the Depression corpus and the SAD corpus) 
because together the two would exceed Wmatrix’s limit. Moreover, the illness 
subcorpus creation procedure was designed to group illnesses and not to split them. 
For this reason, some illness corpora include all the distinct illnesses within the 
disorder type. An example of this is the BipolarDisorder Corpus which contains 
articles reporting on bipolar disorder, hypomania and hypermania. The reason for this 
is that hypermania and hypomania are both symptoms of bipolar disorder in addition 
to being separate illnesses. Furthermore, the illness subcorpus creation procedure 
outlined in Chapter 5 means that it is reasonable to expect that articles on specific 
illness within a disorder type (e.g. SAD and PND) would be included in the more 
general corpus (e.g. depression). Appendices 9.3 and 9.4 provide information about 
	79	van Os’s point is that schizophrenia, unlike other psychotic disorders, is given its own label. The 
labelling of schizophrenia and not other psychotic disorders suggests that schizophrenia is a discrete 
illness when he argues it is not.		
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the illness subcorpora, what search terms each illness subcorpus contains and the 
workflow procedure for the illness subcorpora compilation 
 
FIGURE 9.1. ILLNESSES GROUPED BY DISORDER TYPE AS CATEGORISED IN DSM-V WITH 
RELEVANT TARGET CORPUS. 	
Trauma	Disorders	Post-traumatic	Stress	Disorder				Corpus:	PTSD	Corpus	
Eating	Disorders	Bulimia	Anorexia	Binge	eating	disorder	
Depressive	Disorders	Depression	Seasonal	Affective	Disorder	-	(depression	with	seasonal	pattern)	Postnatal	Depression		
Psychotic	Disorders	Psychosis	Schizophrenia	 Anxiety	Disorders	Agoraphobia	Social	Phobia	
Bipolar	Disorders	Bipolar	Mania	Hypomania	Hypermania	
Obsessive	Compulsive	
Disorders	Obsessive	Compulsive	Disorder	Body	Dismorphia	
Dissociative	Disorders	Dissociative	identity	disorder		
		
Corpus:	DID	Corpus	 Corpus:	BipolarDisorder	
Corpus	
Corpus:	OCD	Corpus	
Corpus:	Psychosis	Corpus	 Corpus:	Anxiety	Corpus	 Corpus:	EatingDisorder	Corpus	
Corpus:	Depression	Corpus	
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Figure 9.1 shows the list of illness contained in the corpus grouped by disorder type. 
For example, bulimia, anorexia and binge eating disorder are all categorised as eating 
disorders. Figure 9.1 provides us with the information needed to fulfil steps A and B 
in Process 1 (outlined in Table 9.1). The next step is to gather information about the 
symptoms of each illness. For clarity, Process 1, Step 3 will be completed by disorder 
type (i.e. in disorder group). 
Sections 9.3 – 9.10 will explore the how the symptoms of each illness or disorder 
type are represented in the corpora. These sections will describe the symptoms of each 
illness contained within each disorder type using keyness analysis as an indication of 
the symptoms covered in the corpus, before moving on to the linguistic representation 
of each illness type, i.e. through linguistic analysis Steps 2a and 2b. Section 9.11 will 
bring together analyses conducted in sections 9.3-9.10 and will explore whether the 
keyness analysis findings are supported by collocation analysis. Section 9.10 will be 
concerned with Steps 2c and 2d in Table 9.1. I do not analyse autism spectrum 
disorders in this chapter because I am not concerned with autism as a condition in 
itself; the Autism corpus was created purely as a means of collecting data pertaining 
to mental illnesses due to the higher incidence of mental illness in people with autism. 
Furthermore, I do not analyse personality disorders in this chapter due to there being 
noise in the corpus which prohibits keyness comparisons. 
 
9.3. Trauma disorders 
 
In this section, I discuss the top keywords and key semantic domains in the PTSD 
corpus in relation to the symptoms of PTSD. Trauma disorders are categorised by 
symptoms including flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, irritability, aggressive behavior 
and being jumpy or easily startled. PTSD is often caused by some form of trauma such 
as a car crash, being attacked or being in combat and can be described as ‘delayed-
onset PTSD’ (where symptoms occur after six months of the trauma), ‘complex 
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PTSD80’ (where the trauma happened at an early age or lasted for a long time) and 
‘birth trauma’ (where the PTSD is caused by a traumatic childbirth). Often people with 
a diagnosis of PTSD also experience other mental illnesses including anxiety 
disorders, depression and dissociative disorders (Mind, 2019e) As a result of the links 
between PTSD and these other mental disorders, it may be the case that the language 
used to describe PTSD in the PTSD corpus overlaps somewhat with the language used 
to describe these other illnesses. Furthermore, PTSD UK (2019) state that “[A]nyone 
can be diagnosed with PTSD, and it’s estimated that 1 in 10 people develop PTSD. 1 
in 5 firefighters, 1 in 3 teenagers who have survived a horrific car crash, 70% of rape 
victims, 2 in 3 prisoners of war, 40% of people who experienced a sudden death of a 
loved one, and an estimated 10,000 women a year following a traumatic childbirth, 
develop PTSD”. Knowing this, we can expect that the possible causes of PTSD that are 
represented in the corpus will be varied. 
The first steps according to Process 2 are to conduct keyness analysis at the 
level of the lexical item (keywords) and at the semantic level (key semantic domains), 
as such analyses make it possible to ascertain whether the symptoms of PTSD are 
represented in the language used about PTSD. The reason for such an analysis is to 
ascertain whether the depiction of symptoms is realistic in the corpus. Exploring 
whether the symptoms of illnesses are present and realistically described is important 
because arguably, a realistic depiction or description of an illness requires some 
discussion of symptoms to a) properly convey the experience of PTSD, and b) convey 
information to the public about the condition in order to help people who may be 
living with the condition (a realistic depiction of the symptoms of the illness allows 
people to determine whether they or someone they know may have it). 
	
80 Mind (2019) state that complex PTSD is a new term and some professionals instead refer to this type 
of PTSD as ‘enduring personality change after catastrophic experience’ (EPCACE) or ‘disorders of 
extreme stress not otherwise specified’ (DESNOS). 
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The keyness analysis I conduct in this chapter uses corpora (rather than 
individual texts) as the target and reference unit for comparison. Due to this, the 
keyness analysis reported is an abstraction from the individual articles (i.e. keyness 
results are based on statistical significance from the data as a whole and not on the 
individual texts). In order to address any potential disparity between the results of the 
keyness analyses and the content of the individual texts, I enrich my keyness analysis 
with qualitative analysis using the most prototypical text in the PTSD corpus to 
ascertain whether the keyness findings are supported by qualitative evidence. In order 
to do this, I use ProtAnt (Anthony & Baker, 2015) which is a tool that finds the most 
prototypical text (here the individual newspaper article) in a collection of texts (here 
the relevant illness subcorpus) based on the number of keywords each text contains 
compared with a reference corpus. Using a combination of keyness analyses and 
whole texts in my analysis (as opposed to relying wholly on keyness analysis) also 
counters the possible over-reliance on researcher-created units of analysis (i.e. 
corpora) at the expense of naturally occurring data (texts), a practice which 
researchers have previously argued can cause analysts to ‘miss the trees for the forest’ 
(Egbert & Schnur, 2018: 159). Furthermore, there is precedent for using prototypicality 
as a means of capturing texts that are representative of particular language feature or 
topic in discourse analytic research (Anthony & Baker, 2015) and research into news 
discourse (Bednarek & Caple, 2017: 146). 
Table 9.2 shows the top 30 keywords in the PTSD corpus compared with all the 
other illness subcorpora minus the “MentalIllness’ corpus. The reason for not 
including the MentalIllness corpus in the keyword comparison is that the 
MentalIllness corpus is a general corpus of mental illness in which articles that 
reference mental illness or mental health generally are. Due to the fact that I wanted 
to compare specific illness subcorpora with specific illness subcorpora (and therefore 
increase the possibility of that I retrieved more specific keywords), I opted to not 
include the MentalIllness corpus. Table 9.3 shows the top 30 key semantic domains in 
the PTSD corpus compared with the ‘MentalIllness’ corpus. All the key semantic 
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domain analyses I conduct in this chapter compares the target corpus with the 
MentalIllness corpus due to the fact that merging all the other illness subcorpora (i.e. 
all illness subcorpora minus the relevant target corpus) would exceed the upload limit 
on Wmatrix. For this reason, I made the decision to base all key semantic domain 
comparisons on the MentalIllness corpus because it was the most general (i.e. most 
likely to include a variety of lexical items related to all illnesses) and it did not exceed 
the token limit on Wmatrix.  
 
Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 31832.062 ptsd 16 3779.657 MOD 
2 14392.202 traumatic 17 3586.087 personnel 
3 13329.759 veterans 18 3442.73 soldier 
4 13329.759 soldiers 19 3430.118 falklands 
5 8854.257 stress 20 3370.299 flashbacks 
6 7644.844 war 21 2638.748 disorder 
7 6790.572 iraq 22 2571.671 troops 
8 6343.375 army 23 2564.377 armed 
9 6235.9 military 24 2418.257 nightmares 
10 5761.355 afghanistan 25 2418.257 served 
11 5597.484 post 26 2025.045 ex 
12 5011.571 combat 27 1986.226 serving 
13 4611.952 trauma 28 1749.6 gulf 
14 4045.618 servicemen 29 1620.687 service 
15 3812.534 forces 30 1534.86 ministry 
TABLE 9.2. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE PTSD CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER ILLNESS 
CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING ANTCONC (ANTHONY, 
2017) 
 
 
Rank LL Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 21852.70 WARFARE, DEFENCE 
AND THE ARMY; 
WEAPONS 
16 254.35 PEOPLE: MALE 
2 1505.56 SAD 17 249.42 EVALUATION: BAD 
3 1128.89 PRONOUNS 18 199.78 TEMPERATURE: 
HOT/ON FIRE 
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4 968.26 ANATOMY AND 
PHYSIOLOGY 
19 195.23 DRINKS AND 
ALCOHOL 
5 851.17 GEOGRAPHICAL 
NAMES 
20 174.94 SAILING, 
SWIMMING, ETC. 
6 801.97 MOVING, COMING 
AND GOING 
21 167.46 VIOLENT/ANGRY 
7 715.65 ANTI-WAR 22 163.90 UNMATCHED 
8 628.38 DAMAGING AND 
DESTROYING 
23 154.66 TIME: ENDING 
9 461.55 KNOWLEDGEABLE 24 129.43 LINEAR ORDER 
10 436.06 FLYING AND 
AIRCRAFT 
25 128.73 TIME: LATE 
11 364.11 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ACTIONS, STATES 
AND PROCESSES 
26 111.96 HINDERING 
12 361.36 WORRY 27 100.80 PERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIP: 
GENERAL 
13 344.80 FEAR/SHOCK 28 93.51 EMOTIONAL 
ACTIONS, STATES 
AND PROCESSES 
GENERAL 
 
14 337.56 VEHICLES AND 
TRANSPORT ON 
LAND 
29 88.95 TRYING HARD 
 
15 311.03 SENSORY: SIGHT 30 84.59 TIME: PERIOD 
 
TABLE 9.3. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE PTSD CORPUS COMPARED WITH 
THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001, P < 0.001) 
CALCULATED USING WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show that the symptoms of PTSD are well-represented in the PTSD 
corpus. Keywords such as ‘flashbacks’ and ‘nightmares’ indicate that the most salient 
symptoms of PTSD are being represented. Furthermore, symptoms such as anxiety 
and aggression are also represented in the key semantic domain analysis where 
‘worry’ and ‘violent and angry’ are both statistically significant. Furthermore, the 
symptom of self-destructive behavior in people with PTSD is represented in the 
corpus as is evidenced by the DRINKS AND ALCOHOL semantic domain which contains 
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instances in which the newspapers report on the misuse of substances such as alcohol 
to deal with PTSD. 
The keyness analyses of the PTSD corpus indicates that the most salient 
symptoms of PTSD are being represented in news reports, which is a positive thing. 
However, the symptoms of PTSD (and by extension the depiction of PTSD more 
generally) in the news as shown in the keyword and key semantic domain analysis 
indicates that PTSD is often only discussed in reference to a very specific group of 
people – veterans or ex-soldiers. 
The major theme of war in reference to PTSD is also shown in the most 
prototypical text taken from the PTSD corpus which is a Guardian article on the topic 
of PSTD (specifically, criminal cases of Vietnam veterans in the USA where PTSD has 
been given as a mitigating circumstance). The most prototypical text in the PTSD 
corpus features a list of symptoms like those generated in the keyness analyses, as the 
extract below shows. It also indirectly references symptoms such as self-destructive 
behaviour and aggression. 
 
Servicing in Vietnam became a major defence in criminal cases. Post-traumatic 
stress disorder it is called, PTSD. At least 250 veterans accused of serious crimes 
have received a more lenient sentence by claiming to be PTSD sufferers - with 
nightmares, depressions, sleep loss and flashbacks touched off by sights, 
sounds or smells that remind them of Vietnam. 
 
(The Guardian, November 17, 1986) 
 
Whilst the extract above does include a list of PTSD symptoms, it does so in the context 
of criminal cases which is a fairly specific set of circumstances in which to talk about 
PTSD given that the whole article is about a Vietnam War memorial service held in 
Washington DC. As a result, it could be argued that the article foregrounds PTSD in 
criminal cases rather than as a condition that many people experience outside of such 
circumstances. Moreover, the journalist’s choice to describe the defendants as 
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“claiming” to be experiencing PTSD implicates that there is a possibility that the 
defendants are using PTSD as an excuse. This choice of word is an unhelpful depiction 
of PTSD and its effect on people’s lives as it questions the validity of the lived 
experience of PTSD. Moreover, it should be noted that the list of symptoms includes 
‘depressions’ but not ‘depression’, which also suggests that, at least at this point in 
time (1986), depression as a diagnosable illness is not recognised. 
Reference to the Iraq War and military action in Afghanistan in the corpus (as 
indicated by the keyword list) is unsurprising given the dates the corpus covers and 
the statistics PTSD UK report on PTSD prevalence in war situations (2 out of 3 
prisoners of war); however, what is surprising is that very little newspaper coverage 
is given to the other common causes of PTSD such as (sexual) assault and childbirth. 
In fact, only one keyword in the top 30 could possibly relate to childbirth (‘trauma’) 
and on closer inspection only seven (including one duplicated article in a local 
newspaper) of 1084 instances of ‘trauma’ appear in the phrase ‘birth trauma’, and all 
of these seven instances are used in the charity name ‘The Birth Trauma Association’. 
This means that just 0.6% of the total number of articles in the PTSD corpus discuss 
‘birth trauma’ using that label. Furthermore, when looking in more detail at the 
keyword list, ‘childbirth’ and ‘childbirths’ are only keyword numbers 457 and 1566 
respectively, and there are only 76 hits in the whole corpus for ‘*births’. The earliest 
of the seven hits for ‘birth trauma’ is in 2004 which indicates that the label was not 
applied to PTSD caused by childbirth before this time, or that it was not a recognised 
illness. Evidence from PTSD UK seems to support this observation. They state: “It has 
long been recognised that following a difficult childbirth some women may go on to 
develop psychological problems. However, it is only relatively recently that it has 
become accepted that women can develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as 
a result” (PTSD UK, 2019). 
Another way that PTSD UK refer to birth trauma is ‘PTSD after birth’. In order 
to ascertain whether birth trauma was being discussed in the corpus under this label, 
I searched ‘after birth’ which only yielded two hits that both refer to an experiment on 
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mice that aimed to explore a genetic basis for PTSD. This finding indicates that ‘birth 
trauma’ as well as ‘PTSD after birth’ are not reported in the corpus using those labels. 
What this analysis of birth trauma in the corpus shows is that whilst the 
symptoms of PTSD are present in the corpus (flashbacks, nightmares, aggression, etc.) 
the symptoms are discussed in relation to specific circumstances, particularly combat 
situations. This means that the reality of PTSD is not accurately portrayed as the 
reportage overall neglects other circumstances from which PTSD arises, particularly 
childbirth. Moreover, PTSD in women is underrepresented overall as is demonstrated 
by the low frequencies for birth trauma and also by the fact that the semantic domain 
‘people: male’ is statistically significant. This representation of PTSD as an illness that 
affects men more than women (as is suggested by the prevalence of male pronouns 
and reference to combat situations where the subject is male) is in contrast to statistics 
into the prevalence of PTSD in the UK where women are more likely to screen positive 
for PTSD than men (around 5.1% compared with 3.7% of men) (Baker, 2018: 8). The 
findings from the linguistic analysis, taken together with the statistical information 
about the reality of PTSD, are important for informing an accurate depiction of PTSD 
in the press. As it stands, there is a disparity between the reality of the condition and 
the representation of it in the press. Arguably, the main purpose of the press is to 
inform the public. Articles reporting on PTSD, then, need to discuss the symptoms of 
PTSD in situations other than combat or military service, otherwise the press are not 
accurately representing the reality of PTSD. 
 
9.4. Dissociative disorders 
 
In this section, I discuss the top keywords and key semantic domains in the 
dissociative identity disorder (DID) corpus in relation to the symptoms of dissociative 
disorders. Dissociative disorders are characterised by periods of dissociation wherein 
a person may be unsure who they are or may have different identities. There are many 
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types of dissociative disorder; however, for our purposes here, I only detail the 
symptoms of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), as this was the only dissociative 
disorder searched for during the corpus compilation process. 
DID, sometimes called multiple personality disorder (MPD), is a condition that causes 
people who experience it to have severe changes in their identity. For example, people 
with DID may have different identity states that each have “different patterns of 
thinking and relating to the world” (Mind, 2019f). These different identities may be 
different ages, or genders, and some people who have DID may refer to themselves 
as ‘we’. People who experience DID may have periods of amnesia, for example, when 
other identities are in control (Mind, 2019f). These identities are sometimes referred to 
as ‘parts’. People who experience dissociation may also experience other mental 
illnesses such as borderline personality disorder (BPD), depression, anxiety and OCD. 
Like trauma disorders, DID may be caused by a traumatic event – and medical experts 
believe that particular traumatic events are more likely to cause DID than others. 
These include abuse and neglect either from a young age or that takes place over a 
long period, or if caregivers are dissociative themselves. 
The DID corpus is the smallest of the illness subcorpora as it contains just seven 
articles. This means that DID (or more precisely articles that contain DID more than 
any other condition) make up just 0.02% (11,953) of all the tokens contained in the MI 
1984-2014 corpus. As a result of the low frequency of tokens, it is necessary to be wary 
of the generalisability of the keyness analyses reported in this section. Nevertheless, 
working through the same processes with the DID corpus as I have done with the 
other illnesses provides a means of ascertaining how well-represented the symptoms 
of DID are. 
As was the case in Section 9.3, I will now present the results of the keyness 
analyses and compare my findings with the most prototypical text in the DID corpus. 
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 show the keywords in the DID corpus compared with all the other 
illness subcorpora minus the MentalIllness subcorpora, and the key semantic domains 
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in the DID corpus compared with the MentalIllness corpus respectively. Due to the 
low frequencies in the DID corpus, there are only 26 key semantic domains. 
 
Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 578.143 hopkins 16 133.905 aliens 
2 479.981 ufo 17 129.605 dummy 
3 442.69 kim 18 127.918 noble 
4 439.007 dissociative 19 105.124 budd 
5 410.8 cueller 20 102.386 alien 
6 348.479 perez 21 102.213 artists 
7 308.514 abduction 22 99.794 mulumba 
8 247.292 linda 23 98.907 annoyingly 
9 231.477 words 24 98.064 aimee 
10 188.314 abductees 25 95.516 wreaks 
11 178.575 paragraphs 26 88.003 contains 
12 154.041 de 27 87.402 dan 
13 149.691 sapir 28 86.844 procrastination 
14 148.685 ufos 29 86.844 swathe 
15 135.05 personalities 30 85.402 malingering 
TABLE 9.4. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE DID CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER ILLNESS 
CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING ANTCONC (ANTHONY, 
2017) 
 
 
Rank LL. Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 237.35 ARTS AND CRAFTS 16 19.81 MEASUREMENT: AREA 
2 154.72 LANGUAGE, SPEECH AND 
GRAMMAR 
17 19.66 MEASUREMENT: SIZE 
3 112.66 PERSONALITY TRAITS 18 19.64 GEOGRAPHICAL TERMS 
4 110.97 UNMATCHED 19 19.23 KNOWLEDGEABLE 
5 93.56 EVALUATION: 
UNAUTHENTIC 
20 16.91 PEOPLE: MALE 
6 59.73 SEEM 21 16.48 GENERALLY KINDS, 
GROUPS, EXAMPLES 
7 54.50 FLYING AND AIRCRAFT 22 16.34 QNATOMY AND 
PHYSIOLOGY 
8 53.12 PERSONAL NAMES 23 14.51 RECIPROCAL 
9 52.37 BEING 24 13.51 MENTAL ACTIONS AND 
PROCESSES 
10 43.83 RECORDED SOUND 25 11.64 SPEED: FAST 
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11 43.73 COMPARING: DIFFERENT 26 11.34 ELECTRICITY AND 
ELECTRICAL 
EQUIPMENT 
12 38.55 COMPARING: USUAL 27   
13 35.89 TIME PERIOD: SHORT 28   
14 27.43 COMPARING: UNUSUAL 29   
15 22.16 PAPER DOCUMENTS AND 
WRITING 
30   
TABLE 9.5. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE DID CORPUS COMPARED WITH 
THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001) CALCULATED USING 
WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
The keyword list in 9.4 is not particularly illuminating in terms of the symptoms of 
DID. This is likely due to skew in the corpus due to its small size which means that 
the keywords are heavily influenced by one long article (4963 words) contained in the 
corpus titled “They’re coming: can space aliens really have abducted the former 
Secretary-General of the United Nations? It sounds absurd but thousands of 
Americans seem convinced by a rumour which has become a cause célèbre even outside 
the mad world of modern ‘Ufology’”, which was published in 1993 in The Independent. 
The article, as the title suggests, reports on the story that UFO enthusiasts (including 
two people called Budd Hopkins and Jay Sapir) believed that the then Secretary-
General of the UN, Javier Perez de Cueller, had been abducted by aliens. In the article, 
there is a discussion that the symptoms of alien abduction may be mistaken for the 
symptoms of dissociative disorders (reported in the article as MPD, specifically). 
Clearly then, this article is not about DID, but rather alien abduction. Keywords that 
have been discounted due to noise in the corpus have been shaded light grey on Table 
9.4 for clarity. 
I conducted a concordance analysis of the remaining keywords in order to 
investigate them in more detail. They revealed that three articles in the corpus focused 
on particular people (hence the significant results for proper names in the semantic 
domain analysis and the proper names in the keyword list). Two of these stories 
related to an artist called Kim Noble who has a diagnosis of DID, but one of these 
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stories reports on the death of a teenager called Alex Mulumba who was stabbed to 
death in London in 2006 and was later found to be linked with a gang. As a result, the 
press coverage of Mulumba’s death quickly turned from reports that foregrounded 
the tragedy of Mulumba’s death and his father’s heartbreak to those that 
foregrounded Mulumba’s part in knife-related gang crime. In the newspaper article, 
which was published in The Independent, the journalist writes: 
 
it might also be because his son was as convincing in his role as a good son as 
he was in his role as a schoolboy gangster. I'm not quite suggesting that Alex 
Mulumba might have been suffering from what used to be called multiple 
personality disorder, and is now called dissociative personality disorder. But 
I'm convinced that the untouchable affectlessness that is reported among many 
of the young men on society's margins - and some of the young women -might 
be an indication that they may be suffering from a range of related dissociative 
disorders. The concept of dissociation is easy to grasp as being on a continuum 
reflecting a range of experiences from those which are quite normal: 
daydreaming, "switching off", to those which are extreme: blacking out, or 
feeling utterly alienated from one's own physical actions. It's worth noting that 
a number of the other activities that worry parents, such as playing video 
games or watching music videos for hours, are well-known to trigger "zoned-
out" states. There's surely some mileage in the idea that "street culture" is 
dissociative, encouraging as it does a retreat into a simple, violent, two-
dimensional world 
 
(The Independent, June 28, 2006) 
 
In writing this, even though the journalist writes that they are “not quite” suggesting 
that Mulumba had DID, the fact that she mentions it at all has the effect (via a flout of 
the Gricean maxim of quantity) of linking Mulumba’s ability to hide the different parts 
of his identity (i.e. the good son vs. the violent gang member) and dissociative 
disorders like dissociative identity disorder. This is a particularly unhelpful 
representation of DID as it places it in the context of violence (here gang violence) 
when there is no evidence that Mulumba had any dissociative disorder. Moreover, 
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speculating about somebody having mental illness is against Time to Change’s media 
guidelines which stipulate “don’t speculate about someone’s mental health being a 
factor in the story unless you know this to be 100% true.“ (Time to Change, 2019a). 
Furthermore, the journalist neglects to offer a list of symptoms of dissociative 
disorders in context, or any follow up to the comments that show there is no basis for 
linking DID and violence. Instead all that is offered is a vague list of symptoms, e.g. 
being ‘zoned-out’ which is not descriptive enough to provide clear information to the 
public about DID. 
The rest of the articles that focus on people are concerned with Kim Noble, an 
artist with DID. Both of the articles about Noble were published in local newspapers. 
Unlike the Mulumba article, both of the articles discussing Noble feature first-person 
narration from Noble in which she describes her own experiences of living with DID. 
The most prototypical text of the DID corpus is an article about Noble. Below is an 
extract which discusses Noble’s role in a mental health initiative that showcases the 
work of artists that are staying or working in hospital: 
Kim has been diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder. She has no 
memory of the personalities who take over her body. But painting is a way for 
her to connect with them. "When we started painting, it was something I found 
we all had in common," said Kim, 52. "The personalities are all different - one's 
a Catholic, for instance, and one likes a drink. But with art we were on the same 
page. "If I lose time when I'm in the house on my own, I can go into my art 
room, see that somebody has painted, and know from the style who has been 
in. It helps me know more about them 
(Kentish Weeklies, October 17, 2013) 
 
The article featuring the extract above does not include a thorough list of symptoms, 
but instead focusses on living with DID, particularly how arts initiatives may help 
those with mental illnesses. This is in line with the findings of research conducted by 
Atanasova et al. (2019) who found that recovery was a key theme in their research into 
press reports on mental health and arts initiatives. Although a list of symptoms is 
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absent in this article, overall the article can be said to provide a positive portrayal of 
DID because it features first-person narration of a person who is living well with DID 
and previous research into positive portrayals have identified first-person accounts 
from people with mental illness as contributing to a positive portrayal (e.g. Nairn & 
Coverdale, 2005; Wahl, 2003). 
An earlier article published in the Daily Mail in 2011 also discusses how Noble is 
using art as a way to live with her DID. Moreover, the article talks about previous 
trauma in Noble’s life that may have caused her dissociation. In addition to featuring 
first-person narration from Noble, the article includes a description of DID and its 
symptoms from a medical consultant. In his description of DID, the consultant lists 
the symptoms of DID and also provides information about how it is linked to PTSD. 
Arguably this is a positive description of DID and its symptoms as it provides an 
account of the lived experience of one person (Noble) as well as the general symptoms 
and causes of DID. As a result of this, the reader has access to an account of DID that 
shows a person living well with DID and is made aware of the symptoms and causes 
of DID that may fall outside of Noble’s experience. 
These articles indicate that overall in the DID corpus, when DID is discussed, 
symptoms or first-person accounts from people with DID are included. However, the 
low number of articles reporting on DID (just three in the whole corpus) suggests that 
there ought to be more coverage of DID in the press more generally given that Positive 
Outcomes for Dissociative Survivors (PODS) reports figures that state that between 
0.4 and 3.1% of people who are not currently involved with mental health services 
have DID (PODS, 2019), which means that more people have DID than schizophrenia. 
 
9.5. Bipolar disorder 
 
In this section, I discuss the top keywords and key semantic domains in the 
BipolarDisorder corpus in relation to the symptoms of bipolar disorder. Bipolar 
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disorder is a mood disorder that causes people to have very high moods (mania or 
hypomania) and very low moods (depressive episodes). Often people with bipolar 
disorder experience extreme mood swings that affect their everyday life. Bipolar 
disorder was previously referred to as manic depression. The symptoms of bipolar, 
e.g. periods of mania or depression (sometimes called bipolar episodes), vary in length 
depending on the person and the specific diagnosis a person has, as medical 
professionals recognise three types of bipolar. These are bipolar I, bipolar II and 
cyclothymia and are diagnosed according to the severity of the moods (i.e. extreme 
mania vs. more extreme depression) the person experiences. The symptoms of mania 
include feeling euphoric, feeling like you cannot be harmed and feeling uncontrollably 
excited (Mind, 2019g). Mania can also include some psychotic symptoms such as 
hearing voices. Mania may result in people losing social inhibitions, spending money 
excessively and not sleeping. The symptoms of mania can last for over a week. Where 
people with bipolar disorder experience the symptoms of mania for a shorter period 
of time, or the symptoms are more manageable, the term used to describe the mania 
is hypomania. In contrast to mania, depressive episodes are characterised by feeling 
upset, tired and having low self-esteem. As a result of this, people experiencing a 
depressive episode may eat more or less than usual, may misuse drugs and may 
attempt self-harm or suicide (Mind, 2019g). Some people with bipolar disorder also 
experience mixed episodes where their mood may fluctuate between feeling 
depressed and manic or hypomanic over short periods of time. 
Tables 9.5 and 9.6 show the top 30 keywords and key semantic domains for the 
BipolarDisorder Corpus. 
 
Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 13680.657 bipolar 16 789.388 i 
2 4182.797 disorder 17 787.405 condition 
3 2278.026 manic 18 750.298 mania 
4 1815.786 mental 19 685.082 ii 
5 1538.836 zeta 20 636.855 swings 
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6 1423.199 catherine 21 564.451 carrier 
7 1281.017 illness 22 533.304 danes 
8 946.429 douglas 23 515.718 was 
9 938.966 her 24 515.464 kerry 
10 928.64 depression 25 502.977 episodes 
11 889.329 jones 26 494.428 actress 
12 852.96 diagnosed 27 448.606 he 
13 838.638 mood 28 424.075 diagnosis 
14 831.81 fry 29 424.071 highs 
15 793.094 she 30 421.293 homeland 
TABLE 9.5. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE BIPOLARDISORDER CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL 
OTHER ILLNESS CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING 
ANTCONC (ANTHONY, 2017) 
 
 
Rank LL Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 2801.47 pronouns 16 161.90 music and 
related 
activities 
 
2 1906.60 comparing: different 17 160.64 linear order 
3 642.68 emotional actions, states 
and processes general 
18 144.78 the media: 
books 
4 534.85 kin 19 128.57 drinks and 
alcohol 
5 474.14 drama, the theatre and 
show business 
20 123.24 general 
appearance 
and 
physical 
properties 
6 411.73 happy 21 121.41 judgement 
of 
appearance: 
positive 
7 395.35 personal names 22 118.81 the universe 
8 344.98 interested/excited/energetic 23 117.75 sad 
9 339.54 anatomy and physiology 24 115.02 moving, 
coming and 
going 
10 301.38 like 25 105.74 existing 
11 215.86 entire; maximum 26 103.26 food 
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12 211.97 the media: tv, radio and 
cinema 
27 98.71 sports 
13 207.41 getting and possession 28 97.91 time: period 
14 181.78 entertainment generally 29 92.81 information 
technology 
and 
computing 
15 180.70 personal relationship: 
general 
30 91.96 evaluation: 
good 
TABLE 9.6. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE BIPOLARDISORDER CORPUS 
COMPARED WITH THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001) 
CALCULATED USING WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
The keywords shown in Table 9.5 show that some of the symptoms of bipolar disorder 
are being discussed; for example, ‘manic’, ‘swings’, ‘moods’, ‘episodes’, ‘highs’. They 
also reveal a tendency to report issues to do with bipolar disorder in the context of 
celebrities with the condition or celebrity spokespeople such as Catherine Zeta-Jones 
and Stephen Fry, two public figures who have both openly discussed their experiences 
of bipolar disorder. The prevalence of names of celebrities in the BipolarDisorder 
corpus, and the relatively low number of keywords concerned with the symptoms of 
bipolar disorder, seems to suggest that the press are reporting on the particular 
experiences of celebrities instead of reporting on the symptoms of bipolar disorder 
more generally. This is problematic because, as the description of the symptoms above 
shows, the experience of bipolar disorder can differ enormously from person to 
person. 
The key semantic domains offer some insight into the range of symptoms 
discussed in the corpus and into the depiction of bipolar disorder more generally. The 
high frequency of words and phrases concerning comparison (COMPARING: DIFFERENT) 
is explained by the fact that bipolar is tagged as belonging to this semantic category. 
In terms of the symptoms reported, the HAPPY, EMOTIONAL ACTIONS, STATES AND 
PROCESSES and the INTERESTED/EXCITED/ENERGETIC categories all contain words 
pertaining to the symptoms of bipolar disorder; for example, the majority of words 
contained in the EMOTIONAL ACTIONS, STATES AND PROCESSES category relate to the 
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phrase ‘mood swings’. Moreover, the HAPPY category contains words pertaining to the 
symptoms of mania, e.g. ‘highs’, ‘euphoric’, ‘over-elation’ and the word ‘mania’ itself 
makes up the majority of the words coded by Wmatrix as 
‘interested/excited/energetic’. Further exploration of the ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY 
category reveals 182 instances (348.52 pmw) of the lemma ‘sleep’. These instances all 
occur in the context of lack of sleep, sleeplessness and fatigue which is in line with the 
symptoms of (hypo)mania. These findings suggest that newspaper representations of 
bipolar disorder do discuss some of the common symptoms of bipolar disorder; 
however, a concordance search reveals only 32 instances of ‘hallucinations’ and only 
3 instances of ‘hearing voices’ in the whole BipolarDisorder corpus. This suggests that 
the newspaper reports do not routinely mention the full range of symptoms of bipolar 
disorder. This arguably does not fulfil the press’ responsibility to inform the public. 
This is problematic when taken in the context of diagnosis statistics about bipolar 
disorder. Bipolar UK states that it takes an average of 10.5 years for a person with 
bipolar disorder to receive the correct diagnosis, with people getting an average of 3.5 
misdiagnoses before this time (Bipolar UK, 2019). Furthermore, when we consider the 
stigma associated with voice hearing (Vilhauer, 2017), not mentioning this as a 
symptom of bipolar could arguably exacerbate stigma (i.e. by making it 
unmentionable). 
Although the keyword list and the semantic domain analysis suggest that some 
symptoms of bipolar disorder are represented in the corpus, the most prototypical text 
of the BipolarDisorder corpus contains no description of the symptoms: 
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ACTRESS Catherine Zeta-Jones has opened up about suffering from bipolar 
disorder. The 41-year-old said there was no need to suffer in silence and hoped 
publicity surrounding her treatment might help others. In a statement, the 
actress and mother to son Dylan, 10, and daughter Carys, eight, said: This is a 
disorder that affects millions of people and I am one of them. If my revelation 
of having bipolar II has encouraged one person to seek help, then it is worth it. 
There is no need to suffer silently and there is no shame in seeking help. Zeta 
Jones checked into rehab after helping husband Michael Douglas battle throat 
cancer. The Oscar-winning star spent five days getting treatment, reportedly at 
the Silver Hill psychiatric hospital in New Canaan, Connecticut, earlier this 
month. Her publicist, Cece Yorke, said at the time: After dealing with the stress 
of the past year, Catherine made the decision to check into a mental health 
facility for a brief stay to treat her bipolar II disorder. Bipolar disorder, formerly 
known as manic depression, is a severe mood disorder 
 
(The Herald, Glasgow, April 22, 2011) 
 
The most prototypical text gives further evidence for the finding that mental illnesses 
(and specifically bipolar disorder) are often reported in the context of celebrity 
experiences of mental illness. In the article, no description of bipolar disorder or its 
symptoms is given apart from that is it a “severe mood disorder”. This is 
disappointing, particularly as the article describes Zeta-Jones as having bipolar II, 
which means that there was an opportunity for the journalist to describe the difference 
between bipolar II and other types of bipolar disorder. Moreover, the article appears 
to suggest that Zeta-Jones’ bipolar was caused by stress brought about by her 
husband’s cancer diagnosis, and was treated in just 5 days. The experience described, 
then, does not accurately depict most people’s experiences of bipolar disorder which 
is a long-term disorder that often requires people to manage their condition over their 
lifespan rather than seeking quick treatment. 
Taken together, the keyness and prototypical text analysis of the BipolarDisorder 
corpus indicates that many of the symptoms of bipolar disorder are mentioned in the 
news reports on bipolar, however, many symptoms are left unreported, including the 
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psychotic symptoms of bipolar disorder including hallucinations and voice hearing. 
In order to fully represent the reality of bipolar disorder in the press, articles need to 
include more references to these symptoms in order to fully inform the public about 
the reality of bipolar disorder. Doing this will also help to destigmatise voice hearing 
and hallucinations by bringing discussion of these symptoms into the open. In 
addition to neglecting some of the symptoms of bipolar disorder, there are some other 
problematic reporting tendencies in reports on bipolar disorder such as using celebrity 
spokespeople or using celebrities as example cases of people with bipolar disorder, 
rather than discussing bipolar disorder in its societal context, i.e. as an illness that 
affects up to 2% of the UK population with a lifetime prevalence (Bipolar UK, 2019). 
 
9.6. Obsessive compulsive disorders 
 
In this section, I discuss the top keywords and key semantic domains in the OCD 
corpus in relation to the symptoms of obsessive disorders. Obsessive compulsive 
disorders include OCD and body dismorphia. OCD has two components. These are 
obsessions, which are repetitive intrusive thoughts or worries that cause anxiety, and 
compulsions, which are repetitive activities than people with OCD may do in order to 
temporarily ease the anxiety caused by obsessions, e.g. repeatedly checking a door is 
locked (Mind, 2019h). A common misconception about OCD is that it is to do with 
cleaning or being tidy. This is not the case. OCD is a condition that causes people who 
experience it to feel like they have no control over their thoughts and/or that not doing 
something in a particular way may cause bad things to happen. Many people with 
OCD report that they only have the obsessive side of OCD, which is sometimes 
referred to are ‘Pure-O’. People who experience OCD may also experience other 
mental illnesses including depression and anxiety. There are also mental health 
problems that are related to OCD because they include repetitive thoughts or 
behaviours. These are perinatal OCD (the OCD experienced before or after birth), 
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body dysmorphic disorder, compulsive skin picking, trichotillomania (compulsive 
pulling out of hair), hoarding and obsessive compulsive personality disorder (Mind, 
2019h). 
The symptoms of OCD include fear of causing (or having already caused) 
harm, fear of contamination (or contaminating others), the ritualistic washing of 
hands or arranging objects and repeating words or phrases in your head. Tables 9.7 
and 9.8 show the top 30 keywords and key semantic domains in the OCD corpus. 
 
Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 32572.08 ocd 16 1038.751 my 
2 7072.916 obsessive 17 1015.624 cleaning 
3 6038.734 compulsive 18 953.842 wash 
4 3196.534 rituals 19 889.967 tourette 
5 2767.387 thoughts 20 837.235 behaviour 
6 2180.545 washing 21 829.003 beckham 
7 2130.468 obsessions 22 818.798 condition 
8 2095.883 compulsions 23 808.37 ocds 
9 2049.437 checking 24 790.263 instrusive 
10 1730.725 germs 25 722.093 repetitive 
11 1697.938 i 26 680.865 clean 
12 1497.948 disorder 27 666.901 compulsion 
13 1370.007 sufferers 28 666.306 ocdaction 
14 1167.913 hands 29 663.204 check 
15 1097.227 contamination 30 581.791 fear 
TABLE 9.7. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE OCD CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER ILLNESS 
CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING ANTCONC (ANTHONY, 
2017).  
 
Rank LL. Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 4748.38 PRONOUNS 16 321.60 UNWANTED 
2 3343.08 CLEANING AND PERSONAL CARE 17 318.64 SENSORY: TOUCH 
3 2663.82 INTERESTED/EXCITED/ENERGETIC 18 313.02 RELIGION AND 
THE 
SUPERNATURAL 
4 1396.21 ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY 19 269.06 THOUGHT, BELIEF 
5 1012.28 OBJECTS GENERALLY 20 251.39 MOVING, COMING 
AND GOING 
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6 954.57 UNMATCHED 21 233.40 GETTING AND 
POSSESSION 
7 839.51 LIVING CREATURES: ANIMALS, 
BIRDS, ETC. 
22 231.27 GENERAL 
APPEARANCE AND 
PHYSICAL 
PROPERTIES 
8 736.55 FEAR/SHOCK 23 217.76 WORRY 
9 646.11 FREQUENT 24 204.27 COMPARING: 
USUAL 
10 532.39 FOOD 25 198.76 MENTAL OBJECT: 
CONCEPTUAL 
OBJECT 
11 477.85 INTERESTED/EXCITED/ENERGETIC 26 192.13 ELECTRICITY AND 
ELECTRICAL 
EQUIPMENT 
12 457.59 CLOTHES AND PERSONAL 
BELONGINGS 
27 187.81 PARTS OF 
BUILDINGS 
13 404.47 LIKELY 28 184.36 LIKE 
14 360.72 JUDGEMENT OF APPEARANCE: 
NEGATIVE 
29 176.03 TEMPERATURE: 
COLD 
15 331.48 JUDGEMENT OF APPEARANCE: 
POSITIVE 
30 171.40 IF 
TABLE 9.8. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE OCD CORPUS COMPARED WITH 
THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001) CALCULATED USING 
WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
The top 30 keywords indicate that the two different parts of OCD (obsessions and 
compulsions) are represented in the corpus, as well as many words related to 
symptoms. These include ‘rituals, ‘thoughts’, ‘washing’, ‘checking’, ‘contamination’, 
‘compulsion’, ‘check’. There are, however, some words that indicate an over-
representation of certain facets of OCD such as contamination as is indicated by the 
keywords ‘germs’, ‘washing’, ‘hands’, ‘cleaning’, ‘wash’, ‘clean’. In addition to this, as 
was the case with bipolar disorder, the OCD keywords also include reference to 
celebrities – for example, the footballer David Beckham – as the extract below shows: 
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Medical experts say Beckham's weird rituals suggest he suffers from a version 
of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). This rare condition is caused by a 
chemical inbalance in the brain which makes victims repeatedly wash, clean or 
arrange their environment into "perfect" shapes. Beckham's bizarre obsessions 
emerged when he let cameras follow him for six months for a Christmas video 
for his fans. 
 
(The People, November 19, 2000) 
 
As well as providing further evidence that celebrities are used as examples of people 
with mental illnesses, the extract shows that even in 2000, journalists were prepared 
to describe diagnosable medical illnesses as “weird” and “bizarre”. Furthermore, the 
article incorrectly states that OCD is caused by chemical imbalances in the brain, 
which is not true – there is no one cause of OCD and causes differ from person to 
person. Again, this is an example of one person’s (possible) experience of a mental 
illness (Beckham had not, at this point, announced that he had OCD) being presented 
as though it is the experience of all people experiencing OCD. Furthermore, the only 
symptoms mentioned are mostly compulsive and not obsessive, i.e. arranging and 
cleaning. 
The over-representation of the compulsive side of OCD, i.e. washing and 
cleaning, is also visible in the key semantic domain list, where the semantic category 
CLEANING AND PERSONAL CARE is the second most statistically significant category. 
Similarly, the fourth and fifth most significant semantic categories ANATOMY and 
OBJECTS GENERALLY which includes words such as ‘hands’ (e.g. washing hands) and 
‘objects’ (e.g. arranging objects) reiterates this finding. Moreover, the seventh most 
statistically significant category, LIVING CREATURES: ANIMALS, BIRDS, ETC., contains 297 
instances of ‘germs’. 
Surprisingly, in the OCD corpus there is only 1 instance of ‘intrusion*’ and 146 
instances of ‘intrusive’, compared with 418 instances of compulsion*; this is indicative 
of the skew towards the reporting of the compulsive component of OCD. The lack of 
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public understanding of OCD is evidenced in the most prototypical text in the OCD 
corpus (below), which is an advertisement for the charity OCD Action, which aims to 
raise awareness about OCD and recovery from OCD. 
 
The site is run by the specialist charity OCD Action with its committee 
comprising some of the UK's top specialists in obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD). It promotes recovery from obsessive compulsive disorders through 
understanding and awareness and gives information on the different types of 
OCDs . It also provides free information packs, contact details for support 
groups, discussion forums and organises OCD conferences. 
 
(The Times, April 4, 2006) 
 
The fact that the most prototypical text does not include any symptoms, or description 
of the illness more generally, but instead refers readers to a place with that 
information, demonstrates that newspapers are printing ways that the public can be 
informed about OCD (i.e. through visiting third-party websites). However, 
descriptions of OCD that include the full range of symptoms – either from those who 
live with the condition or from medical professionals – are uncommon. In order for 
press to fully represent the reality of OCD, there is a need for more coverage of the 
obsessive side of OCD. Reporting only on the compulsion component of OCD, or 
skew in reporting towards this component, serves only to reiterate myths about OCD, 
such as that it is simply to do with germs and tidying. 
 
9.7. Psychotic disorders 
 
In this section, I discuss the top keywords and key semantic domains in the Psychosis 
corpus in relation to the symptoms of psychotic disorders. Psychotic disorders include 
psychosis and schizophrenia. For the reasons outlined in Section 9.3, I only discuss 
psychosis in this section as there is another subcorpus specifically for schizophrenia. 
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As a result, the psychosis corpus is not representative of the press coverage of 
schizophrenia. There are two main symptoms of psychosis. The first of these is 
hallucinations in which the person experiencing the psychotic episode will see things 
that others can’t, sense things that are not actually happening or that have no cause 
(e.g. tasting something or feeling sensations on the skin or hearing voices). The voices 
a person may hear could be positive voices or disturbing voices that are hostile. (Mind, 
2019i). The second main symptom of psychosis is delusions. Delusions can cause 
people to believe things, even when what they believe doesn’t make sense logically. 
For example, a person may believe that that they are more powerful than they are, or 
that someone is trying to harm them (Mind, 2019i). These delusions are sometimes 
called delusions of grandeur and paranoid delusions, respectively. In addition to these 
symptoms, people experiencing psychosis may have disorganised thinking and 
speech resulting in them having racing thoughts or having flights of ideas where the 
link between one thing and another is not clear to their interlocutors. These symptoms 
are also symptoms of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. 
Tables 9.11 and 9.12 show the top 30 keywords and key semantic domains for 
the psychosis corpus. 
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Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 13439.108 cannabis 16 971.69 antipsychotics 
2 11531.016 psychotic 17 937.904 breivik 
3 9023.846 psychosis 18 861.603 patients 
4 3650.694 dementia 19 813.572 users 
5 3468.12 drugs 20 806.322 homes 
6 2528.156 drug 21 753.872 medication 
7 1623.453 skunk 22 712.812 hallucinations 
8 1561.716 psychotics 23 632.462 smoking 
9 1552.951 use 24 603.605 schizophrenia 
10 1260.362 antipsychotic 25 566.277 nurofen 
11 1205.911 mental 26 562.802 paranoid 
12 1184.729 brady 27 561.157 risk 
13 1166.143 anti 28 555.476 alzheimer 
14 1074.09 care 29 532.663 psychiatric 
15 1040.479 thc 30 529.009 rosenhan 
TABLE 9.11. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE PSYCHOSIS CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER 
ILLNESS CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING ANTCONC 
(ANTHONY, 2017) 
 
 
Rank LL. Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 5208.12 SMOKING AND NON-
MEDICAL DRUGS 
16 100.99 LIVING CREATURES: 
ANIMALS, BIRDS, ETC. 
2 1283.58 MEDICINES AND 
MEDICAL TREATMENT 
17 100.32 TIME: OLD; GROWN-UP 
3 1126.86 USING 18 76.68 PLANTS 
4 479.00 ANATOMY AND 
PHYSIOLOGY 
19 73.55 TOUGH/STRONG 
5 422.20 PRONOUNS 20 68.33 LINEAR ORDER 
6 352.13 SUBSTANCES AND 
MATERIALS GENERALLY 
21 67.45 OPEN; FINDING; 
SHOWING 
7 328.82 UNMATCHED 22 66.10 SPEED: FAST 
8 165.49 CAUSE & 
EFFECT/CONNECTION 
23 65.63 DRINKS AND ALCOHOL 
9 163.42 DANGER 24 62.79 THE MEDIA: BOOKS 
10 134.99 EVALUATION: FALSE 25 61.24 WEIGHT: HEAVY 
11 119.84 SENSORY: SOUND 26 60.07 COMPARING: 
UNUSUAL 
12 114.87 KIN 27 59.80 SPEECH: 
COMMUNICATIVE 
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13 109.06 TIME: OLD, NEW AND 
YOUNG; AGE 
28 58.96 TIME: EARLY 
14 106.00 OBJECTS GENERALLY 29 54.19 PERSONALITY TRAITS 
15 102.09 TIME: NEW AND YOUNG 30 53.06 RELATIONSHIP: 
INTIMACY AND SEX 
TABLE 9.12. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE PSYCHOSIS CORPUS COMPARED 
WITH THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001) CALCULATED 
USING WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
What is most apparent from the top keywords and key semantic domains in the 
Psychosis corpus is the significant result for ‘cannabis’, ‘skunk’, ‘drug’, ‘drugs’ and 
‘smoking and non-medical drugs’. In fact, ‘cannabis’ appears in the Psychosis corpus 
3,366.99 times per million words, which is more than the word ‘psychosis’ appears 
(2,016.29 pmw). On closer inspection, many of the instances that mention drugs in the 
corpus relate to drugs causing psychosis, for example, this extract from The Times in 
2001 which reads “[I]n alarmist articles in The Times and elsewhere, they argued that 
scientific evidence shows that cannabis is addictive, causes personality change and 
psychosis”.	Drug taking, and particularly smoking cannabis, then, is a key theme in 
the Psychosis corpus. This is further evidenced by the third most key semantic 
category ‘using’ which includes phrases such as ‘use of the drugs’ and ‘marijuana use’. 
Drug taking for medicinal purposes is also a theme in the keyness analysis. For 
example the ‘medicines and medical treatment’ and ‘substances and materials 
generally’ categories, both of which refer to words and phrases concerning the 
treatment of psychosis. For example, ‘antipsychotics’, ‘halperidol81’ and ‘molecules, 
chemicals’ respectively. 
What these findings show is that there is a tendency in the Psychosis corpus to 
report on the causes of psychosis rather than describing what the illness is and what 
the symptoms of it are. The only keyword related to descriptions or symptoms of 
psychosis are ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘paranoid’. On further exploration, some of the key 
semantic domains do contain words and phrases concerned with the symptoms of 	
81 Haloperidol is an anti-psychotic drug.  
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psychosis, however. These include the ‘sensory: sound’ and ‘evaluation: false’ 
categories which include ‘hearing voices’ and ‘delusions’ respectively. Despite these 
categories including these words, the frequencies of ‘delusions’ and ‘hallucinations’ 
are still comparatively low, with ‘delusion*’ occurring just 300.3 times pmw, and 
‘hallucin*’ appearing just 314.6 times pmw. By comparison, the word ‘Breivik’ which 
relates to an isolated terrorist incident in which a man detonated a bomb and shot 69 
people dead in Oslo, occurs 179.4 times pmw. What these findings indicate is that 
press reportage of psychosis and psychotic disorders over-represent links between 
psychosis and criminality, and under-represent information about psychosis and its 
symptoms. 
The link between psychosis and criminality is also evidenced by the key 
semantic domain ‘danger’ which has not been present in any of the other keyness 
analyses of the illness subcorpora. Moreover, an analysis of the adjective predicates82 
of ‘schizophrenia’ (conducted using Word sketch tool on Sketch Engine) supports the 
finding that psychosis and criminality are linked as schizophrenia is the only illness 
in the corpus to collocate with the adjectives ‘violent’ and ‘dangerous’. In addition, 
the most prototypical text for the Psychosis corpus is a news article reporting on a 
man with schizophrenia who fatally stabbed a woman: 
 
A SCHIZOPHRENIC stabbed a pensioner to death after his carers took him to 
buy alcohol. Martin Davies, who stabbed 66-year-old Gwen Poole at least four 
times with a breadknife, was yesterday ordered to be detained indefinitely. 
Cardiff Crown Court heard Davies, 23, obeyed voices in his head telling him to 
kill after he awoke from a nap, having earlier drunk the vodka he had bought 
with his carers	
 
(South Wales Echo, May 5, 2010) 
 
	
82 The Word sketch tool is based on collocations (using the LogDice statistical test). 
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The article does outline one of the symptoms of psychosis – hearing voices and 
hallucinations, but it does so in the context of a violent crime where the voices the 
person with schizophrenia heard were harmful commands. To return to the finding 
outlined in Section 9.5 (bipolar disorders), in which I argued that the psychotic 
symptoms of bipolar disorder are not mentioned and therefore become stigmatised 
due to being unmentionable, it appears that this is also true in the Psychosis corpus. 
The press neglect to describe these symptoms in detail outside of the fairly extreme 
cases in which, sadly, a person is hurt. Doing this creates links between mental illness 
(here specifically psychosis) and violent crime. This is at odds with research which 
has shown that any violent behavior in people with psychotic disorders such as 
schizophrenia is usually caused by substance abuse (NHS, 2019a), rather than as a 
direct cause of their diagnosis. Moreover, people with a mental illness are more likely 
to be the victim of a crime than the perpetrator (Time to Change, 2019b). Furthermore, 
it is interesting to note the absence of any celebrity spokespeople or celebrity examples 
in the keyword list, which further suggests that as a society psychotic disorders are 
not something that many people, celebrity or not, align with (if we are to take the topic 
matter discussed in newspaper articles as indicative of what is socially acceptable). 
With this in mind, the representation of psychotic disorders in the press needs 
to focus more on descriptions of psychotic disorders and their symptoms, rather than 
on causes (e.g. drug use like cannabis) or isolated criminal incidents such as the case 
described in the most prototypical text and the case of Anders Breivik. Focusing on 
violent crime as well as substance abuse does not represent the many people with 
psychotic disorders who are living well and managing their condition. Furthermore, 
this type of press coverage actively stigmatises psychotic disorders because these 
articles suggest that psychosis is self-inflicted (i.e. caused by drug misuse). This claim 
is supported by the findings of research conducted by Mann & Himlein (2004), who 
discovered that schizophrenia was more stigmatised that other illnesses, such as 
depression. Similarly, research conducted by Nawka et al. (2012) in the Czech 
Republic found that news articles reporting psychotic disorders were more likely to 
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contain descriptions of aggressive behaviour and homicide. Furthermore, Goulden et 
al. (2011: 5) found that in contrast to other mental illnesses, schizophrenia was more 
likely to be mentioned in the context of ‘bad news’. Overall, what my findings 
combined with exiting research suggest is that the press do not represent psychotic 
disorders accurately because these disorder types are taboo. 
 
9.8. Anxiety disorders 
 
In this section, I discuss the top keywords and key semantic domains in the Anxiety 
corpus in relation to the symptoms of anxiety disorders. Anxiety disorders include a 
range of illnesses including social anxiety disorder, generalised anxiety disorder and 
body dysmorphia. Anxiety disorders also include phobias. Phobias are classed as 
anxiety disorders when the phobia lasts more than six months, has a serious impact 
on the everyday life on the person, or when the phobia is classed as extreme given the 
realistic risk of the phobia (Mind, 2019j). Phobias are often subcategorised as specific 
and complex phobias. The first of these phobia types is concerned with phobias of 
specific objects or situations such as heights or particular animals, whereas the latter 
refers to phobias that are more disruptive than the specific phobias, and that often 
affect the everyday life of the person experiencing the phobia. The most common 
complex phobias are social phobia and agoraphobia. Social phobia, which is 
sometimes called social anxiety disorder causes those who experience it to feel high 
levels of anxiety when in social situations such as public speaking or eating in front 
others. As a result, people who experience social anxiety may avoid social situations, 
which can inhibit their ability to work and perform everyday tasks (Mind, 2019j). 
Similarly, the symptoms of agoraphobia include high levels of anxiety when in certain 
places or situations. As a result, people with agoraphobia may avoid leaving their 
home or being in a crowd of people (Mind, 2019j). Symptoms of phobias include 
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feeling dizzy or faint, palpitations, nausea and numbness. In some situations, these 
symptoms can trigger a panic attack (Mind, 2019j) 
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 show the top 30 keywords and key semantic domains for 
the Anxiety corpus. 
Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 40908.881 anxiety 16 1415.95 breathing 
2 5231.574 your 17 1391.817 president 
3 4949.986 lewinsky 18 1324.126 can 
4 4685.534 fear 19 1169.712 exam 
5 3893.807 panic 20 1029.225 yoga 
6 3672.514 you 21 893.828 hypnotherapy 
7 3518.29 anxious 22 890.387 techniques 
8 3475.994 stress 23 831.016 dentist 
9 2710.694 phobia 24 824.333 currie 
10 2115.377 or 25 812.234 dental 
11 1822.839 attacks 26 811.224 relax 
12 1631.003 worry 27 810.148 fears 
13 1609.089 sleep 28 783.768 anxieties 
14 1544.352 phobias 29 773.887 botton 
15 1525.891 relaxation 30 754.994 attack 
TABLE 9.13. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE ANXIETY CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER ILLNESS 
CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING ANTCONC (ANTHONY, 
2017) 
 
 
Rank LL. Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 6705.37 WORRY 16 484.97 EDUCATION IN 
GENERAL 
2 6387.89 ANATOMY AND 
PHYSIOLOGY 
17 391.75 DRINKS AND ALCOHOL 
3 2631.45 PRONOUNS 18 388.66 MEASUREMENT: 
LENGTH & HEIGHT 
4 2534.82 FOOD 19 380.46 COMPARING: USUAL 
5 1796.12 FEAR/SHOCK 20 371.57 EMOTIONAL ACTIONS, 
STATES AND 
PROCESSES GENERAL 
6 1146.76 SPORTS 21 356.66 PLANTS 
7 976.85 CALM 22 351.68 VEHICLES AND 
TRANSPORT ON LAND 
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8 798.36 UNMATCHED 23 336.89 MEASUREMENT: 
WEIGHT 
9 708.37 LIVING CREATURES: 
ANIMALS, BIRDS, ETC. 
24 335.46 LIKELY 
10 653.33 OBJECTS GENERALLY 25 309.57 TIME: MOMENTARY 
11 643.70 SUBSTANCES AND 
MATERIALS GENERALLY 
26 284.90 TIME: NEW AND 
YOUNG 
12 618.45 SUBSTANCES AND 
MATERIALS: LIQUID 
27 280.45 MOVING, COMING 
AND GOING 
13 592.88 FLYING AND AIRCRAFT 28 264.30 IF 
14 557.97 RELATIONSHIP: 
INTIMACY AND SEX 
29 236.79 SHAPE 
15 538.79 THOUGHT, BELIEF 30 232.09 ELECTRICITY AND 
ELECTRICAL 
EQUIPMENT 
TABLE 9.14. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE ANXIETY CORPUS COMPARED 
WITH THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001) CALCULATED 
USING WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
Many of the top keywords and top key semantic domains (in particular, the ‘worry’ 
and ‘fear/shock’ categories) include many of the symptoms of anxiety disorders such 
as ‘anxiety’, ‘stress’, ‘distress’ and ‘fear’, ‘panic’, ‘terror’, ‘dread’ respectively. Further 
to this, the semantic key domain ‘flying and aircraft’ contains instances in which a fear 
of flying is being described. A collocation analysis of the phrase “a fear of” reveals 
that a fear of flying is the most discussed fear in the corpus. This is shown in the top 5 
collocates of “fear of” which are ‘flying’, ‘spiders’, ‘spaces’, ‘heights’, ‘failure’. Further 
to this, the top 10 collocates (L3, R3) of ‘phobia’ are ‘social’, ‘school’, ‘develop’, 
‘specific’, ‘attacks’, ‘School’, ‘fears’, ‘agoraphobia’, ‘panic’ and ‘dental’. What this 
shows is that the press do discuss the difference between general and specific phobias, 
and do discuss the two most common complex phobias: social phobia and 
agoraphobia. Furthermore, the collocates of ‘phobia’ indicate that the press accurately 
describe the process of getting a phobia, via ‘developing’. Closer concordance analysis 
of this lexical item shows that many articles describe the causes and triggers of 
phobias, i.e. they may develop from a trauma or worry around having a panic attack 
in response to something. 
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Despite the fact that the articles reporting on phobias do seem to use the correct 
terminology to refer to the different phobia types as well as describing the causes of 
the phobias accurately, keyness analysis does not suggest that the press reports fully 
describe the symptoms experienced by people with complex phobias. Aside from 
‘panic attacks’, only general symptoms are represented in the keyword list (e.g. 
anxiety and stress). The lack of representation of symptoms could be due to the fact 
that many of the symptoms of anxiety disorders are also symptoms of other mental 
illnesses, which may mean that words related to these symptoms would not come out 
as key in the keyness analysis (because the MentalIllness corpus also contains them). 
This may be a contributing factor to the absence of many of the symptoms of the 
complex phobias in the corpus, however the most prototypical text in the corpus also 
does not include any mention of symptoms: 
 
ANXIETY Care is soon to start a new volunteer training course in Redbridge. 
Successful trainees will help people with anxiety disorders to return to normal 
lives through home visiting and group work. For details telephone 8262 8891/2 
or write to the training officer, Anxiety Care, 19 Mansfield Road, Ilford or email 
anxietycare@aol.com 
 
(This is Local London, May 23, 2001) 
 
What these findings appear to indicate is that the complex phobias are 
underrepresented as illnesses on their own as the most well-represented phobia in the 
corpus is concerned with fear of flying which is a specific phobia. In order to better 
describe the reality of anxiety disorders, the press would do well to provide more 
information about the full range of anxiety disorders, including the complex phobias 
to inform the public that complex phobias are illnesses in themselves and not simply 
symptoms of other illnesses. 
 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 	
347 
 
9.9. Eating disorders 
 
In this section, I discuss the top keywords and key semantic domains in the 
EatingDisorder corpus in relation to the symptoms of eating disorders. Eating 
disorders include anorexia, bulimia and binge-eating disorder. The general symptoms 
of eating disorders include worrying about your weight, eating too little or too much 
food, having strict routines around food and exercising too much. 
Anorexia (also called anorexia nervosa) is a condition where a person 
deliberately does not eat enough food for their body which results in them having a 
body weight that is under what is healthy. Anorexia is often thought to be linked to 
losing weight, but the reasons for anorexia are often closely linked to low self-esteem 
and issues with self-image. Symptoms of anorexia include missing meals, having 
rituals around eating and feeling like you are overweight. Indirect symptoms of 
anorexia are amenorrhea83 in women, headaches and problems sleeping (NHS, 2019b). 
Bulimia (also called bulimia nervosa) is an eating disorder characterised by 
eating large quantities of food over a short period of time and then purposely making 
yourself vomit because you feel ashamed and guilty. This process is often called 
binging (from binge-eating) and purging (vomiting). People with bulimia may also 
take laxatives or exercise excessively. Symptoms of bulimia include eating in secret, 
feeling ashamed, feeling that you are overweight and feeling depressed. 
Binge-eating disorder (sometimes called compulsive eating) is an illness that 
causes people with it to eat very large quantities of food in short periods of time 
resulting in the person feeling uncomfortably full. Symptoms of binge-eating disorder 
include feeling out of control of your eating, eating in secret and feeling ashamed after 
binging. 
Tables 9.15 and 9.16 show the top 30 keywords and key semantic domains for 
the EatingDisorder corpus. 
	
83 Amenorrhea is the medical term for the absence of menstruation. 
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Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 97288.006 eating 16 9100.503 fat 
2 57761.024 anorexia 17 8639.934 size 
3 36296.462 disorders 18 8289.416 fashion 
4 25597.46 she 19 8059.952 nervosa 
5 24944.929 weight 20 6029.912 anorexics 
6 23545.314 bulimia 21 5914.776 skinny 
7 18429.889 her 22 5721.398 stone 
8 15989.135 i 23 4931.9 diet 
9 14754.601 food 24 4709.521 my 
10 14367.483 thin 25 4356.182 dieting 
11 14366.238 anorexia 26 3705.346 diana 
12 13172.097 eat 27 3637.218 bulimic 
13 12136.13 models 28 3629.804 binge 
14 12103.046 girls 29 3573.845 women 
15 10190.163 disorder 30 3408.518 calories 
TABLE 9.15. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE EATINGDISORDER CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL 
OTHER ILLNESS CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING 
ANTCONC (ANTHONY, 2017) 
 
 
Rank LL. Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 31092.70 FOOD 16 917.51 JUDGEMENT OF APPEARANCE: 
POSITIVE 
2 13106.27 PRONOUNS 17 868.82 MEASUREMENT: AREA 
3 7653.10 MEASUREMENTS: 
WEIGHT 
18 748.00 SUBSTANCES AND MATERIALS 
GENERALLY 
4 5087.71 ANATOMY AND 
PHYSIOLOGY 
19 687.10 EXISTING 
5 4828.87 PEOPLE: FEMALE 20 570.55 EXCESSIVE DRINKING 
6 1790.67 KIN 21 560.15 SEEM 
7 1782.16 SHORT AND 
NARROW 
22 559.50 RELATIONSHIP: INTIMACY AND 
SEX 
8 1745.10 CLOTHES AND 
PERSONAL 
BELONGINGS 
23 558.56 EXCLUSIVERIZERS/PARTICULARS 
9 1410.48 MEASUREMENT: 
SIZE 
24 554.59 SHAPE 
10 1382.41 TIME: OLD NEW 
AND YOUNG; AGE 
25 539.13 DEGREE: BOOSTERS 
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11 1371.42 LACK OF FOOD 26 518.62 LIKE 
12 1262.45 OBJECTS 
GENERALLY 
27 510.28 THOUGHT, BELIEF 
13 1107.14 WEIGHT: LIGHT 28 456.19 TIME: NEW AND YOUNG 
14 1028.16 SPORTS 29 419.50 NEGATIVE 
15 1005.46 MEASUREMENT 30 418.92 HEALTHY 
TABLE 9.16. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE EATINGDISORDER CORPUS 
COMPARED WITH THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001) 
CALCULATED USING WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
 
The top 30 keywords indicate that there is a clear tendency in the corpus to talk about 
eating disorders in the context of weight, particularly using evaluative terms about 
weight such as ‘skinny’, ‘thin’ and ‘fat’. Moreover, the top keywords include 
references to weight loss through ‘dieting’ and ‘calories’ and ‘stones’. This focus on 
weight loss in the depiction of eating disorders is unhelpful because, as stated in the 
description of the eating disorders above, the causes of eating disorders are often 
much more to do with the self-esteem of the person rather than weight loss. 
Attributing eating disorders to a desire to lose weight is far more simplistic than the 
reality of the illnesses which often occur with other types of self-harm. 
A further indication that the representation of eating disorders is unrealistic is 
the focus on women in the keywords, indicated by ‘she’, ‘her’, ‘girls’ and ‘women’. 
This finding is also supported by an analysis of the top adjective predicates84 of ‘eating 
disorder’ (conducted using the Word sketch function on Sketch Engine) which shows 
that ‘male’ is an adjective collocate of ‘eating disorder’. This finding suggests that in 
some cases, ‘eating disorder’ is marked i.e. with ‘male’ to convey that the person with 
an eating disorder is male. This is indicative that the ‘eating disorder’ itself is, in some 
cases, presumed to be a female illness. Whilst eating disorders are more prevalent in 
women and girls, this apparent tendency to present eating disorders a female illness 
in the corpus is incorrect. Latest statistics from Anorexia and Bulimia Care state that 
around a quarter of all people with an eating disorder are male (Anorexia & Bulimia 	
84 The Word sketch tool is based on collocations (using the LogDice statistical test).  
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Care, 2019), with diagnoses of eating disorders rising by 27% in males (Micali et al., 
2013). 
In keeping with the general trend in newspaper reports on mental illness, the 
EatingDisorder corpus also includes celebrity examples. These include the keywords 
‘models’ and ‘diana’, the latter relating to Princess Diana who reportedly had bulimia. 
The themes identified in the keyword list are also supported by the key semantic 
domains such as MEASUREMENT: WEIGHT, MEASUREMENT: SIZE, JUDGEMENT OF 
APPEARANCE: POSITIVE and WEIGHT: LIGHT. Closer inspection of these key semantic 
domains support the finding the press that over-represent size and weight in their 
description of eating disorders; for example, the MEASUREMENT: SIZE semantic category 
in which the majority of words pertain to clothes sizes, such as size 10, size 8, etc. What 
is also apparent from closer inspection of these categories is that many of the 
symptoms of eating disorders are not present in the articles. In fact, the EatingDisorder 
corpus has the lowest number of instances of the word ‘symptom*’ across all the 
illness subcorpora occurring just 176.33 times pmw (the PTSD corpus had the highest 
with 839.37 instances pmw). Concordance analysis of ‘symptoms’ reveals that when 
symptoms are discussed, in many cases they are discussed thoroughly and 
realistically, often mentioning eating disorders in men. Moreover, a search for ‘self-
esteem’ reveals that there are 925 instances of this phrase (173.33 instances pmw) in 
the corpus which is positive; however, arguably this phrase ought to appear much 
more frequently given that self-esteem issues are at the root of many eating disorders. 
The frequency of ‘self-esteem’ in the corpus translates to around 0.02% of all tokens in 
the corpus. 
It is the case, however, that articles that do discuss symptoms appear to be lower 
in frequency, as is indicated by keyness analysis. Further exploration of symptoms in 
the corpus reveal that the phrase ‘feel* ashamed’ (which includes ‘felt’, ‘feel’ and 
‘feeling’) occurs just 35 times in the corpus (6.56 instances pmw) and ‘menstrua*’ 
occurs 90 times (16.86 instances pmw). In may be expected from these findings, the 
most prototypical text of the EatingDisorder corpus features no symptoms: 
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TWO-thirds of people with eating disorders risk their lives by waiting more than 
six months for help. Sixty-two per cent of anorexics and bulimics crucially delay 
getting care, says a report by the Eating Disorders Association out tomorrow. 
Sufferers - estimated at 1.1million - are still often misunderstood and 
misdiagnosed. Nearly half blame the emphasis on skinny models for their 
disorders. An EDA spokeswoman said: "We're calling on parents, doctors and 
the media to hear what young people have to say about eating disorders." 
 
(Sunday Mirror, February 5, 2006) 
 
Overall, the EatingDisorder corpus indicates that the press representations of 
EatingDisorders do not accurately describe the reality of eating disorders or their 
symptoms. Keyness analysis indicates that the topic of many of the articles contained 
in the corpus is weight loss and physical appearance, particularly weight loss in 
women. This is evidenced by the female pronouns in the corpus and the reference to 
women’s clothes sizes in the key semantic domain analysis. For the newspapers to 
accurately represent eating disorders, more space needs to be dedicated to describing 
the nature of eating disorders – i.e. the fact that they are not simply about losing 
weight – as well as more thorough description of the symptoms and people eating 
disorders affect. By doing this, the public will be better informed about eating 
disorders and how to spot the early signs of these in themselves and others. 
 
9.10. Depressive disorders 
 
Depressive disorders include depression, seasonal affective disorder (SAD) and 
postnatal depression (where depression occurs after birth). Depressive disorders are 
characterised by low mood, feeling disengaged from activities you used to find 
pleasure in and feeling hopeless. Unlike periods of sadness, which are natural in 
everybody, depressive disorders are those that last a long time and which are 
The discursive construction of mental illness  U1053462 	
352 
 
disabling. The symptoms of depression include feeling numb, feeling suicidal and like 
you want to harm yourself, feeling isolated, being overtired and losing interest in sex. 
In some cases of severe depression, the person experiencing the depression can also 
experience psychotic symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations (Mind, 2019k). 
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) is a type of depression that people only 
experience at particular times of year, or because of particular types of weather. People 
who experience SAD experience the same symptoms of depression but only during 
certain times of the year. 
Postnatal depression (sometimes referred to as PND) is the depression 
encountered after giving birth. The symptoms of PND are very similar to depression 
but include additional symptoms such as feeling hostile towards your baby or your 
partner, or feeling like you are struggling to bond with your baby. 
Tables 9.17 and 9.18 show the top 30 keywords and key semantic domains for 
the Depression corpus. 
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Rank LL. Item Rank LL Item 
1 58891.844 depression 16 2685.97 natal 
2 17524.88 depressed 17 2568.651 depressing 
3 6313.756 suicide 18 2567.856 english 
4 5036.374 depressants 19 2476.602 print 
5 4787.859 p 20 2424.387 i 
6 4664.23 antidepressants 21 2325.922 ltd 
7 4199.802 prozac 22 2315.615 mood 
8 3788.487 his 23 2256.595 postnatal 
9 3416.851 copyright 24 2247.397 inquest 
10 3348.065 you 25 2149.647 independent 
11 3134.292 anti 26 2117.559 seroxat 
12 3107.112 documents 27 2116.734 depressant 
13 2943.179 depressive 28 2106.371 has 
14 2800.013 pounds 29 2096.045 market 
15 2762.89 he 30 1858.602 suicidal 
TABLE 9.17. TOP 30 KEYWORDS IN THE DEPRESSION CORPUS COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER 
ILLNESS CORPORA MINUS THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS CALCULATED USING ANTCONC 
(ANTHONY, 2017) 
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Rank LL. Domain Rank LL Domain 
1 9691.84 UNMATCHED 16 747.13 SUBSTANCES AND 
MATERIALS 
GENERALLY 
2 2308.04 FOOD 17 730.98 SAD 
3 2268.69 ANATOMY AND 
PHYSIOLOGY 
18 707.99 JUDGEMENT OF 
APPEARANCE: 
POSITIVE 
4 1674.85 BUSINESS: SELLING 19 678.88 MUSIC AND RELATED 
ACTIVITIES 
5 1619.59 BUSINESS: GENERALLY 20 668.53 WEATHER 
6 1613.11 PERSONAL NAMES 21 665.99 NUMBERS 
7 1471.22 GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES 22 653.91 ENTERTAINMENT 
GENERALLY 
8 1324.19 MONEY GENERALLY 23 626.65 SHAPE 
9 1089.71 COLOUR AND COLOUR 
PATTERNS 
24 598.97 CLOTHES AND 
PERSONAL 
BELONGINGS 
10 1015.57 THE MEDIA: BOOKS 25 576.16 DRINKS AND ALCOHOL 
11 940.31 SUBSTANCES AND 
MATERIALS: LIQUID 
26 572.49 SUBSTANCES AND 
MATERIALS: SOLID 
12 926.53 PAPER DOCUMENTS 
AND WRITING 
27 568.46 PEOPLE: MALE 
13 857.21 RELATIONSHIP: 
INTIMACY AND SEX 
28 558.28 RELIGION AND THE 
SUPERNATURAL 
14 778.57 LIVING CREATURES: 
ANIMALS, BIRDS, ETC. 
29 548.15 TIME: PERIOD 
15 766.40 GEOGRAPHICAL TERMS 30 540.54 LANGUAGE, SPEECH 
AND GRAMMAR 
TABLE 9.18. TOP 30 POSITIVE KEY SEMANTIC DOMAINS IN THE DEPRESSION CORPUS 
COMPARED WITH THE ‘MENTALILLNESS’ CORPUS (LL CUT OFF 10.83, MIN. FREQ. 5, P < 0.001) 
CALCULATED USING WMATRIX (RAYSON, 2008) 
 
The keyword list indicates that some of the symptoms of depression are represented 
in the news coverage. For example, ‘suicide’, ‘suicidal, mood’. Furthermore, the key 
semantic domain ‘food’ also reveals that eating disorders are represented in the 
Depression corpus which is in line with the fact that many people with an eating 
disorder also experience depression. In addition, a closer inspection of the 
‘relationship: intimacy and sex’ category reveals that the corpus contains words that 
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pertain to the reduced libido in people with depression. Furthermore, collocates of 
‘sex’ in the corpus include ‘drive’ (e.g. “reduced sex drive”) and ‘interest’ (e.g. “loss 
of interest in sex”). Furthermore, ‘appetite’ is also a collocate of ‘sex’ which, on closer 
inspection, is used in reference to changes (particularly loss) of appetite in a list of 
symptoms of depression. An example of this is shown below: 
 
Clinical depression is not a fancy name for the blues - it's a deeply debilitating 
biological illness affecting some 15 per cent of people some time in their lives. 
Sleep patterns, appetite and sex drive are all adversely affected. Sufferers feel 
worthless, are indecisive and unable to concentrate. And the condition is not 
confined to bored suburban housewives. Winston Churchill suffered terribly 
from "the black dog of depression" and actor Jim Carrey took Prozac to combat 
depressive bouts 
 
(Daily Mirror, April 29, 1996) 
 
As well as showing a list of symptoms, the extract above also provides another 
example of where celebrities are used as examples of people who have a mental 
illness. This is also a feature of the most prototypical text in the Depression corpus 
which is about the boxer Ricky Hatton’s experience of depression: 
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RICKY HATTON has revealed just how close he came to committing suicide 
during his three-year retirement from boxing. The 34-year-old said his 
girlfriend often had to prise a knife from his hand as depression took its toll on 
his life. Hatton, who has had well-publicised battles with drink, drugs and 
depression since May 2009 after his loss to Manny Pacquiao in his last fight, 
will return to the ring against Ukraine's Vyacheslav Senchenko next month. He 
said: "I was near to a nervous breakdown, depression, suicidal. Most mornings 
my girlfriend would have to come downstairs and take a knife out of my hand. 
I had a knife at my wrists, I was in a really bad way, just hysterically crying for 
no reason. "I've always liked a little bit of a drink, but my drinking had gone 
way off the Richter scale, I was having blackouts. "And even if I was stonecold 
sober I was trying to kill myself. 
 
(Daily Post, October 29, 2012) 
 
 
9.11. Exploring symptoms through Sketch Thesaurus 
 
So far in this chapter I have based my analysis of how accurately the symptoms of 
particular illnesses are represented in the corpus on keyness analyses and prototypical 
text analysis. Such analyses are useful in determining what is idiosyncratic about each 
illness subcorpus, and seeing how each illness is reported on. However, in this section 
of the chapter, I explore the collocations of each disorder type. The reason for doing 
this is to explore whether collocation analysis reveals any symptoms or overlaps in 
the reporting of illnesses that were not apparent from keyness analysis. In order to 
carry out the collocation analysis, I conducted the final two steps in Process 2. These 
are ‘use concordance analysis using syntactic search frame [query term and…] to see 
what symptoms, or other mental illnesses the query term is being textually equated 
with’ and ‘conduct Sketch Thesaurus search to compare findings’. 
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Table 9.19 shows the collocates that pertain to symptoms or other mental 
illnesses of [query term and…]. Collocates that co-occur with more than one illness 
are colour-coded to show overlap between the illness types.  
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PTSD and Dissociation 
and 
OCD and Psychosis and Agoraphobia 
and 
Anorexia and Depression 
and 
schizophrenia splitting phobia  schizophrenia  claustrophobia  bulimia  anxiety 
depression self-disgust ADHD  paranoia  social phobia  obesity stress  
stress alienation panic attacks  hallucinations  panic attacks  alcoholism  schizophrenia  
anxiety detachment  depression  neurosis  panic disorder  eating disorder  suicide  
 claustrophobia anorexia  Personality 
disorder 
insomnia  depression  alcoholism 
 trauma   delusions  anxiety  self-harm  Panic attacks 
 disturbance  episodes  depression  addiction insomnia  
 delusion  depression  stress  self-mutilation mood swings  
 abuse  schizoaffective 
psychosis  
  manic 
depression 
 depression       
 
TABLE 9.19. COLLOCATES OF QUERY TERM + AND IN THE MI 1984-2014 CORPUS (LOGDICE STATISTICAL CALCULATION, RANKED BY LOGDICE 
SCORE). 
 
Table 9.19 reveals some symptoms and links between illnesses that were not 
revealed in the keyness analysis. For example, the collocation analysis of 
‘dissociation and…’ is much more revealing of the symptoms of dissociative 
disorders than the keyness analysis indicated. This suggests that, despite the 
corpus being very small, the symptoms of dissociation are represented, for 
example, ‘detachment’ (1 instance), and ‘delusions’ (1 instance). Moreover, the 
causes of dissociative disorders such as ‘trauma’ (5 instances), and ‘child abuse’ 
(1 instance) are present. In addition, the collocation analysis also reveals some 
of the symptoms of other disorders that were not revealed in the keyness 
analysis. These include the collocate ‘claustrophobia’ of ‘agoraphobia and…’ 
(17 instances) and ‘insomnia’ for ‘depression and…’ (224 instances). 
Furthermore, the collocates shown in Table 9.19 reveal links between 
symptoms and illnesses that we may not associate such as ‘alcoholism’ and 
‘anorexia’ (23 instances). Alcoholism is not listed as a linked illness or a 
symptom of eating disorders on the Mind website, however research shows 
that alcohol and eating disorders frequently co-occur (Grilo et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the keyness analysis of the EatingDisorder corpus did not reveal any 
mention of eating disorders being concerned with low self-esteem, however the 
collocation analysis reveals that ‘self harm’ (18 instances) is a collocate of 
‘anorexia and…’, which shows that there is a link in the corpus between low 
self-esteem and eating disorders. This is due to the fact that self-harm is a sign 
of low self-esteem (NHS, 2019c). Table 9.19, then, has revealed symptoms 
previously uncovered by keyness analysis, but has also revealed links between 
illnesses and symptoms that even I as an analyst was unaware of. However, 
the frequencies of the collocates mentioned in this section are very few which 
means that whilst these symptoms may be present, they are not common.  
In addition to revealing links between symptoms and illnesses, Table 
9.19 also reveals links between the illness types. For example, people who 
experience PTSD also experience anxiety and depression, both of which are 
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collocates of ‘PTSD and…’. Further, people who experience dissociative 
disorders and psychotic disorders may experience depression and ‘depression’ 
collocates with ‘dissociation and…’ and ‘psychosis and…’. Similarly, links 
between OCD and eating disorders can be observed in Table 9.19, where ‘OCD 
and…’ collocates with ‘anorexia’. This reflects the reality of eating disorders 
which are often linked with obsessive or compulsive behaviours. What these 
collocations indicate, then, is that similar, or linked illnesses are being 
discussed in the press together, which is a positive thing when the purpose of 
the press is to inform the public about mental illnesses. What is also interesting 
to note about the collocates shown in Table 9.19 is that ‘depression’ is the only 
illness to collocate with all the illnesses listed. This is indicative that depression 
is a commonly reported illness and may be the most societally acceptable 
illness as a result of that fact. The fact that depression is the most commonly 
reported illness is interesting when taken in the context of previous research 
which has shown that depictions of depression in the press have become more 
positive and less stigmatised over time (Goulden et al., 2011), whilst we cannot 
be sure whether the direction of this change over time was borne from greater 
exposure in the press, or societal acceptance which in turn resulted in a greater 
number of reports on depression , this finding is interesting because it suggests 
that the less stigmatised the illness, the more it is reported on. It may be the 
case then, that exposure of lesser reported illnesses (like, for example, 
dissociative identity disorder) may result in less stigma around them.  
 Table 9.19 shows the collocations of words in a fairly specific syntactic 
frame; however, these collocational patterns are also observable more broadly 
in the Sketch Thesaurus visualisation for each illness type which provides 
insight into how the illnesses are linked in the corpus. The rationale for using 
the Sketch Thesaurus tool for each illness type is that the Sketch Thesaurus tool 
generates usage-based synonyms, i.e. closely related words based on the 
surrounding context of those words (based on collocation). This means that 
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words that are closely related must share similar linguistic contexts. Figure 9.2 
shows words that are usage-based synonyms of a query word (the word in the 
centre of the circle) based on how many collocates the two words share. The 
concentric circles relate to the statistical significance of the collocation (the 
higher the score, the more significant the collocation and the closer to the 
synonym is to query word). The size of the circle for each word relates to how 
many other words that word also collocates with. For example, the query term 
‘anorexia’ collocates with ‘bulimia’ more statistically significantly than it does 
with ‘depression’, and ‘bulimia’ is a collocate of fewer words than ‘depression’ 
is. Sketch Thesaurus visualisations, then, are indicative of how closely related 
different illness types are in the corpus, and as such provides another way of 
visualizing the links between illnesses. 
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FIGURE 9.2. SKETCH THESAURUS VISUALISATIONS FOR EACH ILLNESS TYPE 
(CALCULATED USING SKETCH ENGINE). 
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9.12. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have explored whether the symptoms of each disorder type 
are accurately represented in the new reports contained in the corpus. I have 
showed that corpus linguistic techniques, particularly keyness and collocation 
analysis provide the means to target links between mental illnesses and 
symptoms that may not be interpretatively significant to researchers using 
qualitative analyses only (for example, the link between alcoholism and 
anorexia). I have showed how a mixed-methods approach, i.e. keyness and 
collocation analysis combined with qualitative analysis of prototypical texts) 
provides a means of cross-comparison between quantitative and qualitative 
interpretation. Furthermore, I showed in Section 9.1 how the social context of a 
societal issue such as mental illness can be incorporated into linguistic analysis 
(through the steps I describe in Table 9.1).  
In combining qualitative and quantitative methods from linguistics, I 
have built on previous research into the representation of symptoms in news 
reports on mental illness. Such as that reported in the introduction to this 
chapter conducted by Wahl et al. (2002). Furthermore, I have showed that the 
computational linguistic analysis of large datasets combined with qualitative 
analysis is much more revealing of the representation of specific mental 
illnesses than the method adopted in research like that conducted by Wahl et 
al. (2002). The reason for this is that in comparison to Wahl et al. (2002), who 
were only able to report that news articles rarely reported the symptoms of 
mental illness, the research I conducted here shows what symptoms were 
present in news reports and gives systematic and robust linguistic evidence for 
the how those symptoms were reported. Moreover, in contrast to Wahl et al. 
(2002), I have showed what symptoms occur in relation to specific illnesses. 
Taken together, the methods I have used in this corpus have resulted in more 
specific and replicable findings. Furthermore, keyness analysis has provided 
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insight into the general themes in mental illness reporting such as the tendency 
to report on celebrities with mental illnesses. The identification of this theme in 
some (but not all) of the illness subcorpora provides interesting new research 
avenues worthy of exploration such as why it is the case that celebrity names 
were statistically significant in the analysis of news reports on bipolar disorder 
and depression but not in the analysis of psychotic disorders like 
schizophrenia. It could be argued (as I allude to in Section 9.7 ‘Psychotic 
Disorders’) that the absence of celebrity names associated with psychotic 
disorders is indicative that psychotic disorders are more stigmatised in the 
press than other illnesses, because psychotic disorders are not something that 
people (celebrity or not) align with. The theme of referring to the names of 
celebrities in reference to specific illnesses, then, is one way that linguistic 
analysis could potentially give insight into levels of societal stigma between 
illness types (e.g. through an analysis of what illnesses are linked with celebrity 
names).  
In the next chapter, I revisit the research questions and findings reported 
in the analysis chapters and conclude this thesis. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have explored the representation of mental illness in the UK 
press. The reason for doing this is that the majority of research into press 
representations of mental illness to date have been conducted in the field of 
psychiatry, and as a result have not studied the language used to discuss 
mental illness as an object of study in its own right. This has resulted in the 
previous research being focused on the analysis of predetermined themes such 
as the depiction of people with mental illness as violent and criminal (e.g. 
Schomerus et al., 2012), and relatedly, on identifying stigma in news reports. 
Although some of the studies in psychiatry do note that language plays a role 
in the creation of stigma (e.g. Rhydderch et al., 2016), language in those studies 
is only mentioned as tangential to the analysis being conducted. Furthermore, 
as I discussed in the introduction to this thesis, it is increasingly the case that 
anti-stigma initiatives are promoting prescribed linguistic forms for discussing 
mental illness in the news and yet there exists no comprehensive account of the 
linguistic features of news reports on mental illness generally. In this thesis I 
have addressed this research gap. I have done this through designing and 
constructing the first and largest85 corpus that contains UK local and national 
news articles on mental illness – the MI 1984-2014 corpus. Moreover, the design 
of the corpus means that diachronic and synchronic analyses can be conducted 
systematically within one dataset.  
Combined with systematic linguistic analysis, the size of the corpus and 
the scope for different analysis types afforded by it means that the research I 
report in this thesis offers new and reliable insight into the language used to 
discuss mental illness in the UK press. Specifically, the research provides more 
specific insight into this area because, unlike previous research, it not only 	
85 To my knowledge. 
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identifies features of and themes in news reports on mental illness (e.g. 
criminality) but also describes how these features and themes are linguistically 
manifested, e.g. through the use of certain naming practices. In addition to 
providing more nuanced information about news reports on mental illness, the 
research I report here has also provided information that may be useful for 
future anti-stigma initiatives that take account of linguistic evidence. For 
example, the research I reported in Chapter 8 on the common collocates of 
words that Time to Change have identified as contributing to stigma around 
mental illness (e.g. ‘suffer’) may be useful because it provides a means of 
identifying textual links between words deemed stigmatising, rather than 
seeing individual words as being inherently stigmatising. As a result of 
bringing attention to these textual links between linguistic forms that have been 
deemed problematic, this research provides a wider picture of stigma creation 
through language (e.g. texts) rather than individual linguistic forms (e.g. 
words). In addition, the analysis I report in Chapter 6 of this thesis, which I 
have been able to conduct due to the design of the MI 1984-2014 corpus, 
constitutes the first exploration of the terms ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’, 
whose meaning, I argued, have previously been taken for granted in the prior 
research (because such prior research does not privilege language as an object 
of study). The findings reported in Chapter 6 not only provide an insight into 
what ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ mean across the time period covered 
by the corpus, but also provide predictive insight into what the nature of future 
lexical change will be in mental health and illness discourse (e.g. that 
‘wellbeing’ will become more widely adopted to refer to mental wellness).  
In this chapter, I provide a final discussion of my research findings and 
the implications of the research I have conducted in this thesis. In Section 10.1, 
I address the research questions listed in the Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’. In 
Section 10.2, I discuss the implications of the research reported in this thesis. 
Section 10.3 describes some potential limitations of this research, and in Section 
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10.5 I make suggestions for future research conducted in the area of 
representations of mental illness in language data. In Section 10.5, I conclude 
this thesis. 
10.1. Fulfillment of research questions 
 
I order to address how I have answered the research questions I outlined in 
Chapter 1, it will be useful to restate them here: 
 
1. How are the terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ used in the MI 
1984-2014 corpus? 
2. What linguistic strategies are used to name, label and describe people 
with mental illness in the MI 1984-2014 corpus? 
2.1. To what extent is person-first language present in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus? 
2.2. What themes are present in the corpus for referring to people with 
mental illness?  
3. What processes are associated with mental illness in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus? 
3.1. What terms do the press use to refer to having mental illness? 
4. Is the depiction of mental illness realistic?  
4.1. Are the symptoms of each disorder type (e.g. depressive illnesses) 
accurately portrayed in the press? 
 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that no previous linguistic research has 
explored the language used to report on mental illness in the UK press (see 
Atanasova et al., 2019 for a linguistic analysis of arts initiatives in local 
newspapers reporting on mental health). As a result, the pool of knowledge in 
linguistics on this topic is limited. For this reason, my research questions were 
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designed to answer some fairly basic linguistic questions about the nature of 
the language used in the MI 1984-2014 corpus; for example, what ‘mental 
health’ and ‘mental illness’ mean. This question relates to RQ1. 
 In order to answer RQ1, I explored the use of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental 
illness’ across the time period covered by the corpus. I found that the frequency 
of both ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health’ increased over time. I argued that 
this finding indicated that mental health and illness is an increasingly 
important social issue. I also found that the increase in ‘mental health’ was 
significantly higher than that of ‘mental illness’. Closer inspection of ‘mental 
health’ and ‘mental illness’ through concordance and collocation analysis 
revealed that there appeared to be a semantic shift ongoing during the period 
(1984-2014), whereby ‘mental health’ was being used to refer to states of mental 
illness. I argued that this semantic shift was the result of socially-motivated, 
euphemistic language change. I argued that this language change was in 
accordance with existing theories of language change and euphemism, which 
indicated that the term ‘mental illness’ was taboo (resulting in euphemistic 
forms like ‘mental health problem’). I also argued that the way the press use 
‘mental health’ in the MI 1984-2014 corpus (particularly after c.2008) differed 
from the definition of ‘mental health’ given by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO). As a result, my research provides some preliminary insight into a 
definition of ‘mental health’ (in a UK context) that is enriched by contemporary 
language data. In addition to exploring the use of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental 
illness’ in the corpus, I reported linguistic evidence that showed that 
‘wellbeing’ was used in the data to refer to states of mental wellness. I argued 
that the fact that ‘wellbeing’ was not textually associated with words like 
‘stigma’ meant that ‘wellbeing’ has the potential to be adopted by anti-stigma 
initiatives to refer to mental wellness, given that ‘mental health’ is textually 
associated with ‘mental illness’ and therefore with stigma. Moreover, I made 
the case that, unlike ‘mental health’ which has a conventionalised negative 
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form (‘mental illness’), ‘wellbeing’ does not have a conventionalised antonym 
and does not have a marked form to denote negation. This means that 
‘wellbeing’ would not be susceptible to the same process of semantic shift that 
‘mental health’ is undergoing. 
Furthermore, I argued that the fact that ‘mental health’ and ‘mental 
illness’ are used in distinct ways has wider implications for the methodological 
best practice of studies whose aims are to model the semantic domain of 
MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS. To summarise these findings and to answer RQ1, 
then, the first finding is that the corpus showed a developing tendency for the 
press to use the term ‘mental health’ over ‘mental illness’. The second finding 
related to RQ1 is that ‘mental illness’ is a taboo term and that in order to discuss 
mental illness without using this term, ‘mental health’ is used to refer to states 
of mental illness. The third finding relating to RQ1 is that the way ‘mental 
health’ is used in MI 1984-2014 is distinct from definitions of ‘mental health’ 
given by some major mental health stakeholders, e.g. the WHO.  
RQ2 was concerned with the naming practices used in the data to refer to 
people with mental illness. The reason for exploring the naming practices in 
the news reports was that naming practices have been identified “a powerful 
ideological tool [and] […] an accurate pointer to the ideology of the namer 
[because] different names for an object represent different ways of perceiving 
it” (Clark, 1992: 209). The two sub-questions of RQ2 related to whether person-
first language was used in the corpus (RQ2.1) and what themes were present 
in the naming practices RQ2.2). In relation to RQ2, I identified that the salient 
head nouns for referring to people with mental illness are ‘patient’, ‘victim’ and 
‘sufferer’. I reported that the frequency of these terms over time was starting to 
plateau, which I argued gave some evidence for the fact that these terms are 
now established in the discourse of mental health and illness. I showed how 
‘patient’, ‘victim’ and ‘sufferer’ carry different semantic associations that may 
contribute to stigma around people with mental illness. Specifically, I argued 
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that ‘victim’ is used to refer to people in irreversible contexts (e.g. a victim of 
suicide). As a result of this, I argued that ‘victim’ suggests that the illness the 
person is a ‘victim’ of is not treatable, which may contribute to stigma around 
mental illness. I also showed linguistic evidence from the corpus to argue that 
‘patient’ is pathologised, which marks this term as being abnormal in some 
way. This is despite the fact that ‘patient’ is not identified as a problematic term 
by Time to Change. Moreover, I showed through an analysis of ‘sufferer’, 
‘patient’ and ‘victim’ in the illness subcorpora how the use of these three labels 
is patterned in the MI 1984-2014 corpus. I found that ‘patient’ (which implies 
pathology) was more likely to occur in reference to psychosis and 
schizophrenia, which I argued gave linguistic evidence for the notion that 
psychotic disorders like schizophrenia are more stigmatised than other 
illnesses (e.g. Mann & Himlein, 2004) because they are pathologised in a way 
that other mental illnesses are not. In addition to this finding, I also reported 
that ‘victim’ is most often used in the PTSD corpus. In contrast to ‘patient’ and 
‘victim’, the label ‘sufferer’ is not markedly more frequent in one subcorpus. 
The label ‘sufferer’ is most frequent in the SAD, OCD and SocialPhobia 
subcorpora.  
 In relation to RQ2.1, I found that person-first language is present in the 
MI 1984-2014 corpus; however, it is infrequent. I showed that overall, the 
identity-first variant of naming (e.g. a schizophrenic) is much more common 
than person-first forms. I also found that despite the low frequency of person-
first terms, there is an overall positive trend for person-first forms which 
indicates that the press are increasingly adhering to prescribed person-first 
forms. I also found in my analysis of person-first forms that person-first 
language occurs in contexts that are supportive of people with mental illness. 
However, I also found that naming practices that have been identified as 
problematic by Time to Change occur additionally in contexts that are 
supportive of person-first forms. I argued that this demonstrates that no 
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linguistic form is inherently stigmatising and that the relationship between 
person-first language and positive representations of mental illness (e.g. 
supportive contexts) is one of correlation and not causation. This finding also 
provides more evidence for the benefits of linguists working with anti-stigma 
advocates (because linguists would not claim that a linguistic form is inherently 
stigmatising and linguists would be able to provide linguistic evidence for such 
claims). 
In my analysis of person-first forms, I also reported the tendency in the 
corpus to refer to people with mental illness in the plural form, e.g. ‘people 
with depression’ over ‘person with depression’. This leads me on to the 
findings I made in response to RQ2.2 (“What themes are present in the corpus 
for referring to people with mental illness?”). In my analysis of the salient 
naming practices in the corpus, I found that a key theme was labelling people 
with mental illness as quantities. I presented linguistic evidence from 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the corpus to show that the press 
routinely present people as statistics. I argued that the overrepresentation of 
statistics in news reports on mental illness is a device used by journalists to 
sensationalise news stories pertaining to mental illness. Moreover, I argued 
that the overrepresentation of statistics and numbers as well as verbs denoting 
rising numbers contributes to what Fowler (1991) terms ‘press hysteria’ via the 
“rhetoric of quantification” (Fowler, 1991) in news reports on mental illness. 
Furthermore, using evidence from the corpus, I demonstrated how news 
reports contribute to the portrayal of mental illness as a “moral panic’ (Cohen, 
1973). Furthering Fowler’s (1991) notion of a ‘rhetoric of quantification’, I 
argued that naming people with mental illness as statistics contributes to a 
‘rhetoric of depersonalisation” whereby the systematic representation of 
people as numbers backgrounds the experiences of individuals. I argued that 
the effect of this depersonlisation is that readers will be less likely to empathise 
with individual people and their experiences of mental illness. 
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RQ3 was concerned with the salient transitivity processes in the corpus. The 
reason for dedicating a research question to transitivity processes was that the 
ways people are described as having mental illness has also garnered attention 
from mental health advocates promoting prescribed linguistics forms (e.g. 
whether a person ‘suffers’ from a mental illness, or ‘experiences’ a mental 
illness). I designed RQ2.1 (“What terms do the press use to refer to having 
mental illness?”) to explore how the press discuss having mental illness in the 
MI 1984-2014 corpus. 
 In my analysis of the data in response to RQ3, I found that ‘suffer’ is 
present in a third of the prototypical text sample. Due to the fact that ‘suffer’ 
has been identified by anti-stigma initiatives such as Time to Change as a 
problematic way to describe having mental illness, I analysed the 
lexicogrammatical function of ‘suffer’ in the corpus. I also analysed the 
lexicogrammatical function of the verb ‘experience’ (e.g. ‘she experienced 
depression’) due to the fact that Time to Change identify ‘experience’ as a 
preferred form. In my analysis of the two terms, I found that ‘suffer’ is 
negatively-valanced, and occurs in contexts that remove agency from the 
‘sufferer’. As a result of this, ‘suffer’ implies that people are not in control of 
their illness, which I argued is an inaccurate depiction of many people with 
mental illness. In contrast, ‘experience’ was neither negatively- or positively-
valanced, but rather conveyed a sense of ‘learned’ (e.g. “learned from 
experience”). Moreover, using evidence from the BNC, I showed that 
‘experience’ encodes agency; i.e. an experience has to be experienced by an 
‘experiencer’. I also showed that ‘suffer’ is used to refer to unbounded (e.g. not 
temporally-fixed) phenomena, whereas ‘experience’ is temporally-fixed. 
Through an exploration of the collocates of ‘suffer’, I also showed that, unlike 
‘experience’, ‘suffer’ collocates with other linguistic forms that are deemed 
problematic by Time to Change, such as ‘victim’. Taken together, I argued that 
my findings provided linguistic evidence for the claim that ‘experience’ is a 
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better term to describe having mental illness than ‘suffer’ because ‘suffer’ is 
routinely used in negative contexts, which suggests that the ‘sufferer’ is not in 
control of their illness and is textually associated (through collocation) with 
other problematic forms. Based on this finding, I suggested that an increase in 
the use of ‘experience’ to describe having mental illness would not just result 
in a reduction in the use of ‘suffer’, but could also result in a reduction of other 
problematic forms that collocate with this verb. This finding provides another 
example of how collaboration between mental health advocates and linguists 
could pave new, evidence-based linguistic guidelines (e.g. exploring collocates 
of problematic forms). 
 As part of my exploration of the data in response to RQ3, I also explored 
the use of ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ in self-reflexive contexts, e.g. “I suffer”, “I 
experience”. The reason for doing this was to further explore the linguistic basis 
for prescribing ‘experience’ and identifying ‘suffer’ as problematic, because if 
‘suffer’ is problematic for people with mental illness, then one would not expect 
frequent self-reflexive use of ‘suffer’. I found that despite initial results 
suggesting that people with mental illness do use ‘suffer’ reflexively, it is 
actually the case that ‘[I + ‘experience’] is proportionally four times more 
frequent in the corpus that ‘[I + suffer]’. The reason for this is that ‘[I + suffer]’ 
often occurs in reported speech, e.g. “the doctor decided I was suffering with 
depression”. 
 In my exploration of ‘experience’ and ‘suffer’ I also found there to be 
conceptual differences in how ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’ are used in the corpus 
and in the BNC which I argued was related to diagnostic status. In a 
concordance analysis of the data, I found that ‘experience’ is typically used to 
describe symptoms of an illness (which may not have been diagnosed), 
whereas ‘suffer’ is the process used to describe having a diagnosed illness, e.g. 
“she experienced low mood and fatigue” vs. “she suffered with depression”. I 
provided further evidence for this interpretation by showing that ‘suffer’ 
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occurs with subject collocates featuring identify-first labels such as 
‘schizophrenic’ whereas ‘experience’ never occurs in the corpus with a subject 
collocate that features an identity-first form (meaning that labels in subject 
position that encode diagnosis do not collocate with ‘experience’). 
 I also found that unlike ‘experience’, ‘suffer’ is used (in the MI 1984-2014 
corpus and in the BNC) in both mental processes, e.g. “she suffered from 
depression” (taking a Senser, Process, Phenomenon configuration), and 
material processes with inanimate actor, e.g. “the fence suffered damage from 
the wind” (taking a Goal, Circumstance, Actor configuration). As a result of 
this finding, I argued that the negation of agency of ‘suffer’ I discussed 
previously may be exacerbated by its association with non-conscious entities 
(e.g. ‘the fence’ in the example above). I also argued that the data demonstrates 
a further conceptual difference: a difference between transitive and intransitive 
‘suffer’. Using evidence from the MI 1984-2014 corpus and the BNC, I argued 
that there is a tendency in the data for intransitive uses of ‘suffer’, e.g. ‘suffer 
with’ to occur with mental states (e.g. she suffered with depression), whereas 
transitive uses of ‘suffer’, occur most often with physical states (e.g. she 
suffered a broken leg). I argued that this finding gives some linguistic evidence 
for a perceived duality (conveyed in language) between mental and physical 
illness. I argued that the lexicogrammatical analysis conducted in response to 
RQ3 enriches existing dictionary definitions of ‘suffer’ in addition to existing 
semantic explications of ‘suffer’ (e.g. Shweder 2003; Wierzbicka, 2016). I 
reported that in answer to RQ3 (‘What processes are associated with mental 
illness?’), ‘suffer’ is a salient process in news reports on mental illness whereas 
‘experience’ is less common. I also argued that, for the reasons I identified in 
Chapter 8 and report here, ‘experience’ is a more appropriate term for the press 
to use than ‘suffer’. 
 The last research questions I addressed I this thesis was RQ4 (“Is the 
depiction of mental illness realistic”) and RQ4.1 (“Are the symptoms of each 
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disorder type (e.g. depressive illnesses) accurately portrayed in the press?”). 
The reason for asking this question of the data was that previous research has 
largely neglected to explore whether the symptoms of mental illnesses are 
accurately portrayed in news reports on mental illness. Moreover, those studies 
that do explore the whether journalists reference symptoms in news reports 
only analysed whether any symptoms were present in the articles and not how 
the symptoms were described, or whether the descriptions were accurate or 
not. (Wahl et al. 2002). 
In order to answer RQ4 and RQ4.1, I used keyness analysis to investigate 
the statistically overused keywords and key semantic domains in each of the 
subcorpora that relate to a disorder type, e.g. depressive disorders. I also 
enriched this corpus linguistic analysis with the analysis of the most 
prototypical article of each illness subcorpora (the most prototypical text is the 
text in the subcorpus that contains the most keywords in comparison with a 
reference corpus). I found that overall the representation of symptoms in the 
subcorpora is mixed. In order to answer RQ4.1 in detail, I report the specific 
findings for each disorder type below: 
 
• Trauma disorders 
I found that overall, many of the symptoms of PTSD were present in 
the PTSD corpus; however, the contexts in which these symptoms are 
commonly reported were too specific to accurately represent PTSD. 
Specifically I found the symptoms of PTSD in combat situations were 
overrepresented whereas the symptoms of PTSD in reference to birth 
trauma were underrepresented. I argued that the tendency in news 
reports on PTSD to focus on combat situations only constitutes a 
disparity between the reality of the condition and the representation 
of it in the press. 
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• Dissociative disorders 
I found that compared with other disorder types, articles on 
dissociative disorders are much less common in the corpus, which 
limited the possible research findings. I found that articles that report 
on DID, although few in number, do generally include a discussion 
of symptoms, although the symptoms reported are usually those 
experienced by a single person. As a result of this, a general 
description of the symptoms of DID are not present in the corpus.  
 
• Bipolar disorder 
I found that despite the fact that some of the commonly known 
symptoms of bipolar disorder (such as high and low mood) are 
represented, the symptoms of bipolar disorder are inaccurate overall. 
The reason for this is that news reports neglect to represent the 
psychotic symptoms of bipolar disorder such as voice hearing and 
hallucinations. Moreover, there is a tendency in the BipolarDisorder 
corpus to report on celebrities’ experiences of bipolar disorder and 
not the symptoms of bipolar disorder generally. 
 
• Obsessive compulsive disorders 
I found that news reports on OCD did not include the full range of 
OCD symptoms. Furthermore, I found that news reports on OCD 
overrepresent the compulsion side of OCD (e.g. washing and cleaning 
hands) and therefore underrepresent the obsessive side of OCD (e.g. 
sexual intrusive thoughts). I argued that the overrepresentation of the 
obsession side of OCD reinforces common misconceptions that OCD 
is only about cleaning. 
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• Psychotic disorders 
I found that a common feature of news reports on psychotic disorders 
is reference to drugs (e.g. ‘skunk’ and ‘cannabis’). I argued that the 
overrepresentation of words related to drugs is indicative of a 
tendency in the press to refer to the causes of psychotic disorders and 
not the symptoms of them. I showed using evidence from the MI 
1984-2014 corpus that lexis relating to common symptoms of 
psychotic disorders (e.g. ‘delusions’ and ‘hallucinations’) are 
comparatively low. I showed that the occurrence of the lexical item 
“delusion*” is less frequent in the corpus (per million words) than 
lexical items associated with isolated terrorist incidents, such as 
‘Breivik’. An analysis of the most prototypical text in the psychosis 
corpus revealed that whilst symptoms of the psychotic disorder 
schizophrenia are included in the article, they are reported in 
reference to a violent attack. Due to the fact that the articles often do 
not generally feature symptoms, and when they so they are used in 
reference to violent crime, I argued that the symptoms of psychotic 
disorders are not accurately portrayed in news reports. 
 
• Anxiety disorders 
I found that in news reports on anxiety disorders (e.g. specific and 
complex phobias), complex phobias (such as social phobia and 
agoraphobia) are underrepresented. I showed that keyness analysis 
reveals a fear of flying to be a key theme in the anxiety corpus which 
relates to a specific phobia. I argued that the lack of representation of 
symptoms of anxiety disorders could be due to the fact that many of 
the symptoms of anxiety disorders are also symptoms of other mental 
illnesses and therefore would not be identified by Wmatrix as key. 
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• Eating disorders 
I found that the articles do not accurately represent the symptoms of 
eating disorders. I argued that this was due to the fact that news 
reports focus on weight loss and physical appearance (particularly in 
women) which does not reflect that eating disorders are a self-esteem 
issue. Moreover, I argued that key words pertaining to women’s 
clothes sizes (e.g. size 10), showed that eating disorders are portrayed 
as a female illness and not one that affects men. I showed that the 
representation of eating disorders in the press is in contrast to the 
statistics on eating disorders which show that a quarter of all people 
with eating disorders are men. 
 
• Depressive disorders 
I found that the news reports of depressive disorders did include 
some of the symptoms of depression, e.g. reduced libido and loss of 
appetite. I also found that discussion of eating disorders also occurs 
in the depression corpus (people with eating disorders can also 
experience depression). Furthermore, I found that, like some other 
illnesses in the corpus (e.g. Bipolar disorder), depression is commonly 
reported in the context of celebrity sufferers.  
 
In addition to exploring the representation of symptoms using keyness 
analysis, I also showed how collocation is revealing of the symptoms discussed 
in the corpus which were not apparent in the keyness analysis. Moreover, I 
showed that collocation analysis can provide insight into overlap in the 
symptoms represented between illness types. I argued that the fact that some 
celebrity names are statistically significant in some illness subcorpora (e.g. 
depression and bipolar) and not others (psychotic disorders) suggests that 
psychotic disorders are not illnesses that people align with. I argued that this 
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finding is a linguistic indication (i.e. through keyness analysis) that psychotic 
disorders are more stigmatised than other illnesses that do have celebrity 
spokespeople. 
 In the next section, I outline the implications of the research reported in 
this thesis.  
 
10.2. Implications of this research 
 
As I previously stated, the research I have reported in this thesis constitutes the 
first, large-scale linguistic analysis of UK news reports on mental health 
generally (i.e. not motivated by a particular theme or focused on a particular 
illness). As a result of this, the first implication of this work is that it creates a 
foundation level of knowledge for this area. In addition to this, the MI 1984-
2014 corpus is the first corpus containing news reports on mental illness that is 
optimised for the analysis of synchronic and diachronic variables (and 
depending on the research question, provides relevant and representative 
reference corpora). As a result, the MI 1984-2014 corpus constitutes a significant 
resource for the field. The first implication of my research, then, is that it 
contributes new knowledge and new resources to the field.  
The second implication of this research is that the research findings I have 
reported offer a much more specific and nuanced understanding of how mental 
illness is reported in the UK press, from the very labels used to describe mental 
health and mental illness (Chapter 6) to how symptoms are reported. My 
research has built on the significant body of research in psychiatry and has 
demonstrated that the analysis of language as an object of study in its own right 
can provide never-before-reported findings into various areas of mental illness 
research such as stigma, the depiction of mental illness generally, and the 
depiction of specific mental illnesses. Due to the fact that several parts of this 
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research have been concerned with the semantic properties of words within the 
semantic field of mental health and illness (and providing a usage-based, 
nuanced definition of words within that semantic field), my research also has 
potential lexicographical implications (e.g. the semantic shift occurring in the 
term ‘mental health’ reported in Chapter 6, and the more nuanced meaning of 
transitive and intransitive uses of ‘suffer’ reported in Chapter 8). As a result, 
the research reported in this thesis has implications in linguistics, but also in 
psychiatry.  
Furthermore, my research has methodological implications for the field 
of corpus linguistics, specifically in the area of corpus construction. I argue that 
the corpus construction procedure I outline in Chapter 5 is innovative as it 
takes into account the interpretative status of search terms. Specifically, I argue 
that the search terms used to construct corpora for the analysis of ideology are 
not interpretatively neutral. I outlined a series of questions in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.1) that the researcher should be able to answer when constructing 
corpora for this purpose. Moreover, I argued in Chapter 3 (‘Analytical Methods 
Part 1: Corpus Linguistics’) that an innovative use of n-gram analysis is to use 
n-grams to identify potential data skew in determining the representativeness 
of a corpus (rather than as an analytical tool). My research , then, has clear 
methodological implications. 
Outside of linguistics, my research has implications within the medical 
humanities more generally because I have shown that the terms ‘mental health’ 
and ‘mental illness’ do differ in their linguistic contexts. Therefore research 
conducted in psychiatry that uses these labels interchangeably to collect press 
data is problematic. That is, the insights from my thesis may be used to improve 
working methods in the medical humanities. 
Beyond these academic implications, there are also practical implications 
for campaigns such as Time to Change, and for journalists writing about the 
issues discussed in this thesis. My research is well placed to have implications 
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outside academia (e.g. societal impact) because of its relevance to public 
institutions such as anti-stigma organisations and dictionaries. For instance, 
Time to Change is a campaign that is particularly focused on tracking change 
over time. However, the focus in mental health research generally is not on 
language, which limits the level of nuanced understanding of change that such 
research can provide. Because my own research does prioritise language as an 
object of study in itself, and utilizes computational methods, I am able to 
provide an insight into changes in language use that go beyond simple value 
judgements of whether a word is inherently positive or negative. For example, 
my analysis of ‘wellbeing’ and ‘mental health’ in Chapter 6 demonstrates that 
change is incremental and inevitable and that language is much more flexible 
than advocates of prescribed forms suggest. These findings could be integrated 
into language awareness exercises for writers on the topic of mental health and 
could be used to assist campaigners in developing better working practices and 
more effective campaign strategies.  
In the next section, I describe some limitations of this research.  
 
10.3. Limitations 
 
The fist limitation of this research is that the data is monomodal. Nexis does 
not save the images that accompany the text in an article, nor does it maintain 
the formatting of articles, e.g. font size differences between the main body of 
an article and the headline. In addition, the mainstream corpus tools (e.g. 
Sketch Engine, Wmatrix, Antconc) do not yet have the functionality to analyse 
the visual aspects of texts. As a result, even if Nexis did retain the visual 
features of the article, I would not have been able to analyse those aspects using 
the methods adopted in this thesis. The monomodal nature of my analysis 
constitutes a limitation because previous research has shown that the 
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multimodal aspects of texts are meaningful and contribute to ideology (e.g. 
Harvey, 2013; Harvey & Brookes, 2017; Lirola & Chovanec, 2012). 
 A further limitation of this research is that it is discourse-specific, i.e. it 
is limited to the representation of mental illness in newspaper data. As a result 
of this, the research cannot account for how people speak or write about mental 
health outside of newspaper discourse, which is heavily edited and intended 
for a wide public audience. Due to this, newspaper discourse cannot account 
for how individuals in UK society discuss mental illness, which (if the research 
is interested in stigma, for example) could possibly be more stigmatising due 
to the fact that it is unedited and private. With these points in mind, I argue 
that newspaper discourse is still a useful data type for investigating commonly-
held beliefs about mental illness, and what is deemed appropriate or 
problematic in relation to mental illness at a given point in time. 
In addition to the limitations listed above, a further limitation of research 
that combines the analysis of big data (like the MI 1984-2014 corpus) with in-
depth qualitative analysis is the issue of striking a balance between the size of 
the data and the analytical depth into which a researcher can go. In this thesis 
I have utilised the size and scope of the MI 1984-2014 corpus to show, for 
example, semantic change over time. I have also used the corpus to explore 
some very small-scale qualitative questions; for example, the semantic 
difference between the lexical items ‘suffer’ and ‘experience’.  As a result of 
giving equal attention to small- and large-scale linguistic phenomena, my 
research here is perhaps open to the criticism that it does not explore the corpus 
in its entirety.   
Notwithstanding whether exploring a corpus in its linguistic entirety is 
even possible, I argue that the balance between the size of the data and 
analytical depth is a strength as well as a limitation of this work because it 
allows me to focus on the data at varying levels of magnification. Throughout 
this thesis, I have used this affordance of corpus methods as a means of research 
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triangulation. One example of how I have done this is by demonstrating that 
the labels ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ are changing over time by 
showing this change through several analytical vantage points, e.g. through 
collocation analysis, concordance analysis and frequency analysis. Whilst in 
isolation these individual analyses are not detailed enough to support this 
claim, together they provide strong evidence for this semantic shift. In this way, 
I have endeavored to ensure that claims made on the basis of qualitative 
analyses of small sections of the corpus are supported by quantitative evidence 
from the corpus as a whole, and vice versa. 
 In the next section, I make some suggestions for future research. 
 
10.4. Suggestions for future research 
 
A large portion of this thesis has been dedicated to discussion of stigma and 
stigmatising linguistic forms. In my analysis, I used the MI 1984-2014 corpus to 
provide an initial exploration of the linguistic basis for some of the linguistic 
forms that have been prescribed by anti-stigma initiatives like Time to Change 
(e.g. using ‘experience’ over ‘suffer’, avoiding person-first language, and 
avoiding calling people with mental illness ‘sufferers’). The reason for doing 
this was that the prescribed forms for discussing mental illness in the press do 
not seem to be informed by any linguistic analysis. A future research avenue in 
this area would be to investigate whether there is any linguistic basis for these 
prescriptions from a pragmatic perspective, informed by the opinions of people 
with mental illness - for example, through interviews that ask informants to 
explore whether they find a particular linguistic form stigmatising in real-
world language data (e.g. newspaper data). To my knowledge only one study 
explores terms that are deemed stigmatising using people with mental illness 
as participants, and that study was specific to schizophrenia and was 
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conducted by a psychiatrist (Haghighat, 2008). In his research, Haghighat 
(2008) actually found that people with schizophrenia preferred the label 
‘schizophrenic’ over person-first forms, although the participants were asked 
to report on words only and not on those words used in any naturalistic 
context. Knowing this, there is substantial scope for an exploration of 
prescribed linguistic forms using participants with mental illness and using 
real-world language data. 
 The future research avenue I just suggested relates to a weakness in 
corpus linguistic analysis more generally, which is that it is focused on the 
production of texts rather than the comprehension of them (i.e. the analyst does 
not know what effect the texts actually have on readers). A future research 
avenue related to addressing this weakness would be to conduct 
psycholinguistic experiments to explore the cognitive basis for some 
problematic forms - for example, using eye-tracking methods (e.g. Conklin & 
Schmitt, 2008) to investigate the psychological validity of the collocations I 
identified in Chapter 8 (e.g. that ‘suffer’ collocates with ‘victim’ and both are 
deemed problematic by Time to Change). Furthermore, new methodologies for 
investigating the psychological validity of collocation are being developed in 
corpus linguistics and cognitive neuroscience, e.g. using electroencephalogram 
(EEG) tests (Hughes, 2018).	
10.5.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I restated the motivation for this research and showed how it 
addresses gaps in the existing research into the discursive construction of 
mental illness. I have revisited in turn the research questions that guided the 
analysis reported in this thesis and reported my research findings pertaining to 
these questions. I have argued that the research reported in this thesis has 
implications in various ways. First it contributes a more nuanced and evidence-
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based understanding of the language used to discuss mental illness. Second, it 
has methodological implications for corpus linguistics. Third, it has 
implications outside of academia in that it contributes never-before-reported 
findings that have the potential to have clear societal impact. The language we 
use to write about mental health and mental illness is of the utmost importance. 
My hope is that this thesis will provide the basis for further exploration of this 
important topic. 
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